Does this count?

Does this count? — praxis

It certainly looks that way. What's your point

That you’re very hard to impress when it comes to ceremony, I guess. It’s Vatican level or your puny “ceremony” is meaningless and don’t count.

:up:

Nihilism seems moderately rare ... — Tom Storm

If by "nihilism" you mean 'not believing in anything' (i.e. believing all beliefs are false), then I agree with you, Tom. If, however, you mean 'belief in nothing', then I disagree because most people believe – place highest value – in fictions (e.g. gods, demons, ghosts, souls, miracles, horoscopes, ideology, ideals) either in lieu of or more than they believe – place highest value – in demonstrable something (e.g. nature, facts, uncertainty, cognitive biases / limits, other people, death, etc).

If by "nihilism" you mean 'not believing in anything' — 180 Proof

Yep, this. :up:

There is always some ritual or ceremony in all human dealings. I haven't denied there is much ritual and ceremony in some religions. All I said was I favour those with what I would count as no significant ritual or ceremony.

.Will Science Eventually Replace Religion?

The opposite of science is art.
Religion is one form of art.

The science of knowledge vs the art of intuition.

One breaks things down. Reduction. Deduction.
The other puts together. Induction. Often narrative.

Both suffer when they are not skeptical or imaginative.

Then ideas fossilize into institutions, losing the creative spark and curios spirit, becoming daycare institutions for adult children.

I would rather ask, "How do I become a free thinker?".
I think that is the desire behind the question of science ever replacing religion. Giving up a Big Religion is one thing, but then if we turn to Big Science, have we really overcome our tendency to look for a Big Pappa to spoonfeed us the answers we crave?

I suppose it's a process.
A slow painful process of overcoming self doubt and learned helplessness.

I don't entirely disagree, but where I live this fills people's time already. There's a veritable cornucopia of lifestyle shit in the west available to fill people's time - writer's festivals, philosophy groups, food festivals, recreation opportunities, etc. Most of it very middle class and aspirational. — Tom Storm

I'm not talking about materialism or pseudo-intellectual activities, but a changeover in dedicated time to work versus activities of meaning on a wider scale that does not revolve around the same materialistic capitalism that is already filling people's lives.

I tend to think this is more apropos -

All of humanity's problems stem from man's inability to sit quietly in a room alone.
- Blaise Pascal.

As true now as it was generations ago. :wink: — Tom Storm

And this is partly what I'm advocating for as well. It's why I mention mediation as a crucial part of psychological wellbeing. The problem is that these practices are somewhat hijacked in people's minds to be automatically religious or spiritual. What I'm arguing for is to dislocate religion from them and form a new cultural routine with such practices and rituals built into everyday life. It's a fundamental change to how people live. Like brushing your teeth, it is a vital normal part of everyone's daily life.

The answers I get in here when I mention "ritual" just shows how hard it is for people to separate it from religion and spiritualism. "Ritual" does not equal any of that, "ritual" is a repeated act that forms a psychological baseline in which the mind returns to known position. It is probably the reason why nostalgia is so powerful. It is the return to something familiar and important to balance against processing new information.

So in a world with an overload of information, rituals can ground people while meditation can focus thoughts.

I'm not convinced the rituals and traditions can survive without the "supernatural and spiritual elements" that motivated them in the first place and without which they lose their meaning. — Janus

Yes they can. As I described above here, "rituals" does not equal anything supernatural or spiritual. "Ritual" simply focuses on a repeating practice or act that ground the mind. It can be used as a purely health-based practice for better mental health in its basic function.

And we already have traditions without any religious foundation having any meaning. Thanksgiving has no religious background and even if Midsommar has pagan roots, there's literary no Swede who celebrate Midsommar in any religious manner. These are traditions that have formed a social and collective event in which non-religious rituals ground the collective and individual to a familiar place. There's no dance around a maypole to celebrate any religious or spiritual thing, the dance is just done because it is part of the celebration and it grounds people into a community as well as letting our minds rest towards new information.

I live in a small hippie village, and such things are celebrated in entirely new, creative ways. The quality's not always great, but the vitality and enthusiasm is there, and no reliance on long-standing traditions. — Janus

And this is what I mean, although, in too small communities, such inventions can have a tendency to incorporate newly invented spiritual ideas or become corrupt by a lack of scientific knowledge that is found on larger scale societies.

It's the larger scale of western culture I'm speaking of. A changeover of how western culture is without dismantling its foundation. A balance and synthesis of a more sustainable living (in terms of psychology) with the fast moving progression of western culture.

.Will Science Eventually Replace Religion?

The opposite of science is art.
Religion is one form of art.

The science of knowledge vs the art of intuition.

One breaks things down. Reduction. Deduction.
The other puts together. Induction. Often narrative. — HarryHarry

One breaks things down. Reduction. Deduction. AND puts together (Relativity and quantum mechanics describe almost all known phenomena)

The other puts together often fictitious events (ex., worldwide flood, miracles) to produce a grand narrative (ex. Jesus died for our sins)

I’ve attended zen pomp and ceremony, just like in the picture that I posted. It’s actually far stricter and elaborate than a typical church service. Your characterization of that tradition is quite wrong. That’s my point.

I've attended Zen groups here in Australia where there was virtually none of that. You commit the fallacy of over-generalizing. And, I was not talking about the mindful ritualization of ordinary activities like eating, drinking and so on, which I don't count as "pomp and ceremony".

The opposite of science is art. — HarryHarry

No it isn't.

Yes they can. As I described above here, "rituals" does not equal anything supernatural or spiritual. "Ritual" simply focuses on a repeating practice or act that ground the mind. It can be used as a purely health-based practice for better mental health in its basic function. — Christoffer

I agree that, for example, holy days can become everyday holidays. I was thinking of more elaborately symbolic ceremonies like the Catholic Eucharist becoming meaningless without their symbolic dimension.

Of course, people love festivals, because they love colour, dressing up, dancing and eating and so on. You don't really need any excuse to do those things. Here where I live such activities may be scheduled simply on, for example, the third Sunday of every month.

And this is what I mean, although, in too small communities, such inventions can have a tendency to incorporate newly invented spiritual ideas or become corrupt by a lack of scientific knowledge that is found on larger scale societies. — Christoffer

What is the problem with "newly invented spiritual ideas" and what has scientific knowledge got to do with celebrating, and how could the latter become corrupt through lack of the former? Your "vision" sounds somewhat like a scientistic prejudice.

"Ritual" simply focuses on a repeating practice or act that ground the mind. It can be used as a purely health-based practice for better mental health in its basic function. — Christoffer

As I noted earlier, Auguste Comte, founder of sociology and of the idea of positivism, attempted to create just such a secular church movement, The Church of Man, although it never really took off. IThere's still a Church of Positivism in Brazil, I read. )

Some will say that religion answers only psychological needs, but that itself is reductionist. According to anthropology and comparative religion, religions operate along a number of different lines to provide social cohesion, normative frameworks, and (most of all) a sense of relatedenss to the cosmos, by providing a mythical story which accords a role to human life in the grand scheme of things.

The difficulty with science replacing religion is that it provides no basis for moral judgements, it is a quantitative discipline concerned chiefly with measurement and formulating mathemtically-sound hypotheses. Strictly speaking there is no 'scientific worldview' as such, as science operates on the basis of tentative (i.e. falsifiable) theories which are only ever approximative. It is a method, and maybe an attitude, rather than a definitive statement as to what is real. (Hence the interminable arguments about 'qualia' and whether human beings actually exist.)

Modern science emerged in the seventeenth century with two fundamental ideas: planned experiments (Francis Bacon) and the mathematical representation of relations among phenomena (Galileo). This basic experimental-mathematical epistemology evolved until, in the first half of the twentieth century, it took a stringent form involving (1) a mathematical theory constituting scientific knowledge, (2) a formal operational correspondence between the theory and quantitative empirical measurements, and (3) predictions of future measurements based on the theory. The “truth” (validity) of the theory is judged based on the concordance between the predictions and the observations. While the epistemological details are subtle and require expertise relating to experimental protocol, mathematical modeling, and statistical analysis, the general notion of scientific knowledge is expressed in these three requirements.

Science is neither rationalism nor empiricism. It includes both in a particular way. In demanding quantitative predictions of future experience, science requires formulation of mathematical models whose relations can be tested against future observations. Prediction is a product of reason, but reason grounded in the empirical. Hans Reichenbach summarizes the connection: “Observation informs us about the past and the present, reason foretells the future.”

The demand for quantitative prediction places a burden on the scientist. Mathematical theories must be formulated and be precisely tied to empirical measurements. Of course, it would be much easier to construct rational theories to explain nature without empirical validation or to perform experiments and process data without a rigorous theoretical framework. On their own, either process may be difficult and require substantial ingenuity. The theories can involve deep mathematics, and the data may be obtained by amazing technologies and processed by massive computer algorithms. Both contribute to scientific knowledge, indeed, are necessary for knowledge concerning complex systems such as those encountered in biology. However, each on its own does not constitute a scientific theory. In a famous aphorism, Immanuel Kant stated, “Concepts without percepts are blind; percepts without concepts are empty.” — Edward Dougherty

The difficulty with science replacing religion is that it provides no basis for moral judgements, — Wayfarer

I concur, and said as much earlier.

The trouble is, while religion pretends to moral authority, it repeatedly fails.

So there can be no argument that we must adhere to religion in order to have a "moral compass" or some such.

The difficulty with science replacing religion is that it provides no basis for moral judgements, it is a quantitative discipline concerned chiefly with measurement and formulating mathemtically-sound hypotheses. — Wayfarer

I think the best basis for moral values is human harmony and flourishing. Science cannot tell us what to do, per se, but it may help to determine just what does and does not contribute to human flourishing, and it can also help dispel the superstitions which cause so much suffering, such as absurd religious reasons for not providing condoms to impoverished communities, or the genital mutilation of women.

The trouble is, while religion pretends to moral authority, it repeatedly fails. — Banno

Someone once told me that all generalisations are false, although I took it with a grain of salt.

Well, we can go in to why religion fails to provide moral authority, if that suits. It's basically because dogma is algorithmic, while making choices as to our behaviour cannot be. No mere moral rule can possibly give the right course of action in every case.

Making decisions as to what we ought do is not an algorithmic process. But dogma is algorithmic.

Or if you want a more direct argument, the decision to adhere to this or that religion is already a moral decision. And this circularity is vicious, each religion forming it's own bubble of self-justification. Hence they provide no guidance as to which of them to choose.

But, and here we have previously agreed, there is much to be said for Awe. And some small place for ritual in times of pain.

I've attended Zen groups here in Australia where there was virtually none of that. You commit the fallacy of over-generalizing. — Janus

There are all sorts of zen groups, and even some teachers who are less orthodox, such as Brad Warner, though they’re not well respected within the tradition. Indeed, Warner describes himself as an entertainer.

I was not talking about the mindful ritualization of ordinary activities like eating, drinking and so on, which I don't count as "pomp and ceremony". — Janus

Never heard of the tea ‘ceremony’ or oryoki?

As I tried to point out ealier in this thread, I think the issue is bound up with the emphasis on 'belief' as the sole criteria of what constitutes a religious maxim. This is why I often refer to Eastern philosophical attitude, for their emphasis on insight as distinct from simple acceptance of dogma. Earlier in this thread @Gnomon provided a definition of theosophy, to wit:

Theosophy is a term used in general to designate the knowledge of God supposed to be obtained by the direct intuition of the Divine essence. In method it differs from theology, which is the knowledge of God obtained by revelation, and from philosophy, which is the knowledge of Divine things acquire by human reasoning. . . . India is the home of all theosophic speculation.

There's a problem with that definition, as no Buddhist would agree that illumination comprises 'knowledge of God', as Buddhism is not theistic. But nevertheless the general idea stands, which is that there is genuine insight into the domain of the first cause, etc. It is hard to obtain, and few obtain it, but real nonetheless. But as our view of all such matters is indeed so thoroughly jaundiced by the very dogma which our particular forms of religious consciousness have foisted on us, then it is impossible to differentiate that genuine type of insight from its ossified dogmatic remnants. But, as the sage Rumi said, 'there would be no fools gold, were there no gold'.

I get that.Yep. But there remains a problem with that description. Theosophy and such new age stuff and religion more widely sought to find the truth, a description of how things are with regard to the relation between god and the universe and everything. in assuming this could be found it methodological tied itself to what is the case. Science will always do a better job of telling us what is the case.

This by way of agreeing that "the issue is bound up with the emphasis on 'belief'"

But what is at stake here is not what is the case. It's what to do.

So to reiterate, science cannot replace religion because science tells us how things are, while if religion has any value it is by way of telling us what to do.

And the further step is that in that very regard, religion fails.

Never heard of the tea ‘ceremony’ or oryoki? — praxis

Of course, the ritual there is an aesthetic elaboration or formalization of the ordinary event, which is itself more or less ritualized, of drinking tea together, but it's not overblown as the kinds of ceremonies I have a distaste for are.

But nevertheless the general idea stands, which is that there is genuine insight into the domain of the first cause, etc. It is hard to obtain, and few obtain it, but real nonetheless. But as our view of all such matters is indeed so thoroughly jaundiced by the very dogma which our particular forms of religious consciousness have foisted on us, then it is impossible to differentiate that genuine type of insight from its ossified dogmatic remnants. But, as the sage Rumi said, 'there would be no fools gold, were there no gold'. — Wayfarer

There is no intersubjectively definitive way to determine whether something is the case regarding the veracity of purportedly pure intellectual insights into the nature of things; that is, whether the insight is real or somehow illusory cannot be determined. The advantage of everyday observation and its elaboration, science, is that, within their contexts, observations can be confirmed to be veridical or not.

When it comes to metaphysical speculations, there is no way to determine whether they are veridical. An individual may feel absolutely certain that they are seeing into the nature of things, and that may well satisfy the individual seer, but their seeing cannot be evidence for anyone else. That is the insurmountable hurdle that any philosophical attempt to do metaphysics as traditionally understood faces.

So, in summary, it could be that intellectual intuition really can give real insight into the nature of things, but how could we ever demonstrate whether this is the case or not? Also if you were so certain of some insight, would it even matter to you whether it's truth could be discursively, empirically or logically confirmed. Judging from my own experience I would say not. It only becomes a problem if you wish to demonstrate it philosophically to others.

The "gold' analogy from Rumi seems to fall down on examination. On the one hand we can learn to recognize the difference, just as we may be thought to be able to learn to intuitively recognize the truth or falsity of metaphysical claims, but the learning in the case of being able to recognize real gold is based on sensorially perceptible attributes that can be taught and that are. being observable, unequivocal. Also, chemical tests can be done to determine whether something you might think is gold, but have not acquired the skill to be sure, is the real thing or not.

From the Bing AI, when I asked it this question: "can there be any evidence for the veracity of intellectual intuition":

That’s an interesting question. According to Wikipedia1, intuition is the ability to acquire knowledge, without recourse to conscious reasoning or needing an explanation. Some philosophers, such as Descartes and Kant, have distinguished between different types of intuition, such as sensory intuition and intellectual intuition. Sensory intuition is based on direct perception of external objects, while intellectual intuition is based on direct apprehension of abstract or metaphysical truths.

One possible way to understand intellectual intuition is as a kind of rational insight that reveals the necessary or essential features of reality. For example, some philosophers might claim that they have an intellectual intuition that torturing a sentient being for fun is wrong2. This would mean that they grasp this moral truth directly and with certainty, without needing any empirical evidence or argument.

However, the veracity of intellectual intuition is not uncontroversial. Some philosophers have challenged the reliability, validity, and explanatory power of intuitions as a source of knowledge. They have raised various skeptical arguments, such as:

The argument from lack of independent calibration: We have no way of checking whether our intuitions are true or false, since we cannot compare them with any other source of evidence2.
The argument from unreliability: Intuitions are prone to error and inconsistency, both within and across individuals2.
The argument from lack of explanatory necessity: Intuitions are not needed to explain our knowledge or justify our beliefs, since we can appeal to other sources of evidence or methods of reasoning2.
The argument from inexplicability of reliability: Intuitions are mysterious and inexplicable, since we have no account of how they are generated or how they track the truth2.
These arguments pose serious challenges for the defenders of intellectual intuition. They would need to show how intuitions can be calibrated, reliable, necessary, and explicable in order to establish their veracity. Alternatively, they might try to undermine the force of these arguments by appealing to self-support or epistemic circularity2. That is, they might argue that intuitions are justified by themselves or by other intuitions, and that this does not undermine their credibility.

Another way to approach the question of the veracity of intellectual intuition is to examine the empirical evidence from psychology and cognitive science. Some researchers have conducted experiments to test how people form and use intuitions in various domains, such as logic, morality, mathematics, physics, and language3. These experiments have revealed some interesting findings, such as:

Intuitions are influenced by various factors, such as culture, education, emotion, motivation, framing, and context3.
Intuitions are often biased, inaccurate, or inconsistent with scientific or logical principles3.
Intuitions can sometimes be improved by training, feedback, or reflection3.
Intuitions can sometimes outperform conscious reasoning or deliberation in complex or uncertain situations3.
These findings suggest that intuitions are not a homogeneous or monolithic phenomenon. Rather, they are diverse and context-dependent cognitive processes that involve both conscious and unconscious elements. They also suggest that intuitions are not infallible or authoritative sources of knowledge. Rather, they are fallible and tentative hypotheses that need to be evaluated and revised in light of further evidence or reasoning.

Therefore, the answer to your question may depend on how you define intellectual intuition and what kind of evidence you consider relevant. There may not be a simple yes or no answer to whether there can be any evidence for the veracity of intellectual intuition. Rather, there may be different types and degrees of evidence that support or challenge different kinds of intuitions in different domains.

One breaks things down. Reduction. Deduction. AND puts together (Relativity and quantum mechanics describe almost all known phenomena)

The other puts together often fictitious events (ex., worldwide flood, miracles) to produce a grand narrative (ex. Jesus died for our sins) — Art48

Both break things down and put things together.
Science does so with external phenomena and "religion" (in its ideal form) does so with internal phenomena.

Your OP can be interpreted as:

Will skepticism replace assumption?
Or:
Will the hard sciences ever replace the soft sciences?

The opposite of science is art.
— HarryHarry

No it isn't. — Banno

Maybe it's a spectrum more than a hard line?

Theosophy and such new age stuff and religion more widely sought to find the truth, a description of how things are with regard to the relation between god and the universe and everything. in assuming this could be found it methodological tied itself to what is the case. Science will always do a better job of telling us what is the case. — Banno

'What to do' is bound up with 'how things are' or perhaps more to the point 'what things mean'. Science does a great job of measurement, quantification and prediction, within its scope - not so much on what its discoveries mean (witness the current hand-wringing over predictive AI). Nowadays there are arguments raging in various branches of physics as to whether this or that approach or hypothesis even is science at all. Many of the disputes about interpretations of physics are also philosophical in nature. There you're starting to roam into qualitative judgement with precious little 'inter-subjective agreement' (Google Popperazi ;-) )

When doing Buddhist Studies, one of the Sanskrit terms that leapt out at me was 'yathābhūtaṃ'. This is something like the quality of sagacity. "Yathābhūtaṃ" can be translated as "seeing as it actually is" or "in accordance with reality." It can be used to describe a state of mind or perception that is free from illusions, misunderstandings, or bias, and that allows one to see things objectively and truthfully ¹. I suppose there are equivalents in Western languages, perhaps 'Veritas' being one. Arguably, the whole idea of scientific detachment arose from this. But the difference is that post-Galilean science is predicated on the separation of observer from observed, the distinction between primary and secondary qualities, and the divorce of fact and value, among very many other things . This stance amounts to a kind of implicit metaphysic with its baseline assumptions being, as Polanyi said, the boundary conditions for science.

But the over-arching insight characteristic of sagacity arises from a very different kind of mentality or type of consciousness. There are those who say that some of the ancient Greek philosophers - Parmenides and Plotinus come to mind - embodied that kind of sagacity. But then, many of their ideas became assimilated by Christianity and subsequently abandoned on account of that association. And now science has stepped into the vacuum caused by that absence, but without anything like the philosophical depth that they used to embody.

There is no intersubjectively definitive way to determine whether something is the case regarding the veracity of purportedly pure intellectual insights into the nature of things; — Janus

But surely the cultural context is fundamental to that. Our culture does have an agreed basis, and that is scientific method. But the problem, as I mentioned already, is that it methodically excludes the qualitative (not to mention 'the immeasurable'). Different cultures have other standards and frameworks and plenty of scope for intersubjective validation according to those frameworks. Heck, it's practically what 'culture' means. But Western culture, so-called, has an uncanny knack for the dissolution of all and any frameworks. That is what John Vervaeke means by 'the meaning crisis'. I mean, yay science!, computers are great, as is dentistry and penicillin and innummerable other inventions, but the 'scientific worldview' is another matter altogether. But then

the answer to your question may depend on how you define intellectual intuition and what kind of evidence you consider relevant

One of the better, current books I read on this is Defragmenting Modernity, Paul Tyson.

Something form Hanna Arendt:

The term vita activa, comprehending all human activities and defined from the viewpoint of the absolute quiet of contemplation, therefore corresponds more closely to the Greek askholia ("un-quiet"), with which Aristotle designated all activity, than to the Greek bios politikos. As early as Aristotle the distinction between quiet and unquiet, between an almost breathless abstention from external physical movement and activity of every kind, is more decisive than the distinction between the political and the theoretical way of life, because it can eventually be found within each of the three ways of life. It is like the distinction between war and peace: just as war takes place for the sake of peace, thus every kind of activity, even the processes of mere thought, must culminate in the absolute quiet of contemplation. Every movement, the movements of body and soul as well as of speech and reason-ing, must cease before truth. Truth, be it the ancient truth of Being or the Christian truth of the living God, can reveal itself only in complete human stillness. — The Human Condition, p. 15

But surely the cultural context is fundamental to that. Our culture does have an agreed basis, and that is scientific method. — Wayfarer

What I meant was that everyday empirical observations are intersubjectively confirmable, and this doesn't require a cultural context. For example: "It is raining", "the mammoth is behind that hill", "hear that thunder" and so on. I think basic scientific method is an extension of this; we must observe what is happening accurately, and once we have collated accurate data we can conjecture as to the explanations for the phenomena observed. Then we have more accurate observations to make to check if the predictions entailed by our hypotheses obtain.

These kinds of empirical observation, as far as I can tell, are the only things that can be directly confirmed intersubjectively. We find out we are wrong on those occasions (perhaps very rare) by checking with others. If no one else sees that it is raining, or the mammoth behind the hill or hears the thunder, then I might conclude that I have been hallucinating.

As to intellectual intuition, I take it that a proponent would say that it is possible to directly see metaphysical truth. Kant was one of, if not the, first to deny that possibility, the point being that maybe we can, but we cannot demonstrate empirically, logically or discursively that we can, so it remains a matter of belief. I can't see how that can be denied. I can't see any kind of rational argument against it, but I'm open to hearing one.

Kant says we have practical, not pure, reason to believe in God, freedom and immortality, so he understands that it remains a matter of faith. That was his project, to discover the limits of reason in order to make way for faith.

Very good. I've not read much of Hannah Arendt though clearly a profound thinker.

As to intellectual intuition, I take it that a proponent would say that it is possible to directly see metaphysical truth. Kant was one of, if not the, first to deny that possibility, the point being that maybe we can, but we cannot demonstrate empirically, logically or discursively that we can, so it remains a matter of belief. I can't see how that can be denied. I can't see any kind of rational argument against it, but I'm open to hearing one. — Janus

I think the kind of 'direct seeing' we're discussing is more characteristic of the mystical traditions. As you know I have huge admiration for Kant, but I can't help but feel something his missing from his rather dessicated account of the a priori, which often amounts to nothing more than competence in mathematics and logic. And also recall that Kant's critique ushered in a novel form of of critical metaphysics, unlike positivism which sought to completely reject it (and which is still very much part of modern discourse).

I'll mention again the essay by Edward Conze on Buddhist philosophy and its European parallels, where he says that in classical philosophy, East and West, there was recognition of an hierarchy of persons, some of whom, through what they are, can know much more than others; that there is a hierarchy also of the levels of reality, some of which are more real, because more exalted, than others; and that the wise have found a wisdom which is true, although it has no empirical basis in observations which can be made by everyone and everybody; and that there is a rare and unordinary faculty in them by which they can attain insight into those domains - through the Prajñāpāramitā of the Buddhists, the logos of Parmenides, the Sophia of the Greeks, Spinoza's amor dei intellectualis, Hegel's Vernunft, and so on; and that true teaching is based on an authority which legitimizes itself by the exemplary life and charismatic quality of its exponents.

Science will always do a better job of telling us what is the case.

This by way of agreeing that "the issue is bound up with the emphasis on 'belief'"

But what is at stake here is not what is the case. It's what to do.

So to reiterate, science cannot replace religion because science tells us how things are, while if religion has any value it is by way of telling us what to do — Banno

It’s not science per se that is focused on the notion of what is the case, it is propositional logic. Science has the flexibility to extricate itself from the philosophical presuppositions of proportional logic, because it is inextricably tied to philosophy itself and historical movement of philosophical thinking.
Freeing itself from propositional logic is a matter of recognizing the priority of what is at stake and at issue over what is the case. Without such grounding there can’t be a coherent case in the first place. Ascertaining what is at stake and at issue is also prior to determining what to do. Kuhninan normal science plods uncreatively through what is the case, locked into a particular framework of belief , while revolutionary science determines freshly what is at stake and at issue, by shifting the frame of belief, thereby determining freshly how to intervene in the world and build new niches. Science is fundamentally an endeavor of praxis, production and performance rather than disengaged epistemological knowledge. We know the world by doing, by intervening and making changes in it. The invented world then talks back to us, changing our frame of belief.

In sum, the philosophically creative, revolutionary impetus of science gives us new ways of determining what to do by freeing itself from logic’s freezing of the movement of nature down to what is the case. How religious belief differs from philosophical belief is a complex issue. I would just say that the way belief operates to both ground and change religion, philosophy and science reveals more commonalities than differences at a superordinate level of analysis.