Hmm. Confusing. I think compatibilism is an off-road to nowhere. I'm a contradictionalist. :)

So what did the first person who talked about free will mean by the term? — Michael

Re freedom, the debate was originally about whether given some antecedent state, A, was there more than one immediately following, incompatible consequent state, at least B or C, that had a >0 probability of obtaining. (And then re free will, whether this was the case in conjunction with will phenomena, especially with respect to whether will could at all direct or influence the consequent state that did obtain.)

The determinist side, on the other hand, originally said that given some antecedent state, A, only one immediately following state, B, has a non-zero probability--namely a 100% probability--of obtaining.

It would be silly to frame the whole thing around the "could have done otherwise" phrase. You can just state it as "there is more than one possibility that has a >0 probability of obtaining." — Terrapin Station

The discussion of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP) has been central to the debate about free will and determinism for decades and it isn't silly at all. There is a genuine cost for accepting it (usually incurred by libertarians) and a genuine cost for rejecting it (usually incurred by compatibilists). The reason libertarian believe compatibilists to be silly, and vice versa, is because each side is acutely aware of the bullet being bitten by the other side. Compatibilists are resigned to accept that free agents only have the illusion of having several genuinely (as of yet unsettled) open options to them, and libertarians struggle with the problems of luck and control.

New dispositionalist analyses of the abilities of rational agents aim at providing an account of free will that avoids both of those costs. I am not a new dispositionalist myself, but I can credit them with seeing the blind spots of both libertarians and compatibilists, whereas those two traditional opponents usually only see each other's blind spots, not realizing that they themselves are paying too high a cost.

Re freedom, the debate was originally about whether given some antecedent state, A, was there more than one immediately following, incompatible consequent state, at least B or C, that had a >0 probability of obtaining. (And then re free will, whether this was the case in conjunction with will phenomena, especially with respect to whether will could at all direct or influence the consequent state that did obtain.)

The determinist side, on the other hand, originally said that given some antecedent state, A, only one immediately following state, B, has a non-zero probability--namely a 100% probability--of obtaining. — Terrapin Station

Do you have a source for this? The IEP offers this account of free will:

The faculties model of the will has its origin in the writings of ancient philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle, and it was the dominant view of the will for much of medieval and modern philosophy [see Descartes (1998) and the discussion of Aquinas in Stump (2003)]. It still has numerous proponents in the contemporary literature. What is distinct about free agents, according to this model, is their possession of certain powers or capacities. All living things possess some capacities, such as the capacities for growth and reproduction. What is unique about free agents, however, is that they also possess the capacities for intellection and volition. Another way of saying this is that free agents alone have the faculties of intellect and will. It is in virtue of having these additional faculties, and the interaction between them, that agents have free will.

The intellect, or the rational faculty, is the power of cognition. As a result of its cognitions, the intellect presents various things to the will as good under some description. To return to the case of Allison contemplating walking her dog, Allison’s intellect might evaluate walking the dog as good for the health of the dog. Furthermore, all agents that have an intellect also have a will. The will, or the volitional faculty, is an appetite for the good; that is, it is naturally drawn to goodness. The will, therefore, cannot pursue an option that the intellect presents as good in no way. The will is also able to command the other faculties; the will can command the body to move or the intellect to consider something.

This seems to be the account I gave here. Free will is concerned with one's will being responsible for one's actions.

I can credit them with seeing the blind spots of both libertarians and compatibilists, whereas those two traditional opponents usually only see each other's blind spots, not realizing that they themselves are paying too high a cost. — Pierre-Normand

Because hard determinists and hard indeterminists have not noticed the problem with both sides of the debate for a long time.

I do not think the compatibilists is unaware of what they are accepting. In fact, it would appear, on the surface, they view themselves as critically analyzing what we consider "free" and "responsible" to mean beyond the naive notions we commonly hold.

Confusing. I think compatibilism is an off-road to nowhere. — Mongrel

I agree with you -- regarding traditional PAP-denying-compatibilism -- but I think traditional incompatibilist libertarianism also is on such an off-road. New dispositionalists also seem to have made a wrong turn, but their attempt is instructive for they seem to have traveled on the right track for a little longer than either of their two predecessors. And they are in the best position to see the shortcomings of both.

Cool. Where does so-called first person data fit into their analysis, or does it? I'm thinking of Searle wiggling his finger as proof of will. I think he'd agree the evidence he's witnessing is subjective.

The discussion of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP) has been central to the debate about free will and determinism for decades and it isn't silly at all. — Pierre-Normand

You didn't seem to understand my comment. I'm saying that hinging the whole thing on that particular linguistic characterization is silly.

Do you have a source for this? The IEP offers this account of free will: — Michael

Not without doing research for it (that would collate a lot of different materials, etc.). I'm not simply reporting something I just read off the Internet, on an online phil encyclopedia, etc.

No, I'm not. I'm saying that there's not the possibility in any sense. If you say that the possibility obtained, you're not a determinist. Hence not a compatibilist. — Terrapin Station

Sure, there is a sense of possibility that applies to unactualized dispositions (or unexercised powers or abilities). This is the sense that is captured by a conditional analysis such as those of G. E. Moore, David Lewis or their 'new dispositionalist' sucessors, and it is perfectly consistent with determinism. For sure, you may not be satisfied with the way this clearly defined sense of 'possibility' can be adduced to secure the 'principle of alternate possibilities' in a way that makes it adequate for the ascription of freedom and responsibility to rational agents. But you'd have to actually look up the details of the proposals in order to assess them.

Sure, there is a sense of possibility that applies to unactualized dispositions (or unexercised powers or abilities). This is the sense that is captured by a conditional analysis such as those of G. E. Moore, David Lewis or their 'new dispositionalist' sucessors, and it is perfectly consistent with determinism. — Pierre-Normand

I disagree. It is not consistent with determinism. The only thing consistent with determinism in the original debate, where we're not changing the subject, is this, which I typed out above: given some antecedent state, A, only one immediately following state, B, has a non-zero probability--namely a 100% probability--of obtaining.

So any other state is not a possibility. It's rather an impossibility. It has a 0% probability of obtaining.

You didn't seem to understand my comment. I'm saying that hinging the whole thing on that particular linguistic characterization is silly. — Terrapin Station

What are you referring to as "that particular linguistic characterization"? It would be a mistake to view those conditional analyses as mere arbitrary semantic conventions. The analysis of G. E. Moore was a first attempt. Lewis improved on it to account for 'finks'. Michael Fara improved again to account for 'masked abilities' and Kadri Vihvelin improved the analysis even further to account for asymmetries in PAP (the fact that we want agents who acted badly to have had the ability of have acted well, but not vice versa, as a requirement for them being deserving of praise or blame) in a manner that rather deeply illuminates the metaphysics of rational agency.

I disagree. It is not consistent with determinism. — Terrapin Station

You are not disagreeing with the analyses of dispositions that I have mentioned being consistent with determinism, are you? If anything, those analyses are tantamount to the recasting of power ascriptions to specific kinds of objects as statements of universal deterministic laws that link the actualization of those powers to triggering circumstances. Maybe that's not quite true of Vihvelin's analysis of practical rational abilities in terms of bundles of dispositions, but those constituent dispositions are deterministic and the overall account is completely insensitive to the underlying physical and/or neurophysiological levels of implementation being either deterministic or indeterministic (e.g. quantum-indeterministic).

What are you referring to as "that particular linguistic characterization"? — Pierre-Normand

You were characterizing new dispositionalism as hinging on an analysis of the "could have done otherwise" account of free will.

You are not disagreeing with the analyses of dispositions that I have mentioned being consistent with determinism, are you? — Pierre-Normand

Yes. If you posit any possibility other than one, it's inconsistent with determinism.

If anything, those analyses are tantamount to the recasting of power ascriptions to specific kinds of objects as statements of universal deterministic laws that link the actualization of those powers to triggering circumstances. — Pierre-Normand

Say what? Maybe if you added more prepositional phrases to that, haha.

Yes. If you posit any possibility other than one, it's inconsistent with determinism. — Terrapin Station

The analysis is meant as a conspicuous definition that captures how we talk about dispositions of ordinary things. Those dispositions may be linked either deterministically, or merely probabilistically, in the analysis, to their normal conditions of actualization. Hence the possibility of such an analysis of dispositions makes no commitment whatsoever to the universe being deterministic or not. Again, where you seem to balk, is not over the specific analyses of abilities and dispositions that new dispositionalists are relying on. It is rather its relevance to free agency that you seem to be skeptical of. But you are dismissing the analysis on faulty grounds (implying falsely that it is inconsistent with determinism) before even considering how it my be used to support a compatibilist account of alternative possibilities that might be relevant to free will and agency.

The analysis is meant as a conspicuous definition that captures how we talk about dispositions of ordinary things. — Pierre-Normand

What would an analysis of how we talk have to do with an ontological discussion?

And according to this, "As a theory-neutral point of departure, then, free will can be defined as the unique ability of persons to exercise control over their conduct in the manner necessary for moral responsibility". Therefore, if one believes in causal determinism but also in moral responsibility then one is a compatibilist rather than a hard determinist. — Michael

Isn't the schism / confusion in most such debates about the metaphysical difference between empiricism and idealism / pragmatism?

Determinism could very well be true yet we don't have the capacity to empirically verify exactly what is causing someone's behaviour. Using determinism to conclude that morality / personal responsibility is some sort of illusion and even use it to inform (moral?) action is akin to taking an advance on future knowledge, which doesn't seem like the empirical thing to do.

For morality / personal responsibility we seem to be dependent on things like human communication, observing behaviour (our own as well as that of others), etc. This might not be preferred method of getting data / information for hard determinist / empiricists but we can't deny there's a decent amount of understanding between people at times. The unique part of it might not lie in man being an exception to how the universe might work but rather in the (complex) way we respond to our environment / process information.

What would an analysis of how we talk have to do with an ontological discussion? — Terrapin Station

It is relevant to the 'free will and determinism' debate because the way 'possible' is tacitly understood in discussions of the principle of alternative possibilities often loses touch with the 'possibilities' that figure as open options from the perspective of the rational practical deliberation of agent (conceived by them as powers and opportunities that they have). Paying attention to how 'possibilities' likewise are involved in our conceptions of the powers of ordinary objects can alert us to the manner in which they are often misconstrued within a Humean metaphysics of event-causation. Talking about objects having powers and events being historically possible, in a deterministic universe, are two different things. Philosophers who aren't attentive to the problematic connection between those two sorts of (im)possibilities (i.e. historical impossibilities of specific events versus merely unactualized powers of agents) are led to mischaracterize agents as bundles of events, or deterministic processes that somehow supervene on underlying causal-chains of physical events. And those philosophers thereby lose track of the actual causal structure of rational agency.

often loses touch with the 'possibilities' that figure as putative open option from the perspective of the rational practical deliberation of agent (conceived by them as powers that they have). — Pierre-Normand

I haven't the faintest idea what this is saying.

Paying attention how 'possibilities' likewise are involved in our conceptions of the powers of ordinary objects can alert us to the manner in which they are often misconstrued within a Humean metaphysics of event-causation. — Pierre-Normand

But that "misconstrual" is what the debate is tradtionally about.

Anyway, a lot of what you're typing I'd have to work out one phrase at a time, but you don't seem to care for some reason (because you're offering no attempt at clarification . . . at least none that doesn't read as additional word salads of prepositional phrase after prepositional phrase)

the actual causal structure of rational agency. — Pierre-Normand

The actual causal structure of anything (at least under determinism) is a deterministic processes that is causal-chains of physical events, by the way. (There's no need for invoking supervenience or "underlying" there.)

But that "misconstrual" is what the debate is tradtionally about. — Terrapin Station

It is actually ignored by a majority of participants in the debate. The relevance of the metaphysics of substances and powers (which contrasts with the metaphysics of Humean event-event causation) to rational-causation is often ignored because libertarian agent-causation is taken to conflict with our understanding of physics and neurosciences. (But traditional libertarian agent-causation hardly is the only alternative to traditional determinism.) Hence, a recent discussion between proponents of four different main orientations in the philosophy of free-will: John Martin Fischer, Robert Kane, Derk Pereboom, Manuel Vargas, (Four Views on Free Will, Blackwell, 2007), who are semi-compatibilist, libertarian, hard determinist and revisionist-compatibilist, respectively, never mention the possibility of agent-causation (as opposed to event-event causation) except as a topic of joke.

The actual causal structure of anything is a deterministic processes that is causal-chains of physical events, by the way. (There's no need for invoking supervenience or "underlying" there.) — Terrapin Station

This is a category error. A causal structure isn't a process of any kind. And yes, there most definitely is a need to invoke supervenience in order to bridge the categorical gap in the argument that you are attempting to make. Jaegwon Kim has developed such sophisticated supervenience based arguments to get from the determinism (assumed) of the laws of physics to the causal exclusion of high-level causal/explanatory powers of agents (or of mental states of agent). The supervenience of the events that involve the high-level entities (psychological processes, bodily motions, etc) over the microphysical events must be assumed in order that the deterministic causal efficacy of the low-level initial state of the "system" exclude the possibility of of their being independent causes of the agent's actions at the higher level.

I haven't the faintest idea what this is saying. — Terrapin Station

It it really that hard? Apologies if it is badly formulated. I am simply referring to the fact that rational agents such as us, when we deliberate about what we are going to do, are contemplating a range of options that we have both the power and the opportunity to do. All of those options are 'possible', or so do we believe, just in virtue of our having both the power and the opportunity of realizing any one of them. The traditional compatibilist philosopher, on the other hand, claims that only one of those 'possibilities' is really possible, and, indeed, necessary; and that, consequently, the other options that seem open to us only appear to be open due to our unavoidable epistemic limitations regarding the past state of the universe and the implications from the laws of physics. I am further claiming that this claim by the compatibilist stems in part from a confusion over two different sorts of possibilities, or lack of attention to the way in which they relate to one another (allegedly, through supervenience, on Kim's influential albeit misguided account).

This is a category error. A causal structure isn't a process of any kind. — Pierre-Normand

Couldn't disagree with you more here. There's nothing extant that's not a process.

The post that contained this next bit was much clearer. Thanks.

two different sorts of possibilities, — Pierre-Normand

What two different sorts of possibilities are you positing?

Couldn't disagree with you more here. There's nothing extant that's not a process. — Terrapin Station

It's not something extant that I meant to refer to. I was suggesting that two different sorts of occurrences -- agent-causation and event-event Humean causation, specifically -- exemplify different forms of causation. Forms of causation, or "causal structures" as I meant the phrase, are abstracta. They are exemplified by causal processes that are similarly structured in some respect, and it is this respect of similarity that I called "causal structure". Thus, what I was objecting to is the common belief that explanations of human actions in terms of rational-causation, or agent-causation, can be reduced, somehow, or identified with, or eliminated in favor of, explanations in terms of Humean event-event causation (rendered popular by Donald Davidson in the philosophy of action) relating either mental states to one another (and to bodily motions) or their underlying realizations into deterministically evolving neurophysiological states and events.

Forms of causation, or "causal structures" as I meant the phrase, are abstracta. — Pierre-Normand

Are you saying that in your view they obtain somehow (or whatever word you'd use) but they don't exist?

In my ontology there are no real abstracts. Abstracts only exist as dynamic states in individuals' brains. In other words, they're particular mental content.

Mental states, including rationality, etc. are particular physical events.

What two different sorts of possibilities are you positing? — Terrapin Station

The two sorts of possibilities that I was discussing were (1) an event being possible consistently with the system it is involved in being in some initial state and the laws governing the evolution of that system. And (2) some choice or action being possible as an action that an agent has both the power and the opportunity to perform at some time in the future, from the prior perspective of her practical deliberation. That an event is impossible from the standpoint of an external observer (e.g. a Laplacean demon) who observes the agent from some external non-intervening standing point doesn't entail that this event can't constitute an open option, and hence be possibly realizable in the second sense. Furthermore, and this is where I am parting company with most compatibilists, the possiblitity of this event being realized by the agent isn't merely a matter of the epistemic limitations of the agent. Finally, since I am not denying that this event, which is possible form the agent's practical perspective, may also be 'impossible' (in the first sense) from the external Laplacean perspective, I am also parting company with most libertarians. As I suggested, the apparent incoherence in holding the same event to be both possible and impossible, in the future, at the same time, from two different sorts of perspectives, only seems contradictory owing to the failure to distinguish two radically different forms of causation.

In my ontology there are no real abstracts. Abstracts only exist as dynamic states in individuals' brains. In other words, they're particular mental content — Terrapin Station

There are different forms of explanations of events, and likewise there are different forms of causal processes that that are the topics of those different forms of explanation. For instance, biologists who make use of functional/teleological explanations of adaptative behaviors, or physiological processes, focus on different "causal structures" than do engineers who explain why a bridge collapsed. It really doesn't matter for the purpose of my argument if you are a realist or an anti-realist about universals or abstract objects. My only claim is that two specific forms of causal explanations don't reduce to one another and failure to properly distinguish them (or properly relate them) has produced mischief in the free will literature.