You are conflating the fact and a statement of fact. — Fooloso4

Where did I do that?

All I've done is point out that your:

The fact: the baby is crying
The proposition: the baby is crying — Fooloso4

does not set out a distinction. If anything, it says that facts and propositions are the same.

Where did I do that? — Banno

Here:

Neither does the fact. You're thinking of the baby. — Banno

The term 'fact'; is ambiguous; it can mean either 'true proposition' or 'actuality'. — Janus

A fact is not true or false. There are no false facts, only false claims and beliefs about what is a fact.

A fact is not true or false. There are no false facts, only false claims and beliefs about what is a fact. — Fooloso4

You are thinking of 'fact' as equivalent to 'actuality'. In a different sense, the encyclopedia is a compendium of facts, or true propositions and descriptions. Facts, considered as true propositions are necessarily true. If a propositons or description is false it is not a fact. Facts considered as actualties are not true or false, they simply obtain.

Here: — Fooloso4

The proposition does not get hungry or need its diaper changed.
— Fooloso4

Hmm. Neither does the fact. You're thinking of the baby. — Banno

What I said was correct. Facts do not cry. Babies cry.

This is silly.

This is silly. — Banno

I agree.

2. What is the case—a fact—is the existence of states of affairs.

2.01 A state of affairs (a state of things) is a combination of objects (things).

What is the case, the state of affairs, the fact is that the baby (the thing) is crying.

Ok, so let's reset.

Now the next question is how one gets from a fact to a proposition - so to the elephant in the corner, proposition 6.

This seems about right:

What Wittgenstein is saying is that you can create any proposition you want by starting with the whole set of atomic propositions and negating a certain subset of those. — Reddit

Science as removing the false propositions from logical space...?

I may have at some point in the past. Why do you ask?

Facts, considered as true propositions are necessarily true. If a propositons or description is false it is not a fact. Facts considered as actualties are not true or false, they simply obtain. — Janus

I agree with everything, except, I'm not sure what you mean by the first sentence. Are you saying true propositions are necessarily true?

Are you saying true propositions are necessarily true? — Sam26

Not quite, I'm saying that if a proposition is to be counted as a fact then it is necessarily true. That still sounds a little ambiguous, because it might be understood to be saying that only propositions which are necessarily true are to be counted as facts, but that's not what I meant. So, I should have said that if a proposition is to be correctly counted as a fact, it must be true.

So, I should have said that if a proposition is to be correctly counted as a fact, it must be true. — Janus

But propositions are not facts, they either mirror a fact, or they mirror or picture a possible fact. It sounds like you're conflating true propositions with facts. Do you agree that propositions and facts are two separate things? Propositions, as I see it, are claims about facts.

As I understand it the term 'fact' refers ambiguously to both actual states of affairs, and statements describing states of affairs. It is in the latter sense that it is said that encyclopedias are compendiums of facts (or at least purported facts). Encyclopedias do not contain states of affairs, but statements of states of affairs like 'Water boils at 100 degrees centigrade at sea level". "Water boils at 100 degrees centigrade" is a fact or true statement in this sense.

So, I don't see it as a case of "either/ or" but "both/ and" since the word 'fact' is commonly used in both of these senses, and thus I don't believe I have conflated anything.

What Wittgenstein is saying is that you can create any proposition you want by starting with the whole set of atomic propositions and negating a certain subset of those. — Reddit

Right:

6.001 What this says is just that every proposition is a result of successive applications to elementary propositions of the operation N(ξ).

Science as removing the false propositions from logical space...? — Banno

The problem is atomic propositions are an a priori assumption. He never identifies an elementary proposition. Without elementary propositions we cannot get started.

The problem is atomic propositions are an a priori assumption. He never identifies an elementary proposition. Without elementary propositions we cannot get started. — Fooloso4

I pointed that out a long time ago and was chastised for not just allowing Wittgenstein to get away with it.

You are thinking of 'fact' as equivalent to 'actuality'. — Janus

Following the Tractatus, there is a distinction between facts, which are a combination of objects (2.01), and statements of facts which are propositions.

In a different sense, the encyclopedia is a compendium of facts, or true propositions and descriptions. — Janus

It is a compendium of statements of facts, that is, propositions. It does not contain the objects that make up facts.

Following the Tractatus, there is a distinction between facts, which are a combination of objects (2.01), and statements of facts which are propositions. — Fooloso4

What value does any of this obviousness have? The important part is figuring out the true propositions.

Just saying that there are states of affairs and we can make propositions that are true or false (about these states of affairs) just seems not adding anything.

What value does any of this obviousness have? The important part is figuring out the true propositions. — schopenhauer1

How can we distinguish between and true and false proposition?

That’s precisely my question and doesn’t seem Wittgensteins enterprise here. He doesn’t really go into a thorough investigation on how to determine true propositions other than the circular understanding that it’s atomic facts, deduction of these atomic propositions and some remarks about observation and empirical investigation.

He doesn’t really go into a thorough investigation on how to determine true propositions other than the circular understanding that it’s atomic facts, deduction of these atomic propositions and some remarks about observation and empirical investigation. — schopenhauer1

You have provided the answer: observation and empirical investigation.

4.01 A proposition is a picture of reality.

2.223 In order to tell whether a picture is true or false we must compare it with reality.

4.05 Reality is compared with the proposition.

4.06 Propositions can be true or false only by being pictures of the reality.

You have provided the answer: observation and empirical investigation.

4.01 A proposition is a picture of reality.

2.223 In order to tell whether a picture is true or false we must compare it with reality.

4.05 Reality is compared with the proposition.

4.06 Propositions can be true or false only by being pictures of the reality. — Fooloso4

So it's neat that you interpreted him this way (that he means by pictures of reality- empirical observation or whatnot), but let's say this is the correct interpretation, what does this add? He thus proclaimed something as thus. Other than the fact that he uttered a statement that he believed to be true, what exactly does this progress in the conversation, other than defining pretty self-explanatory things (that there is the world, and we create propositions about the world).

It doesn't tell us what true propositions are or anything like that, so I don't quite see the significance here of his project.

He's basically saying, "Anything beyond atomic facts and their combinations is nonsense". But without explaining what makes something true, this is just a preferential or prejudicial statement about what statements/propositions are meaningful. Something he saw clearly as an error in his later work.

Here's another statement, but in this case it is I who will utter them (a person that is not Wittgenstein, who is apparently given great significance to his words):

"What is really meaningful is what we can intuit". Why is that true or false? I don't know, but it is on par with the utterance "What is really meaningful is what is observed". Ok, so where does that get us? Nowhere. I can build systems on any utterance I thus have.

Edited the above post a bit.

So it's neat that you interpreted him this way — schopenhauer1

These were direct quotes from the text.

It doesn't tell us what true propositions are or anything like that, so I don't quite see the significance here of his project. — schopenhauer1

True propositions are those that accurately picture reality, propositions that state the facts.

He's basically saying, "Anything beyond atomic facts and their combinations is nonsense". — schopenhauer1

The totality of facts is the world. (1.1) The world is not nonsense.

But without explaining what makes something true, this is just a preferential or prejudicial statement about what statements/propositions are meaningful. Something he saw clearly as an error in his later work. — schopenhauer1

2.221 What a picture represents is its sense.

2.222 The agreement or disagreement of its sense with reality constitutes its truth or falsity.

The proposition, "it is raining", is true if it raining and false if it is not raining. The proposition has a sense, that is, we know what is the case if it is true or false.

What about the proposition, "God exists"? Does this agree or disagree reality. Can we know whether it is true or false?

It should be noted that Wittgenstein is neither affirming or denying metaphysical beliefs, he is attempting to draw the limits of what can be said. And what can be said is what has a sense, what can be determined to be true or false.

6.53 The right method of philosophy would be this: To say nothing except what can be said,
i.e. the propositions of natural science, i.e. something that has nothing to do with philosophy:
and then always, when someone else wished to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate
to him that he had given no meaning to certain signs in his propositions. This method would be unsatisfying to the other—he would not have the feeling that we were teaching him philosophy—but it would be the only strictly correct method.

These were direct quotes from the text. — Fooloso4

You added what the text didn't say. You quoted something, then you said other stuff not in the text that you gleaned from the text.

The text said:

4.01 A proposition is a picture of reality.

2.223 In order to tell whether a picture is true or false we must compare it with reality.

4.05 Reality is compared with the proposition.

4.06 Propositions can be true or false only by being pictures of the reality.

I didn't see anything about empirical observation. I am sure of it, he did discuss that elsewhere and that is what he means here, thus completing his self-referential circle of himself to himself but just saying, there are authors who explain themselves and ones where you explain them. This is the latter apparently.

True propositions are those that accurately picture reality, propositions that state the facts. — Fooloso4

That is either saying nothing or saying something so obvious as to be not worth saying, "Ok, and anything of significance?". Each person describing reality thinks they are accurately picturing reality. He is giving his preference for observation of events in the world as this "accurate picture". And so what of this preference?

Here's example of things that do have some explanatory worth (or at least have that potential) perhaps:

Chomsky's theory of language aqcuisition device. It explains how language derives from a small set of inputs. Now, it could be completely wrong by future empirical evidence to the contrary. But it is trying to explain something.

Tomasello's theory of language from social learning: It explains how language derives from children having the capacity for common ground and showing a shared reference that is not directly about wanting the item. It may be refuted or revised with further experiments and observations but it is trying to explain something.

Wittgenstein's theory of atomic facts and propositions: It doesn't explain how language is derived. Ok. It doesn't explain how words get their meaning. Ok. It doesn't explain why observation and empirical evidence is more important than intuition, feeling, immediate sensation, abstractions of imagination, etc. It just asserts something (observed objects are what reality is). But he doesn't explain this. He just asserts this. He just says, observed objects are reality. He doesn't explain why this is the case. He just starts with it. And then, once we have this assertion, what of it? What is it proving? Not much except about common sense ideas like, "If you observe that an apple is on the table, there must be a fact that the apple is on the table". Not blowing me away here.

It should be noted that Wittgenstein is neither affirming or denying metaphysical beliefs, he is attempting to draw the limits of what can be said. And what can be said is what has a sense, what can be determined to be true or false.

6.53 The right method of philosophy would be this: To say nothing except what can be said,
i.e. the propositions of natural science, i.e. something that has nothing to do with philosophy:
and then always, when someone else wished to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate
to him that he had given no meaning to certain signs in his propositions. This method would be unsatisfying to the other—he would not have the feeling that we were teaching him philosophy—but it would be the only strictly correct method. — Fooloso4

How is this proven? This is just a preference for discussing things observed. It explains nothing. It advances nothing. It is just preference-writ-large and then self-referential ideas circling this same preference over and over.

I didn't see anything about empirical observation. — schopenhauer1

How can we compare a proposition to reality without empirical observation?

That is either saying nothing or saying something so obvious as to be not worth saying, "Ok, and anything of significance?". — schopenhauer1

This needs to be read against what he says about metaphysical propositions. The former have a sense the latter do not.

Each person describing reality thinks they are accurately picturing reality. — schopenhauer1

Right, and how do we determine which is an accurate picture of reality? There are facts about the world, but no facts about God.

It doesn't explain why observation and empirical evidence is more important than intuition, feeling, immediate sensation, abstractions of imagination, etc. — schopenhauer1

He does not claim it is more important.

6.432 How things are in the world is a matter of complete indifference for what is higher. God
does not reveal himself in the world.

6.4321 The facts all contribute only to setting the problem, not to its solution.

6.44 It is not how things are in the world that is mystical, but that it exists.

6.45 To view the world sub specie aeterni is to view it as a whole—a limited whole.
Feeling the world as a limited whole—it is this that is mystical.

6.52 We feel that even when all possible scientific questions have been answered, the problems of
life remain completely untouched. Of course are then no questions left, and this itself is the answer.

6.522 There are, indeed, things that cannot be put into words. They make themselves manifest.
They are what is mystical.

My interpretation: Shut up in order to allow things that can be seen and experienced to manifest themselves.

How can we compare a proposition to reality without empirical observation? — Fooloso4

That's for HIM as the PHILOSOPHER (not Fooloso4) to explain.

This needs to be read against what he says about metaphysical propositions. The former have a sense the latter do not. — Fooloso4

No, I get. God, free will, the green idea that sleeps by the dreamy number 3, etc. is "non-sense" because they are not observed (and is a misuse of atomic facts and category errors and all that). But this is the very idea that needs to be EXPLAINED. He is just asserting it.

Right, and how do we determine which is an accurate picture of reality? There are facts about the world, but no facts about God. — Fooloso4

It is Accurate Picture of Reality that needs to be explained. What IS this idea of an "accurate picture of reality"? He doesn't explain what makes true propositions true, so he's not helpful there. He is just a reality ELITIST. And like elitists who have no reason to be elitist except for their behavior towards the undesirables, he simply asserts his preferences as the world-writ-large. He is simply stating (but not really stating like the cool hipster he was because he was "showing" it by not stating anything :roll: ) that "observation is more important than speculation". But this is just, like, his opinion man.. He liked concrete things about the world (at that time in his life), and thought this was just the bees knees.

Plato fanatics like the idea of Forms. Some people like speculating on the Hard Problem, which cannot be observed itself, but is the very foundation of the observation, so not amenable to simply pointing at. What fruitful investigation comes from this, I don't know. But what is "fruitful" here? Does it explain something? At a certain level of explanatory power, it might be. But to cut off speculation and non-observable ideas from the start as "not reality", is a huge assertion that itself IS THE THING TO BE EXPLAINED. But it isn't. It's assertion all the way down.

The problem is atomic propositions are an a priori assumption. — Fooloso4

Not sure I have what you mean here. Atomic propositions are not each learned a priori. I hope youa re not saying that.

But one might say that the category, "atomic propositions", is understood a priori.

Some people like speculating — schopenhauer1

I think this might be what is really at issue for you, at least in part, although it does not explain your apparent animosity. You like speculative philosophy.

I think this might be what is really at issue for you, at least in part, although it does not explain your apparent animosity. You like speculative philosophy. — Fooloso4

My animosity mainly comes from the very project of the Tractatus itself which is ultimately speculative, but poorly done speculation, as it doesn't even explain itself. Schopenhauer is very speculative (all of existence is striving, and this striving is an indication of a philosophical principle, etc.). But he explained himself. He explained it, put it in context with previous and contemporary philosophers. In fact, he over-explained it. He put all the ideas, and all the reasoning out there to be criticized. Tractatus doesn't do this. It is a long opinion piece with common sense ideas about facts being true propositions.

His a priori assumption is that there are elementary propositions. That in the final analysis we have a configuration of simple names of simple objects.

4.221 It is obvious that the analysis of propositions must bring us to elementary propositions
which consist of names in immediate combination.

It is an a priori assumption because nowhere are these names or objects identified. Nowhere are elementary propositions given. It is just assumed that the world and language must be built from this starting point.

Yes, I understand that the Tractatus priveleges one usage over another, but that doesn't change the fact that there are different usages. It is an ambivalent term. A dog chasing a ball, for example, according to common usage as I understand it, is not a fact but an event. That the dog chased the ball is a fact, and that the dog chased the ball is also a proposition or statement.

Anyway, this just reflects the sloppiness of language, and I'm not claiming it is of any great importance.