I'd phrase it as "Cooperation being a 'means' to a goal (wellbeing or flourishing), not the goal itself", but that is essentially the same. — Mark S

That's fine.

To me the most interesting aspect of morality is whether anyone can demonstrate objective goals.

From a top-down perspective, we can understand that cooperation problems in our universe must be solved by all beings that form sustainably cooperative societies. Further, game theory shows that for these strategies for intelligent, independent agents to be successful, violators must be punished. Hence, just as predicted, cultural moral norms exist and can be identified as norms whose violation is commonly thought to deserve punishment. — Mark S

Also traffic rules can be explained in terms of cooperation strategies, yet they are not commonly understood as moral rules. So something more specific about morality seems to be left out in your functional analysis.

Because it is empirically true.

From a bottom-up perspective, all past and present cultural moral norms (norms whose violation is commonly thought to deserve punishment) can be explained as parts of cooperation strategies. — Mark S

If that's true, then how come that societies in the past and present do not have the same cultural moral norms? As I said there are also cultural clashes because societies do not share the same moral cultural norms, so maybe there are limits to the possibility of cooperation which morality must account for. But if cooperation is not possible, then what's left to do with societies with non-shared cultural moral norms? Exploitation?

Proposed counterexamples of moral norms that are not parts of cooperation strategies are always welcome. — Mark S

Yet you wrote: Knowing the function of cultural moral norms is to solve cooperation problems enables us to predict when those moral norms will fail, so it seems you are suggesting that there are cultural moral norms which might fail to meet the function you are attributing to them. And failing to meet a certain function may also mean that there is no such intrinsic function, the function is an external criterion.

Deontology is not "the traditional perspective" but one traditional perspective. There are others.— Fooloso4

First, I agree. Second, deontology was not mentioned.

I was talking about imperative oughts being the traditional perspective. By imperative ought I mean “what everyone ought to do regardless of their needs and preferences”. It has been my reading of traditional moral philosophy that imperative oughts, not conditional ones, are what are being assumed in most proposed moral systems, not just Kant's categorical imperatives. Is that incorrect? — Mark S

There are imperatives. Imperatives are of two kinds, hypothetical and categorical. A hypothetical imperative carries the weight of an “ought” and is conditioned by desire, a categorical carries the weight of a “shall” and is conditioned by moral law, desire be what it may.

There is no Kantian categorically imperative “ought”, and traditional moral philosophy other than deontology treats conditional oughts as hypothetical imperatives, while deontologically grounded moral philosophy merely grants conditional oughts, but assigns no proper moral quality to them.

Your wording is confusing I think.

To me the most interesting aspect of morality is whether anyone can demonstrate objective goals. — Tom Storm

Moral philosophy has focused largely on goals. Given the lack of progress in convincingly defining an objective goal for moral behavior, we must face the possibility of no such goal existing. I am not concerned about this.

Choosing as a moral reference the function of human morality - moral 'means' as cooperation strategies that solve the cooperation/exploitation dilemma - gives us two constraints on moral behavior:

• Acting morally requires acting consistently with cooperation strategies
• The goals of morality cannot be achieved by exploitation

Then people are otherwise free to set whatever goal for moral behavior they can agree on. That looks like a pretty good moral system even if no objective goal of that moral system (aside from the constraint about no exploitation) is ever found.

traffic rules can be explained in terms of cooperation strategies, yet they are not commonly understood as moral rules. So something more specific about morality seems to be left out in your functional analysis. — neomac

Traffic rules are laws; as you suggest, rule of law is an invention to solve cooperation problems. But laws coincide with what is moral only to the extent they are cooperation strategies that solve the cooperation/exploitation dilemma – how to sustainably obtain the benefits of cooperation without exploitation limiting future benefits.

I claim that the function of human morality is solving the cooperation/exploitation dilemma. I have not said that all cooperation strategies, such as laws, are necessarily moral.

If that's true, then how come that societies in the past and present do not have the same cultural moral norms? As I said there are also cultural clashes because societies do not share the same moral cultural norms, so maybe there are limits to the possibility of cooperation which morality must account for. But if cooperation is not possible, then what's left to do with societies with non-shared cultural moral norms? Exploitation? — neomac

Cultural moral norms are diverse, contradictory, and strange mainly because of 1) different definitions of who is in favored ingroups and disfavored or exploited outgroups and 2) different markers of membership in those ingroups and outgroups.

Understanding the origins of these differences provides an objective basis for groups to resolve them. Groups may not always be able to resolve their differences (different goals for moral behavior may be intractable), but at least they can focus on the right issues.

... so it seems you are suggesting that there are cultural moral norms which might fail to meet the function you are attributing to them. And failing to meet a certain function may also mean that there is no such intrinsic function, the function is an external criterion. — neomac

Cultural moral norms, such as versions of the Golden Rule, are heuristics (usually reliable but fallible) rules of thumb for parts of cooperation strategies. Their failure to solve cooperation problems in times of war, when dealing with criminals, and when tastes differ is due to them being heuristics, not due to their function being misunderstood.

There are imperatives. Imperatives are of two kinds, hypothetical and categorical. A hypothetical imperative carries the weight of an “ought” and is conditioned by desire, a categorical carries the weight of a “shall” and is conditioned by moral law, desire be what it may.

There is no Kantian categorically imperative “ought”, and traditional moral philosophy other than deontology treats conditional oughts as hypothetical imperatives, while deontologically grounded moral philosophy merely grants conditional oughts, but assigns no proper moral quality to them.

Your wording is confusing I think. — Mww

This agrees with the Encyclopedia Britannica “a hypothetical imperative, in the ethics of the 18th-century German philosopher Immanuel Kant, a rule of conduct that is understood to apply to an individual only if he or she desires a certain end and has chosen (willed) to act on that desire. Hypothetical imperatives are contrasted with “categorical” imperatives, which are rules of conduct that, by their form— “Do (or do not do) Y”—are understood to apply to all individuals, no matter what their desires.”

I have been thinking of the two concepts as

Conditional oughts (instrumental oughts) “If you desire x, then you ought to do Y” = (or close to) Kant’s hypothetical imperatives and

Imperative oughts (what everyone ought to do regardless of needs and preferences) = (or close to) Kant’s categorical imperatives

I do not want to rely on Kant’s ethics for definitions, but rather to take a broader view of how moral oughts and moral bindingness are commonly used in moral philosophy. For example, the kind of ought, or bindingness, implied by the question “But what makes it moral?” can be much clarified by specifying if a conditional ought or an imperative ought is sought.

If I use the term imperative ought in the future, I will include what it refers to and point out its similarity to Kant’s categorical imperative. Thanks for pointing out the possible source of confusion.

Choosing as a moral reference the function of human morality - moral 'means' as cooperation strategies that solve the cooperation/exploitation dilemma - gives us two constraints on moral behavior:

Acting morally requires acting consistently with cooperation strategies
The goals of morality cannot be achieved by exploitation — Mark S

Ok - I see this. Focusing on the strategies rather than the ends (which have long been unclear). So essentially, in getting the 'how' right, you believe you can ensure a consistent and progressive morality.

….the kind of ought, or bindingness, implied by the question “But what makes it moral?” can be much clarified by specifying if a conditional ought or an imperative ought is sought. — Mark S

To be moral belongs to the agent in possession of the means for being so. It follows that “what makes it moral” is not quite the correct iteration, when it is much closer to the case that it should be, “what makes me moral?”.

If I use the term imperative ought in the future, I will include what it refers to and point out its similarity to Kant’s categorical imperative. — Mark S

I’ll try to keep that in mind; it’s an awful lot like unlearning simple arithmetic, after all these years. Might be interesting to see what you end up with.

Focusing on the strategies rather than the ends (which have long been unclear). So essentially, in getting the 'how' right, you believe you can ensure a consistent and progressive morality. — Tom Storm

Right.

….the kind of ought, or bindingness, implied by the question “But what makes it moral?” can be much clarified by specifying if a conditional ought or an imperative ought is sought.
— Mark S

To be moral belongs to the agent in possession of the means for being so. It follows that “what makes it moral” is not quite the correct iteration, when it is much closer to the case that it should be, “what makes me moral?”. — Mww

]
The word "it" is too vague, though I have often heard the question phrased this way. "What makes the behavior or moral principle moral?" would be more precise. I see "What makes me moral?" is a different question.

I resist using Kant's vocabulary because it comes with too much baggage. All it takes is mentioning "categorical imperative," and people erroneously leap to the idea that the topic is Kantianism or deontology.

Cultural moral norms are diverse, contradictory, and strange mainly because of 1) different definitions of who is in favored ingroups and disfavored or exploited outgroups and 2) different markers of membership in those ingroups and outgroups.

Understanding the origins of these differences provides an objective basis for groups to resolve them. Groups may not always be able to resolve their differences (different goals for moral behavior may be intractable), but at least they can focus on the right issues. — Mark S

The irony is that you keep pointing at an issue of your definition of morality as solving cooperation problems which then you refuse to acknowledge. If cultural moral norms define "who is in favored ingroups and disfavored or exploited outgroups" and related "markers of membership in those ingroups and outgroups" which are at the origin of moral differences and clashes then cultural moral norms can solve AS MUCH AS can generate cooperation problems !

The irony is that you keep pointing at an issue of your definition of morality as solving cooperation problems which then you refuse to acknowledge. If cultural moral norms define "who is in favored ingroups and disfavored or exploited outgroups" and related "markers of membership in those ingroups and outgroups" which are at the origin of moral differences and clashes then cultural moral norms can solve AS MUCH AS can generate cooperation problems ! — neomac

I don’t see the irony.

Yes, “1) different definitions of who is in favored ingroups and disfavored or exploited outgroups and 2) different markers of membership in those ingroups and outgroups" are the two primary sources of moral disputes between cultural groups.

And yes, understanding 1) the origins of morally favored ingroups and morally disfavored outgroups and 2) the arbitrary origins of marker strategy moral norms can be useful for resolving those disputes.

For example, 1) understanding that “homosexuality is immoral” is a strategy for creating and exploiting an outgroup and 2) “eating shrimp is an abomination” is a marker of membership in a morally favored ingroup can support rational resolutions of disputes about enforcing such norms. Such discussions would be much more likely to be resolved than if the origins, function, and motivating power of cultural moral norms remained mysterious.

Where is the irony?

Such discussions would be much more likely to be resolved than if the origins, function, and motivating power of cultural moral norms remained mysterious. — Mark S

That is more likely expressing your confidence (or hope?) about that, it doesn't constitute evidence that your theory can actually contribute to solve moral clashes. Wearing a heads-scarf is cultural moral norm in some societies not in others, do you have any actual evidence that your understanding of morality as solving cooperation problems would fix such difference where it is bitterly defended (like say in a Taliban society)?
The problem is that cultural moral clashes are rooted in incompatible cultural moral norms, so they can't possibly solve cooperative problems in the same sense and as you admitted they generate cultural clashes AS WELL, so they can not be claimed to have the function to solve cooperation problems, only because this might be a possible effect or that knowing this is enough to more likely start overcoming moral differences. There are other effects too: like generating conflicts. Cultural moral norms can be invoked also to justify our cooperation limits.
Maybe it's simply a rationalization trying to find one function (or a function) for moral norms. Different individuals may rely on cultural moral norms to cooperate, others to engage in rivalries, others to spiritually distance themselves from society, others only as socially inherited/imposed habits since early childhood.

Such discussions would be much more likely to be resolved than if the origins, function, and motivating power of cultural moral norms remained mysterious.
— Mark S

That is more likely expresses your confidence (or hope?), it doesn't constitute evidence that your theory can actually contribute to solve moral clashes. — neomac

My claim is that Morality as Cooperation Strategies can contribute to rational discussions about which moral norms to enforce. Specifically, understanding the origins, function, and motivating power of cultural moral norms will provide objective evidence for resolving such disputes.

And your claim is that a culture and mind-independent understanding of the origins, function, and motivating power of cultural moral norms will NOT provide objective evidence for resolving such disputes? I can’t make any sense of that.

The present chief barrier to resolving moral disputes by rational discussion is the existing murky, mysterious origins and power of cultural moral norms. Morality as Cooperation Strategies removes that barrier.

My claim is that Morality as Cooperation Strategies can contribute to rational discussions about which moral norms to enforce. Specifically, understanding the origins, function, and motivating power of cultural moral norms will provide objective evidence for resolving such disputes. — Mark S

The present chief barrier to resolving moral disputes by rational discussion is the existing murky, mysterious origins and power of cultural moral norms. Morality as Cooperation Strategies removes that barrier. — Mark S

Identifying origins, function, and motivating power of cultural moral norms can inform a rational discussion about moral norms. I’m not sure that would be enough to overcome cultural clashes though e.g. when cultural moral norms are grounded in religious faith. Besides I’m questioning the way you conceptually frame cultural moral norms as strategies to solve cooperation problems from the start. On one side, if this is the RESULT of an empirical investigation you can’t include it in the definition of morality from the start. On the other side, cultural moral norms can be diverse and incompatible. This fact suggests that there might be limits to the possibility of cooperation which may be at the roots of cultural moral norms. In other words, there might be an ambivalence in morality similar to building walls around a limited area which can be good at keeping certain people within it but also at keeping other people out of it.

And your claim is that a culture and mind-independent understanding of the origins, function, and motivating power of cultural moral norms will NOT provide objective evidence for resolving such disputes? I can’t make any sense of that. — Mark S

My claim is simply that you didn’t provide evidence, so neither that there are not such evidences nor that there won’t be. Try to have a rational discussion with muslims while claiming that putting a head-scarf is a way for men to exploit women, so this cultural moral norm is wrong because cultural moral norms are there to solve cooperation problems.

And your claim is that a culture and mind-independent understanding of the origins, function, and motivating power of cultural moral norms will NOT provide objective evidence for resolving such disputes? I can’t make any sense of that.
— Mark S

My claim is simply that you didn’t provide evidence, so neither that there are not such evidences nor that there won’t be. Try to have a rational discussion with muslims while claiming that putting a head-scarf is a way for men to exploit women, so this cultural moral norm is wrong because cultural moral norms are there to solve cooperation problems. — neomac

Science does provide that evidence, based mostly on the remarkable explanatory power of Morality as Cooperation Strategies for cultural moral norms and our moral sense. It is irrelevant to my arguments that there are people who will reject them for irrational reasons such as "God told them something different".

Science does provide that evidence, based mostly on the remarkable explanatory power of Morality as Cooperation Strategies for cultural moral norms and our moral sense. It is irrelevant to my arguments that there are people who will reject them for irrational reasons such as "God told them something different". — Mark S

The first claim doesn't make sense to me: it sounds as if you are claiming that evidences are based on an empirical theory (if Morality as Cooperation Strategies is an empirical theory) while it should be the other way around. Empirical theories must be based on evidences. Besides you keep lauding the success of such theory, yet providing very little to support it.
The second statement confirms my suspects: taking "solving cooperation problems" as a rational condition (à la Gert) to establish what "morality" is, it's a NORMATIVE criterion, it's external to actual historical cultural moral norms, not descriptive of them (against what you seemed to be claiming in past posts). And it remains generic until you specify what constitutes a cooperation problem and its solutions independently from actual specific cultural moral norms.

I am keenly interested in why you say:

The first claim doesn't make sense to me: it sounds as if you are claiming that evidences are based on an empirical theory.... — neomac

Your interpretation is, strangely, the opposite of what I am arguing.

My first claim was: “Science does provide that evidence, based mostly on the remarkable explanatory power of Morality as Cooperation Strategies for cultural moral norms and our moral sense.”

Perhaps we need a review of how science, including the science of morality, proceeds to conclusions:

1. Assemble an interesting category of phenomena such as “past and present cultural moral norms and the spontaneous judgments and motivations of our moral sense” - This is the data set to be explained.
2. Look for hypotheses that explain why this entire data set of phenomena exist – perhaps cooperation strategies, or acting for the good of everyone (utilitarianism), or a means of social control imposed by the powerful, or ?
3. If one hypothesis is far better than any competing one at explaining this huge, diverse, contradictory, and strange data set, we have a potential theory.
4. If the potential theory meets other relevant criteria for scientific truth such as simplicity and integration with the rest of science, then we have a theory explaining that data set. That theory may become generally accepted as provisionally true (the normal kind of truth in science) or rejected, with rejection usually in favor a new theory that better explains the data set.

Hence:
“Science does provide that evidence, based mostly on the remarkable explanatory power of Morality as Cooperation Strategies for cultural moral norms and our moral sense.”

Then you say:

"confirms my suspects: taking "solving cooperation problems" as a rational condition (à la Gert) to establish what "morality" is, it's a NORMATIVE criterion,

"it's external to actual historical cultural moral norms, not descriptive of them (against what you seemed to be claiming in past posts). And it remains generic until you specify what constitutes a cooperation problem and its solutions independently from actual specific cultural moral norms. — neomac

Do you see why they don’t make any sense?

The theory is empirical, not “external” because it is based on its explanatory power for the huge, diverse, contradictory, and strange data set of “past and present cultural moral norms and the spontaneous judgments and motivations of our moral sense” (plus meeting other relevant criteria for scientific truth).

Are you arguing that “past and present cultural moral norms and the spontaneous judgments and motivations of our moral sense” is external to what morality ‘is’?

Finally, you say:

“And it remains generic until you specify what constitutes a cooperation problem and its solutions independently from actual specific cultural moral norms.”

I have already done this in this thread and will repeat it here for convenience and emphasis.

“In our universe, cooperation can produce many more benefits than individual effort. But cooperation exposes one to exploitation. Unfortunately, exploitation is almost always a winning short-term strategy, and sometimes is in the long term. This is bad news because exploitation discourages future cooperation, destroys those potential benefits, and eventually, everybody loses.
All life forms in the universe, from the beginning to the end of time, face this universal dilemma. This includes people and our ancestors.”

The above describes why the cooperation problems morality solves are innate to our universe. The solutions relevant to morality are primarily cooperation strategies such as indirect reciprocity.

Are there goals shared by all well-informed, rational people? — Mark S

Even if that were the case (which I do not doubt), it would have no significance for moral duties because, as Hume already stated, one cannot derive an "ought" from an "is."

"Hume's law or Hume's guillotine is the thesis that, if a reasoner only has access to non-moral and non-evaluative factual premises, the reasoner cannot logically infer the truth of moral statements."

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Is%E2%80%93ought_problem

Or, as John Leslie Mackie put it: "There are no objective values."

Are there goals shared by all well-informed, rational people?
— Mark S

Even if that were the case (which I do not doubt), it would have no significance for moral duties because, as Hume already stated, one cannot derive an "ought" from an "is." — Jacques

My point in the OP is the unfortunately common ambiguity of the term “moral oughts” in philosophical discussions.

Are these “moral oughts”

1) what everyone ought to do regardless of their needs and preferences (what I understand Hume and Mackie were referring to)? – I’ll call these imperative oughts.

2) a code of conduct that, given specified conditions, would be put forward by all rational people (Gert in https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/morality-definition/)?

Gert’s definition encompasses conditional oughts of the form “If your goal for morality is X, then you ought (conditional) to do Y”. If all well-informed, rational people share some goals for morality, then:

1) All rational, well-informed people have a universal moral code they can advocate to best achieve those goals.

2) And we can derive a universal moral code based on conditional oughts and shared goals.

3) A universal moral code that is objective in the sense of being what all rational, ell-informed people would advocate.

When the topic is "moral oughts", I do not understand the combination of

1) the continued philosophical interest in, and too common assumption of, “imperative oughts” that do not seem to exist and

2) the apparent lack of philosophical interest in universal moralities based on conditional oughts such as Morality as Cooperation Strategies.

Can anyone explain it?

Can anyone explain

1) the continued philosophical interest in, and too common assumption of, “imperative oughts” that do not seem to exist and

2) the apparent lack of philosophical interest in universal moralities based on conditional oughts such as Morality as Cooperation Strategies? — Mark S

Meanwhile, I believe I understand what you're getting at. I will do my best to compose a satisfactory answer to it, but it will take a few more days, I'm sorry to say.

1) the continued philosophical interest in, and too common assumption of, “imperative oughts” that do not seem to exist and

2) the apparent lack of philosophical interest in universal moralities based on conditional oughts such as Morality as Cooperation Strategies.

Can anyone explain it? — Mark S

Yes. People aren't much interested in morality as a subject, but they're happy to hold unexamined 'oughts' which can be used to judge others. Morality functions as a series of prejudices and biases.

People aren't much interested in morality as a subject, but they're happy to hold unexamined 'oughts' which can be used to judge others. Morality functions as a series of prejudices and biases. — Tom Storm

The biology underlying our moral sense supplies the motivation to act just the way you describe. No surprise there concerning average people.

My surprise and puzzlement is about the continued interest in the illusion of imperative oughts among people who spend their lives studying morality - moral philosophers.

Meanwhile, I believe I understand what you're getting at. I will do my best to compose a satisfactory answer to it, but it will take a few more days, I'm sorry to say. — Jacques

No rush.

My surprise and puzzlement is about the continued interest in the illusion of imperative oughts among people who spend their lives studying morality - moral philosophers. — Mark S

Oh I see. Surely there must be several reasons. One being the attraction so many minds have for certainty and truth. Surely that quest has often created a type of blindness.

When the topic is "moral oughts", I do not understand the combination of

1) the continued philosophical interest in, and too common assumption of, “imperative oughts” that do not seem to exist and

2) the apparent lack of philosophical interest in universal moralities based on conditional oughts such as Morality as Cooperation Strategies.

Can anyone explain it? — Mark S

I'll give it a try. The lack of interest in moral concepts based on conditional norms of oughtness can be explained by the fact that it represents a relatively simple problem. When the goal is known, it is relatively easy to reach a consensus on how it can be achieved. If X is known, determining the means Y is relatively straightforward. On the other hand, the more intriguing and challenging question seems to be what one can do before setting the goal X, or through which procedure one can achieve this goal. Or in other words, it's about the question of which goal X one should set and with what justification. This appears to be an almost insurmountable task, especially when one wants to find objections against rational egoism.

The lack of interest in moral concepts based on conditional norms of oughtness can be explained by the fact that it represents a relatively simple problem. When the goal is known, it is relatively easy to reach a consensus on how it can be achieved. — Jacques

I don’t see moral systems chosen based on conditional oughts as necessarily a simple problem.

1) There is no commonly accepted ultimate goal for advocating and enforcing moral systems

2) Even if a commonly accepted goal were found, there is no commonly accepted understanding of moral means to accomplish that goal (except within the science of morality)

3) There is no commonly accepted definition of who is which circle of moral concern – Peter Singer claims our obligation to children we will never meet is morally the same as our obligation to our own children (and people will predictably fail to meet this high moral standard).

So even if choosing what moral system we ought to advocate and enforce is merely a matter of a conditional ought, there are lots of remaining unknowns here. The science of morality gives us a big leg up on the problem, but lots of interesting philosophical problems remain.

There is no commonly accepted ultimate goal for advocating and enforcing moral systems — Mark S

That's why I'm saying that moralizing without such a goal is much more challenging than when you orient yourself towards a goal X that you already have set for yourself.

@Mark S
What I intended to convey is that it is considerably simpler to prescribe the actions one ought take to achieve a particular goal, rather than prescribing the goal they ought to strive for.

I am keenly interested in why you say:

The first claim doesn't make sense to me: it sounds as if you are claiming that evidences are based on an empirical theory.... — neomac


Your interpretation is, strangely, the opposite of what I am arguing.

My first claim was: “Science does provide that evidence, based mostly on the remarkable explanatory power of Morality as Cooperation Strategies for cultural moral norms and our moral sense.”

Perhaps we need a review of how science, including the science of morality, proceeds to conclusions:

1. Assemble an interesting category of phenomena such as “past and present cultural moral norms and the spontaneous judgments and motivations of our moral sense” - This is the data set to be explained.
2. Look for hypotheses that explain why this entire data set of phenomena exist – perhaps cooperation strategies, or acting for the good of everyone (utilitarianism), or a means of social control imposed by the powerful, or ?
3. If one hypothesis is far better than any competing one at explaining this huge, diverse, contradictory, and strange data set, we have a potential theory.
4. If the potential theory meets other relevant criteria for scientific truth such as simplicity and integration with the rest of science, then we have a theory explaining that data set. That theory may become generally accepted as provisionally true (the normal kind of truth in science) or rejected, with rejection usually in favor a new theory that better explains the data set.

Hence:
“Science does provide that evidence, based mostly on the remarkable explanatory power of Morality as Cooperation Strategies for cultural moral norms and our moral sense.” — Mark S

I might agree on the 4 points about empirical science. But your way of talking still sounds misleading based on those 4 points: “evidences” are the empirical base for the explanatory/predictive task of empirical theories (see point 1) and related comparisons (see point 3). So empirical theories are based on empirical evidences, not the other way around. If charitably understood, what you may have meant is that your empirical theory of morality is better supported by available data than other competing theories.
If that’s your claim, then let’s move on to more substantive points.

Then you say:

"confirms my suspects: taking "solving cooperation problems" as a rational condition (à la Gert) to establish what "morality" is, it's a NORMATIVE criterion,

"it's external to actual historical cultural moral norms, not descriptive of them (against what you seemed to be claiming in past posts). And it remains generic until you specify what constitutes a cooperation problem and its solutions independently from actual specific cultural moral norms. — neomac


Do you see why they don’t make any sense?

The theory is empirical, not “external” because it is based on its explanatory power for the huge, diverse, contradictory, and strange data set of “past and present cultural moral norms and the spontaneous judgments and motivations of our moral sense” (plus meeting other relevant criteria for scientific truth).

Are you arguing that “past and present cultural moral norms and the spontaneous judgments and motivations of our moral sense” is external to what morality ‘is’? — Mark S

Such comment keeps evading my actual points:
- You didn’t offer any such proof that your empirical theory of morality has greater explanatory/predictive power than other competing empirical theories. You just keep claiming that’s the case, that’s all. At least you could point at the literature where this comparison is provided.
- According to your four points, point 1 must refer to a data set that doesn’t presuppose your theory of morality otherwise there would be a selection bias. How do you build this dataset? The least prejudicial approach would be to build such dataset based on what cultural norms are pre-theoretically considered moral within the local culture that adopted them. THIS AND ONLY THIS looks to me an internal and descriptive representation of cultural moral norms. The problem is that these cultural norms may include also EXPLOITATIVE cultural norms (which are the opposite of cooperation according to you), therefore on one side claiming that morality is about solving cooperation problems is actually false if there are cultural norms deemed as moral which are exploitative, on the other side claiming that only cultural social norms that solve cooperation problems should be considered moral because more universal is no longer a descriptive claim but an external normative claim (i.e. Gert’s principle for a normative definition of morality)

What I think one can at best try to empirically prove is that cultural norms that solve cooperation problems and are deemed as “moral”, are the most cross-culturally shared. Or that cultural norms that solve cooperation problems and that are the most cross-culturally shared are deemed as “moral”. Or that cultural norms that are deemed “moral” and that are the most cross-culturally shared solve cooperation problems.
I can even try to guess their plausibility (e.g. the first hypothesis sounds to me more intuitively plausible than the other 2 hypotheses).
While claiming that cultural norms are moral because they solve cooperation problems, doesn’t sound intuitive at all (e.g. there are cultural norms that exploitative and cooperation problem solving norms which are not moral).

Finally, you say:

“And it remains generic until you specify what constitutes a cooperation problem and its solutions independently from actual specific cultural moral norms.”

I have already done this in this thread and will repeat it here for convenience and emphasis.

“In our universe, cooperation can produce many more benefits than individual effort. But cooperation exposes one to exploitation. Unfortunately, exploitation is almost always a winning short-term strategy, and sometimes is in the long term. This is bad news because exploitation discourages future cooperation, destroys those potential benefits, and eventually, everybody loses.
All life forms in the universe, from the beginning to the end of time, face this universal dilemma. This includes people and our ancestors.”

The above describes why the cooperation problems morality solves are innate to our universe. The solutions relevant to morality are primarily cooperation strategies such as indirect reciprocity. — Mark S

This comment doesn’t even address my concern. If you want to use game theory in specifying cooperation problems you have to specify strategies (payoffs, iterations, etc.) of specific games in some quantifiable way. If you want to support your claims generically, I can support my objections generically: exploitation is part of moral code maybe because the conditions to achieve long-term goals are simply more uncertain.