Its not that we can't know how consciousness occurs by measuring brain states. — Philosophim

If we can, can you explain it? Particles interacting with each other in the only ways they can, due to their properties and the forces acting upon them, are doing things other than interacting with each other in the only ways they can, due to their properties and the forces acting upon them. We know this subjectively, because we are each experiencing. And we know it objectively, because scans of our own brains during this experiencing reveal nothing but particles interacting with each other in the only ways they can, due to their properties and the forces acting upon them. What I mean is, we don’t look at those scans, and say, "What the...! What's going on there??" And if we didn’t know what the scans were, we would not think, "Ah. this is a conscious being." Because we are only seeing, if you will forgive me, particles interacting with each other in the only ways they can, due to their properties and the forces acting upon them.

Hello Philosophim,

We may be at an impasse here Bob. I respect your view point, but I can't agree on this one. Being able to express doubt about a theory does not disprove a theory. A scientific theory is not like the layman's meaning of theory.

Firstly, I agree that “theory” does not refer to the same thing as it is used in colloquial speech in science, and I was using it in its scientific sense.

Secondly, the problem is that the more we understand the brain + consciousness and the actual methodological approach science uses (i.e., reductive naturalism) the more we understand that our old ways of scientific explanation simply do not work with consciousness.

So I am saying that the scientific theory is wrong in the sense that it doesn’t prove what it thinks it does and, quite frankly, the only way to reconcile it in favor of it is to reach towards metaphysics.

I will refer back to the argument:

The form is as follows: “consciousness is [set of biological functions] because [set of biological functions] impacts consciousness [in this set of manners]”. That is the form of argumentation that a reductive naturalist methodology can afford and, upon close examination, there is a conceptual gap between consciousness being impacted in said manners and the set of biological functions (responsible for such impact) producing consciousness

And your response:

No, there is not a conceptual gap between the biology and the experience. Get someone drunk and they become inebriated. This is due to how alcohol affects the brain. No one disputes this. The only gap is you don't know what the other person is subjectively experiencing while they are drunk. Objective consciousness vs subjective consciousness.

I am not disputing, nor does the above argument contend, that medications and drugs affect our minds—I am not saying that, under a view where the brain does not produce consciousness, I would expect someone who gets drunk not to become impaired. I am likewise not claiming that we shouldn’t expect neural activity corresponding to where alcohol inhibits brain functions.

What I am saying is that explaining the qualitative experience that drunk person has in terms of the brain functions, as opposed to those functions being the extrinsic representation of mental activity, has the explanatory gap of ‘I see how those functions impact consciousness, but how do those functions produce consciousness?’. This can be clearly see, at least by my lights, in the abstract form of any argument reductive naturalism can afford in terms of explaining consciousness.
When you say “ The only gap is you don't know what the other person is subjectively experiencing while they are drunk”, I feel as though you are somewhat agreeing with me but you still do not agree that the qualitative experience is different than our conceptual account of the brain functions. For example:

I'm not sure that's the right comparison. Its not "also have a qualitative experience", its "why is that a qualitative experience?" The interpretation of the wavelength by the brain is the qualia is it not?

Seeing with a brain scanner that alcholol inhibits this and that doesn’t produce any conceptual explanation of how the brain functions (inhibited or still functional) are producing the qualitative experience (e.g., the drunk person’s experience of seeing the color red) of that person. That’s where the explanatory gap is. Likewise, the interpretation of a wavelength and your brain’s ability to acquire that it is green doesn’t conceptually explain your qualitative experience of the greeness. If you already hold that the brain produces consciousness, then, yes, I would expect you to try to explain the mental event as the wavelength interpretation: but whether one can actually give a conceptual reductive explanation of that is what is in question.

I think you may agree with me here insofar as you hold some aspect of our subjective experience as off limits (and thusly non-reducible to the brain), and, in that case, it is important to note that if you agree then I think you are conceding that you do not have an conceptual account of how a mind-independent brain allegedly produces consciousness and, thusly, you cannot prove it. I am not saying it is impossible nor that it isn’t the case: I am saying you cannot prove it if you cannot conceptually reduce mental states (such as seeing the color red) to brain states—and, no, as seen in the form of the argument, appealing to how functions impact consciousness says nothing about them producing consciousness.

I'm having a hard time understanding the difference between those terms. If you have knowledge of something, you are aware. And if you are aware, that attention is qualia is it not?

No. Awareness is more generic than being conscious in the sense that I am using it. The former is just the ability to quantitatively observe one’s environment (like an AI) while the latter a qualitative experience of one’s environment (like a human). An AI does not know what it is like to see red qualitatively: when it ‘sees’ red, it is just mechanically registering that it was red based off of wavelengths, but it has no qualitative experience of it.

To me it appears you're comparing unconscious awareness with conscious awareness.

Yes I am. If a being has no qualitative experience, they may be still aware of their environment (like an AI, or a speed gun).

The man sees something that he is not aware of. I suppose I would say his unconscious mind sees the object, but his conscious mind does not. So comparing that to your point, the unconscious mind would see green, while the conscious mind would not experience the qualia of green, but he would know that it was green. Is that a good comparison to what you're saying?

This isn’t what I am saying, but I would like to go with it to explain my previous points above: when you explain that he knows that it was green you can easily explain this in terms of brain states (and what not), but you can’t explain why, when the person doesn’t have blindsight, why they consciously experience the greeness. The conceptual gap lies exactly between the explanation of how a being unconsciously knows the color and consciously experiences it. Under the conceptual explanations of physicalism (that the mind is produced by the brain), there is absolutely no reason why there would be a qualitative experience of the greenness on top of the brain merely mechanically interpreting the wavelengths.

Now I am not saying that about blindsight (but only wanted to use it to hopefully convey the conceptual gap better), I am saying two things:

1. Blindsight patients only prove that people can lose the ability to identify with the conscious (qualitative) experience, and that is indicated by them:

A) Clearly being able to see; and
B) Answering that they aren’t seeing; and because I
C) Consider it a better explanation to hold that all life is qualitatively experiencing (so long as they are alive), so I think it makes more sense to say that they are qualitatively experiencing.

In terms of C, obviously I anticipate you are going to disagree with that, but the justification is depending on the resolution of the hard problem (or lack thereof). So I will put a pin it for now.

2. Blindsight patients, if #1 isn’t the case, demonstrate potentially that they have lost (at least partially) there meta-consciousness (i.e., the ability to be aware of their qualitative experience). So, instead of being unable to identify with their qualitative experience but it still is happening, they may not even have it anymore (because of something getting damaged). Again, I think animals can be qualitatively experiencing without being aware that they are: without having self-knowledge.

Does this also fit into your definition of awareness and experience? So in blindsight terms, we would say he is aware of the object in front of him, but he does not experience it in his qualia.

Exactly! I am not actually claiming that the blindsight person is aware of the object but not conscious, but this is a perfect depiction of the conceptual gap with a reductive methodological approach. Appealing to reductive accounts only provides evidence of a person being aware and not experiencing: the experiencing they are having is extra phenomena that isn’t expected under that account (physicalism) of the world.

Now I think you may be able to see the conceptual gap in explaining the qualitative experience of the greeness (of the pen) by appealing to “the wavelengths are interpreted by the brain as green”: the latter only explains bare awareness and doesn’t explain at all why there would be qualia. Thusly, this doesn’t prove that the qualitative experience of the greeness is reducible to the brain’s interpretation of the wavelength: this is the conceptual gap.

He's asking, "Why is there subjective experience?" He's not saying, "Its impossible for the brain to produce subjective experience". He says it seems unreasonable, but it clearly does

I agree. I think that Chalmer’s is still trying to explain consciousness by a physicalist metaphysical account of the world and he didn’t fully see it as an irreconcilable problem. But that is usually how hard problem’s are first formulated: the person still has allegiance to the core theory that they are positing a dilemma for. Nowadays, I think it is recognized a lot more, by philosophers in philosophy of mind, as irreconcilable for physicalism.

My point is that “but it clearly does” is incredibly unwarranted. He give’s zero conceptual account reductively of how it “clearly does”. I think he was still thinking just in the sense that brains affect conscious experience.

Nothing we study about the brain will ever give us insight into its subjective experience. It is outside of our knowledge. That's why its a hard problem.

Given what I have said hitherto, if you agree with me that we cannot gain insight into qualitative experience then you are equally conceding that we cannot reduce qualitative experience to brain states; which means you have no proof that the former really is from the latter.

According to Chalmer's here, it is not presumption. That is the easy problem.

Chalmer’s never said that consciousness (as qualitative experience) being explained through the brain is an easy problem, he said that awareness aspects of consciousness (such as the functions which you quoted later on) are easy problems. His use of the term “consciousness” includes ‘awareness’ and ‘experience’. Within his schema, yes, the awareness aspects of consciousness are easy problems (if that is what you are talking about). But he isn’t saying that qualitative experience is an easy problem.

I do not care about physicalism, dualism, or idealism. I care about logical consistency, philosophical schools of thought be damned! :) To me its like I use a martial arts move that does not fit in with karate and someone berates me that it destroys karate. If the move is effective at defending oneself, what does it matter?

I respect that, but the terms are good quick and general depictions of the fully thought out, logically consistent, metaphysical views. If you hold that the brain produces consciousness, then the only logically consistent views available to you are physicalist accounts of the world: there’s no way around that.

It is not that the hard problem comes about from physicalism, its that the hard problem is for our ability to understand the subjective nature of consciousness an an objective manner

I have to push back here: it is absolutely due to one’s metaphysical commitment to the brain producing consciousness, which is only claimed in physicalist accounts of the world (by definition). Your second sentence implicitly depends on a physicalist account of the world being true; and this just muddies the waters when someone uses it implicitly but denounces it explicitly. Philosophim, if you think that the brain produces consciousness and the brain (and the world) is mind-independent, then you are a physicalist. By ‘physicalist’, I do not mean one oddly specific and straw manned position, I just mean that you are subscribing to a view that is a part of the metaphysical family of views under physicalism. I don’t see how you can argue around this.

Dualism and idealism are not objective, so of course the hard problem doesn't exist. When you don't care about objectivity, a lot of problems go away

If by “objective” you mean “something which we can empirically observe”, then no metaphysical theory, including physicalism (including the view that the brain produces consciousness), “cares” about “objectivity”. This is why I worry when you denounce physicalism but then implicitly use it in your arguments: it seems like you think you aren’t engaging in metaphysics.

They can know what consciousness is objectively. They simply can't know what a consciousness experiences subjectively. Brain state A can be switched to state B, and every time they do, you see a Cat, then a Dog in your mind. You can tell them this, but no one knows what that experience you have of seeing a cat or dog is like.

Again, please remember that “they can know what awareness is objectively”--not experience.

Again, I think we're in agreement that it is impossible for science to ever know what it is like to subjectively experience from the subject's viewpoint. This in no way backs a claim that the brain does not produce a subjective experience.

If science can’t prove that you experience, then (1) you are engaging in metaphysics when you claim that the brain produces consciousness and (2) experience is irreducible to the brain states because we cannot conceptually prove it (by the reductive naturalist method, which is the same one science uses).

So in your viewpoint, if I am actively thinking, "I know 2+2 equals 4", is that qualia? If not, what is it?

I would say that it is qualitative in the sense that it occurred at a timestamp within a steady flow of qualitative time, but it was non-spatial—so not qualitative pertaining to that. Likewise, I would also hold that the imagination is qualitative. I hold that our faculty of reason is a sense that takes perceptions in as its input and generates concepts of them.

Also, for my sake, instead of saying, under a philosophical theory x results, can you simply give me the logic why X results? My experience with people citing such theories is that everyone has a different viewpoint on what that theory means, so I want to understand what it means to you.

I will do my absolute best! I agree that people tend to hide being names and badges; However, I think it is important to note that you are making metaphysical claims, not just scientific ones.

What is higher consciousness? Why is higher consciousness different from lower consciousness?

Through evolution, not all conscious beings have the same capabilities—e.g., my dog lacks the cognitive capabilities to abstract his perceptions as much (or at all) like I can. Likewise, some beings are qualitatively experiencing, but have no perceptions (i.e., they cannot represent the world to themselves), such as some plants. Higher vs. lower consciousness is the abilities/faculties a being has in relation to others. We evolved to have higher capacities and abilities than other animals.

Perceptions are sensations which a mind processes into a representation of the world.

Correct.

You seem to imply that our direct attentiveness to it is not required. So in the case of blindsight, the man is conscious of that which he cannot attend to

I believe so (if I am understanding you correctly). My mind’s ability to identify with or have self-knowledge of the qualitative experience is different than merely having it. He cannot “attend to it” because he isn’t meta-conscious or perhaps he simply can’t identify as “his self” having them (so it could be an ownership thing).

Finally, here's a link to a fairly good philosophy professor online who breaks down the hard problem. I'm posting it so that you know I understand the subject, and to also help clarify what I mean by the hard problem, and why we should just separate consciousness into objective and subjective branches.

I never doubted that you have studied and looked into the hard problem! I think we have different interpretations of it.

Thank you Bob for taking the time to really break down your methodology for me. This subject comes up every so often and I find most people are either unable or unwilling to really go into the details. Another long discussion already, but one that I am glad to explore!

As always, I am glad to explore it as well!

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

Its not that we can't know how consciousness occurs by measuring brain states.
— Philosophim
If we can, can you explain it? — Patterner

Sure, lets use a modern medical practice, anesthesia. If you've ever had a major surgery, they give you different types of chemicals with the sole purpose of knocking you unconscious. Here's a paper talking about anesthesia and unconsciousness if you're interested. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2743249/#:~:text=According%20to%20this%20framework%2C%20anesthetics,patterns%20available%20to%20cortical%20networks).

Let me also clarify what I mean. We cannot get inside of the subject of consciousness. Its impossible. No outside measurement will reveal what is inside. Subjective consciousness is inside. But can we measure brain states and find causality between a person's ability to express subjective consciousness? Absolutely. To think the brain does not cause consciousness is to invalidate decades of working science and medicine.

What I am saying is that explaining the qualitative experience that drunk person has in terms of the brain functions, as opposed to those functions being the extrinsic representation of mental activity, has the explanatory gap of ‘I see how those functions impact consciousness, but how do those functions produce consciousness?’. — Bob Ross

Perhaps its the construction of your sentence I disagree with, and maybe not your underlying point. The problem is you keep saying "impact" as if its different from "cause". They aren't. Now, does that mean they are the entire cause? No one could say that. But you can't separate "impact" from "cause". They are essentially the same thing.

What I think you're trying to get at, as this is what the real problem of "consciousness" is, is that you cannot see the internal subjectiveness of a function. We see because light bounces off of objects. Measurement is essentially all done by bouncing something off another thing. But a subjective experience is the internal process of matter and energy. We cannot "bounce" off of the subjective internal. We can see the brain and its functions by bouncing off photons and other measuring tools, but those are inadequate to get inside the thing itself.

When you say “ The only gap is you don't know what the other person is subjectively experiencing while they are drunk”, I feel as though you are somewhat agreeing with me but you still do not agree that the qualitative experience is different than our conceptual account of the brain functions. — Bob Ross

Perhaps the confusion is that I am talking about the external measurement of consciousness, not the internal. Regardless of the qualia one experiences, the brain states are the outside objective measurements of that creation. If an apple falls from a tree, gravity suddenly impacts the living cells. They react to it. Do we know what its like to experience that reaction internally as a cell or group of cells? No, its impossible. Does gravity still affect the apple and we can observe the reaction of the cells? Yes.

Seeing with a brain scanner that alcholol inhibits this and that doesn’t produce any conceptual explanation of how the brain functions (inhibited or still functional) are producing the qualitative experience (e.g., the drunk person’s experience of seeing the color red) of that person. That’s where the explanatory gap is. — Bob Ross

To be clear from my end: the brain scanner cannot measure the internal experience of what its like to have the qualia of being drunk. It can scan the brain and note that the individual is inebriated, and through testing, we can note that when the brain is in a particular state, inebriation of the subject occurs. Hands down Bob, alcohol changes the brain which causes drunkenness. That's not debatable. What you seem to think is that because we cannot measure the internal subjective experience of consciousness, that we can't say the brain causes consciousness. That doesn't work. Its illogical.

If you already hold that the brain produces consciousness, then, yes, I would expect you to try to explain the mental event as the wavelength interpretation: but whether one can actually give a conceptual reductive explanation of that is what is in question. — Bob Ross

Its not in question. We can give a conceptual reductive explanation of why alcohol inebriates a person. We cannot give a conceptual reductive explanation of what it is like to internally experience that inebriation. This is because we cannot measure the subjective with the tools we have. That does not mean the objective measurements of what we can measure, suddenly cannot make objective conclusions and measurements of consciousness by the beings actions and responses.

I think you may agree with me here insofar as you hold some aspect of our subjective experience as off limits (and thusly non-reducible to the brain), and, in that case, it is important to note that if you agree then I think you are conceding that you do not have an conceptual account of how a mind-independent brain allegedly produces consciousness and, thusly, you cannot prove it. I am not saying it is impossible nor that it isn’t the case: I am saying you cannot prove it if you cannot conceptually reduce mental states (such as seeing the color red) to brain states—and, no, as seen in the form of the argument, appealing to how functions impact consciousness says nothing about them producing consciousness. — Bob Ross

Again, I think the issue here is vocabulary. Functions cause consciousness. "Impact" is part of causality. If a cue ball impacts the eight ball, it causes it to fly in a particular direction. Cause is what produces an affect. If I touch a person's brain with an electrode at a particular location, scan the brain, and they say, I see a red car, I start to associate brain scans with their expression of what they consciously perceive. If we can repeat it every time and the person is being honest, then we see the brain causes the person to see the color red.

What we cannot see is the internal of being that brain stimulus. We can see the neuron's cascade. We can see they do it every time and produce a particular result. But that is all by external measurement. We cannot measure internally. We cannot measure existence as its subject. Our inability to do so does not mean that the external results of brain stimulation suddenly do not cause consciousness. Its proven. There's no gap here. The only gap is again, our inability to measure something as a subject itself.

Given what I have said hitherto, if you agree with me that we cannot gain insight into qualitative experience then you are equally conceding that we cannot reduce qualitative experience to brain states; which means you have no proof that the former really is from the latter. — Bob Ross

We're so close on agreement here Bob! The only problem is that we have reduced qualitative experience to brain states repeatedly in science and medicine for decades. I really feel at this point you're just using the wrong words to describe a situation. We can measure qaulitative brain states to measure levels of consciousness as an outside observer. we can never measure qualitative brain states to measure levels of conscousness as an inside observer, the subject itself.

Chalmer’s never said that consciousness (as qualitative experience) being explained through the brain is an easy problem, he said that awareness aspects of consciousness (such as the functions which you quoted later on) are easy problems. — Bob Ross

Agreed, this is what I meant.

If you hold that the brain produces consciousness, then the only logically consistent views available to you are physicalist accounts of the world: there’s no way around that. — Bob Ross

Again, you'll have to explain what you mean by physicalist. Yes, the terms are great if everyone holds exactly to what they are and if we all agreed on what they meant. In experience for any serious discussion, I've found the person using the term must clearly explain what they mean as it is often a subjective use for them.

Dualism and idealism are not objective, so of course the hard problem doesn't exist. When you don't care about objectivity, a lot of problems go away

If by “objective” you mean “something which we can empirically observe”, then no metaphysical theory, including physicalism (including the view that the brain produces consciousness), “cares” about “objectivity”. — Bob Ross

No, objectivity is something that can be logically concluded to the point that any challenge against it fails. A falsifiable claim that cannot be shown to be false essentially.

I believe you define qualia as

Nowadays, I think it is recognized a lot more, by philosophers in philosophy of mind, as irreconcilable for physicalism. — Bob Ross

Would you mind linking to a philosopher who believes that mind does not come from the brain? I would like to read from one.

Philosophim, if you think that the brain produces consciousness and the brain (and the world) is mind-independent, then you are a physicalist. — Bob Ross

I'm not sure what you mean by "mind-independent". The brain and the mind are one. Mind is not independent of matter and energy, it is the internal result of matter and energy. We are not separated from matter and energy. We are matter and energy. Which tells us that matter and energy can be conscious in the right combination. If that makes me a physicalist or contradicts a physicalist view according to your view of physicalism, I don't care.

The point is it is logically consistent to hold that matter and energy can create consciousness internally. We can see evidence of this internal experience by our own experience, and the actions that an internal consciousness results in. But knowing what the subjective experience of matter and energy that is not ourselves, is currently impossible with our tools and understanding of reality.

So in your viewpoint, if I am actively thinking, "I know 2+2 equals 4", is that qualia? If not, what is it?

I would say that it is qualitative in the sense that it occurred at a timestamp within a steady flow of qualitative time, but it was non-spatial—so not qualitative pertaining to that. Likewise, I would also hold that the imagination is qualitative. I hold that our faculty of reason is a sense that takes perceptions in as its input and generates concepts of them. — Bob Ross

Then this disagrees with every notion of qualia I've ever known. If "you" are thinking, that's "your" qualia. Qualia is "you" experiencing something. I can observe and identify thoughts correct? I can consciously dream. This is a massive definition gap in the discussion, and if this is not agreed upon, we will simply talk past each other.

In my understanding of qualia, qualia is a base requirement for consciousness. Meaning that like all tigers are cats, all consciousness is qualia. It is possible to have qualia but not have consciousness. From my example, one could observe, but not attempt to identify. This is qualia. But if you are thinking, you are observing and identifying. Therefore that is consciousness.

Your proposal of qualia seems to imply a person can be conscious of something, but not have qualia of that something. That seems very contradictory to me. Can you try to give a logical reason why? Lets remove qualitative and spatial as I think these terms add nothing to the point. Nothing in your head is spatial, and any identification can be considered qualitative upon examination. "4" and "red" are just concepts that we give a limit to, but we're talking about the qualia of experiencing "4" and "red". You're a person thinking "2+2=4". Why is that any different from "I see the color red"?

However, I think it is important to note that you are making metaphysical claims, not just scientific ones. — Bob Ross

I view the term "metaphysical" as its most base definition. "Analysis of the physical". Put another way, its the interpretation of reality in a way that makes logically consistent assessments of that reality. All language is metaphysical. As such, I find the term not very useful. All that matters to me is if my definitions are consistent, logical, and accurate in assessing reality.

What is higher consciousness? Why is higher consciousness different from lower consciousness?

Through evolution, not all conscious beings have the same capabilities—e.g., my dog lacks the cognitive capabilities to abstract his perceptions as much (or at all) like I can. — Bob Ross

So really this is the ability for a being to be conscious of more abstracts than another. If that's the case I don't see how higher consciousness affects any of the points here. Its still consciousness, just more of it.

You seem to imply that our direct attentiveness to it is not required. So in the case of blindsight, the man is conscious of that which he cannot attend to

I believe so (if I am understanding you correctly). My mind’s ability to identify with or have self-knowledge of the qualitative experience is different than merely having it. He cannot “attend to it” because he isn’t meta-conscious or perhaps he simply can’t identify as “his self” having them (so it could be an ownership thing). — Bob Ross

Again, this is a unique view of consciousness to me. I have never heard of consciousness without qualia.

After thinking about the larger discussion, I believe I can summarize our differences down to a few points. We may have to simply agree to disagree on some of these points, but I think a conclusion one way or the other on these will bring the discussion to a close.

1. The definition of qualia

I define qualia as essentially "subjective experience". This subjective experience does not need to be identified, but a stream of sensations, emotions, etc. would be qualia. Anything that I do not subjectively experience, for example the blood pumping through my left leg, would not be qualia.

You seem to think that there is a subjective experience that is qualia, and and a subjective experience that is qualitative. A person can have a qualitative experience without having qualia. This seems a semantic difference from my above evaluation. However, our conclusions differ. You seem to imply that something quantitative that does not have qualia is conscious, while I would call that an unconscious event. To help clarify this issue, what would you define as unconscious?

2. You believe that because we cannot measure the subjective experience of being conscious, that this proves that we cannot claim that consciousness comes from brain states. I note that science and medicine has for years evaluated objective consciousness through medicine and has determined that brain states cause consciousness. I also note that we cannot measure the subjective experience of consciousness, but that it is irrelevant to the conclusion that brains cause consciousness as objective measures of consciousness aren't trying to evaluate subjective measures, just objective outcomes.

I hope that summary accurately depicts our current differences, as well as some similar stances we hold. I honestly believe that we're not very far from one another's view points, and it seems a few semantical differences are leading to two different conclusions. Thanks again Bob, I look forward to hearing from you.

Hello Janus,

“I would argue that they do not “see” in the same manner (i.e., one is qualitatively seeing while the other is just quantitatively processing its environment), so I think you are equivocating when using the term “seeing” in this sentence to refer to both.”
--Bob Ross

I would argue that if there is no awareness of seeing that it makes no sense to speak of qualitative seeing.

I am unsure as to your point here in terms of your quote of me. I was saying that you were equivocating ‘seeing’ when referring to quantitative processing of one’s environment vs. qualitatively experiencing one’s environment.

Moreover, one can be qualitatively ‘seeing’ without having the self-knowledge that they are, so I am unsure as to what you mean by “no awareness of seeing” somehow entails that there is nothing to be said about them qualitatively ‘seeing’.

Again I would say that being disassocited from experience is the same as having no (qualitative) experience

This is just false. There are people who are disassociated from themselves, who have lost all sense of self, but we don’t say that they thereby do not exist simply because they can no longer identify with their existence. Likewise, one can have qualitative experience while failing to identify as having them.

Quality is a judgement which is all in the conscious modelling.

What is the “conscious modelling”?

Bob

I think it all depends on what you mean by "qualitative seeing". People with colour agnosia can "guess" with not perfect, but greater than random accuracy, what colour card is being held before their eyes, for example. They are not actually aware of seeing the colour, but that greater than random accuracy of guessing shows that the data which would normally produce an experience of colour is registered by the brain and can be more or less reliably accessed even though the conscious qualitative experience is absent.

My point is that I would not refer to the brain's mere registration of the data as qualitive experience or seeing. If you don't agree, then all we will be arguing about is terminology, and there cannot be a definitive right answer. So, I'm saying that to me, it makes no sense to speak of qualitive experience in the absence of awareness of that experience.

Quality is a judgement which is all in the conscious modelling.

What is the “conscious modelling”? — Bob Ross

Conscious modeling is conceptual modeling made possible by re-cognition. We say things have qualities because we recognize similarities. Take red as an example; we call red things red because they look similar to one another, and there is a great range of different red. But on either side towards yellow and blue we reach points where we would say a thing is orange or mauve or purple.

To think the brain does not cause consciousness is to invalidate decades of working science and medicine. — Philosophim

That answers the question of Where. My question is of How. How do the physical processes that explain our senses, and our behaviors resulting from the signals our senses send to the brain, also aware at different levels? These physical processes are doing two things at once, and one of them isn't physical. And the one that isn't physical isn't necessary. There are living things that react to stimuli without awareness of the stimuli or their reaction to it. We have also built machines like this. If our awareness is causal, then their benefit, and the reason evolution choose for them, is obvious. But it still doesn't explain the How. (If our awareness is not causal, of course, and merely observes our actions, which are simply physics-driven interactions of particles, then it is of no value, and there is no reason evolution would have selected for it.)

Hello Philosophim,

1. The definition of qualia

I think that, in hindsight, it isn’t helping our conversation to call qualia “subjective experience” (in your case) nor “qualitative experience” (in my case) because the meaning of the word just gets pushed back into what “subjective” and “qualitative” mean; and I don’t think we are agreeing on that aspect. So let me try to use a more technical definition of ‘qualia’: ‘a mental event whereof there is something it is like to have such in and of itself’.

Let’s go back to the blindsight person. When they see, there is still something it is like to see (qualitatively) as they do, but they cannot identify that they are the one’s having it. Another example is a person who has dreams but doesn’t identify as having them: they still have the dream and there is something like to have the dreams, but they have lost the cognitive ability to self-reflectively identify with having it. In these cases, there is still something it is like in and of itself to qualitatively experience (e.g., to see in the case of a blindsight person or to dream in the other case) and, thusly, they still have qualia. However, it is a different discussion whether they have meta-consciousness, which, to make it clearly, I would say can include both self-reflective cognition and introspection.

Let’s take another example: blinking. Most of the time, ‘I am’, as the ‘Ego’, do not have introspective access to my qualitative experience of blinking but, lo and behold, if ‘I’ focus on it (e.g., you tell me “don’t forget to blink!”) then it “bubbles up” to the “ego” and I have introspective access. In both cases, there is still something it is like to experience blinking even though I do not have introspective access, as the ego, in both scenarios. The conscious experience is still happening.

2. You believe that because we cannot measure the subjective experience of being conscious, that this proves that we cannot claim that consciousness comes from brain states. I note that science and medicine has for years evaluated objective consciousness through medicine and has determined that brain states cause consciousness. I also note that we cannot measure the subjective experience of consciousness, but that it is irrelevant to the conclusion that brains cause consciousness as objective measures of consciousness aren't trying to evaluate subjective measures, just objective outcomes

You switched the terminology mid-argument here: the first sentence is about “consciousness” in the sense of qualitative experience—i.e., qualia—and the second was about mere observance/awareness. Pointing out that science can evaluate the “objective consciousness”, which is just mere awareness with no necessity of qualia, has nothing to do with the claim in the first sentence. If you are going to say we can evaluate “objective consciousness”, in the manner you have described, then you can’t equally claim that that gives us insight into “subjective consciousness” which is what you would need to prove “subjective consciousness” is caused by brain states. This is why keeping the terminology very tight is vital, I think you conflated “consciousness” multiple times the above quote.

Perhaps its the construction of your sentence I disagree with, and maybe not your underlying point. The problem is you keep saying "impact" as if its different from "cause". They aren't. Now, does that mean they are the entire cause? No one could say that. But you can't separate "impact" from "cause". They are essentially the same thing.

Yes, agree that normally by cause we mean “physical causality”. What I mean by “cause” is the actual reductive explanation of phenomena and not necessarily a physical chain of impact. So, for me, “impact” and “cause” are two different things. If you would like to use them as synonymous, then we could use “cause” and “explanation” to denote the same distinction I am trying to make.

What I think you're trying to get at, as this is what the real problem of "consciousness" is, is that you cannot see the internal subjectiveness of a function

My problem is that you seem to be claiming that “objective consciousness” and “subjective consciousness” are two sides of the same coin, and the side we see is just relative to our epistemic access (e.g., my private qualia looks like observation, identifying, and action from a public eye); but by this “objective” observation of “consciousness” we gain absolutely no insight into the being also qualitatively experiencing—there is a disconnect there in your argument. When I refer to “consciousness”, I am talking about that private qualia that we definitely cannot empirically observe (which I think you are agreeing with me here) and this has no connection to an empirical merely observation of a being observing, identifying, and acting upon its environment.

Let me try to be very specific. I think, under your view, you cannot account for your qualia as reducible to brain states (but you can reduce your ability to observe, identify, and act upon your environment as reducible thereto) and you cannot know that anyone else has qualia—you can only effectively know the PZ aspect. Thusly, you cannot claim that science, which is empirical analysis that you concede gives us no knowledge of beings having qualia, has proven that qualia is reducible to the brain but you can claim that science can reduce our ability to observe, identify, and act upon our environment. Do you see how these are completely separate claims? And that the hard problem pertains exactly to the part which you cannot prove is reducible to brain states?

Hands down Bob, alcohol changes the brain which causes drunkenness. That's not debatable. What you seem to think is that because we cannot measure the internal subjective experience of consciousness, that we can't say the brain causes consciousness. That doesn't work. Its illogical.

What is illogical about claiming that the phenomenal world, which includes brains, is an extrinsic representation of the mental?

What is illogical about saying that we have cannot account for “consciousness” in the sense of qualia (qualitative experience) in terms of the reductive naturalist approach? Again, I think you may be conflating your use of “consciousness” in terms of “objectively” with “subjectively”--and the hard problem only pertains to the latter. The objective aspect you refer to doesn’t matter in terms of whether the brain causes or doesn’t cause mental events.

If a cue ball impacts the eight ball, it causes it to fly in a particular direction.

Correct, but from my perspective, as an idealist, what is fundamentally going on there is a representation of mental events—there are no mind-independent cue balls hitting each other: there isn’t series of cue balls that exist beyond consciousness experience (other than as ideas in a mind). The physical causality you are referring to is what it looks like from our perceptions of those ideas playing out, so to speak.

Our inability to do so does not mean that the external results of brain stimulation suddenly do not cause consciousness. Its proven. There's no gap here. The only gap is again, our inability to measure something as a subject itself.

Being able to associate people’s mental activity with brain states doesn’t prove in itself that the latter causes (i.e., reductively explains) the former: you keep bringing up examples of this as if it does prove it. Why do you think it proves it?

We're so close on agreement here Bob! The only problem is that we have reduced qualitative experience to brain states repeatedly in science and medicine for decades. I really feel at this point you're just using the wrong words to describe a situation. We can measure qaulitative brain states to measure levels of consciousness as an outside observer. we can never measure qualitative brain states to measure levels of conscousness as an inside observer, the subject itself.

I am confused, as you agreed with me that we cannot reduce “subjective consciousness” to brain states and that is all that matters for the debate on the hard problem—and there has never been such a proof in medicine nor science. Please send me anything that you think proves it in either of those fields.

What you are referring to, I think, is our ability to affect consciousness with what looks like from our perceptions as physical objects (e.g., popping a pill to get rid of my headache, cutting part of a brain off and observing the person’s personality change, etc.). This doesn’t mean that we have a reductive, conceptual account of brain states producing mental states. Within my perspective, popping a pill is just an extrinsic representation of mentality: the pill doesn’t fundamentally exist as something physical.

Again, you'll have to explain what you mean by physicalist.

I mean a person who holds that the world is fundamentally mind-independent: it is made up of non-conscious, mind-independent ‘parts’. Idealists, on the other hand, is a person who thinks it is mind-dependent: it is made up of a mind and everything is in mind.

No, objectivity is something that can be logically concluded to the point that any challenge against it fails. A falsifiable claim that cannot be shown to be false essentially.

What do you mean by “logically concluded to the point that any challenge against it fails”? Do you mean logical necessity?

I would say that objectivity is that which its truthity is will-independent.

Also, “a falsifiable claim that cannot be shown to be false” is a contradiction in terms. If it is falsifiable, then it is possible to shown to be false, whereas an unfalsifiable claim is something which cannot be shown to be false.

Would you mind linking to a philosopher who believes that mind does not come from the brain? I would like to read from one.

In terms of modern day philosophers, Bernardo Kastrup is a good one. You can read his free papers at https://www.bernardokastrup.com/p/papers.html . I would recommend reading Analytic-Idealism: a Consciousness-dependent Ontology for a good general quick-ish read.

In terms of older philosophers, which are still pertinent but didn’t flesh out the views 100% accurately, Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason is a must pre-requisite, then Schopenhauer’s The World as Will and Representation (both volumes), and Berkeley’s A Treatise Concerning Principles of Human Understanding. I would suggest just starting with Kastrup for an introductory read.

I'm not sure what you mean by "mind-independent". The brain and the mind are one.

Not quite. Either the brain produces the mind, and thusly the mind is an emergent property thereof (and so they are not one and the same) or vice-versa.

The point is it is logically consistent to hold that matter and energy can create consciousness internally.

Something being logically consistent doesn’t make it true in metaphysics nor science: idealism and physicalism are both logically consistent.

So I agree with you here but not with your implication that it gives your view the upper-hand.

Then this disagrees with every notion of qualia I've ever known. If "you" are thinking, that's "your" qualia. Qualia is "you" experiencing something

Not at all: if by “thinking” you mean the normal usage of the word (e.g., I am thinking “I want some bread”). Think of lower-life forms, like squirrels: they don’t self-reflectively know (cognitively) that there is something it is like to see from there eyes nor that they qualitatively experience in general. According to your definition, then, one would likewise have to have the over-and-above cognitive abilities to gain self-knowledge of one’s qualia, which is different than the qualia itself.

Your proposal of qualia seems to imply a person can be conscious of something, but not have qualia of that something.

Not under my definitions. But under yours: yes. That is the whole point I am trying to make: under your argument your “objective consciousness” is referring, in terms of what it can prove, to only PZs.

"4" and "red" are just concepts that we give a limit to, but we're talking about the qualia of experiencing "4" and "red". You're a person thinking "2+2=4". Why is that any different from "I see the color red"?

Correct. But the cogitated “2+2=4” or “I am seeing the color red” are self-reflective notions of the qualia--they are not the qualia themselves.

I view the term "metaphysical" as its most base definition. "Analysis of the physical"

This isn’t what metaphysics means: it is the “study of that which is beyond the possibility of all experience”. For example, are there Universals or just particulars? Does the ‘now’ have ontological privilege (or is it a timeblock)? Is the world fundamentally mental or physical? These are metaphysical questions.

Your definition implies more like our self-reflective cognitive abilities, which has nothing to do with the subject.

So really this is the ability for a being to be conscious of more abstracts than another. If that's the case I don't see how higher consciousness affects any of the points here. Its still consciousness, just more of it.

You can think of it as “better” consciousness while they all are still consciousness.

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

So let me try to use a more technical definition of ‘qualia’: ‘a mental event whereof there is something it is like to have such in and of itself’. — Bob Ross

I think this is a good approach and agree on this.

In these cases, there is still something it is like in and of itself to qualitatively experience (e.g., to see in the case of a blindsight person or to dream in the other case) and, thusly, they still have qualia. — Bob Ross

I like your separation of qualitative and qualia at first, but then you erase the distinction making qualitative experience just a subordinate of qualia. You didn't answer my question about the difference between conscious and unconscious either. In every normal case of those words, we would say that what is qualitative can be received unconsciously, but what is qualia is what is received consciously. Are we saying then an unconscious being has qualia? A P zombie would be completely qualitative right? It would have to see and act upon different stimuli. If you start to say that qualitative processing is also qualia, then is a P zombie a conscious being? Because we would be saying there is something it is like to have such in and of itself.

If qualitative experience is qualia, then it is a part of qualia. If I agreed with you, in our conversation then its pointless to note what is qualitative and what is not. My reasoning about qualia would still be "the experience from the subject", and you already said that we can match the brain to qualitative experience. Which means we've now associated brain states directly with subjective experience. If it can observe, identify, and this is confirmed in its actions, we just say its a qualitative analysis or objective consciousness that doesn't concern itself with any other type of qualia.

This is a very real problem you'll need to address Bob. If there's no difference between qualitative and qualia beyond qualitative being a specific type of qualia, then it doesn't disprove my argument. The "subjective consciousness" of higher qualia that you note would still just be qualia. If the qualitative is just a form of qualia, brain scans can explain qualitative actions, therefore qualia.

You switched the terminology mid-argument here: the first sentence is about “consciousness” in the sense of qualitative experience—i.e., qualia—and the second was about mere observance/awareness. — Bob Ross

I don't think I switched terminology here. I divided consciousness between the subjective and objective, but they are descriptor of the totality of consciousness as it is generally used today. "Consciousness" as a whole contains both the subjective and objective aspects. Objective consciousness is the expression of the actions that something subjectively experiences. The objective is simply what we can scientifically observe and conclude, while the subjective is impossible to know.

If you are going to say we can evaluate “objective consciousness”, in the manner you have described, then you can’t equally claim that that gives us insight into “subjective consciousness” which is what you would need to prove “subjective consciousness” is caused by brain states. — Bob Ross

Objectively, subjective consciousness is explained by brain states. That we are certain of. Just go back to my brain surgery example. What we cannot know, is what that subjective experience is like from my viewpoint. Objectively, it doesn't matter exactly what the subject is experiencing from its perspective. If the person states they see a tree, we don't need to know exactly how they subjectively experience a tree to believe they see a tree right?

I'll give you another example, a car. We see that a car runs. When we look under the hood we see an engine. How does it move? Gas burns and some weird thing happens that turns the engine. Later we find out its the combustion of gas that leads to magnetism. How does magnetism work? Well... we don't fully know. Its kind of a mystery really. Does that negate that the truck is ultimately run by magnetism, even though we don't understand why exactly magnetism actually works? No.

What I mean by “cause” is the actual reductive explanation of phenomena and not necessarily a physical chain of impact. So, for me, “impact” and “cause” are two different things. — Bob Ross

Sure, lets for now say they don't need a physical impact. But in the case of the brain, it is physical, and it impacts consciousness. Therefore consciousness is caused by the physical brain. The clarification does not negate that. Now if you want to speculate that something else besides the brain causes the mind, we can look at that. I'm not saying the brain is necessarily the only cause.

My problem is that you seem to be claiming that “objective consciousness” and “subjective consciousness” are two sides of the same coin, and the side we see is just relative to our epistemic access — Bob Ross

Yes.

but by this “objective” observation of “consciousness” we gain absolutely no insight into the being also qualitatively experiencing — Bob Ross

Correct.

there is a disconnect there in your argument. When I refer to “consciousness”, I am talking about that private qualia that we definitely cannot empirically observe (which I think you are agreeing with me here) and this has no connection to an empirical merely observation of a being observing, identifying, and acting upon its environmen — Bob Ross

Incorrect, but by just a tweak of wording. Yes, the act of knowing what it is like for another being to be subjectively conscious is unknowable. We can know what its like for ourselves of course. As I've noted, we are incredibly close on our analysis. I think its just a few syntax and definition differences.

We know that as subjectively conscious beings, there are certain actions which we can only do while conscious. So first we define consciousness. I noted it was the ability to observe/experience and identify. I cannot know what exactly another being subjectively experiences while its observing and identifying, so it cannot be part of my definition of consciousness in regards to other beings. But I can know that only a being which can experience and identify can make certain actions. If a being makes those particular actions that require it to observe and identify, then objectively, I can note they are conscious.

Subjective consciousness is for ourselves. It is our personal understanding that it is possible to have a state of experience subjectively. But objectively, no one can ever know that experience, and we cannot know theirs. Can we know they are conscious by their actions? Yes. That is objective consciousness. The analysis of subjective consciousness is a belief system. It is not objective.

Did you know some people cannot visualize in their mind Bob? Its just dark when they close their eyes. Unless they told you, you might never figure it out. Even then, I can't actually know what not being able to visualize is like. I can make conjectures and beliefs, but it is outside of my personal knowledge. Does that mean that I can know people claim they cannot visualize? Yes. Can we make objective tests that a person who can visualize would pass while a person who cannot visualize can fail? Yes.

Its like truth Bob. We can never know the truth. The truth is what is. But can we set up a logical system of deduction called knowledge that works for us in objective society? Of course. Does that fact that we cannot directly know the truth invalidate knowledge as a useful tool? No. Does the fact that we can never know what is true negate the knowledge of the identity of truth as a concept? No. Same with an objective consciousness and its relation to the subjective mind.

Can we doubt that when we know something, it isn't true? Of course. Does doubt alone negate knowledge? The idea that we are being manipulated by an evil demon or are brains in a vat? No, you know this. An objective consciousness is what is within our capability of knowledge. Same with the concept of a subjective consciousness. Does pointing out that because we cannot know what it is like for another being to be subjectively conscious change anything about our objective conclusions? No.

To negate the knowledge that the brain causes subjective consciousness Bob, you have to have more than a doubt. More than a, "But it doesn't quite answer everything." Doesn't matter. All of our knowledge that we hold can be criticized in this way. We may wonder at the mystery of magnetism on the quantum level, but we still use it objectively to power our cars. As well, your own assessment is not free of this criticism either. If you claim brain states do not cause subjective consciousness, you have to combat modern neuroscience and medicine, which holds this to be known. This requires a replacement.

What does your replacement offer? If brain states do not cause consciousness, then what have we been doing wrong all these years in medicine? It is not your notion that we cannot know exactly what it is like to be a subjective being that I disagree with. It is the idea that because we do not, we have to throw away all the other objective knowledge we've accumulated. This knowledge does not make claims about the exact subjective experience of an individual, so where is the logic in throwing it away?

There must be more than doubt, or skepticism, or the idea that our current knowledge cannot identify or understand certain aspects of reality. We must offer an alternative that gives us something better than the current system. I asked this a while back and I'll ask again. What do you hope to get out of your system? I can invent the idea that an evil demon controls all of our actions, but it cannot be proved, so what does it do for us in reality?

What you are referring to, I think, is our ability to affect consciousness with what looks like from our perceptions as physical objects (e.g., popping a pill to get rid of my headache, cutting part of a brain off and observing the person’s personality change, etc.). This doesn’t mean that we have a reductive, conceptual account of brain states producing mental states. Within my perspective, popping a pill is just an extrinsic representation of mentality: the pill doesn’t fundamentally exist as something physical. — Bob Ross

No, the pill is physical because it fits the terms of what physical means. The pill is an identity with a particular set of essential properties. It matches those properties in reality, therefore we know it as a pill. We use the identity of "physical" to represent reality, and our analysis of reality works. Everything is matter and energy, so far that's held. If someone pops a rock instead of a pill, it doesn't matter that they identified and believed the rock to be a pill, its not going to have the same effect. Again, this is general knowledge Bob. You can't come to it and start saying things like "it looks like from our perceptions". If we go that route, we don't have knowledge. And if we don't have knowledge, any system goes. And if any system goes, people are going to choose the system that works in reality, not yours.

"All of existence consists,it is claimed,solely of ideas—,emotions,perceptions,intuitions,imagination,etc.—even though not one’s personal ideas alone."

I did look up the paper, and wanted to point this summary out. Bob, we've already discussed knowledge before. This author is a person who clearly does not understand knowledge. Knowledge and personal experience consists of all of these things. Yet reality is ultimately what all of these are tested against. I can have a dream that I can fly, but when I awake and imagine myself flying, I can't do it in reality. We've discussed this at length in the past, so I do not feel the need to revisit it. His theory is a theory we can invent, but a theory that fails when tested against reality. I will not debate this point as a courtesy since we already have before. This may be a point in which we agree to disagree here. If this is a key point of difference between what is stated here, then we will not be able to continue the conversation. I still have full respect for your thought process, passion, and intelligence, it is just something we have already explored at length.

I'm not sure what you mean by "mind-independent". The brain and the mind are one.

Not quite. Either the brain produces the mind, and thusly the mind is an emergent property thereof (and so they are not one and the same) or vice-versa. — Bob Ross

Let me clarify then, a "living brain" and the mind are one. A dead brain of course produces nothing. But a living brain which fires synapses and has a subjective experience is the mind. Beyond the science of "death", You can do an experiment to confirm this. Note where your consciousness is in your body. Now move to a new location. Does your consciousness move with you? Can you by concentration extend your consciousness out past your body to where you were? I know I'm unable to. Therefore the only reasonable conclusion is that consciousness follows physical movement, and is therefore subject to physical reality. It is located at a particular physical location. With our scientific understanding of the brain, the only reasonable conclusion is that physical location is the brain. I am open to hearing reasonable alternatives.

The point is it is logically consistent to hold that matter and energy can create consciousness internally.

Something being logically consistent doesn’t make it true in metaphysics nor science: idealism and physicalism are both logically consistent. — Bob Ross

That's an avoidant answer Bob. I don't hold to idealism and physicalism because I often find they are summary identities that are not logically consistent when examined in detail. Unless you can show me why its not logical to hold that matter and energy can create consciousness internally, you do not have a logical argument yourself. You either need to present a logical alternative, which I have not seen so far, or demonstrate where my logical claim fails explicitly.

Being able to associate people’s mental activity with brain states doesn’t prove in itself that the latter causes (i.e., reductively explains) the former: you keep bringing up examples of this as if it does prove it. Why do you think it proves it? — Bob Ross

Its not "associate", its real claims of knowledge and science. If you deny this, then once again we're going to have to agree to disagree here. I've given plenty of examples in neuroscience and medicine. I have yet to hear any counters to them besides an insistence its just a correlation. You need to prove they are correlations, not causations, and you have not done so. Expressions of doubt just aren't enough.

Think of lower-life forms, like squirrels: they don’t self-reflectively know (cognitively) that there is something it is like to see from there eyes nor that they qualitatively experience in general. According to your definition, then, one would likewise have to have the over-and-above cognitive abilities to gain self-knowledge of one’s qualia, which is different than the qualia itself. — Bob Ross

According to our discussion of qualia, it is not simply self-reflectiveness. It is the experience of the subject itself. Self-knowledge of qualia is a higher consciousness, but unnecessary to be conscious. If a thing experiences and identifies, it has consciousness. You seem to be implying that only meta-consciousness is consciousness. But its not, its why we note "meta". A squirrel likely may not be able to evaluate its own qualia. That has nothing to do with being conscious at the most basic level.

But the cogitated “2+2=4” or “I am seeing the color red” are self-reflective notions of the qualia--they are not the qualia themselves. — Bob Ross

Self-reflection is also qualia. I don't understand how its not. You even noted that qualitative processing is qualia, so why is this all of the sudden not qualia? On your next pass, lets see if we can really clearly identify what qualia is as a unique identity that does not have these inconsistencies or questions.

I view the term "metaphysical" as its most base definition. "Analysis of the physical"

This isn’t what metaphysics means: it is the “study of that which is beyond the possibility of all experience”. — Bob Ross

The word includes "meta", which essentially means, "about the subject", and the subject is physics, or the physical. Physical in later years has been replaced with "experience", but metaphysics always refers to what is real. It is about taking the real and identifying it in a way that we can logically process. For example, "Gravity pulls everything together", is a metaphysical description of the math and science of gravity. But it relies on there actually being the math and science of gravity. Metaphysics that does not rely on existence or reality isn't metaphysics. Studying what is beyond the possibility of reality is not metaphysics, but speculation and imagination.

Regardless of your definition, the underlying meaning is all that matters. I am discussing matters of experience. Anything that cannot be experienced, is outside of what can be known. Anything outside of what can be known is speculation, and while fun, is pointless to debate the veracity of any one speculation over another.

Finally,

No, objectivity is something that can be logically concluded to the point that any challenge against it fails. A falsifiable claim that cannot be shown to be false essentially.

What do you mean by “logically concluded to the point that any challenge against it fails”? Do you mean logical necessity?

I would say that objectivity is that which its truthity is will-independent.

Also, “a falsifiable claim that cannot be shown to be false” is a contradiction in terms. If it is falsifiable, then it is possible to shown to be false, whereas an unfalsifiable claim is something which cannot be shown to be false. — Bob Ross

Objectivity is deduction that is not contradicted by reality. Going back to a long ago conversation, applicable knowledge. if we don't want to go down that road again, the closest view would be scientific laws and tested theories.

As for falsifiable, all falsifiable means is that we can imagine a situation in which a claim could be false. For example, "I will be at a dinner at 2pm". Its falsifiable in the fact that there is a state in which I am not at the dinner at 2pm." But if I am indeed at a dinner at 2pm, my statement cannot be shown to be false. Apologies for the unclear sentences there.

A good deep dive again Bob! I now these replies are getting long again. I'll try to pare down the next reply.

To think the brain does not cause consciousness is to invalidate decades of working science and medicine.
— Philosophim
That answers the question of Where. My question is of How. How do the physical processes that explain our senses, and our behaviors resulting from the signals our senses send to the brain, also aware at different levels? These physical processes are doing two things at once, and one of them isn't physical. And the one that isn't physical isn't necessary. — Patterner

Its all matter and energy Paterrner. I already covered that with Bob in my last reply, so feel free to sort through to that section. If my reply to Bob doesn't fully answer your question, feel free to ask again.

Its all matter and energy Paterrner. I already covered that with Bob in my last reply, so feel free to sort through to that section. If my reply to Bob doesn't fully answer your question, feel free to ask again. — Philosophim

Let me try to explain my thinking this way... It we saw a skyscraper made entirely of liquid water, we would look for something else going on. Because the properties of liquid water cannot account for the characteristics of a skyscraper.

The properties of matter and energy are even farther removed from the characteristics of consciousness than liquid water from skyscrapers. At least water and skyscrapers are both physical objects, composed of primary particles.

Water and skyscrapers are also closer to flight, though flight is a process, rather than an object. Because flight is a physical process. We can see how flight takes place due to the physical macro characteristics of various physical things; that these physical things are comprised of the primary particles; and how the properties of the primary particles make it possible for them to make the physical things.

I do not see an attempt to explain how the characteristics of consciousness that are not physical things or processes can arise from physical things and processes. It is less logical than building skyscrapers out of water. The fact that there is, clearly, a connection between consciousness and the brain, and consciousness would not exist without the brain, doesn't mean that, when we ask how physical building blocks can lead to non-physical properties, we should settle for the answer "It just does." We should look for what else is going on, as we would for a water skyscraper.

The properties of matter and energy are even farther removed from the characteristics of consciousness than liquid water from skyscrapers. At least water and skyscrapers are both physical objects, composed of primary particles. — Patterner

I've never understood this thinking. Every animal living thing is matter and energy. Many living things have consciousness at a basic level. Therefore matter and energy can be conscious. Why deny what's in front of your eyes?

Many living things have consciousness at a basic level. Therefore matter and energy can be conscious. — Philosophim

But this begs the question - it assumes what needs to be proven. At issue is the claim that organisms can be understood solely in terms of matter and energy, or physics and chemistry. But this is a contentious claim. What if there is something about even the very simplest forms of organic life that is not observable in inorganic matter? What if organism have attributes that are not reducible to physics and chemistry?

To quote a biology article on the topic:

The idea that life evolved naturally on the primitive Earth suggests that the first cells came into being by spontaneous chemical reactions, and this is equivalent to saying that there is no fundamental divide between life and matter. This is the chemical paradigm, a view that is very popular today and that is often considered in agreement with the Darwinian paradigm, but this is not the case. The reason is that natural selection, the cornerstone of Darwinian evolution, does not exist in inanimate matter. In the 1950s and 1960s, furthermore, molecular biology uncovered two fundamental components of life—biological information and the genetic code—that are totally absent in the inorganic world, which means that information is present only in living systems, that chemistry alone is not enough and that a deep divide does exist between life and matter. This is the information paradigm, the idea that ‘life is chemistry plus information’.

Ernst Mayr, one of the architects of the modern synthesis, has been one of the most outspoken supporters of the view that life is fundamentally different from inanimate matter. In The growth of Biological Thought, p. 124, he made this point in no uncertain terms: ‘… The discovery of the genetic code was a breakthrough of the first order. It showed why organisms are fundamentally different from any kind of nonliving material. There is nothing in the inanimate world that has a genetic program which stores information with a history of three thousand million years!’ — What is Information?

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I feel this also fixes ideas that observation or subjective consciousness creates all of reality. Subjective consciousness creates a subjective reality. Subjective reality does not alter objective reality. Whether you define that material in front of you as a rock or not, that material is still there. They each have their uses, but one does not affect the other. — Philosophim

But this overlooks the role of the observer in physics. This shows that the act of observation and the establishment of measurement outcomes seem to play a fundamental role in determining the observed properties of the objects of the analysis, which are, purportedly, also the fundamental particles of physics. This connection between observation and the physical world suggests that the attempt to explain everything solely in terms of physical entities and processes - matter~energy, in other words - is insufficient in accomodating or accounting for the role of the observer.

This is what gave rise to physicist John Wheeler's theory of the 'participatory universe', in which our participation as observers is as essential to the nature of the Universe as are the objects of analysis. So that torpedoes any neat separation of the objective and subjective poles. But that, in any case, is also called into question by 'enactivism', which shows that the organism and environment (or subject and object) are 'co-arising', such that it is impossible to draw an ultimate dividing line between one and the other.

But this begs the question - it assumes what needs to be proven. At issue is the claim that organisms can be understood solely in terms of matter and energy, or physics and chemistry. But this is a contentious claim. What if there is something about even the very simplest forms of organic life that is not observable in inorganic matter? What if organism have attributes that are not reducible to physics and chemistry? — Wayfarer

There's not question being begged here. Doubt or skepticism alone does not refute what is known. Its the old "evil demon" argument Wayfarer. What if everything you know and understand is being manipulated by an evil demon? What if there's something we don't know?

That's always the case. What ifs, imagination, and maybe's are always second class citizens to known facts. Now if something legitimate is found, for example a new energy, matter, or substance, then of course we have a valid question to look into. You must ask the question, then provide something tangible to look into. Is there anything in the universe besides matter and energy? No.

The idea that life evolved naturally on the primitive Earth suggests that the first cells came into being by spontaneous chemical reactions, and this is equivalent to saying that there is no fundamental divide between life and matter. — What is Information?

Largely, there's only a slight difference between life and matter, its true. We have this human centric way of looking at things and sometimes forget we are not special or separate from the rest of reality. I've described life like this: Life is a set of chemical reactions and processes that actively acts to keep its processes going. Contrast this with baking soda and vinegar. The reaction doesn't seek out new baking soda or vinegar, it just reacts and is done. Life is a fantastic delicate balance of all these reactions that seek self-sustainment when the process is about to run out of energy.

The reason is that natural selection, the cornerstone of Darwinian evolution, does not exist in inanimate matter. In the 1950s and 1960s, furthermore, molecular biology uncovered two fundamental components of life — What is Information?

I'm ok with this definition. Once again though, DNA is just more matter and energy. I would argue this is organic life, as I believe we could create an inorganic system of life with AI. I have no issue with expanding the definition to be "matter and energy that can hold and process information".

Ernst Mayr, one of the architects of the modern synthesis, has been one of the most outspoken supporters of the view that life is fundamentally different from inanimate matter. — What is Information?

Nothing wrong with that either. We can define life as we see fit, then apply it across matter and energy. But it does not negate that life is still just matter and energy. Beyond the need to feel unique, there is no evidence of any kind that life is not matter and energy.

But this overlooks the role of the observer in physics. This shows that the act of observation and the establishment of measurement outcomes seem to play a fundamental role in determining the observed properties of the objects of the analysis, which are, purportedly, also the fundamental particles of physics. — Wayfarer

This is a largely misunderstood understanding of quantum physics. Our "observations" are bouncing light particles and photons off of other smaller particles. We read the "bounce" like we do with light, hearing, and everything else, but our actual measurement alters the course of the particles we are tracking. Depending on what we're trying to track with the bounce, we can know one state, but not the other state. It is not that fact that your eyeballs are in the direction of light that quantum outcomes are altered. Its fun science fiction, but not reality.

This is what gave rise to physicist John Wheeler's theory of the 'participatory universe', in which our participation as observers is as essential to the nature of the Universe as are the objects of analysis. So that torpedoes any neat separation of the objective and subjective poles. But that, in any case, is also called into question by 'enactivism', which shows that the organism and environment (or subject and object) are 'co-arising', such that it is impossible to draw an ultimate dividing line between one and the other. — Wayfarer

Now this I like! I agree with this entirely, but perhaps the conclusion may differ from what you're proposing. I wrote a paper that Bob Ross and I had a lengthy conversation over that does somewhat question the neat separation between objective and subjective, but salvages it. Too dense to go into here! At a very basic level, subjectivity is the ability to experience. We can create identities, then attempt to apply them to reality. Those identities that can co-exist without contradiction by reality become objective. Its too dense to get into here, so if you want to make a point, please go to that article, "A theory of knowledge".

Again, our mere presence of having ears and eyes does not alter reality, well beyond being in the way of light and sound like anything else. But, our active measurement can very well affect the reality of the situation then if we never measured it at all. In cases in which our measurement is relatively low mass and energy, the affect to the object being measured is negligible. But in the cases like the quantum realm, its like slinging a que ball at an eight ball.

Further, because we have the capability to identify, we can determine what type of matter and energy is important. Without an identifier, sheep, clouds, and grass would still exist. But there would never be an aspect of reality outside of those identities, that could identify them in a particular way. Our ability to identify, the existence of living brains, creates an interaction with reality that could not happen with a simple reacting object. We are most certainly not apart from reality, but one expression of matter and energy within it that causes a unique type of identity and interaction from anything else.

I've never understood this thinking. Every animal living thing is matter and energy. Many living things have consciousness at a basic level. Therefore matter and energy can be conscious. Why deny what's in front of your eyes? — Philosophim

I do not deny it. I have gone to lengths, with my words and with Nagel's, to make clear that it seems obvious that matter and energy are conscious. Our consciousness is not separable from our brain.

However, some aspects of consciousness do not seem to be explainable by what we have learned about the properties of particles, the forces we are aware of, and how they all interact. I have not heard a theory that attempts to explain how those properties and forces can explain those characteristics. The stance seems to be an unspoken "They just do."

Doubt or skepticism alone does not refute what is known. — Philosophim

It is not something known, but something assumed by you. You assume that it is scientifically established that matter~energy is the only true existent.

it does not negate that life is still just matter and energy. — Philosophim

It is exactly what is called into question by that article. It is saying, there is a capacity or attribute which cannot be accounted for by physics and chemistry, namely, information. There's a well-known aphorism by one of the founders of cybernetics, Norbert Wiener, to wit, 'information is information, not matter or energy. No materialism which does not admit this can survive at the present day.'

in the cases like the quantum realm, its like slinging a que ball at an eight ball. — Philosophim

The explanation of uncertainty as arising through the unavoidable disturbance caused by the measurement process has provided physicists with a useful intuitive guide as well as a powerful explanatory framework in certain specific situations. However, it can also be misleading. It may give the impressions that uncertainty arises when we lumbering experimenters meddle with things. This is not true. Uncertainty is built into the wave structure of quantum mechanics and exists whether or not we carry out some clumsy measurement — Brian Greene, The Fabric of the Cosmos

one expression of matter and energy — Philosophim

An assumption again. You know about the 4% universe, right? So it seems that the current model of physics does not account for 96% of the total matter-energy of the Universe. You might say, well, it might be a previously-unknown type of matter-energy - but if it's unknown, then it is not encompassed by our current understanding of matter~energy. It might turn out not to be physical at all, or to be so radically different from known physics that it upends our ideas of what is physical (per Hempel's Dilemma).

it seems obvious that matter and energy are conscious. — Patterner

That is panpsychism, which seeks to resolve the apparently inexplicable nature of consciousness by saying it is elementary, in the same sense that the physical attributes of matter are. As you then correctly observe there are aspects of consciousness that are external to the models of physics. That is the subject of philosophy of mind, in particular, and there are many involved in trying to come up with a theory.

However, some aspects of consciousness do not seem to be explainable by what we have learned about the properties of particles, the forces we are aware of, and how they all interact. I have not heard a theory that attempts to explain how those properties and forces can explain those characteristics. The stance seems to be an unspoken "They just do." — Patterner

Sure, we don't know everything yet. Just like we don't know how quantum physics fully works. Doesn't mean we can't take what we do know and work with it from there. Doesn't mean that we don't understand the part of quantum physics that we do. Subjective states are internal, whereas we measure externally. If we could one day measure something internally, perhaps? Or its just something that isn't possible. We don't have to know everything about component parts to use the parts that we do know.

Doubt or skepticism alone does not refute what is known.
— Philosophim

It is not something known, but something assumed by you. You assume that it is scientifically established that matter~energy is the only true existent. — Wayfarer

Wayfarer, matter and energy is the only true existent that we know of. Please show me someone who knows of something that exists besides matter and energy. You're evil demoning it up here! :)

Let me rephrase it thus: We know that sometimes what we conclude as knowledge can be changed at a future date with new discoveries or thinking. We also know that sometimes what we conclude as knowledge is not changed with new discoveries or thinking. Therefore what is known today, could be known tomorrow, or change. But the fact that we do not know what tomorrow will bring does not negate what we know now.

Show me knowledge today of something that exists that is not matter and energy. If you do that, then I will concede. If you cannot, then my point stands.

It is exactly what is called into question by that article. It is saying, there is a capacity or attribute which cannot be accounted for by physics and chemistry, namely, information. — Wayfarer

That's just silly. Obviously DNA is matter and energy, and honestly it is a storage of information. So is the brain. So is your hard drive. Do we think that a fly or a roach is something magical because it can retain information? Even plants do. Viruses. There are tons of example of matter and energy that store information. Its just your perspective. We mistake our awe of the magic reality for something that is separate from reality itself.

However, it can also be misleading. It may give the impressions that uncertainty arises when we lumbering experimenters meddle with things. This is not true. Uncertainty is built into the wave structure of quantum mechanics and exists whether or not we carry out some clumsy measurement — Brian Greene, The Fabric of the Cosmos

Viable and predictable uncertainty comes about two ways. By our measurement's effects, and our inability to measure. Any uncertainty by wave math that does not rely on the former is due to the later. A wave function is formed as a mathematical concept to deal with our inability to get a fine tune. Its like Newtonian physics versus relativity of large objects. Newtonian physics works at certain scales, but larger scales require us to add in variables we could eliminate as insignificant. Quantum mechanics is a theory full of probabilities, possiblities, and poor measurement, and yet its been brilliantly put together to the point we can create reliable cell phones.

This is because science understands well you can't wait to understand everything before applying what you do know. Carefully applying what we can be certain of in quantum mechanics, including the certainty of uncertainty, allows us to create a theory which works in many applications. Our lack of understanding everything about it does not negate what we do know about it.

Could we one day find something in physics that changes our entire outlook? Of course. Does that mean we discard what we know today? No.

it seems obvious that matter and energy are conscious.
— Patterner

That is panpsychism, which seeks to resolve the apparently inexplicable nature of consciousness by saying it is elementary, in the same sense that the physical attributes of matter are. — Wayfarer

I did not say anything about panpsychism. I don't care for broad theories that don't make any sense, nor care to be attributed to them unless without my explicit consent. I never said consciousness was elementary. Consciousness arises when a particular combination of matter and energy produces what we identify as consciousness. Think of water. Its a Hydrogen and two Oxygen atoms. Separate, they express completely differently then if we combine them together in a particular fashion. We don't blink at that utter, inconceivable, mind blowing magic, and yet we blink at consciousness? Why? Every single existent thing is a marvel of impossiblity that it exists, and yet it does. Why is consciousness suddenly an exception?

Just like not all combinations of matter and energy create water, not all combinations of matter and energy create consciousness. Water is not elementary, and to my mind, I cannot see consciousness as elementary either.

As you then correctly observe there are aspects of consciousness that are external to the models of physics. That is the subject of philosophy of mind, in particular, and there are many involved in trying to come up with a theory. — Wayfarer

Certainly, but unless the theory is testable and objective, its conjecture. The philosophy of mind is not going to solve this without being lock step in with neuroscience. It is not going to come up with anything new if it proposes the idea that consciousness does not come from matter and energy, when that is all we clearly know. Anyone can come up with a "what if". Great philosophy comes up with, "What is".

Wayfarer, matter and energy is the only true existent that we know of. — Philosophim

Says who? Quote a source for that. See, what you always argue is basically 'materialism 101'. Then you are exasperated that it can be questioned, when it seems so obvious.

the fact that we do not know what tomorrow will bring does not negate what we know now. — Philosophim

It might completely revolutionise it. If we were having this discussion in 1620, you would be utterly convinced that the Earth stands still and Sun goes around it. If we were having it in 1840, you would know nothing about electromagnetic fields.

A wave function is formed as a mathematical concept to deal with our inability to get a fine tune. — Philosophim

The ontological status of the wave-function is one of the great unanswered questions of modern science and philosophy. If you google the phrase, science disproves objective reality, you will find many discussions of the radical implications of this idea.

Obviously DNA is matter and energy, and honestly it is a storage of information. So is the brain. So is your hard drive. Do we think that a fly or a roach is something magical because it can retain information? Even plants do. Viruses. There are tons of example of matter and energy that store information. — Philosophim

It is precisely the ability of living material to store information and to adapt to the environment, that marks it off from inorganic matter, such as crystals or plasma. It is not 'just silly' but fundamental distinction, the subject of the comment I provided above from a reputable biological scientist.

Wayfarer, matter and energy is the only true existent that we know of.
— Philosophim

Says who? Quote a source for that. See, what you always argue is basically 'materialism 101'. Then you are exasperated that it can be questioned, when it seems so obvious. — Wayfarer

I'm not exasperated Wayfarer, you're the one stamping down on the stone here (Callback! I liked that story.). You agree that its materialism 101, so you know all the evidence. If you want to challenge it, go ahead. Its on you, not me to disprove. Provide me evidence of something that exists that is not matter and energy, and we have a discussion. If not, I'm right. I don't have to prove that the evil demon doesn't exist, you have to prove it does.

the fact that we do not know what tomorrow will bring does not negate what we know now.
— Philosophim

It might completely revolutionise it. If we were having this discussion in 1620, you would be utterly convinced that the Earth stands still and Sun goes around it. If we were having it in 1840, you would know nothing about electromagnetic fields. — Wayfarer

Of course. We could only know what we knew then. Suppositions are great for exploration, and questions are always needed. But do you know how many other proposals there were that also weren't correct? Some people thought the world existed on the back of a turtle. We don't countenance ideas that do not have anything substantial to them that add to what we can know. My problem is not with the idea that there might be more than matter and energy in the universe. Sometimes I feel you don't catch that in our discussions. Its your insistence that there is something beyond matter and energy without actual evidence.

A wave function is formed as a mathematical concept to deal with our inability to get a fine tune.
— Philosophim

The ontological status of the wave-function is one of the great unanswered questions of modern science and philosophy. The fact that you think you can sweep it aside with a sentence speaks volumes. — Wayfarer

This is not a counter. This is a statement from a person that suddenly realized they got into territory they weren't familiar with. It was also more than one sentence, many of which you did not address. If it was so easy to discount my hand waving, why didn't you do it? Educate me, don't insult me because all that tells me is you don't actually have anything substantial to say.

If you google the phrase, science disproves objective reality, you will find many discussions of the radical implications of this idea. And they are radical - far more so than you're apparently aware of. — Wayfarer

Ah, there we go again with the condescending insults. Apparently I'm not aware of them. Without checking with me, you just assume I'm some plebe beneath you eh? You didn't even bother to link a specific paper and use it to make a point.
I've been in a lot of debates over the years Wayfarer. Did you mean this one? https://www.technologyreview.com/2019/03/12/136684/a-quantum-experiment-suggests-theres-no-such-thing-as-objective-reality/ Supperposition, quantum entaglement? Spooky action at a distance? Even if I wasn't familiar with these concepts, how would I ever know how you thought these concepts countered my point? Not a very good argument.

I've respected you Wayfarer. I've always asked you your viewpoints, asked you to clarify, give evidence, etc. instead of simply dismissing you. Because I might learn something from anyone. You see Bob Ross here? The first time he replied to me in a thread it was a wall of text. I had to paste it into word and spent time spacing the paragraphs out so I could read it. And you know what? It was brilliant. If I had simply looked down on Bob without giving him a chance like you seem so willing to do with me here, I would have missed engaging with one of the most brilliant, insightful, and thoughtful people on this board. (Sorry if I embarrassed you Bob)

I wouldn't be this direct normally, but I hold you in higher regard than snippy insults and then leaving. Am I wrong? I took a rain check discussing this topic because we were in Bob's thread. I'm cashing that check Wayfarer because this is my thread. You in, or out?

However, some aspects of consciousness do not seem to be explainable by what we have learned about the properties of particles, the forces we are aware of, and how they all interact. I have not heard a theory that attempts to explain how those properties and forces can explain those characteristics. The stance seems to be an unspoken "They just do."
— Patterner

Sure, we don't know everything yet. Just like we don't know how quantum physics fully works. Doesn't mean we can't take what we do know and work with it from there. Doesn't mean that we don't understand the part of quantum physics that we do. Subjective states are internal, whereas we measure externally. If we could one day measure something internally, perhaps? Or its just something that isn't possible. We don't have to know everything about component parts to use the parts that we do know. — Philosophim

That's all entirely true. That is the state of our understanding of consciousness. When we have two different things, such as objective and subjective, outer and inner, physical and mental, or any A and B, we should not assume that understanding and having explained A is the same as understanding and having explained B. And we should not claim that, by talking about A, we are talking about B.

I hold you in higher regard than snippy insults and then leaving. — Philosophim

OK, I appreciate that, and I apologise for it. I will explain myself further. As I see it, scientific or philosophical materialism is the predominant outlook of many educated members of today's culture. When it is described as 'materialism' it seems pejorative, because that term also refers to 'an unhealthy obsession with material goods and status'. But that's not what I am referring to. The kind of materialism I'm referring to is the attitude, characteristic of modern scientific cultures, that the only real constituents of existence are those that can be described in terms of matter and energy. And that is what you're proposing - you state it outright in any number of posts. That is what is at issue. OK, I acknowledge, it 'pushes buttons' in my case, hence my snippy tone. I'll try and refrain from that in future.

But leaving that aside, I've provided a number of counter-arguments, but you don't recognise or respond to them - you simply brush them aside, as per this exchange:

Many living things have consciousness at a basic level. Therefore matter and energy can be conscious. — Philosophim

To which I responded that 'this begs the question'. Then you said

There's not question being begged here. Doubt or skepticism alone does not refute what is known. — Philosophim

I'm pointing out that the assumption that organisms can be understood in solely physical terms is the point at issue. In other words, I'm saying it isn't known. You're assuming that organisms can be accounted for solely in terms of matter-energy, and brushing off a reasoned argument (illustrated with references), which calls this into question. That's what 'begging the question' means.

So we then get to:

Provide me evidence of something that exists that is not matter and energy, and we have a discussion. — Philosophim

I mentioned already the aphorism that 'information is information, not matter or energy'. So, do you think that is wrong? Do you think that Ernst Mayr's assertion that the genetic code cannot be accounted for in terms of matter and energy, but implies something over and above them, is also wrong? I provided both of those as examples, and you haven't discussed them or even acknowledged them, beyond saying 'it's kind of silly'. Because you already know (or think you know) that 'everything is matter-energy', then you're dismissing any counters to that, without really presenting an argument.

Finally, the point I made about the difficulty of establishing what exactly is objective reality, according to quantum physics, was given as a response to your assertion in the OP that:

Subjective reality does not alter objective reality. — Philosophim

This is precisely what the measurement problem in quantum physics calls into question.

Educate me... — Philosophim

See Quantum: Einstein, Bohr, and the Great Debate about the Nature of Reality, Manjit Kumar

Uncertainty: Einstein, Heisenberg, Bohr, and the Struggle for the Soul of Science, David Lindley

These are popular books that lay out some of the philosophical issues of physics. Notice the sub-titles!

When we have two different things, such as objective and subjective, outer and inner, physical and mental, or any A and B, we should not assume that understanding and having explained A is the same as understanding and having explained B. — Patterner

I agree. But we can still know of A and B, and not fully knowing B does not negate what we fully know of A.

OK, I appreciate that, and I apologise for it — Wayfarer

Water under the bridge. I've had my bad days, thanks for staying. :) You're a good person Wayfarer.

I'm pointing out that the assumption that organisms can be understood in solely physical terms is the point at issue. You're assuming that organisms can be accounted for solely in terms of matter-energy, and brushing off a reasoned argument (illustrated with references), which calls this into question. That's what 'begging the question' means. — Wayfarer

My attempt was not to ignore this point, I still don't see from my view how I'm begging the question. If I had said something like, "Ice cubes are cold because they are ice", yeah, that would definitely be on me. I'm not saying it is truth that everything in the universe is made out of matter and energy. I'm stating everything that we know of in the universe is made out of matter and energy. To me that's the same as saying, "Ice cubes are known to be made out of H20 that is at a temperature below 32 degrees F." Maybe the reality is that its not. But that's what we know today.

Knowledge is not the same as truth. Going with your example, it used to be known that the Sun rotated around the Earth. I mean, it would be obvious right? You look up in the sky and there it goes! If someone came along and said, "Actually, we rotate around the Sun", that person might be ridiculed, even though what they said was true.

I'm no stranger to ideas that challenge the status quo. As such, I don't dismiss or ridicule new ideas. The point I've been trying to convey is that I'm very open to the idea that we rotate around the Sun, but there has to be some evidence for it. I'm very open to the possibility that there is more than matter and energy in the universe. Correct me if I'm wrong Wayfarer, but it seems your assertions are that this must be true. To me that's different from it could be true.

So if you claim is that there is more to the universe than matter and energy as an assertion, I'm looking for evidence or proof of that assertion. Its not to belittle the idea, its to see if there is something behind it more than doubt or speculation. Its not an assumption that everything in the universe that we know of is made up of matter and energy, its currently a fact. Facts can be wrong, but they need other facts to challenge them.

I mentioned already the aphorism that 'information is information, not matter or energy'. So, do you think that is wrong? Do you think that Ernst Mayr's assertion that the genetic code cannot be accounted for in terms of matter and energy, but implies something over and above them, is also wrong? I provided both of those as examples, and you haven't discussed them or even acknowledged them, beyond saying 'it's kind of silly'. — Wayfarer

Sure, my apologies if I was too short in analyzing your point. I believe his assertion that information is more than matter and energy is wrong. DNA is made up of matter and energy. All life is made up of matter and energy and stores information. Computers are matter and energy, and they store information. Its wonderous that matter and energy can do so, and honestly makes me want to go down other speculative paths about reality.

Now is it possible that information could be more than matter and energy? Sure, I'm definitely open to it. But if the claim is to be more than speculation, it needs a few good points to back it. For example, does the current model of matter and energy have weaknesses, failings, and inadequacies. Most certainly! To my mind, there is not a single system invented by humanity that explains the world that we can't find issues with. Even math, what we would consider the gold standard! So I am listening and considering challenges to the current matter and energy model with seriousness.

Back to the point of "information" being something different from matter and energy. One criticism I can definitely get behind is that it is difficult to explain information in terms of matter and energy. It would be like me explaining how to start your car by using quantum theory. Quantum theory is fantastic and explains a lot of things, but its pretty worthless in explaining how to start your car. Does explaining that you need a key to insert and turn it an invalidation of quantum mechanics though? No. Does quantum mechanics invalidate the need for a better model of communication to explain how to start your car? No here as well!

In my readings of challenges to a matter and energy or a physicalist model, it seems to me many think that a problem with the current model or the introduction of a new model somehow invalidates the old model. This is where I'm looking for evidence, and so far have not seen it. Can we make an information model of reality and apply it to dna? It might be fantastic to do so and allow us to communicate in new ways with new ideas. But does that invalidate that dna is also made up of matter and energy? No.

Its really the core issue Bob and I are debating right now. Bob wants to claim that consciousness cannot come from the brain, whereas we know it does. I'm very open to there being something new introduced, or even seeing how a new model of understanding mind apart from the brain might be more useful to us then using the brain model alone. But at the end of the day, if there is a claim the old model is simply wrong, it needs to show where it is wrong in its realm of knowledge by demonstrating evidence of contradiction, and a replacement that fixes it.

Subjective reality does not alter objective reality.
— Philosophim

This is precisely what the measurement problem in quantum physics calls into question — Wayfarer

My point was that a "wave" in math is not he same as a wave in the ocean. I've waded into mathematical terminology before, and often times English is an attempt to convey what the math is saying, but often times is interpreted much more literally to our understanding of the terms than their mathematical meaning.

For example, particle and wave do not mean that particulate matter stops being particulate matter. Particle math is useful for straight line mathematical assessments. So for example you fire a ball from a cannon, you treat it as a "particle". Wave math is about a mathematical distribution of odds when a straight path is not certain. Electrons are not the solid orbits of the Bohr model, but constantly "buzzing". As such, it becomes more mathematically accurate if when we move an electron that we calculate the probability that this "buzzing" will affect the final outcome. This is most readily communicated as a "wave" or predicted high and low outcomes based on the limits of probable possibilities from the "buzz".
This is why you can treat an electron like a wave or a particle. It all accounts on what you're doing to the electron, and what you're trying to measure.

My point is that our subjective reality of whether we treat the electron as a wave or a particle does not alter reality, it just alters are mathematical predictive or post assessment models. Having our eyeballs focused in the direction of a particle does not change its behavior. Our eyes are just receptacles, they do not affect reality outside of this receipt. Blasting particles with another type of particle to measure it at the quantum level however distorts the outcome.

Here's a good summary of the issue. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Measurement_problem

If you read, you'll notice when they're talking about the collapse of the wave theory into classical particle mechanics, they're trying to figure out why and how exactly that math occurs. Decoherence theory sums it up best for me.

"As it is well known, [many papers by Bohr insist upon] the fundamental role of classical concepts. The experimental evidence for superpositions of macroscopically distinct states on increasingly large length scales counters such a dictum. Superpositions appear to be novel and individually existing states, often without any classical counterparts. Only the physical interactions between systems then determine a particular decomposition into classical states from the view of each particular system. Thus classical concepts are to be understood as locally emergent in a relative-state sense and should no longer claim a fundamental role in the physical theory."

Put in layman's terms, it is more of a natural state for there to be probabilities within matter and energies' next predicted movement. Instead of X energy at Y velocity = Z location every time, the reality is more =Z+ or - 2. Only by the relative interaction of object forces can classic particle type analysis be viewed. So when we take a dense cannon ball and fire it from a cannon, the natural state is truly that of a wave. The cannonball, unlike the classical particle model, will not travel exactly X feet at a exactly the angled arc of the cannon. But, the variation may be so insignificant for our purposes, that a classic particle model is all we need for the accuracy we desire.

Finding the exact relative situation that causes wave collapse, or essentially gets rid of the probabilistic + or -2 wiggle, is a very real challenge at the sub atomic level. There may be impacts in our measurements that suddenly resolve the predicted outcomes of a probabilistic wave into closely resembling a particle model. So while we might expect, due to probability, that a particle could end its path within this variance of outcomes, oddly it more often then not acts like the limits of its possible variants do not exist, or mostly lands on just z, and can be treated as a particle.

None of this changes the idea of what is subjective or objective, at least to my understanding of the definitions. If you could explain why you think they negate subjective and objective outlooks, I would love to hear it. I do appreciate the links Wayferer, but they aren't access to the books themselves. While they may be interesting reads, is there something I can read more immediately to contribute to the conversation at this time?

Hello Janus,

I think it all depends on what you mean by "qualitative seeing". People with colour agnosia can "guess" with not perfect, but greater than random accuracy, what colour card is being held before their eyes, for example. They are not actually aware of seeing the colour, but that greater than random accuracy of guessing shows that the data which would normally produce an experience of colour is registered by the brain and can be more or less reliably accessed even though the conscious qualitative experience is absent.

I would say that they are still seeing the colour card, to some degree, if they can accurately guess them; and the fact that sometimes they can’t means that they no longer have introspective access to those qualitative experiences.

By “qualitatively seeing”, I mean something which is not-quantitative (viz., it has no definite quantity) and there is something it is like to see in and of itself.

My point is that I would not refer to the brain's mere registration of the data as qualitive experience or seeing. If you don't agree, then all we will be arguing about is terminology, and there cannot be a definitive right answer. So, I'm saying that to me, it makes no sense to speak of qualitive experience in the absence of awareness of that experience.

I think you are conflating consciousness proper with meta-consciousness: there can be a qualitative experience and something it like in and of itself to see of which the person, as the ego, does not have introspective (or perhaps cognitive) access to.

Conscious modeling is conceptual modeling made possible by re-cognition. We say things have qualities because we recognize similarities. Take red as an example; we call red things red because they look similar to one another, and there is a great range of different red. But on either side towards yellow and blue we reach points where we would say a thing is orange or mauve or purple.

I see: is this like our ability to self-reflective on our perceptions? Is that what you are saying?

Bob

When we have two different things, such as objective and subjective, outer and inner, physical and mental, or any A and B, we should not assume that understanding and having explained A is the same as understanding and having explained B.
— Patterner

I agree. But we can still know of A and B, and not fully knowing B does not negate what we fully know of A. — Philosophim

(FYI, I added the sentence "And we should not claim that, by talking about A, we are talking about B." after you had hit Quote.)

I may be misinterpreting, but it seems to me that, every time I ask about B, you give me an explanation of A, and say you are giving an explanation of B.

Hello Philosophim,

Let me clarify my terminology with more technical verbiage as, although I do think we are progressing, I think we are (1) using the terms differently and (2) our usages thereof still contain nuggets of vagueness.

Also, you brought up some good points, and I just wanted to recognize that: you are genuinely the only other person on this forum that I have discussed with that forces me to produce razor thin precision with my terminology—and that is a good thing! The more rigorous the discussion, the better the views become.

To better relate the terms together, in contradistinction to how you use them and to shed light on some of the issues I have with your view, I am going to revert back to ‘qualia’ being best defined as ‘instances of qualitative experience’; but by ‘qualitative experience’ I would like to include in the definition the property of there being ‘something it is like to have it in and of itself’.

I think this fits more what I am trying to convey, as I think you are thinking that ‘qualitative experience’ and ‘qualia’ are two separate things: the former being non-quantitative experience and the latter being a ‘mental event whereof there is something it is like to have such in and of itself’. Consequently, I think you view the hard problem as pertaining to the latter and not the former; whereas, I am trying to convey that the hard problem pertains to both.

Within my terms, non-quantitative experience (i.e., the experience of qualities) is necessarily coupled with the property of there being something it is like to have it in and of itself. For you, I think your argument only works if you deny this claim.

If I see something qualitatively (viz., non-quantitatively), then I would say that there is necessarily something it is like in and of itself to see that something (in that manner as a stream of qualities). So, to clarify, ‘qualia’ is just an instance of a stream of qualities that we experience which we nominally single out to meaningfully navigate our lives; and the experience of the stream of qualities has of its own accord the property of something it is like to have such. For me, the qualitative seeing of the green apple is inextricable from there being something it is like to qualitatively see the green apple: I anticipate you denying this claim.

In terms of ‘sensations’, I only hold they are qualitative if we are talking about a fundamentally qualitative world, which would entail a mind-dependent world, and not a mind-independent one. If we are talking about a world that is mind-independent (such as being fundamentally matter and energy) then I think, to be consistent to that view, there are fundamentally no qualities: it only exists with the emergent property of our minds from our brains. Our nerves, for example, although from our qualitative experience seem to be gathering qualitative senses, are really taking in objectively quantifiable measurements—there’s no quantities there.

In terms of ‘perceptions’, I am still referring to our mind’s (or I think in your case: our brain’s) interpretation of those sensations (which are quantitative or qualitative depending on the aforesaid factors).

By “consciousness”, then, I am referring to ‘qualitative experience’ which, I will stress, includes the property of ‘there being something it is like to have such in and of itself’.

You didn't answer my question about the difference between conscious and unconscious either.

I apologize: I must have forgotten! By “unconscious”, I mean something which is not ‘qualitatively experiencing’ (e.g., a camera taking in light and processes the environment in the form of a picture).

In every normal case of those words, we would say that what is qualitative can be received unconsciously, but what is qualia is what is received consciously.

Agreed, because “consciousness” colloquially is used very loosely. However, I must stress that there is nothing qualitative (in terms of sensations) being received by your body (and ultimately processed by the brain) if the brain is producing the mind: the qualities that you observe are soley within your conscious experience as an emergent property of a quantitative brain and body. The world, according to that view, and correct me if you disagree, would be purely ontologically quantitative. The qualities simply aren’t there—they only exist within the emergent minds.

Are we saying then an unconscious being has qualia?

I think my attempt to refurbish the terminology created some confusion: I apologize. To answer: no. An unconscious being is purely made up of quantitative, physical stuff and never comes in contact with qualities.

A P zombie would be completely qualitative right? It would have to see and act upon different stimuli. If you start to say that qualitative processing is also qualia, then is a P zombie a conscious being? Because we would be saying there is something it is like to have such in and of itself.

I am saying that the PZ doesn’t qualitatively experience and its sensory inputs do not take in qualities—it is quantitative through and through; and, consequently, there is nothing it is like in and of itself for its experiences.

and you already said that we can match the brain to qualitative experience. Which means we've now associated brain states directly with subjective experience. If it can observe, identify, and this is confirmed in its actions, we just say its a qualitative analysis or objective consciousness that doesn't concern itself with any other type of qualia.

Saying we can “match” and “associate” brain states and mental states doesn’t mean that the former produces the latter. When you say we can tell objectively that a being observes, identifies, and acts upon its environment, you are describing a quantitative being through-and-through (or at least that is the conceptual limit of your argument: it stops at identifying Pzs)--not any sort of qualitative experience.

I think if you are going to claim there is a bridge between “objective” and “subjective” conscious, then you will have to prove that the former gives us knowledge of a being qualitatively experiencing as opposed to merely observing, identifying, and acting.

So, in short:

Objectively, subjective consciousness is explained by brain states.

You have an explantory gap between the objective and subjective aspects, since objectively you are only talking about quantitative measurements and nothing qualitative. The hard problem is about how we have qualities at all that get produced by the brain, and an inextricable aspect of that is that the streams of qualities have in and of itself something it is like to have such.

This is a very real problem you'll need to address Bob. If there's no difference between qualitative and qualia beyond qualitative being a specific type of qualia, then it doesn't disprove my argument. The "subjective consciousness" of higher qualia that you note would still just be qualia. If the qualitative is just a form of qualia, brain scans can explain qualitative actions, therefore qualia.

I am not saying that qualitative experience is a type of qualia. And to clarify this, let me start here:

Self-reflection is also qualia. I don't understand how its not

Self-reflection, such as introspection and cognition, are also qualia; but my point was that the self-reflective thought “I am seeing the color red” is not the same as the qualia it is referencing, which is what I thought you were talking about. They are both a part of qualitative experience. Likewise, I was trying to note (way back when) to the fact that having a qualia in the form of a thought does not mean that you are qualitatively experiencing qualitative experience: it doesn’t double up like that (which is what you were saying about meta-consciousness). Meta-consciousness is a higher order aspect of consciousness which isn’t required to say that a being is qualitatively experiencing.

Again, I am as of yet to hear a proof from you, scientific or othewise, that “brain scans can explain qualitative actions”. Scientifically, the explanations of actions are quantitative.

Objective consciousness is the expression of the actions that something subjectively experiences

So far, I would say this is an assumption under your view. If it is not, then please provide a proof. I failing to see how the exact same expression of actions, which are supposed to be quantitative (as your qualitative experience of other peoples’ actions do not matter: they are in your head only), could not be a PZ.

Objectively, it doesn't matter exactly what the subject is experiencing from its perspective. If the person states they see a tree, we don't need to know exactly how they subjectively experience a tree to believe they see a tree right?

This is partly why I like my original definition of qualia, because I think you are conflating the hard problem with only what is it like to have qualitative experience in and of itself, when you can’t likewise even prove qualitative experience itself by virtue of the brain.

Does that negate that the truck is ultimately run by magnetism, even though we don't understand why exactly magnetism actually works? No

The problem, as I outlined in my proof, is that it is provably impossible to prove brain states produce mental states, so this is disanalogous. I agree with you here though (in terms of the actual example you gave).

But in the case of the brain, it is physical, and it impacts consciousness
…
No, the pill is physical because it fits the terms of what physical means.

It is important to note that the ‘physical’ brain and pill you are describing is only within your qualitative experience: you will have to prove abstractly that there is also a mind-independent (i.e., physical) pill and brain. I am of yet to hear a proof of this.

Its like truth Bob. We can never know the truth. The truth is what is

We can come to understand different things that pertain to the truth. Truth is just a relationship between thinking and being. I can know that 2 + 2 = 4 or a = a and that is a part of ‘the truth’.

Did you know some people cannot visualize in their mind Bob?

My point is not that we simply haven’t been able to prove consciousness arises from the brain nor that we simply cannot come to understand what it is like to have qualitative experience: I am saying you can’t prove the brain produces qualitative experience.

More than a, "But it doesn't quite answer everything." Doesn't matter.
…
There must be more than doubt, or skepticism, or the idea that our current knowledge cannot identify or understand certain aspects of reality.

This is just a straw man of my position. I am not invoking a ‘in-the-gaps’ or ‘from ignorance’ kind of argument: I already provided a proof that reductive naturalism cannot account for qualitative experience:

The form is as follows: “consciousness is [set of biological functions] because [set of biological functions] impacts consciousness [in this set of manners]”. That is the form of argumentation that a reductive naturalist methodology can afford and, upon close examination, there is a conceptual gap between consciousness being impacted in said manners and the set of biological functions (responsible for such impact) producing consciousness

What does your replacement offer? If brain states do not cause consciousness, then what have we been doing wrong all these years in medicine?

Medicine is unaffected by whether the brain produces consciousness.

"All of existence consists,it is claimed,solely of ideas—,emotions,perceptions,intuitions,imagination,etc.—even though not one’s personal ideas alone."

I did look up the paper, and wanted to point this summary out. Bob, we've already discussed knowledge before. This author is a person who clearly does not understand knowledge

I don’t see how the quote you gave of him demonstrates that he doesn’t know what knowledge is.

Knowledge is not the testing of our dreams in comparison to reality, if that is what you are trying to claim. Under idealism, the ‘objective’ world is fundamentally ‘subjective’ in the sense that is mind-dependent: that doesn’t mean we can just whimsically make up what is true of reality and what isn’t.

Now move to a new location. Does your consciousness move with you? Can you by concentration extend your consciousness out past your body to where you were?

This doesn’t prove that the brain produces consciousness: this is expected under my view as well because the brain is a (parital) extrinsic representation of my mind. This just doesn’t matter if you can’t float outside of your body at will.

Therefore the only reasonable conclusion is that consciousness follows physical movement,

Consciousness doesn’t follow physical movement: it is the necessary preconditions of experiencing a physical world.

I would imagine that you hold that our dreams are purely within our minds (and not ‘of reality’). Have you ever had a vivid dream where you assume a conscious character within it? That ‘physical’ world, even by your lights, is obviously not actually physical (fundamentally). Now imagine that I told you that your conscious experience in that dream world was ‘following you as a physical being in it’--you would rightly point out that the conscious experience, being a dream and all, is the primary precondition for the experience of the physical dream world.

No different with reality for all intents and purposes.

That's an avoidant answer Bob. I don't hold to idealism and physicalism because I often find they are summary identities that are not logically consistent when examined in detail.

I don’t think I avoided anything: a view being logically consistent doesn’t make it cogent to hold as true. I can make any view, if you give me long enough time (depending on how absurd it is), logically consistent. Logical consistency is just about not having any logical contradictions which only pertains to the form of the argument.

Unless you can show me why its not logical to hold that matter and energy can create consciousness internally,

And this is why I brought it up: I don’t need to prove that. I agree that it is logically consistent: so is mine! Logical consistent is a basic prerequisite for candidate metaphysical theories: it doesn’t mean much beyond that. In other words, it isn’t saying much to be logically consistent (although that is a good thing).

You either need to present a logical alternative, which I have not seen so far, or demonstrate where my logical claim fails explicitly.

A logical alternative of what exactly? My purpose with the hard problem was to refute the positive claim that it is emergent from the brain—I haven’t explained my alternative view yet. I can if you would like.

Its not "associate", its real claims of knowledge and science.

It being real claims of science doesn’t mean it isn’t a proof of association.

A squirrel likely may not be able to evaluate its own qualia. That has nothing to do with being conscious at the most basic level.

Agreed! This was my point with the blindsight person! They are conscious, they have qualia and qualitative experience, but they don’t understand self-reflectively that they do.

The word includes "meta", which essentially means, "about the subject", and the subject is physics, or the physical.

For now, I think it is best to agree to disagree on what metaphysics means.

I am discussing matters of experience. Anything that cannot be experienced, is outside of what can be known.

This doesn’t work. To be brief, by your lights, we cannot know that “every change has a cause”, that “88888888888888888 + 2 = 88888888888888890”, or that ‘a = a’. You will never prove that empirically.

This is getting long, so I will stop here. I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

My point is that our subjective reality of whether we treat the electron as a wave or a particle does not alter reality, it just alters are mathematical predictive or post assessment models — Philosophim

I know we're probably both out of our depth here, but I think you're incorrect about that. It's not as if you can state that a particle really exists irrespective of whether it has been observed or not. If it were as simple as you say it is, then there would be no 'interpretation problem' in the first place. I think the approach of Bohr was to say that it was pointless or impossible to say what the 'object' 'really is', apart from the act of measurement. Again your presumption of the reality of the object conditions your analysis - you presume that the object exists independently of any act of measurement, when that is precisely the point at issue! As for decoherence, the Wiki article you point to says 'Quantum decoherence does not describe the actual collapse of the wave function, but it explains the conversion of the quantum probabilities (that exhibit interference effects) to the ordinary classical probabilities.' The 'collapse of the wave function' is not at all a resolved issue.

As far as readings are concerned, try A Private Vew of Quantum Reality, Chris Fuchs, co-founder of Quantum Baynesianism (QBism). Salient quote:

Those interpretations (i.e. Copenhagen, Many Worlds) all have something in common: They treat the wave function as a description of an objective reality shared by multiple observers. QBism, on the other hand, treats the wave function as a description of a single observer’s subjective knowledge.

So it's right on point with the question of subject-object relations.

I believe his [i.e. Norbert Wiener's] assertion that information is more than matter and energy is wrong. DNA is made up of matter and energy. All life is made up of matter and energy and stores information. — Philosophim

Again, your dismissal is simplistic. How DNA came into existence is still not something known to science. The fact that living things are able to maintain homeostasis, heal from injury, grow, develop, mutate and evolve into new species, all involve processes and principles that may not be explicable in terms of physics and chemistry, as there's nothing in the inorganic domain.

Could I also recommend you have a glance at The Natural Attitude, which I think is the basis of what you're writing.

That's all for now. Thanks for your responses.

Let me clarify my terminology with more technical verbiage as, although I do think we are progressing, I think we are (1) using the terms differently and (2) our usages thereof still contain nuggets of vagueness. — Bob Ross

Yes, a good idea. I think I'm going to spend the time really getting into qualia vs quantitative experience as I think that's the crux of where a lot of arguments go.

Also, you brought up some good points, and I just wanted to recognize that: you are genuinely the only other person on this forum that I have discussed with that forces me to produce razor thin precision with my terminology—and that is a good thing! The more rigorous the discussion, the better the views become. — Bob Ross

You as well Bob! It forces me to be clearer, and I think despite whether we agree at the end or not, it forces both of us to be better philosophers. I always enjoy your points, it is fun to be made to think. :)

I am going to revert back to ‘qualia’ being best defined as ‘instances of qualitative experience’; but by ‘qualitative experience’ I would like to include in the definition the property of there being ‘something it is like to have it in and of itself’. — Bob Ross

I feel your definition is not concise enough to give a clear and unambiguous identity. "something it is like to have it in and of itself" is too many words. I can't make sense of it. I'm trying though. In trying to pare the words down I start with "something it is like to have it", and I'm still not quite sure here. If I look at "In and of itself", that seems similar to "experience unidentified". So if I'm seeing, I'm not trying to describe or identify what I'm seeing, I'm just in the moment per say.

If that's the case, then I can combine this into "Something it is like to have experience". Something can be separated into some thing, which I think can be translated to, "What it is like to have experience". Now, I'm not saying that was your intention, but it was the closest I could get to with the definition.

I think this fits more what I am trying to convey, as I think you are thinking that ‘qualitative experience’ and ‘qualia’ are two separate things: the former being non-quantitative experience and the latter being a ‘mental event whereof there is something it is like to have such in and of itself’. — Bob Ross

What I was noting is that there didn't seem to be a discernible difference between qualitative experience and qualia. If my pared down definition of "What it is like to experience" works, then this fits. The hard problem would apply to both in my view. If my pared down definition is also correct, I see no reason for the terms qualitative and qualia. They're the same thing in regards to the assessment. Or so I thought until I read this:

So, to clarify, ‘qualia’ is just an instance of a stream of qualities that we experience which we nominally single out to meaningfully navigate our lives; and the experience of the stream of qualities has of its own accord the property of something it is like to have such. — Bob Ross

I tried to pare this down again. "Qualia is just a stream of qualities that we experience. This is not just any experience though, but experience that we nominally single out to meaningfully navigate our lives".

First, what does "nominally single out" mean? Do we give attention to certain experience over others? So if I'm not paying attention to something in the corner of my eye, is this not qualia? If so, what is it? Or is this about definitions/identities we create out of the stream of experience we have? So for example I say, "That's a TV", because that's meaningful to me in my life.

I then tried to pare down the second sentence. "The experience of qualia has of its own accord, what its like to experience." or "Qualia is what its like to experience". Is this right?

This leaves me now with a question of what quantitative experience is. I'm going to confess something. Words which have the first few letters the same as another are something my brain easily mixes up. I looked back briefly and am not sure that I did not accidently do that between the words quantitative and qualitative. It is something I've worked on a long time, but I still slip up occasionally.

So I want to bring back the discussion to quantitative for a second. If a quantitative experience is an experience, is there something that has that experience? For lack of a better term, this would be an "unconscious experience"? In the case of blindsight, the person would unconsciously see the object, but has no actual qualia, or conscious experience of doing so. I believe this is what you confirmed, but I'm making sure. If so I am fairly certain I had the two terms crossed in my head unknowingly as I was writing them, and most definitely recant that you had a problem in your qualitative/qualia comparison.

When you say we can tell objectively that a being observes, identifies, and acts upon its environment, you are describing a quantitative being through-and-through (or at least that is the conceptual limit of your argument: it stops at identifying Pzs)--not any sort of qualitative experience. — Bob Ross

Yes, I agree with this fully.

If I understand your definitions correctly, then you and I don't disagree. Qualia/qualitative experience is simply subjective consciousness while quantitative analysis is simply objective consciousness. There's really no difference between them. "Quantitative experience" is essentially unconscious experience. If so, then you agree with my division between objective and subjective consciousness as a viable means to assess consciousness. Let me translate my argument to yours so you can see.

Qualia (Subjective consciousness) can be neatly described as, "The viewpoint of consciousness itself".

Quantitative analysis (Objective consciousness) occurs when we can know that something that is not our qualia is also experiencing qualia with identification. The problem in knowing whether something is qualitatively conscious is that we cannot experience their qualia. So the only logical thing to do is to observe what a quantitative consciousness does that only an observing and identifying thing could do.

Quantitative consciousness then requires the addition of one other term, "Action". Only through a thing's actions can we ascertain that it can observe and identify. Combine baking soda and vinegar together and it merely "reacts". Its a simple chemical process with no means of control, identification, or observation. Chemicals collide and results happen.

So there we go, in the end we went about defining a few terms which are semantically no different from one another. :)

I'll stop it here and confirm with you if this is a good breakdown of your definitions. If so, then I'll address the second half.

I would say that they are still seeing the colour card, to some degree, if they can accurately guess them; and the fact that sometimes they can’t means that they no longer have introspective access to those qualitative experiences.

By “qualitatively seeing”, I mean something which is not-quantitative (viz., it has no definite quantity) and there is something it is like to see in and of itself. — Bob Ross

The reflected light still enters the eyes, stimulates the rods and cones, leading to neural signals travelling to the brain and stimulating the visual cortex, but there is no subjective awareness of seeing. All those processes I just outlines are quantitative processes, equivalent in a way to the operation of a camera. You can keep asserting that it is the case that there is qualitative seeing, but I'm not seeing any explanation from you that could convince me of that.

I think you are conflating consciousness proper with meta-consciousness: there can be a qualitative experience and something it like in and of itself to see of which the person, as the ego, does not have introspective (or perhaps cognitive) access to. — Bob Ross

No, I'm simply referring to the normal ability to be aware of what we are seeing or have seen and we are by no means aware of most of the potential visual data that is being received by the eye. There is no reason to think that there are not many things in your visual field right now that you are not aware of at all, even though the light from those things is being reflected into your eye and neural signals are being received by your visual cortex. I don't think it makes any sense at all to call all that visual data we are not aware of "qualitative seeing".

is this like our ability to self-reflective on our perceptions? — Bob Ross

We can be self-reflective on the small percentage of the overall visual data we have been consciously or unconsciously aware of. The rest has not been noticed in the first place and is lost forever I would say. In the person with visual agnosia, there is no conscious awareness of seeing, even though some data may have been unconsciously registered by the brain. That data enables the person to guess with somewhat greater accuracy than random guessing as to what that data is, but since there is no recall at all the experience os seeing I just don't see any way in which it could make sense to call it qualitiative.