Is the space Kant discusses in the Aesthetic the same space I experience and move through on a daily basis and is the time he discusses in the Aesthetic the same time I experience passing by on a daily basis? — charles ferraro

If I remember correctly, Kant understood space and time to be things not manifested by the exterior world, but imposed on the world by our minds a priori. That makes sense to me, by which I mean it is consistent with the way I see the world, although I'm not sure it's true.

If Kant is correct, then the answer to your question would be "yes," Kant's space is your space. His time is your time.

But, then, am I to conclude that the mentally spatialized universe is somehow located in my mind?

But, then, am I to conclude that the mentally spatialized universe is somehow located in my mind? — charles ferraro

I have not read a lot of Kant, but I was struck by his views on space and time. These Kant quotes are from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy's article "Kant's Views on Space and Time."

Space is not something objective and real, nor a substance, nor an accident, nor a relation; instead, it is subjective and ideal, and originates from the mind’s nature in accord with a stable law as a scheme, as it were, for coordinating everything sensed externally...

Now what are space and time? Are they actual entities [wirkliche Wesen]? Are they only determinations or also relations of things, but still such as would belong to them even if they were not intuited? Or are they such that they belong only to the form of intuition, and therefore to the subjective constitution of our mind, without which these predicates could not be ascribed to any things at all? — Kant - From the SEP article on Kant's views on space and time

Does the way Kant describes time and space mean that a "mentally spatialized universe is somehow located in my mind?" I'm not sure.

Kantian space and time are not experiences.

I have found that Transcendental Idealism is interpreted very differently depending on the person and Kant was a very poor writer (as far as I am considered) so it is hard to tell exactly what he meant (precisely); so here is my take.

Is the space Kant discusses in the Aesthetic the same space I experience and move through on a daily basis and is the time he discusses in the Aesthetic the same time I experience passing by on a daily basis?

Space and time are not something you experience (in the sense that Kant means it), as @Mww noted, but, rather, the necessary precondition of your experience. Space, for example, is not an entity which you encounter but, rather, is the pure form of your experience.

Now, if you are a realist about space and time, then it may be that the pure forms of one's experience corresponds or is governed by whatever laws affect them; but Kant is not claiming anything about that, as space and time beyond the forms of one's experience, would be something related to the things-in-themselves.

For example, Einstein famously held that Kant can't have space and time as synthetic and a priori; as he thought that there really is a space and time, of which we can empirically treat like entities, that are mind-independent. Is he right? I will leave that up to you and your metaphysics.

With respect to idealism, Kantianism paved the way for Schopenhaurian metaphysics that posits that the only space and time there is the pure forms of one's experience--as all there is are mind activities happening.

Last thing I will say is that time and space as originally proposed by Kant do not hold up to Einstein's special nor general relativity; as Kant, and Schopenhauer, held that we can be a priori certain of how they work and that the succession in space and time is universal for rational minds: both of which have been refuted by Einstein.

Bob

Kant refers to ‘time and space’ in way as to express our faculties as needing them to paint a picture of the world on.

We cannot think of anything without time or space.

The most useful part of his text (for me) was how he discerned noumenon and phenomenon. It is so obvious that many misconstrue what he meant here - to the point that philosophers still argue about it today for some reason! ..l maybe I a wrong though :D

Note: Keep in mind that Kant argues for numerous opposing positions in Critique and you will often find people using quotes to back up one argument of their own that Kant himself refuted elsewhere in this particular text.

Kantian space and time are not experiences. — Mww

:up:

But, then, am I to conclude that the mentally spatialized universe is somehow located in my mind? — charles ferraro

No, definitely not.

Crudely, he says that when we say that something exists physically, we normally mean that it is located in space and time "My greenhouse has been in my garden for the last two years; my lungs are in my chest and have been all my life." It follows, that we cannot locate space itself or time itself, and therefore they do not exist in the same way. Rather they are the categories by which we order experience.

And apart from that 'in my mind' is not a location, but another category.

Of course he didn't know about non-Euclidian geometry, and it turns out that these categories are not as 'necessary' as he thought, or at least they are capable of radical alteration. Nevertheless, it is a necessary condition of having any experience whatsoever that one has it here and now.

Kantian space and time are not experiences. — Mww

The SEP article on Kant’s Transcendental Idealism writes:

In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant argues that space and time are merely formal features of how we perceive objects, not things in themselves that exist independently of us, or properties or relations among them. Objects in space and time are said to be “appearances”, and he argues that we know nothing of substance about the things in themselves of which they are appearances.

It seems that Kant is arguing that the space and time we perceive is not the space and time that exists independently of us.

The space and time we perceive we must also experience, otherwise we wouldn't be able to perceive it. The space and time that exists independently of us we can neither perceive nor experience.

Source text. Scroll down to (1).

It seems that Kant is arguing that the space and time we perceive is not the space and time that exists independently of us. — RussellA

Correct, that’s exactly what he’s arguing.

Einstein thought Kant was wrong on that. Then again, he also thought quantum physics were wrong, on very similar grounds.

‘Does the moon….’ Etc

Kant is interested in objective knowledge. To what extent is our daily existence explicitly governed by scientific laws? Or by mathematical physics. For Kant, and for scientific realism, time and space are basic coordinate systems of nature which make objective locating of entities and events possible. In this sense we "experience" or feel/understand time and space usually/sometimes differently i.e. more "subjectively".

The space and time we perceive we must also experience — RussellA

Correct, insofar as experience requires perception, and space/time is not an experience, just means neither is space nor time a perception.

The space and time that exists independently of us we can neither perceive nor experience. — RussellA

That which exists independently of us is that which can be an affect on our senses and is thereby a possible representation in us as phenomenon. Space or time, because they are not perceptions, are not affects on our senses, therefore are not possible as a phenomenon, therefore are not that which is known as an existence independent of us.

It seems that Kant is arguing that the space and time we perceive is not the space and time that exists independently of us. — RussellA

Kant says we don’t perceive space or time, space and time do not exist independently of us insofar as they do not exist at all, so your interpretation is not what he’s arguing. To argue an objective validity is not to promote an existence.

Where the difficulty in understanding occurs generally, is the mediate conclusion derived in the transcendental thesis, that an objective validity without an empirical reality accompanying it, is the same as being an ideal. Further exacerbated by the method by which the former is necessary yet the latter is not even remotely possible, with respect to knowledge a posteriori, which seems contradictory. Which reduces to understanding exactly how, in Kant, the origin of space and time as ideal conceptions is accomplished, irrespective of their employment regarding the possibility of experience itself, and thereby granted as metaphysically legitimate conditions.

Correct, insofar as experience requires perception, and space/time is not an experience, just means neither is space nor time a perception. — Mww

I am crossing a busy road and see a truck moving straight towards me. I perceive the truck and I perceive the truck moving through space and time.

If I wasn't able to perceive space and time, I wouldn't be able to perceive that the truck was moving straight towards me. It would appear stationary and not presenting an immediate danger.

My perceptions are my experiences. My perceptions of objects in space and time are my experiences of objects in space and time.

I clearly perceive objects, space and time in my mind.

How I am able to perceive objects, space and time in my mind is a subsequent question. Is Chomsky correct that humans are born with certain innate abilities, or is Skinner correct that the human is born a blank slate having no innate capabilities and everything is learnt from their environment or is Kant correct that humans have non-empirical intuition ?

Though it seems to me that Kant's non-empirical intuitions have similarities with Chomsky's innate abilities.

I am crossing a busy road and see a truck moving straight towards me. I perceive the truck and I perceive the truck moving through space and time. — RussellA

I clearly perceive objects, space and time in my mind. — RussellA

Yes, sure seems that way, donnit? Conventionally speaking, its what Everydayman accepts as the facts. If you’re ok with it….so be it.

Me, I reject that my mind perceives, preferring to leave such occupation to my senses, as Nature intended.

Building on what you said, we now know that both Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometries can be used successfully to try to explain the occurrence of certain physical phenomena.

The degree of success of the physical theories (paradigms) proposed to try to explain and predict the occurrence of certain physical phenomena is determined largely by the degree of appropriateness of the kind of mathematical/geometric tools which are selected for inclusion in the theories to try to accomplish such predictions and explanations.

This, I think, disproves the validity of Kant's explicit (testable) epistemic hypothesis that only Euclidean geometry must apply to the physical world because it is a transcendental (necessary and strictly universal) form of human sensible intuition.

However, can Kant's theory of sensible intuition be modified to better fit contemporary facts, or must it be completely discarded as a once very interesting, but now debunked, theory?

Might there not be, instead, objective multiverses, each functioning according to different kinds of mathematics and geometries, some already known others not, which have nothing at all to do with any transcendental forms of human sensible intuition?

I also think that Kant's notions of space and time are not the same as the space and time that I experience on a daily basis.

Einstein's notions of space and time are the dynamic ones that can be empirically verified through a wide range of experiments.

For example, empirical space bends in the presence of large masses and their strong gravitational fields; Kant's transcendental space is a static, rigid, container. Empirical time passes slower or faster depending on how near or far one is from a strong gravitational field, Kant's transcendental time flows uniformly everywhere for every person.

However, can Kant's theory of sensible intuition be modified to better fit contemporary facts, or must it be completely discarded as a once very interesting, but now debunked, theory? — charles ferraro

Kant's non-empirical intuition seems very similar in principle to today's Innatism.

From Wikipedia - Innatism
In epistemology, innatism is the view that the mind is born with already-formed ideas, knowledge, and beliefs. The opposing doctrine, that the mind is a tabula rasa (blank slate) at birth and all knowledge is gained from experience and the senses, is called empiricism.

From SEP - Kant's Views on Space and Time
Now what are space and time? Are they actual entities [wirkliche Wesen]? Are they only determinations or also relations of things, but still such as would belong to them even if they were not intuited? Or are they such that they belong only to the form of intuition, and therefore to the subjective constitution of our mind, without which these predicates could not be ascribed to any things at all? (A23/B37–8).

Me, I reject that my mind perceives, preferring to leave such occupation to my senses, as Nature intended. — Mww

Unfortunately, when going to the dentist, it is my mind that perceives the pain of the cold water on a sensitive tooth. If only it was just my unconscious senses that perceived the pain.

As the Merriam-Webster dictionary writes, perception involves awareness:
Perception is the awareness of the elements of environment through physical sensation

Kant's transcendental time flows uniformly everywhere for every person. — charles ferraro

“…. The schema of substance is the permanence of the real in time; that is, the representation of it as a substratum of the empirical determination of time; a substratum which therefore remains, whilst all else changes. (Time passes not, but in it passes the existence of the changeable. To time, therefore, which is itself unchangeable and permanent, corresponds that which in the phenomenon is unchangeable in existence, that is, substance, and it is only by it that the succession and coexistence of phenomena can be determined in regard to time.)….”
(A143/B183)

The determinations of the changeable is the same everywhere for every person. Time is not that.

All Einstein did was show the determinations of the changeable is the same for everyone iff they are each in the same everywhere as the change being determined.

If I wasn't able to perceive space and time, I wouldn't be able to perceive that the truck was moving straight towards me. It would appear stationary and not presenting an immediate danger. — RussellA

That the truck is moving straight toward you is a conclusion, not a perception. You perceive (sense) motion, and you make a judgement as to whether the truck is coming toward you or not. The judgement that it is coming straight toward you is not a perception, and is independent from the sensation that it is moving.

Unfortunately, when going to the dentist, it is my mind that perceives the pain of the cold water on a sensitive tooth. If only it was just my unconscious senses that perceived the pain. — RussellA

You make a judgement that the cause of your pain is cold water, rather than that it is something else, like hot water. You do not perceive that the "water is cold", you decide this by way of judgement. You do not perceive that the "sky is blue", nor that the "grass is green". Those are all judgements, which in basic epistemology are called predications.

But according to Kant, you do perceive (sense) activity and motion. And this is why space and time, as a priori intuitions, are said to be prior to sensibility and sense experience in general, as necessary conditions for the possibility of sensation.

This is perhaps the fundamental difference between Hume and Kant. Hume represents sensations as static, states of existence, which change from one moment to the next. Kant represents sensations as active, according to the necessary requirements for sensation, those pure a priori intuitions, space and time. This is the means by which Kant places mind as prior to sense experience, as required for sensation, while Hume is empiricist. Hume would argue that change and movement are judgements derived from sense experience.

That the truck is moving straight toward you is a conclusion, not a perception. You perceive (sense) motion, and you make a judgement as to whether the truck is coming toward you or not. The judgement that it is coming straight toward you is not a perception, and is independent from the sensation that it is moving. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree I perceive something moving towards me and then judge it to be a truck.

But I cannot perceive an object moving without perceiving the manner in which it is moving. When I perceive a moving object, my perception includes the manner in which it is moving. I don't perceive an object moving and then judge it to be moving to the left. I perceive an object moving to the left.

I agree judgement is independent to perception, but when perceiving a moving object, the fact that the object is coming straight towards me is part of the perception, not part of a subsequent cognitive judgement.

You make a judgement that the cause of your pain is cold water, rather than that it is something else, like hot water. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree, I perceive pain and then judge the cause to be cold water.

But according to Kant, you do perceive (sense) activity and motion. And this is why space and time, as a priori intuitions, are said to be prior to sensibility and sense experience in general, as necessary conditions for the possibility of sensation. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree. Perhaps would be called Innatism today.

This is perhaps the fundamental difference between Hume and Kant. Hume represents sensations as static, states of existence, which change from one moment to the next. Kant represents sensations as active, according to the necessary requirements for sensation, those pure a priori intuitions, space and time. — Metaphysician Undercover

Not necessarily.

It is true that Hume is described as an Empiricist, meaning he believed "causes and effects are discoverable not by reason, but by experience", such that the cornerstone of his epistemology was the problem of induction.

However, such a philosophy may be argued to be founded on Hume's belief in natural instinct, rather than reason, thereby discovering a strong link between Hume's inductive inference and Kant's non-empirical intuition.

The following is taken from James Hill's The Role of Instinct in David Hume's Conception of Human Reason

In a detailed and enlightening discussion of Hume's conception of instinct, Bertram Laing maintains that ‘a theory of instinct’ is fundamental and it ‘underlies his other doctrines’. Laing associates this implicit theory of instinct above all with the First Enquiry where, ‘in contrast to the Treatise,’ a doctrine of instinct can be seen ‘to stand out more prominently’ (Laing 1926). Let us set out this theory of instinct, starting with an enumeration of the different instincts that Hume attributes to man.

We should not be surprised to find the so-called ‘primary appetites’, such as hunger, thirst, and ‘affection between the sexes’, described as instincts (T 2.3.9.8/439 ; NHR Intro; EPM app. 2.12/301). Nor will we be surprised to learn that passions and desires such as love of progeny, love of fame,2 and ‘a desire of the happiness or misery of others, according to the love or hatred we bear them’, are all instincts for Hume (T 2.2.12.5/398 ; T 2.2.7.1/368 ; NHR Intro; EPM app. 2.12/301).

In addition to these ‘low’ appetites and often turbulent passions, Hume follows Francis Hutcheson (1756: 292) in treating more elevated and humane dispositions of the soul as instincts.3 The moral virtues expressed in the ‘calm desires’ of benevolence, compassion, generosity, appetite to good, aversion to evil are originally determined by nature and thus qualify as instincts (T 2.3.3.8/417–8; L 38). This means that, like Hutcheson, Hume takes moral judgement, and conduct in accordance with it, as stemming from instinct not reason, although reason and reflection will still have a part to play in the final determination of this judgement and conduct.

IE, Hume often makes the case that natural instinct, rather than reason, is the foundation of human behaviour, of which induction is one example.

we now know that both Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometries can be used successfully to try to explain the occurrence of certain physical phenomena.
…
This, I think, disproves the validity of Kant's explicit (testable) epistemic hypothesis that only Euclidean geometry must apply to the physical world because it is a transcendental (necessary and strictly universal) form of human sensible intuition.

I agree. Kant, however, was more interested in our representative faculties and assumed, like a lot of people in his time, that newtonian physics would never be superseded. Obviously, many of his newtonian-based claims are stale; but his idea of there being transcendental truths seems still rather convincing.

However, can Kant's theory of sensible intuition be modified to better fit contemporary facts, or must it be completely discarded as a once very interesting, but now debunked, theory

I think the core of his theory is fine: we are representative beings who do have necessary a priori knowledge and synthetic a priori judgments. Just think of how your brain fills in the gaps constantly as it guesses what it is experiencing: it is adding something which is not there beyond phenomenal experience. Likewise, it seems rather convincing that the objects (or whatever the things-in-themselves are or thing-in-itself is) conform to our representative faculties: we don’t get any direct knowledge of the world-as-it-is. Now, can be philosophically decipher what a priori synthetic conceptions we have? I don’t think so: I will that up to neuroscience and the like.

Might there not be, instead, objective multiverses, each functioning according to different kinds of mathematics and geometries, some already known others not, which have nothing at all to do with any transcendental forms of human sensible intuition?

Kant adamantly claims that we cannot know anything about the things-in-themselves; so his theory does not negate nor affirm the existence of a multiverse. He calls things-in-themselves “purely negative conceptions”, which are placeholders for whatever we are representing.

Personally, I don’t a need to posit extra universes doing their own things in parallel with ours. All I see needing explanation is the reality in which we live, and it seems unparsimonious to posit extraneous realities.

I also think that Kant's notions of space and time are not the same as the space and time that I experience on a daily basis.

Einstein's notions of space and time are the dynamic ones that can be empirically verified through a wide range of experiments.

I sort of agree. Space and time are not experienced, they are the necessary forms of your experience: our minds don’t produce space and time but, rather, are conditioned by it; however, I think you are correct that they are not purely a priori (in the sense Kant wanted it to be), as we can gain more understanding of them via a posteriori investigations but they are still a priori insofar as they are the necessary preconditions of our experience (as the necessary forms thereof). In other words, their behaviors can be empirically investigated, but they are still only the form of your minds representations. I think Kant made the mistake of thinking that because something is synthetic a priori that it must be impossible to understand empirically—but that simply isn’t true.

I think the degree of use of Kantianism in one’s view is just relative to the metaphysical theory one holds. A physicalist could hold that there is a phenomenal and noumenal space and time, such that the former is attempting to represent the latter; and many ideas from Kant will follow therefrom. However, they will deny that they synthetic.

As an analytic idealist, I salvage many of Kant’s and Schopenhauer’s metaphysical views; and, thusly, I hold time and space are synthetic a priori.

For example, empirical space bends in the presence of large masses and their strong gravitational fields; Kant's transcendental space is a static, rigid, container. Empirical time passes slower or faster depending on how near or far one is from a strong gravitational field, Kant's transcendental time flows uniformly everywhere for every person.

This is true; but I think it only demonstrates that:

1. Even the form of our experience can be empirically investigated;
2. It can behave differently than we would initially intuit (upon empirically studying it);
3. Newtonian physics doesn’t work anymore; and
4. They are governed by objective laws (and are not purely subjective productions of our minds).

However, this doesn’t mean that they aren’t synthetic (i.e., add something to the world that isn’t already there) nor that they are not a priori (i.e., that they are the necessary preconditions for the possibility of our phenomenal experience). For me, without a perceptive being, there is not extension (space) nor temporality (time) other than the ideas pertaining thereof in the mind of God.

Bob

But I cannot perceive an object moving without perceiving the manner in which it is moving. — RussellA

I don't think that this is right at all. Think about how sensation works. Sight and hearing receive the activity of waves. But people were seeing and hearing long before they knew the manner of this motion. And the other senses perceive the activities of molecules, but the perceptions which result do not include anything about the manner in which the molecules are moving.

This is to say that the percept, the sense image, or whatever you want to call what your mind apprehends, is nothing at all like, or similar to the motion which is actually being sensed. So your mind creates for you an image of an object moving, but this is not even similar to the manner of motion which the senses are sensing.

I agree judgement is independent to perception, but when perceiving a moving object, the fact that the object is coming straight towards me is part of the perception, not part of a subsequent cognitive judgement. — RussellA

This is the issue which Hume had difficulty with. To determine which direction the object is moving, requires sensing it over an extended period of time. For him this meant a number of distinct sensations of the object at different locations, a conclusion as to the direction it has moved, then a cause/effect assumption that it will continue to move in a similar way in the future.

In reality, the conclusion that the object is coming straight towards you requires what is known as "quick thinking". When someone is capable of ducking from a rapidly approaching flying object, we say that the person has demonstrated "quick thinking". You'll notice that human beings are much better at this quick thinking than other animals.

Not necessarily.

It is true that Hume is described as an Empiricist, meaning he believed "causes and effects are discoverable not by reason, but by experience", such that the cornerstone of his epistemology was the problem of induction.

However, such a philosophy may be argued to be founded on Hume's belief in natural instinct, rather than reason, thereby discovering a strong link between Hume's inductive inference and Kant's non-empirical intuition. — RussellA

But the point is that Hume describes sensation as apprehending distinct states, then using what you call "natural instinct" to infer that motion has occurred between these distinct states. This is completely different from Kant who places the intuitions of space and time as necessary for the possibility of sensation. For Kant then, motion is already inherent within the sensation as those intuitions are prior to and necessary for sensation, but for Hume motion is inferred from the sensation of distinct states, so this "natural instinct" operates posterior to sensation making judgements about motion from the sensations..

But even if motion is already inherent within sensation, this does not validate your claim that sensation provides for you the judgement as to which way the motion is going. We sense change as motion, activity, without knowing where the change is headed toward.

I don't think that this is right at all. Think about how sensation works. Sight and hearing receive the activity of waves. But people were seeing and hearing long before they knew the manner of this motion. And the other senses perceive the activities of molecules, but the perceptions which result do not include anything about the manner in which the molecules are moving. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is true that I may perceive an itch on my hand, but the itch does not represent what caused it. This has been my argument in the past against Direct Realism. The Direct Realist's position is that just knowing an effect, say an itch, this would automatically enable them to know its cause, say a thistle.

At one moment in time I may perceive two objects spatially separated, say one to the left and one to the right. But perception is not only spatial, it is also temporal, in that I may perceive an object at one moment in time to the right and at a later moment in time to the left. Not only does perception allow spatial separation but perception also allows temporal separation. If that weren't the case, all my perceptions would be frozen in time, making life unworkable.

In driving along a busy road through a city centre, if all me perceptions were of instants of time, and I had to connect these frozen perceptions by cognitive judgement, I would have crashed my car within the first five minutes. No amount of quick thinking would allow the human to successfully succeed in any task requiring a quick response - such as driving through a city centre, playing tennis, reading a novel, cooking a meal, engaging in conversation - if they had to constantly consciously reason how one event at one moment in time is connected to a different event a fraction of a second later.

Humans, as animals, have evolved such that their perceptions are not only spatial but also temporal. As Kant said, humans have a unity of the manifold of intuition imposed by the unity of consciousness.

But the point is that Hume describes sensation as apprehending distinct states, then using what you call "natural instinct" to infer that motion has occurred between these distinct states. This is completely different from Kant who places the intuitions of space and time as necessary for the possibility of sensation. — Metaphysician Undercover

There is an object to the right of my field of vision, and one second later there is an object to the left of my field of vision. Hume induces that there is only one object and it is moving from right to left.

One can ask where the human faculty for induction came from. Is Innatism true, whereby humans are born with certain innate abilities, ie "natural instincts", or is Behaviourism true, whereby humans are born a blank slate having no innate abilities and everything is learnt from their environment.

Is the human faculty for induction an innate "natural instinct" or learnt from the environment.

There is evidence that Hume believed that not only animals but also humans are born with "natural instincts", ie, a form of Innatism. Kant argued for non-empirical intuitions, ie, in today's terms, a form of Innatism

In this regard, it can be seen that both Hume and Kant have an acceptance of what would be called today, Innatism.

……both Hume and Kant have an acceptance of what would be called today, Innatism. — RussellA

What would be called today, perhaps, insofar as Innatism, being a rather more psychological formalism, had no standing in Enlightenment metaphysics. Nevertheless….

“….. Now, how can an external intuition anterior to objects themselves, and in which our conception of objects can be determined à priori, exist in the human mind? Obviously not otherwise than in so far as it has its seat in the subject only, as the formal capacity of the subject’s being affected by objects, and thereby of obtaining immediate representation, that is, intuition; consequently, only as the form of the external sense in general…”

…...gives the impression of a form of standing henceforth classified as Innatism. On the other hand, one must be cautioned against obtaining Innatism as a formal capacity of the subject in general, from the formal capacity of the subject’s being affected by objects. I think Kant would attribute pure reason and pure practical morality as innate formal capacities in subjects as such, leaving the formal capacity of being affected by objects, to sensibility.

What would be called today, perhaps, insofar as Innatism, being a rather more psychological formalism, had no standing in Enlightenment metaphysics. — Mww

From the Wikipedia article on Innatism, Innatism refers to the philosophy of Descartes.

Innatism and nativism are generally synonymous terms referring to the notion of pre-existing ideas in the mind. However, more specifically, innatism refers to the philosophy of Descartes, who assumed that God or a similar being or process placed innate ideas and principles in the human mind.

Nativism represents an adaptation of this, grounded in the fields of genetics, cognitive psychology, and psycholinguistics. Nativists hold that innate beliefs are in some way genetically programmed in our mind—they are the phenotypes of certain genotypes that all humans share in common. Nativism is a modern view rooted in innatism. The advocates of nativism are mainly philosophers who also work in the field of cognitive psychology or psycholinguistics: most notably Noam Chomsky and Jerry Fodor.

Descartes' (1596 - 1650) rationalist system of philosophy is one of the pillars on which Enlightenment (1685 - 1815) thought rests.

Kant (1724 - 1804) came after Descartes, so we can assume that Kant was aware of the concept of Innatism.

Our friend Chomsky (b. 1928) is a contemporary supporter of Innatism against the Behaviourism of Skinner (1904 - 1990).

As regards Kant's non-empirical intuition, if such intuition is non-empirical, then where is the source of such intuition if not innate ?

It is true that I may perceive an itch on my hand, but the itch does not represent what caused it. — RussellA

Just as the itch requires more than its sensation for the determination of its cause, so too must an object’s relation to you, that it is left or right, that it is above or below, that it is this or that, require more than its mere perception.
————

From the Wikipedia article on Innatism, — RussellA

C’mon, man. If Innatism, indicating a dedicated doctrine in itself….it is an -ism, is it not???…. was so much a part of historic philosophy, why is not the term nor the doctrine as such, found in it? That there are innate ideas or notions or subjective conditions in the human intellect goes as far back as rational discourse, but as a topic in its own right, it is modern psychology. Those that followed, deemed historic philosophers to be intimating Innatism, even if they themselves never described it as an -ism.

“…. It is quite possible that someone may propose a species of preformation system of pure reason—a middle way between the two—to wit, that the categories are neither innate and first à priori principles of cognition, nor derived from experience, but are merely subjective aptitudes for thought implanted in us contemporaneously with our existence….”

I, speaking only for myself, would never be so presumptuous as to suppose…..well, this is what he said, but this is what he really meant.
—————

As regards Kant's non-empirical intuition, if such intuition is non-empirical, then where is the source of such intuition if not innate ? — RussellA

Understanding. Plain and simple. It’s all in the text. Not in wiki. Space and time are irrefutably merely representations, all representations are products of either sensibility as phenomena, or thought as conceptions. Both sensibility and cognition insofar as they are active processes of the human intellect, are not themselves innate, thus it follows that neither are their respective products. That humans can sense and can think may indeed be innate, but the process by which these are done, which implies a system, is not that by which they are possible, which is given from a certain kind of existence alone.

Following the yellow brick road gets you to the conclusion there is no such thing as a non-empirical intuition; such is pure a priori, which only denotes the mode of the cognition for its place in the system, and not its function.
———-

Your claims are not groundless, I must admit…..

“…. It is therefore from the human point of view only that we can speak of space, extended objects, etc. If we depart from the subjective condition, under which alone we can obtain external intuition, or, in other words, by means of which we are affected by objects, the representation of space has no meaning whatsoever. This predicate is only applicable to things in so far as they appear to us, that is, are objects of sensibility. The constant form of this receptivity, which we call sensibility, is a necessary condition of all relations in which objects can be intuited as existing without us, and when abstraction of these objects is made, is a pure intuition, to which we give the name of space….”

….in which it does seem as if the subjective condition is itself innate. But don’t confuse a subjective condition from which departure is possible hence is contingent, re: the means by which we are affected by objects given a different theoretical system, for a necessary one from which no departure is possible, re: the logical predicates of one particular system. Which just says….if this then that necessarily, but your this may be different than mine.

In driving along a busy road through a city centre, if all me perceptions were of instants of time, and I had to connect these frozen perceptions by cognitive judgement, I would have crashed my car within the first five minutes. No amount of quick thinking would allow the human to successfully succeed in any task requiring a quick response - such as driving through a city centre, playing tennis, reading a novel, cooking a meal, engaging in conversation - if they had to constantly consciously reason how one event at one moment in time is connected to a different event a fraction of a second later. — RussellA

You have no argument here, because each of your examples requires practise. The exercise must be learned, and in the learning process the activity is nowhere near as smooth and fluid as you make it out to be here, in the case of an individual who is well educated and practised.

There is an object to the right of my field of vision, and one second later there is an object to the left of my field of vision. Hume induces that there is only one object and it is moving from right to left. — RussellA

The problem with this approach is that we expect to see the object move from right to left, if we watch it. And if the object suddenly jumps from right to left, without me seeing it move, this is very suspicious to me. It is suspicious because we naturally sense movement, so to see something jump from point A to point B without moving there looks unnatural, as if magical or supernatural. We assume that the eyes can keep up with any movement that the object can make, even if it's just a blur, so for it to instantaneously go from being at one spot, to being at another, would appear very suspicious.

So Hume's explanation is not consistent with our natural sensation which is to see the object moving from right to left, in a manner of spatial-temporal continuity of the object. In other words, we expect to see the spatial-temporal continuity of the object, including its motions, that is intuitive. So Hume's starting point, the assumption that we see the object at point A and then at point B, is not consistent with our intuitions. It starts from a broken spatial-temporal existence, one which would appear like magic, or supernatural if we ever saw it in the way he proposed.

Just as the itch requires more than its sensation for the determination of its cause, so too must an object’s relation to you, that it is left or right, that it is above or below, that it is this or that, require more than its mere perception. — Mww

It comes down to the meaning of perception.

From the Wikipedia article on Perception

Perception is the organization, identification, and interpretation of sensory information in order to represent and understand the presented information or environment. Perception is not only the passive receipt for of these signals, but it is also shaped by the recipient's learning, memory, expectation, and attention.

Many philosophers, such as Jerry Fodor, write that the purpose of perception is knowledge. However, evolutionary psychologists hold that the primary purpose of perception is to guide action. They give the example of depth perception, which seems to have evolved not to aid in knowing the distances to other objects but rather to aid movement. Evolutionary psychologists argue that animals ranging from fiddler crabs to humans use eyesight for collision avoidance, suggesting that vision is basically for directing action, not providing knowledge.

Perception is more than sensation. Perception is what interprets sensations. Perception is what gives us the spatial relationship between objects, whether to the left or to the right, whether above or below.

Perhaps this is why one reads in the SEP article on Kant's Views on Space and Time that

But leaving that complication aside, it is surely very surprising to hear that intuition, which in some regards is akin to perception (Parsons 1992, 65–66; Allais 2015, 147ff), can also be empirical or a priori in character.

According to Locke’s view, a version of which was also defended by Hume (Treatise, 1.2.3), we obtain a representation of space—not of places, but of the one all-encompassing space, which may be akin to geometric space—from the perception of spatial relations.

It is our perception of the world that allows us to distinguish left from right, above from below.

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Understanding. Plain and simple. It’s all in the text. Not in wiki. Space and time are irrefutably merely representations, all representations are products of either sensibility as phenomena, or thought as conceptions. Both sensibility and cognition insofar as they are active processes of the human intellect, are not themselves innate, thus it follows that neither are their respective products. That humans can sense and can think may indeed be innate, but the process by which these are done, which implies a system, is not that by which they are possible, which is given from a certain kind of existence alone. — Mww

From SEP - Kant's Views on Space and Time

Space is not an empirical concept which has been derived from outer experiences. A23/B38

Finally, transcendental idealism, in so far as it concerns space and time, has the following essential component: we have a non-empirical, singular, immediate representation of space. Part of Kant’s innovation is to introduce into the philosophical lexicon the very idea that we can have non-empirical intuition.

As you say, the ability to think is probably innate. The question is, is what we think, our understanding, limited or not by our "natural instincts".

For Kant, our non-empirical intuition of time and space doesn't come from observation, doesn't come from any perception of the world, but comes from pure cognition in our minds.

The question is, what is the link between the innate ability to think and what is thought. Even if we accept Innatism, that the mind is born with already-formed ideas, knowledge, and beliefs, is it possible for our thoughts to be independent of such ideas, knowledge and beliefs. Does our innate ability to think determine what we think, or can what we think be independent of such innate ability of thought.

Any thoughts we have must be expressed in the physical state of the brain. There must be some correspondence at any moment in time between what we are thinking and the physical state of the brain. Any new thought must require an altered state of the physical brain. But any physical change requires a physical cause, in that a physical state cannot spontaneously change without a preceding physical cause. An effect needs a cause.

Summing up, any new thought requires a change in the state of the physical brain, but any change in the state of the physical brain requires a preceding physical cause. But in its turn, any preceding physical cause must require its own preceding physical cause, and so on, leaving no possibility that our thoughts have not been determined by a pre-existing physical state of the brain.

IE, understanding cannot be free of the physical state of the brain. Cognition is a function of the state of the physical brain, not something that can be achieved free of the state of the physical brain.

So in answer to my question, regarding Kant's non-empirical intuition, if such intuition is non-empirical, then where is the source of such intuition. The source can only be the momentary physical state of the brain, which has been determined by the preceding physical state of the brain, and so on, eventually leading back, to the innate ability of humans to think. In other words, Innatism.

So Hume's explanation is not consistent with our natural sensation which is to see the object moving from right to left, in a manner of spatial-temporal continuity of the object — Metaphysician Undercover

Hume writes in An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding

When we say, therefore, that one object is connected with another, we mean only, that they have acquired a connexion in our thought, and give rise to this inference, by which they become proofs of each other's existence: A conclusion, which is somewhat extraordinary; but which seems founded on sufficient evidence.

I would have thought that Hume based his theory of constant conjunction on our natural sensations, not on some abstract philosophical reasonings.

So in answer to my question, regarding Kant's non-empirical intuition, if such intuition is non-empirical, then where is the source of such intuition. The source can only be the momentary physical state of the brain…. — RussellA

Oh. Well alrighty then. Which state would that be, that relates to the representation of space, and to no other representation in the least? From which neural pathway would that originate? There are 3.6b neural connectors per mm3 in the human brain, any one considerable as being itself a state of the brain.

So what we have heah….in best Strother Martin imitation….is a tautological truth: everything a human does mentally reduces to a brain state, which, of course, tells us not a damn thing regarding what we really want to know.

And brain states aren’t Innatism; they’re cognitive neuroscience. Or quantum biology maybe. Sure as hell ain’t proper metaphysics.
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For Kant, our non-empirical intuition of time and space doesn't come from observation, doesn't come from any perception of the world, but comes from pure cognition in our minds. — RussellA

Yes, as I said. Pure cognition in our minds, is understanding.

It comes down to the meaning of perception. — RussellA

As it should. Since it is Kant’s notion of space and time being discussed, we would use Kant’s notion of perception. Which is……?