What is the importance of the free will debate, in your eyes? In mine it is one of responsibility- the metaphysics only interest me insofar as they inform the notion of responsibility. If responsibility is the main focal point, then one can be a compatibilist even if determinism is false because the free will the compatibilist is concerned with is one of responsibility, not metaphysics. — Chany

I agree with you that the topic of responsibility is centrally important to the 'free will and determinism' debate.

Some philosophers, such as Helen Steward, defend the thesis of agency incompatibilism, according to which determinism isn't compatible with animal agency in general, and not just incompatible with free rational agency. (See her A Metaphysics for Freedom). This may be true, and if it is true it would entail that free will isn't compatible with determinism since free will characterizes just one particular sort of animal agency.

But while we recognize non-rational animals such as cows, dogs and finches to be agents, we don't ascribe then free will. They are, in a sense, irresponsible, since they aren't able to take ownership of their own natural and/or conditioned tendencies. So, even if it is the case that the bare metaphysical inquiry into possibilities for the future, as it applies to the natural powers of substances and of non-rational animals, is undoubtedly relevant to the free will issue, it remains the case than an inquiry into the topic of specifically rational agency (which includes questions about the philosophy of 'moral psychology') remains centrally relevant.

Paper : http://www.academia.edu/4309985/Epicurus_refutation_of_determinism — FreeEmotion

Thanks for that. It would be interesting to compare this exegesis/reconstruction of Epicurus's account to Chisholm's, Clarke's or Kane's more recent libertarian accounts of free will and see if it suffers from the same limitations (such as the problems from luck and intelligibility).

On your view, in a world where microphysical determinism obtains in such a way at to enable an ideal Laplacean predictor to foresee all future events (on the basis of his knowledge of all the present physical conditions and of the deterministic laws of physics), there are two senses in which a future occurrence can meaningfully be said to be 'possible' -- epistemic possibility or ontological possibility -- where the latter doesn't depend on an agent's perspective at all. — Pierre-Normand

??? That's not my view. There is no "epistemic possibility" where there is no ontic possibility. An "epistemic possibility" with no ontic possibility is otherwise known as a false belief.

On your view, though, there is only one 'ontological possibility' in the Case 1 scenario. And the fact that the agent doesn't yet know (prior to making up her mind) which door it is that she will open is a case of epistemic possibility, just as it is in the Case 2 scenario. — Pierre-Normand

I just want to clarify that on my view, if determinism is true then there is only one ontic possibility, and the agent is simply mistaken that there is more than one.

However, on my view, determinism isn't true. I'm an incompatibilist and a libertarian.

My question to you, then, is this: Why is it that the agent, in the first scenario, wouldn't be justified to just try one door at random and forego any prior deliberation regarding the potential threats (tiger versus snakes), just as it would make sense to forego such pointless deliberations in the the first scenario when she knows that only one door is unlocked anyway. Why is there any practical point in her prior deliberating what choice to make when, on your view, there actually just in one real (ontological) possibility that already has been set by the past state of the universe and the laws of physics; and her 'feeling' that there are two options really (ontologically) open to her reflects nothing more than mere 'epistemic possibilities'? — Pierre-Normand

Note by the way that I'm not at all saying anything about justification.

On my view, if determinism is true, whatever the agent does in both scenarios, whether they deliberate or just go right ahead and try opening one door or the other, it had to happen exactly the way it did, and the agent didn't really have any choice in it. The agent is either going to deliberate or not. It's not the agent's choice to deliberate or not if determinism is true, and that's the case contra appearances, contra anything the agent thinks.If determinism is true, and the agent believes they have a choice, the agent us simply mistaken. They're the victim of an illusion. If the agent realizes this and thus stops deliberation in scenario 1, that can only be because that's the only thing that could happen, if determinism is true. It's not that the agent chose to not deliberate in that case.

On my view, if determinism is true, whatever the agent does in both scenarios, whether they deliberate or just go right ahead and try opening one door or the other, it had to happen exactly the way it did, and the agent didn't really have any choice in it. — Terrapin Station

I am not sure what is meant by "choice" here - does the act of choosing mean the mental act of thinking and weighting options? If that is what it means, then then occurs in either case.
Merriam- Webster:

1 :  the act of choosing :  selection finding it hard to make a choice
2 :  power of choosing :  option you have no choice

So the question is in a non-box universe, and a non- mechanical universe, where the future is non existent, does a person act as a result of a result of several interacting mechanical processes ie atoms and electrical currents in the brain, or do they act out of a result of something else, the mind, the soul, something supernatural that cannot be caused or analyzed? Is that the question? (2) seems to imply that.

Choice doesn't obtain when we're only talking about an illusion. There has to really be more than one option.

On my view, mind is identical to particular (dynamic) brain structure/functioning. I'm a physicalist.

It's just that I don't buy that the physical world is (wholly) deterministic.

There has to really be more than one option. — Terrapin Station

So what would these options be and what would this look like?

??? That's not my view. There is no "epistemic possibility" where there is no ontic possibility. An "epistemic possibility" with no ontic possibility is otherwise known as a false belief. — Terrapin Station

I was using the term "epistemic possibility" in the way it is commonly used in philosophy. From Wikipedia: "In philosophy and modal logic, epistemic possibility relates a statement under consideration to the current state of our knowledge about the actual world: a statement is said to be:
epistemically possible if it may be true, for all we know..." (my emphasis)

So, a claim of epistemic possibility regarding a proposition that is (unbeknownst to one) metaphysically, historically or nomologically impossible isn't the expression of a false belief. It is more akin to an avowal of ignorance.

My own account of free will doesn't rely at all on epistemic modalities. They are rather irrelevant to it. The reason why the issue came up is because you (and also John) were charging me with conflating epistemic and ontological issues when I was attempting to distinguish two different sorts of possibilities for the future, neither one of which is epistemic on my view.

However, it seems to me, the tendency to conflate those two sorts of 'necessities' (the duals of the corresponding 'possibilities') often leads philosophers into a dilemma. Compatibilists who deny the principle of alternative possibilities are embracing one horn of this dilemma (and face problems in dealing with van Inwagen's consequence argument), whereas many libertarians (including traditional agent-causal theorists) are embracing the other horn (and face difficulties in dealing with the luck and intelligibility objections). My suggestion is that when the proper distinction is made between the two sorts of modalities that are relevant to the metaphysics of agency (neither one of which is merely epistemic) then there appears a third path between the two horns of the traditional compatibilist/libertarian dilemma.

Thanks for expressing your view regarding my 'room-escape' thought experiment. I'll comment further on your response later on.

So what would these options be and what would this look like? — FreeEmotion

I don't know how to answer "what would this look like," because I'm not sure what you're asking. What the options would be are real possibilities, where from antecedent state A, either B or C (where B or C are incompatible) can obtain as an immediate consequent state, because they're not causally determined by A.

I believe there is a concrete example given above, the example with the two doors - in that case, what would the 'real possibilities' be? Is that a good example to use?

So, a claim of epistemic possibility regarding a proposition that is (unbeknownst to one) metaphysically impossible isn't the expression of a false belief. — Pierre-Normand

Yes it is on my view. The definition of epistemic possibility that you give describes an illusion--something that one is mistaken about re how the world really is (or a false belief). Namely that it's possible that C can obtain consequent to A, in the scenario where there is only one possibility that can obtain consequent to A, B.

The reason why the issue came up is because you (and also john) were charging me with conflating epistemic and ontological issues — Pierre-Normand

For at least the third time, the reason that you were conflating the two is that you were talking about understandings etc. That's epistemological. But this is an ontological issue.

Re your "two types of possibilities," I'd have to go digging through previous posts to even recall what the two types of possibilities were supposed to be and whether your supposed distinction made any sense in my opinion.

Re the other comments, I'm not that familiar with Van Inwagen's argument (and not that fond of the fact that it seems to be made strictly as a formal logical argument, due to my belief about what logic is, etc.). I'd have to go more into detail just what the issue would be there. Re the "luck" and "intelligibility" issues, for one, will seems to bias probabilities. There's no reason to believe that different possibilities are equiprobable. And the bias can be near 100% in some cases.

I believe there is a concrete example given above, the example with the two doors - in that case, what would the 'real possibilities' be? Is that a good example to use? — FreeEmotion

Sure. In my view the real possibilities there including choosing door 1, door 2, not making a choice and looking for another way out (I wouldn't say that I'm necessarily exhausting the possibilities . . . maybe I am, but those would at least be a few).

If determinism were the case, though, then there would only be one real possibility.

Yes it is on my view. The definition of epistemic possibility that you give describes an illusion--something that one is mistaken about re how the world really is (or a false belief). Namely that it's possible that C can obtain consequent to A, in the scenario where there is only one possibility that can obtain consequent to A, B. — Terrapin Station

You are misunderstanding the definition. It's not an illusion, it's a claim of ignorance. Saying that P is an epistemic possibility (always relative to the consistent body of beliefs of an individual or some community consensus) just means that it isn't inconsistent with this prior body of beliefs. If I am coming back home and I don't know if my girlfriend is home already, that means that either (1) her being home already or (2) her not being home already are propositions that both are consistent with everything that I already know or believe (truly or falsely). This is what it means that both propositions are epistemic possibilities from my perspective.

You are misunderstanding the definition. It's not an illusion, it's a claim of ignorance — Pierre-Normand

If you believe that I'm saying that the definition has it as an illusion you're misunderstanding my comment. I'm saying that what the definition is describing would be an illusion, if determinism is true.

Re the other comments, I'm not that familiar with Van Inwagen's argument (and not that fond of the fact that it seems to be made strictly as a formal logical argument, due to my belief about what logic is, etc.). I'd have to go more into detail just what the issue would be there. Re the "luck" and "intelligibility" issues, for one, will seems to bias probabilities. There's no reason to believe that different possibilities are equiprobable. And the bias can be near 100% in some cases. — Terrapin Station

Getting acquainted at least with an informal statement of van Inwagnen's consequence argument (also credited to Carl Ginet) is useful because it has been central to the debate about free will and determinism for many decades now, and it brings into focus many of the incompatible commitments that ground the accounts of the libertarians, the compatibilists and the hard determinists.

The "intelligibility problem" for for libertarian free will is a very old objection that has been raised for it and that has been much discussed by one of the most prominent contemporary libertarian: Robert Kane. See page 23 in Four Views on Free Will, which you can preview for free on Google Books.

The "luck objection" is closely related to the intelligibility problem but it is most often raised in the context of the libertarian accounts of the "possibility to do otherwise", i.e. the libertarian way to simultaneously satisfy the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP) and secure "agent control" over the choice actually being made. Maybe you can just Google "agent", "control", "luck" and "PAP". It is also mentioned in the SEP article mentioned above (search the word "luck" in the page).

But that is not what we are talking about here, it is like the question - do parallel universes exist at the point of each possible action? — FreeEmotion

Choice (I hesitate to use the concept of Free Will) is an attempt to move in a particular direction that is constrained. Constrained by what? Memories (habits) that are within us and the forces that we perceive applied too us, e.g the choices of others. All of this yields a probabilistic outcome that manifests as what we perceive as quantum waves. Consciousness is not outside attempting to direct (control) the waves but rather are imbued within the waves. There is no duality. It is all done. That is why it is impossible to separate consciousness from perception or imagination.

Getting acquainted at least with an informal statement of van Inwagnen's consequence argument (also credited to Carl Ginet) is useful because it has been central to the debate about free will and determinism for many decades now, and it brings into focus many of the incompatible commitments that ground the accounts of the libertarians, the compatibilists and the hard determinists.

The "intelligibility problem" for for libertarian free will is a very old objection that has been raised for it and that has been much discussed by one of the most prominent contemporary libertarian: Robert Kane. See page 23 in Four Views on Free Will, which you can preview for free on Google Books.

The "luck objection" is closely related to the intelligibility problem but it is most often raised in the context of the libertarian accounts of the "possibility to do otherwise", i.e. the libertarian way to simultaneously satisfy the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP) and secure "agent control" over the choice actually being made. Maybe you can just Google "agent", "control", "luck" and "PAP". It is also mentioned in the SEP article mentioned above (search the word "luck" in the page). — Pierre-Normand

This comment suggests that you didn't really read or understand the comment you're responding to.

If you believe that I'm saying that the definition has it as an illusion you're misunderstanding my comment. I'm saying that what the definition is describing would be an illusion, if determinism is true. — Terrapin Station

You still seem to be missing the point of the concept of epistemic possibility. If when I am claiming that for all I know my girlfriend may (epistemic 'possibly') still be at home, I am saying nothing more than that I dont know. I don't know because both the proposition and its negation are consistent with everything that I do know or believe falsely. In what sense would this seemingly justified claim of ignorance be illusory, and what is the relevance of determinism to it? Maybe I know that she is home and have temporarily forgotten due to some distraction? So I can be brought to remember that knew it already? That would by one way to interpret your claim that a statement of epistemic possibility can be mistaken. But determinism has nothing to do with it.

You still seem to be missing the point of the concept of epistemic possibility. If when I am claiming that for all I know my girlfriend may (epistemic 'possibly') still be at home, I am saying nothing more than that I dont know. I don't know because both propositions are consistent with everything that I do know (or believe falsely). In what sense would this seemingly justified claim of ignorance be illusory, and what is the relevance of determinism to it? Maybe I know it and have forgotten? That would by one way to interpret the claim that a statement of epistemic possibility is mistaken. — Pierre-Normand

If we're ONLY saying "I don't know if she's home or not" how are we talking about possibility?

If we're ONLY saying "I don't know if she's home or not" how are we talking about possibility? — Terrapin Station

Because it an extremely common and everyday use of the words "possible" and "impossible" (Did you know that P? I don't know, that's possible, for all I know.) And also because those uses of the words possible and impossible (and necessarily) in an epistemic context obey the very same rules of modal logic as alethic or metaphysical modalities. Which is why, of course, it is natural to use those words in epistemic contexts, since they obey the same logic and hence licence the same forms of inference.

If we're ONLY saying "I don't know if she's home or not" how are we talking about possibility? — Terrapin Station

Is it possible that I have a brother?

Because it an extremely common and everyday use of the words "possible" and "impossible" — Pierre-Normand

What??? You didn't seem to understand if we're only. If we're only saying that "I don't know," then we're not saying "that's possible," right? Because "that's possible" is not ONLY "I don't know."

Is it possible that I have a brother? — Michael

If I'm only saying I don't know, it doesn't follow that I believe it's possible. (I can explain why, but I shouldn't have to.)

This comment suggests that you didn't really read or understand the comment you're responding to. — Terrapin Station

I was just trying to be helpful in providing links to the commonly discussed issues (in the free will literature) that I had mentioned and that you claimed not to be familiar with. There is no obligation for anyone to make use of them. They're just there for the taking in case anyone is interested.

that you claimed not to be familiar with. — Pierre-Normand

Which is not what I said, and that should have been clear from what I typed as well. Hence, you either didn't read or understand what I typed very well.

Is it possible that I have a brother? It's a yes-no question.

Is it possible that I have a brother? It's a yes-no question. — Michael

Are you simply asking my personal view, outside of the context of what I was talking about? If so, then yes, certainly. Keep in mind that I'm not a determinist.

If I'm only saying I don't know, it doesn't follow that I believe it's possible. — Terrapin Station

If it means that both the proposition and its negation are consistent with everything that you know (or believe to be true), then that's 'possible' in the epistemic sense. Nobody ever suggested that epistemic possibility implies other sorts of possibility. But when people make use of the word "possible" in ordinary contexts, what they mean satisfies the definition of epistemic possibility, and what they say is often true.

If it means that both the proposition and its negation are consistent with everything that you know (or believe to be true), then that's 'possible' in the epistemic sense. — Pierre-Normand

An epistemic sense has to do with individuals' beliefs, right?

Maybe post when you're not so busy, so that it doesn't take so long to get a simple yes or no answer?

What??? You didn't seem to understand if we're only. If we're only saying that "I don't know," then we're not saying "that's possible," right? Because "that's possible" is not ONLY "I don't know." — Terrapin Station

If the person isn't badly confused, and she genuinely doesn't know, this tends to imply that she doesn't know or believe something on the basis of which the proposition or its negation can be deduced. (Although this raises issues regarding the logical closure of knowledge, not very relevant here). That means that for all practical purposes, claims of ignorance are equivalent with claims of epistemic possibility. They have logical implications governed by the logic of epistemic modalities.