• Eugen
    702
    I learned about hylomorphism some time ago, but until recently I didn't pay much attention to it. However, this idea appeared somewhere in my OPs and it piqued my curiosity. So I started digging deeper into the problem and came across a certain William Jaworsky.
    The guy looks straight out of the Van Damme movies and claims with great vigor that his theory solves all the problems of consciousness and that it succeeds in everything that physicalism fails. To be honest, I like his style and in principle, I can agree with a lot of what he says. Everything goes well until it doesn't. There is a point where it seems to me that the proponent of the theory does not actually explain anything. And this is where my torment begins because I have the impression that it is actually something very subtle that I do not understand.

    Concretely, everything goes well until the central part, where Jaworsky says the following:
    1) We are made of particles.
    2) The properties of the whole are determined by the properties of the particles.
    3) Physical particles are not conscious.
    4) No number of non-conscious particles can combine to form consciousness.
    So, we've got a problem!
    Wonderful!

    He says that hylomorphism does not agree with premise 2). He even says:

    "Emergent properties have three characteristics:

    1. They have first-order properties, not higher-order ones; that is, they are not logical constructions with definitions that quantify over other properties.
    2. They are not epiphenomenal, but make distinctive causal or explanatory contributions to the behavior of the individuals having them.
    3. They are possessed by an individual on account of its organization or structure. "

    After which he makes a statement that I don't understand: "Notice: it is not a characteristic of emergent properties (at least not on the hylomorphic view) that they are generated or produced by lower-level systems—a claim endorsed by classic emergentists and epiphenomenalists."

    As a solution, we are told that the mind cannot be reduced to matter, but if we introduce "form" into the equation, things are resolved. And this is where my total confusion begins.

    If Jaworsky claims that it is not logical to believe that particles with 0 consciousness can form consciousness, how can he believe that a particle with 0 consciousness + form with 0 consciousness can create consciousness?
  • Pantagruel
    3.3k
    I haven't yet read Jaworsky but, as I've mentioned elsewhere, he is on my short list.

    Systems theory has a satisfying perspective on emergence. In particular, I'd recommend Laszlo's Introduction to Systems Philosophy which has a nice section on the mind-matter problem.

    When I have finished something by Jaworsky in the next few months I'm sure I'll be posting something. Which of his books did you read?
  • T Clark
    13k
    If Jaworsky claims that it is logical to believe that a particle with 0 consciousness can form consciousness, how can he believe that a particle with 0 consciousness + form with 0 consciousness can create consciousness?Eugen

    Can a particle with 0 life + a form with 0 life create life?
  • Eugen
    702
    You didn't pay attention, that wasn't my question.
  • Eugen
    702
    Which of his books did you read?Pantagruel

    I didn't read his books, I saw a presentation of his and I also read some blogs of his and a dissertation of a guy about his work.

    https://podcasts.ox.ac.uk/hylomorphic-structure-emergence-and-supervenience

    https://philosophyofbrains.com/2016/05/11/hylomorphism-and-emergence.aspx

    HYLOMORPHISM AND THE MIND-BODY RELATION Kevan Norris
  • T Clark
    13k
    You didn't pay attention, that wasn't my question.Eugen

    I did pay attention. In the past, people believed that life couldn't come out of non-living material. Most now agree that it can. That situation is analogous to the question of consciousness coming out of non-conscious materials.
  • Eugen
    702
    Thanks! Solved, although for some reason I cannot provide the link for the dissertation, but you can google it with the name I provided.
  • Eugen
    702
    No, you didn't. Your answer isn't connected to my question.
  • Eugen
    702
    I'm not sure about Laszlo's view on emergence, but Jaworsky seems odd to me. He admits consciousness is irreducible to matter, but he says those properties are not ''generated" by lower-level systems. But the word emergent itself denotes something generated.
  • noAxioms
    1.4k
    Well let's apply the object to something less associated with magic, like 'wet'.

    Concretely, everything goes well until the central part, where Jaworsky says the following:
    1) We are made of particles.
    2) The properties of the whole are determined by the properties of the particles.
    3) Physical particles are not conscious.
    4) No number of non-conscious particles can combine to form consciousness.
    So, we've got a problem!
    Eugen
    1) Rocks and water are made of particles (electrons and such ...)
    2) Being wet is not a property of any particle
    3) Physical particles are not wet
    4) No number of non-wet particles can combine to form a wet rock.

    I agree, the logic simply doesn't hold. Why should I make an exception for the property of consciousnes?
  • Eugen
    702
    But that's not the point of my issue with Jaworsky
  • simplyG
    111
    If two such lifeless particles are in motion then it seems reasonable to attribute them conventional concepts such as consciousness because through their interaction the force of gravity or mass comes into play. This assumption can be taken further for any lifeless environment such as early earth yet varied forces such plate tectonics created different environments and thus atmospheric pressure gasses etc if you think about it.

    These lifeless masses or particles would’ve combined by principles of unification creating different types of matter to eventually single cell multicellular then consciousness
  • Wayfarer
    20.8k
    .
    As a solution, we are told that the mind cannot be reduced to matter, but if we introduce "form" into the equation, things are resolved.Eugen

    Thanks for introducing us to this author. He looks like a very substantial thinker, going on the ToC of his book, Structure and Metaphysics of Mind. (Review here.) Perhaps the answer to your question can be found there, it is after all a 353 page book with a very detailed survey of many of the issues. I would look for an account of the origin of forms (morphe). There are accounts in later Greek philosophy of this idea, I don't know if he draws on them for his account. Given that physics is the science of matter (hyle), then the question is, what is the science of form? (morphe)

    I notice this thought-experiment mentioned in the review (above):

    Suppose we put Godehard [i.e. 'a human'] in a strong bag -- a very strong bag since we want to ensure that nothing leaks out when we squash him with several tons of force. Before the squashing, the contents of the bag include one human being; after, they include none. In addition, before the squashing the contents of the bag can think, feel, and act, but after the squashing they can't. What explains these differences in the contents of the bag pre-squashing and post-squashing? The physical materials (whether particles or stuffs) remain the same -- none of them leaked out. Intuitively, we want to say that what changed was the way those materials were structured or organized. (p. 9)

    Interestingly, there's an exact parallel in the early Buddhist texts, wherein one Prince Payasi (generally depicted as representing materialism) was said to have ordered that condemned prisoners be sealed into a clay jar and suffocated. The jar containing the prisoner was to be weighed before and after death, and if it weighed the same, it would show that no soul had escaped from the body at time of death. Primitive, maybe, but it was after all 400 b.c. or so, and in pursuit of exactly the same facts.
  • wonderer1
    1.8k
    Given that physics is the science of matter (hyle), then the question is, what is the science of form? (morphe)Wayfarer

    All sciences are sciences of both.
  • T Clark
    13k
    Your answer isn't connected to my question.Eugen

    You weren't paying attention.
  • Joshs
    5.3k


    As a solution, we are told that the mind cannot be reduced to matter, but if we introduce "form" into the equation, things are resolved. And this is where my total confusion begins.

    If Jaworsky claims that it is logical to believe that a particle with 0 consciousness can form consciousness, how can he believe that a particle with 0 consciousness + form with 0 consciousness can create consciousness?
    Eugen

    For me the problem with Jaworsky’s model is the assumption that materiality, including such things as the nature of particles, can be separated from structural aspects, as if changes in structural organization don’t have any effect on what a particle is. As an example of an alternative to Jaworsky’s thinking, physicist and philosopher Karen Barad writes:

    On my agential realist elaboration, phenomena do not merely mark the epistemological inseparability of “observer” and “ob­served”; rather, phenomena are the ontological inseparability of agentially intra-acting “components.” That is, phenomena are ontologically primitive relations—relations without preexisting relata. The notion of intra­-action (in contrast to the usual “interaction,” which presumes the prior existence of independent entities/relata) represents a profound conceptual shift. It is through specific agential intra-actions that the boundaries and properties of the “components” of phenomena become determinate and
    that particular embodied concepts become meaningful.

    Let me guess. That’s not the point of your issue with Jaworsky.
  • Eugen
    702
    I don't really understand him. On one hand, he says particles can't form consciousness because they have 0 consciousness, but on the other hand, he thinks that particles with 0 consciousness + form with 0 consciousness can.
    I also don't understand his view on emergence. He says holomorphic emergence implies irreducibility, but it seems to me consciousness is reducible to matter + form at the end of the day.
  • Eugen
    702
    You weren't paying attention.T Clark

    You are right, but not for the reason you think. There was a mistake in my initial post.
  • Gnomon
    3.5k
    If Jaworsky claims that it is logical to believe that a particle with 0 consciousness can form consciousness, how can he believe that a particle with 0 consciousness + form with 0 consciousness can create consciousness?Eugen
    I'm not familiar with Jaworsky, but on this forum, we have discussed how the ancient notion of hylomorphism might help to explain some perennial problems in science & philosophy (e.g. consciousness & emergence)*1. Unfortunately, Aristotle's compound of two ontological principles -- matter & form -- also brings together physics & metaphysics. And that's blasphemous to believers in the comprehensive powers of mechanical Materialism --- like the explosive clash of matter & antimatter.

    The tangible substance (hyle) is not very controversial, because it's what we all know via the 5 senses. But the metaphysical part is essentially the same as Plato's concept of transcendent Form (idea or design or logical structure), and is only knowable via the sixth sense of Reason (inference). Apparently, not all humans are capable of grasping such imaginary abstractions; hence the incredulity toward anything immaterial. Even though Aristotle seemed to be uncomfortable with the notion of ideal transcendence, his distinction of Form from Matter, implied that the logical structure that the human recognizes (to cognize/conceive = to know) is invisible to the naked eye (to perceive = to see). Reason is like X-ray vision : it reveals the hidden structure within.

    In the 20th century, Claude Shannon borrowed an old English term -- Information -- a traditionally transcendent concept (soul insight) referring to abstract knowledge : the act of generating internal representations of external concrete reality in the metaphysical Mind (e.g learning). Ironically, for his engineering purposes, the specific meaning (semantics) of such knowledge was not as important as the general ability to contain & convey (syntax) ideas from one mind to another. Yet, for my own philosophical purposes, I have adopted a definition of "Information" that harks back to Aristotle's distinction between malleable Matter (hyle) and causal Energy (act of changing form ; in-form-action).

    Surprisingly, in the 21st century, scientists have re-discovered the identity of physical Energy and mental Information*2. Some people seem to think that Energy is a material substance that flows like water. But physicists are aware that Energy is an imaginary invisible intangible Cause to which we attribute observed changes in material objects. Just as invisible intangible Energy (action) can be transformed into Mass (matter), Mental Information can be transformed into Causal Energy, and vice-versa. Does any of that new science remind you of Aristotle's transformation of transcendent Form into immanent Matter? :smile:


    *1. Hylomorphism is a philosophical doctrine developed by the Ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle, which conceives every physical entity or being (ousia) as a compound of matter (potency) and immaterial form (act), with the generic form as immanently real within the individual. The word is a 19th-century term formed from the Greek words ὕλη (hyle: "wood, matter") and μορφή (morphē: "form"). Hylomorphic theories of physical entities have been undergoing a revival in contemporary philosophy.
    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hylomorphism

    *2. The mass-energy-information equivalence principle :
    American Institute of Physics
    Landauer’s principle formulated in 1961 states that logical irreversibility implies physical irreversibility and demonstrated that information is physical. Here we formulate a new principle of mass-energy-information equivalence proposing that a bit of information is not just physical, as already demonstrated, but it has a finite and quantifiable mass while it stores information.
    https://pubs.aip.org/aip/adv/article/9/9/095206/1076232/The-mass-energy-information-equivalence-principle
  • Gnomon
    3.5k
    ↪Joshs
    I don't really understand him. On one hand, he says particles can't form consciousness because they have 0 consciousness, but on the other hand, he thinks that particles with 0 consciousness + form with 0 consciousness can.
    I also don't understand his view on emergence. He says holomorphic emergence implies irreducibility, but it seems to me consciousness is reducible to matter + form at the end of the day.
    Eugen
    If you are interested in an amateur philosophical perspective, my thesis postulates a way to resolve your incomprehension of 0 + 0 = 1. Hint, one of those 0s is infinite. It also explains evolutionary emergence of Life & Mind, by reference to the hylomorphic concept : hint Form is holistic. :smile:
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