Without too much exaggeration, the only thing they have in common is the word 'logic'. — Fooloso4
The transcendental logic of the Tractatus is not simply the logic of language, it is the logic of the world. — Fooloso4
You see no thread in terms of the logic of language that goes from his early thinking to his later thinking? — Sam26
107. The more closely we examine actual language, the greater becomes the conflict between it and our requirement. (For the crystalline purity of logic was, of course, not something I had discovered: it was a requirement.) The conflict becomes intolerable; the requirement is now in danger of becoming vacuous. We have got on to slippery ice where there is no friction, and so, in a certain sense, the conditions are ideal; but also, just because of that, we are unable to walk. We want to walk: so we need friction. Back to the rough ground!
108. We see that what we call “proposition”, “language”, has not the formal unity that I imagined, but is a family of structures more or less akin to one another. —– But what becomes of logic now? Its rigour seems to be giving way here. But in that case doesn’t logic altogether disappear? For how can logic lose its rigour? Of course not by our bargaining any of its rigour out of it. The preconception of crystalline purity can only be removed by turning our whole inquiry around. (One might say: the inquiry must be turned around, but on the pivot of our real need.
... the logic of our language is misunderstood — Sam26
It's the logic of language and how it connects with the world of facts. — Sam26
The logical scaffolding surrounding a picture determines logical space. (3.42)
The proposition constructs a world with the help of a logical scaffolding (4.023)
I'm not sure why you keep using the term "transcendental logic — Sam26
Logic is transcendental. (6.13)
My understanding of his later philosophy is that he still believes there is a limit to what can be sensibly said, which is why I think T. 1 is still something that he holds on to. — Sam26
What I'm saying is, he still believes that the "world is [still] all that is the case," — Sam26
The world is all that is the case — Sam26
The world of the happy man is a different one from that of the unhappy man. (T6.43)
... the figure can be seen in two ways as a cube; and all similar phenomena. For we really see two different facts. (T 5.5423)
... what can be said in his later philosophy is still limited to the world — Sam26
The thoughts that I publish in what follows are the precipitate of philosophical investigations which have occupied me for the last sixteen years. They concern many subjects: the concepts of meaning, of understanding, of a proposition and sentence, of logic, the foundations of mathematics, states of consciousness, and other things.
122. A main source of our failure to understand is that we don’t have an overview of the use of our words. - Our grammar is deficient in surveyability. A surveyable representation [ an übersichtlichen Darstellung] produces precisely that kind of understanding which consists in ‘seeing connections’. Hence the importance of finding and inventing intermediate links.
The concept of a surveyable representation is of fundamental significance for us. It characterizes the way we represent things, how we look at matters. (Is this a ‘Weltanschauung’?)
125. This entanglement in our rules is what we want to understand: that is, to survey.
It throws light on our concept of meaning something. For in those cases, things turn out otherwise than we had meant, foreseen. That is just what we say when, for example, a contradiction appears: “That’s not the way I meant it.”
The civic status of a contradiction, or its status in civic life - that is the philosophical problem.
This doesn't take away from my main point, that there is an underlying logic to language, viz., in the use of grammar (syntax) or the expanded grammar that Wittgenstein refers to. — Sam26
if everyone is using different terms for their starting points — schopenhauer1
It is, rather, about trying to get to an agreed starting point or marking the differences in starting points. — Fooloso4
Theology as grammar (PI 373)
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