Indeed, I am rejecting determinism. — Pierre-Normand

Which means that you're not a compatibilist.

What you're addressing in this passage is an epistemic issue. That's why you're conflating an epistemic and an ontological issue. Whether possibilities and free will obtain has nothing to do with our ability to explain anything, our understanding of physical laws, what physical laws can say about anything, etc. — Terrapin Station

Causal explanations for sure address our explanatory needs, but to single then out for that reason doesn't turn them into merely epistemological issues. There is a tight conceptual connection between causation and explanation (as there is, also, between causation and natural laws and/or natural powers, and between causation and counterfactual dependence). So, when I'm suggesting that, the fact that some bodily motions happen to realize, in some specific practical contexts, some specific sorts on intentional actions, is explained by the intelligible source of the intention of the agent (i.e. her reasons for acting in that way precisely in contexts of that sort), I am not merely pointing to the fact that she may believe, truly or wrongly, that this fact is causally relevant to the production of her action. I am suggesting that it is explanatory by virtue of its being causally relevant.

The alternatives to the reality of those real instances of rational-causation are either causal-overdetermination or something like pre-stablished harmony (à la Mallebranche or Leibniz). But the only alternative explanation of the fact that those bodily motions come to constitute the specific form of intentional action that they do constitute, the allegedly determinative neurophysiological (or microphysical) causal entecedent of the bodily motions, doesn't actually explain the fact at all. It is a very poor candidate cause. On the other hand, the rational-causal explanation makes perfect sense in light of the fact that human brains have have evolved over phylogenetic time frames, and then continue to adapt through learning over ontogenetic time frames, precisely to sustain the practical rational powers of mature human beings. But it is enough to account for the dependence of rational abilities on underlying neurophysiological structure to cast the latter as enabling-causes of cognitive function, and not as determinative causes of our specific exercises of practical and theoretical rational powers.

Which means that you're not a compatibilist. — Terrapin Station

Indeed, I am not. But I do share with compatibilists the commitment to the idea that free will and responsibility are compatible with the causal closure of the physical domain. As for the question of the determinism of fundamental physical laws, I also share with compatibilists the belief that it is irrelevant to the question of free will. So, my position is intermediate between traditional compatibilism and traditional incompatibilist libertarianism.

Thanks for all the replies - five pages of replies or more since I asked the question!

I have briefly run through the answers. It's difficult to deal directly with the question, so let me give an example.

In an universe without any human beings or any living things, all events can be said to be strictly deterministic, is this not correct? It appears that the principle objection to determinism is that it affects human responsibility and morality. But in an inanimate universe or part of the universe which has no humans or life in it, would be totally deterministic.

Can robots be programmed to develop morality and laws? Of course they can. This does not mean that we can absolve ourselves of any responsibility, on the contrary, if a robot steps out of line all the other deterministically programmed robots will take corrective action, and the offending robot will have to take into consideration the cost of doing 'wrong'. As an academic concept, there should be no fear in discussing the issue. So it is with us.

So the arrival of human beings in the universe suddenly changed the universe from a deterministic to a non-deterministic one? I am not sure that makes sense. That is my problem.

If there were a switch to turn the universe from deterministic mode to non-deterministic mode in an instant, would turning the switch make any difference? Would we feel any different?

Causal explanations for sure address our explanatory needs, but to single then out for that reason doesn't turn them into merely epistemological issues. — Pierre-Normand

What makes it an epistemological issue is that you're talking about explanations, understanding, what our physical laws can do, etc.

Aren't you the user Streetlight under a different name by the way?

"Top down" and "bottom up" are nonsensical ontologically. They might make sense re how some people think about causal relations, but they'd have no correlate in the external world. — Terrapin Station

They are multitudes of correlates in the real world. You should keep up with recent literature on the philosophy of science, the philosophy of biology, the philosophy of chemistry and the philosophy of physics. (Search "top-down causation on PhilPapers). Nobody seems to deny that externally triggered changes in high-level features of organized systems seem to reliably produce systematic effect on low-level features (and this matches up with traditional interventionist accounts of causation: if manipulation of A produces systematic change is B, then there is a causal relationship between A and B). So, the only issue that separate strong emergentists from skeptics on that issue is the question of the potential reducibility (or 'eliminative' analysis) of those prima facie real cases of inter-level causal efficacy into low-level constituent causal processes. The chances for that seem bleak and only to be motivated by die hard reductionist or physicalist tendencies.

They are multitudes of correlates in the real world. You should keep up with recent literature on the philosophy of science, the philosophy of biology, the philosophy of chemistry and the philosophy of physics. ( — Pierre-Normand

It's not the case that it's not nonsense ontologically just because a lot of people are talking about it.

It's not that I'm stumping for "low level causality" as you seem to believe. The whole "level" idea is nonsense. It's simply an artifact of how people are choosing to think about this stuff.

However, I am a physicalist. The idea of nonphysical existents is incoherent.

What makes it an epistemological issue is that you're talking about explanations, understanding, what our physical laws can do, etc. — Terrapin Station

That's because in the case of rational agency, our understanding of what we are intentionally doing is normally part of the cause of our doing it. Just because epistemically relevant concepts are mentioned in the context of the discussion of human cognitive powers hardly means that no real causation can be involved. As I mentioned in an earlier post, there are two radically different manners to know that something will happen. The first one is to learn about a sufficient causal antecedent. The second one is to choose to make it happen (when it is within our powers to do make it happen). The second one is a reliable means for us to know many things that will happen that doesn't depends on us our knowing, or ignoring, any other causal antecedents of those happenings.

Aren't you the user Streetlight under a different name by the way?

Certainly not. I only have one single account and my handle is my real name.

That's because in the case of rational agency, our understanding of what we are intentionally doing is normally part of the cause of our doing it. — Pierre-Normand

Our understanding is irrelevant to whether possibilities or free will obtain.

And our understanding of what we are intentionally doing can be part of the cause of what we are doing where either (a) only one possibility exists in any given situation and there is no free will, or (b) at least two possibilities exist in at least some situations and there is free will.

So again, it would be a conflation of epistemological issues with ontological issues. The epistemological issues here have no bearing on what's the case ontologically.

Whether there is more than one possibility and whether free will obtains have zilch to do with what we know.

(Sorry for all the typos . . . Which I've been trying to correct as quickly as I can. I'm on a mobile and I'm always fighting with the keyboard, with spell check, etc.)

It's not the case that it's not nonsense ontologically just because a lot of people are talking about it. — Terrapin Station

No, of course not. But you were suggesting that the idea of top-down causation doesn't have any "correlate" in the real world. So, I thought you rather seemed unfamiliar with the very idea of top-down causation, which refers to an abundance of phenomena in both the natural and the social sciences. But, in any case, I offered an argument why the idea isn't nonsensical at all, can be defined with a scientifically sound criterion for the existence of causal relations. You've ignored my explanations.

It's not that I'm stumping for "low level causality" as you seem to believe. The whole "level" idea is nonsense. It's simply an artifact of how people are choosing to think about this stuff.

This is like saying that the very idea of "rabbits" is nonsense. "Rabbits" just is an artifact of how biologists are choosing to think about lumps of biological stuff.

This is like saying that the very idea of "rabbits" is nonsense. "Rabbits" just is an artifact of how biologists are choosing to think about lumps of biological stuff. — Pierre-Normand

Which I'd agree with in the sense that I'm a universal/natural kind antirealist. I'm a nominalist.

Your "support" of "top down" (or "high-level")/"bottom up" (or "low-level") causation being something that actually obtains ontologically included statements like "Nobody seems to deny that externally triggered changes in high-level features" . . . which simply assumes what it's supposed to be a support of and which is also an argumentum ad populum.

an universe without any human beings or any living things, all events can be said to be strictly deterministic, is this not correct? — FreeEmotion

Since everything is quanta, the above statement it's incorrect.

In any case, any speculation about a universe without humans is strictly outside the realm of science. It is not even philosophy. I guess it is pure imagination and pretty much inapplicable to humans.

However, your question about what switch was pulled and who pulled the switch to go from the non-living to the living is a reasonable one. Religion claims god did it. Biologists claim... It magically emerges?

Indeed, I am rejecting determinism.
— Pierre-Normand

Which means that you're not a compatibilist. — Terrapin Station

Pierre-Normand may not be a compatibilist, but this doesn't necessarily follow from the fact that he's not a determinist.

Compatibilism is simply the view that free will is compatible with determinism. It does not entail the view that determinism is true (although some compatibilists may take the position that determinism is necessary for free will).

Pierre-Normand may not be a compatibilist, but this doesn't necessarily follow from the fact that he's not a determinist.

Compatibilism is simply the view that free will is compatible with determinism. It does not entail the view that determinism is true (although some compatibilists may take the position that determinism is necessary for free will). — ChrisH

I wouldn't say that someone is a compatibilist unless they actually assert that both determinism and free will are the case.

What is the importance of the free will debate, in your eyes? In mine it is one of responsibility- the metaphysics only interest me insofar as they inform the notion of responsibility. If responsibility is the main focal point, then one can be a compatibilist even if determinism is false because the free will the compatibilist is concerned with is one of responsibility, not metaphysics.

What is the importance of the free will debate, in your eyes? In mine it is one of responsibility- the metaphysics only interest me insofar as they inform the notion of responsibility. If responsibility is the main focal point, then one can be a compatibilist even if determinism is false because the free will the compatibilist is concerned with is one of responsibility, not metaphysics. — Chany

My primary interest in the issue is ontological--whether we can actually make choices, and I prefer to focus on the simplest choices for that--whether we can really choose to turn left or right on a street on a whim while we're walking or taking a bike ride say.

I wouldn't say that someone is a compatibilist unless they actually assert that both determinism and free will are the case. — Terrapin Station

Then I'm afraid you've misunderstood compatibilism.

The claim that X is compatible with Y does not entail that Y must be true.

Then I'm afraid you've misunderstood compatibilism. — ChrisH

And I'm afraid that you've misunderstood my comment.

From a compatibilist perspective, Anthony Kenny, Freewill and Responsibility, is a favorite of mine, and it is written in an engaging style. From an incompatibilist perspective, Michael Ayers, The Refutation of Determinism is hard to beat but it is both difficult and hard to find (though there might be cheap second hand copies available). You will easily find papers by Michael Smith or Kadri Vihvelin online. (See for instance Vihvelin, Free Will Demystified: A Dispositional Account). Erasmus Mayr's Understanding Human Agency is excellent but not cheap. Also quite relevant, and excellent, are two papers by Don Levi: Determinism as a Thesis about the State of the World from Moment to Moment and The Trouble with Harry (this last one is available online and is especially relevant to the principle of alternative possibilities). — Pierre-Normand

Thanks dude!

OK, thanks for your excellent explanation. I find nothing to disagree with here; and I begin to get a glimpse of where you are coming from. I haven't done anything like enough reading in that area to properly appreciate it, though.

I understand the idea of quantum mechanics "God playing dice with the universe". The statement by Einstein has had many interpretations, I am sure, but mine is that God (let's assume one exists, or let's assume an universe in which God exists) .. God cannot be ignorant of the outcome of any event. It's not like playing dice where we have to play the dice and then read the dots. Somehow I would think that the existence of a God would imply determinism since there is only one fore-known (by God) sequence of events that takes place, will have taken place in that universe.

Also, there is no need to imagine a universe without humans - take a location far away from the earth, even beyond the distance light could travel from the times humans appeared - isn't this area purely mechanical in its operation? Yes, but I then rule out quantum mechanics. Fair enough.

Let me rephrase the switch question:

How will a purely deterministic universe be different from a non-deterministic one? Surely this is a simple enough question? My answer is that it would not look any different.

Is the past determined?

Paper : http://www.academia.edu/4309985/Epicurus_refutation_of_determinism

Also, there is no need to imagine a universe without humans - take a location far away from the earth, even beyond the distance light could travel from the times humans appeared - isn't this area purely mechanical in its operation? Yes, but I then rule out quantum mechanics — FreeEmotion

You say that there is no need to imagine a universe without humans but then you try to imagine one. It is compatible to discuss anything without the concept of conscious observation. What ever is outside of observation is simply unknown an inaccessible. Consider the observer as an active participant (totally entangled in any discussion) and not parenthetical.

What I meant was that there it was not necessary to imagine a universe devoid of humans but we could do with imagining (hypothizing?) a part of the universe outside the scope of human influence.

What ever is outside of observation is simply unknown an inaccessible.

I am not sure that that is this is one of the assumptions this discussion is based on. However, assuming that the observer is an active participant, and considering the world humans inhabit, I am still puzzled as to what the difference would be if we were in a world where events are determined by some giant clockwork machine.

Lets take a clockwork machine - Big Ben for example. Suppose I am a cogwheel in the clock. Suppose I want to turn at so many revolutions per hour, and I feel I am doing this of my own free will. Suppose then I decide to stop turning, and I do. At the same time, however, the clock has jammed and my intention to stop turning coincides exactly with events.

I believe this is something akin to what happens - our feeling of free will accompanies our actions. For example I may believe I have the free will to walk on water. What happens after the first step is not relevant.

Has anyone suggested this line of reasoning? I get the feeling that free will means different things to different people - could possibly free will be confused with omnipotence? If not why?

The paper is muddy with it's descriptions of concepts, but with some background of the deBroglie-Bohm real wave interpretation (the electron is a perturbation of a wave being guided by the quantum potential) then it is all very easy to understand the probabilistic nature of the wave. What remains to be answered in what causes the perturbations (the swerve)? One could speculate that it is conscious choice that imbued in the wave. The beauty in this model is it dissipates all quantum paradoxes and fully explains how "the swerve" manifests as a reflection of conscious choice.

What I meant was that there it was not necessary to imagine a universe devoid of humans but we could do with imagining (hypothizing?) a part of the universe outside the scope of human influence. — FreeEmotion

You could try to imagine such a situation but it is your consciousness that is doing so. One cannot disentangle consciousness from any discussion or exploration-either philosophically or scientifically. A thought experiment is an experiment of the mind (consciousness).

For me, there is no such thing as free will. What is possible (and this is reflected in everyday life) is to make a directed (willful) choice in a particular direction. Outcome is never certain (though probabilistic) and is completely unknown until it unfolds in psychological time (the time of life). We try and we then observe what happened in memory.

You could try to imagine such a situation but it is your consciousness that is doing so. One cannot disentangle consciousness from any discussion or exploration-either philosophically or scientifically. A thought experiment is an experiment of the mind (consciousness). — Rich

I understand your point perfectly. I can work within such a view, though I it's a tricky area to explore, does anything happen outside my consciousness, it does, but imagining it brings it in.

For me, there is no such thing as free will. What is possible (and this is reflected in everyday life) is to make a directed (willful) choice in a particular direction. Outcome is never certain (though probabilistic) and is completely unknown until it unfolds in psychological time (the time of life). We try and we then observe what happened in memory. — Rich

I broadly agree, except for the fact that I do think I have a free will, as a passenger to this roller coaster ride.

But I think I need to get to the definition of free will itself:

http://www.thefreedictionary.com/free+will

free will
n
1. (Philosophy)
a. the apparent human ability to make choices that are not externally determined
b. the doctrine that such human freedom of choice is not illusory. Compare determinism1
c. (as modifier): a free-will decision.
2. the ability to make a choice without coercion: he left of his own free will: I did not influence him.

Collins English Dictionary – Complete and Unabridged, 12th Edition 2014 © HarperCollins Publishers 1991, 1994, 1998, 2000, 2003, 2006, 2007, 2009, 2011, 2014

I personally find the definitions here problematic and even disturbing. I think that is what brought me to the forum in the first place.

a. the apparent human ability to make choices that are not externally determined

It's 'apparent' - illusory? Externally determined? External to what? The mind? real slippery slope here.

b. the doctrine that such human freedom of choice is not illusory. Compare determinism1

Not illusory? What would it look like if it was real? Free will is known to us by our senses - our mind, emotion, feelings. But this goes outside the human mind as it were. It relates to the nature of the universe.

If I pick up a glass of water - there I just physically did that, I am sure we all agree that there are thoughts and feelings and mental processes accompanying that event, even preceding it.

That is what I call free will.

But that is not what we are talking about here, it is like the question - do parallel universes exist at the point of each possible action?

I am beginning to see the light here while reading the Wikipedia article on Free Will.

Different things are meant by free will and even by determinism, so it remains to me to pick which meanings of free will are incompatible with which versions of determinism,

Many times the debate is chaotic and circular due to the lack of hard definitions of free will, I think.

Interesting test of lecture by Stephen Hawking:

http://www.hawking.org.uk/does-god-play-dice.html

Our understanding is irrelevant to whether possibilities or free will obtain.

And our understanding of what we are intentionally doing can be part of the cause of what we are doing where either (a) only one possibility exists in any given situation and there is no free will, or (b) at least two possibilities exist in at least some situations and there is free will. — Terrapin Station

On your view, in a world where microphysical determinism obtains in such a way at to enable an ideal Laplacean predictor to foresee all future events (on the basis of his knowledge of all the present physical conditions and of the deterministic laws of physics), there are two senses in which a future occurrence can meaningfully be said to be 'possible' -- epistemic possibility or ontological possibility -- where the latter doesn't depend on an agent's perspective at all.

I think this leads you to paper over an important metaphysical distinction regarding possibilities for the future (though you hardly are alone in doing this). Imagine the following two cases.

Case 1: Suppose an agent is placed in a room with only two doors leading out. The agent is informed that the room will be flooded in ten minutes. At that time, both doors will lock down automatically. The agent must thus exist the room within ten minutes in order not to drown. Furthermore, the agent is informed that there is a wild tiger behind the first door and that there are a dozen venomous snakes laying on the ground behind the second door. The agent is, as of yet, indecisive about what to do, except that she is quite certain that she must exit soon. Until such a time when she will have made up her mind what kind of beast(s) might be more manageable or least dangerous, she doesn't know what door it is that she will open. (But the Laplacean predictor knows what her eventual choice will be already).

Case 2: Consider now a variation on the previous scenario where one (and only one) of the two doors is locked from the very beginning, and the agent is informed of this also, though she isn't told which one it is. However, if the agent would first try to open the door that happens to already be locked, there will be no penalty. She would then be allowed to walk to the other door and open it (provided the ten minutes time limit hasn't elapsed already). Now, the agent still doesn't initially know what door it is that she will eventually manage to open and what sort of beast(s) it is that she will confront. But there is no point in her losing time pondering over the issue since in any case only one of the two doors is unlocked. She might as well try out one door (chosen at random) and thereby find out as fast as possible which one is unlocked, and then confront the tiger, or snakes, on the other side, whatever the case may be.

On my view, in the first case, before the ten minutes have elapsed, and before the agent has made up her mind which door it is that she will try to open first, *both* options are open to her (and hence represent possible future outcomes) from her own practical perspective, and this not merely a matter of epistemic limitation, or so I would argue.

In the second case, only one option is open, and it is indeed merely a matter of epistemic ignorance which one is open from the practical perspective of the agent. The agent only has one exit option but doesn't yet know which one it is.

On your view, though, there is only one 'ontological possibility' in the Case 1 scenario. And the fact that the agent doesn't yet know (prior to making up her mind) which door it is that she will open is a case of epistemic possibility, just as it is in the Case 2 scenario.

My question to you, then, is this: Why is it that the agent, in the first scenario, wouldn't be justified to just try one door at random and forego any prior deliberation regarding the potential threats (tiger versus snakes), just as it would make sense to forego such pointless deliberations in the the first scenario when she knows that only one door is unlocked anyway. Why is there any practical point in her prior deliberating what choice to make when, on your view, there actually just in one real (ontological) possibility that already has been set by the past state of the universe and the laws of physics; and her 'feeling' that there are two options really (ontologically) open to her reflects nothing more than mere 'epistemic possibilities'?