Nagel, commenting on Peirce’s platonist musings, says that Peirce’s idea of the ‘inward sympathy’ with nature is alarming to many people: — Wayfarer

I'm quite the opposite; I would love to think that there can be purely rational intuition of reality. There have been many, many moments in my life where i have felt this to be true. But the critical side calls this into question, and asks whether this is not just a feeling, a kind of wishful thinking.

He doesn't leave it at a single sentence. A very detailed discussion of the sovereignty of reason and its treatment by evolutionary theorists occupies the remainder of the essay.

I'm reasonably familiar with the arguments in support of rationalism. The problem for me is that reason by itself tells us nothing, it is really just a good practice of consistent thinking. The premises our consistent thinking is based on are not themselves supported by reason.

So, the idea that what the mind intuits about reality is true on the basis of a deep connection between the "inner workings" of the mind and the inner workings of the world is a nice premise, and from there we can reason our way to, for example, Platonist conclusions, but a critical mind will ask the question as to how we know this most attractive thought is actually true.

And I can't see any possible answer other than that it might "feel right". It isn't empirically verifiable, and it isn't logically necessary, so what other ground do we have?

That said, I think we don't know that our intuitions cannot tell us about reality, either, so I also don't reject the idea; I just cannot settle on one or the other belief. A change in consciousness can bring a different vision, and I know from moments of my own experience that what is felt to be "direct knowing" can be so compelling as to dispel all doubt whatsoever, but such an altered state is not perennial. at least not for me.

Direct knowing like that might indeed constitute sufficient evidence for the individual enjoying that state of mind, but it cannot constitute sufficient evidence for anyone else, although they may be moved to believe by something they see or seem to see in the person with the direct knowing.

The problem for me is that reason by itself tells us nothing, it is really just a good practice of consistent thinking — Janus

Which has among other things resulted in the scientific revolution.

a critical mind will ask the question as to how we know this most attractive thought is actually true.

And I can't see any possible answer other than that it might "feel right". It isn't empirically verifiable, and it isn't logically necessary, so what other ground do we have? — Janus

My tentative answer is that the world is the experience-of-the-world, and so the order we find in reason, is also the order we find in the world, because they're not ultimately separable (a lot rides on 'ultimately' in that sentence.)

Logical necessity is nowadays often deemed to be a separate issue to physical causation (something I explored in this offsite post.) But that doesn't seem to me to address the 'unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in the natural sciences' which time and again has produced predictions for which at the time there wasn't even the empirical means to test (e.g. relativity, Dirac's discovery of anti-matter.) I think these are all examples of Kant's synthetic a priori and a testimony to the power of reason.

Nagel's point is that if we are to be considered rational beings, then this is because we accept the testimony of reason, not because we are compelled to do so by the requirements of adaptation, but because we can see the truth of its statements. I think it is that power to discern apodictic truths which caused the ancients to grant it a kind of quasi-religious status, and conversely the tendency to deprecate reason as simply an evolved capacity is an indicator of a kind of deep irrationality.

Nagel's point is that if we are to be considered rational beings, then this is because we accept the testimony of reason, not because we are compelled to do so by the requirements of adaptation, but because we can see the truth of its statements. I think it is that power to discern apodictic truths which caused the ancients to grant it a kind of quasi-religious status, and conversely the tendency to deprecate reason as simply an evolved capacity is an indicator of a kind of deep irrationality. — Wayfarer

In other words, reason suggests naturalism is false, or at least, incomplete, that there's an explanation needed to account for our preference for such self-evident truths?

Nagel's point is that if we are to be considered rational beings, then this is because we accept the testimony of reason, not because we are compelled to do so by the requirements of adaptation, but because we can see the truth of its statements. I think it is that power to discern apodictic truths which caused the ancients to grant it a kind of quasi-religious status, and conversely the tendency to deprecate reason as simply an evolved capacity is an indicator of a kind of deep irrationality. — Wayfarer

<another option>

To make an argument is indeed to appeal to norms, often within the quest to modify those very norms. Our concept of the rationality itself has evolved through endless self-investigation and self-clarification. Apodictic truths tend to be analytic, syntactical, grammatical, a mere elaboration or unfolding or making explicit of these often tacit norms. It's not at all clear that we need some god to have installed these norms, especially as we've come to understand evolution. Does us having evolved mean we can't trust our own norms ? If so, why exactly ? I don't think we have any choice. We 'are' these norms, and we/they are liquid rather than solid, always on the move, if sufficiently slowly for us to remain sane.

In other words, reason suggests naturalism is false, or at least, incomplete, that there's an explanation needed to account for our preference for such self-evident truths? — Tom Storm

I think self-evident truths are supposed to be the fingerprints of the Divine.

Naturalism as construed in neodarwinian terms, which seems to dictate that whatever faculties we possess are the product of adaptive necessity. Interesting how it’s a similar argument to both Donald Hoffman’s and Alvin Plantinga’s, albeit each of them draw very different conclusions from the same basic premises (although I suppose Plantinga and Nagel are closer then either are to Hoffman, even if Plantinga is theistic, and Nagel claims not to be). Nagel is defending the sovereignty of reason. That is the thrust of that whole book of his The Last Word, which was published about 1996 as an argument against cultural relativism from which that essay is extracted.

I think self-evident truths are supposed to be the fingerprints of the Divine. — plaque flag

In ancient and medieval philosophy, the order of nature was seen as ‘God’s handiwork’. But that was especially true in respect of Aquinas and that strain of scholastic philosophy that incorporated Aristotelianism - scholastic realism, in short. But the countervailing historical strain was Ockham’s nominalism and Bacon’s early empiricism, and that was the strain that prevailed. (This was the theme of a fantastic book, The Theological Origins of Modernity, M A Gillespie, which I read when I first joined forums. It links nominalism with the rise of theological voluntarism, which says that the soveriegnty of God is not constrained by reason. Very deep and lengthy argument however.)

But look at the current debates around Platonism in mathematics. These revolve around the argument as to whether and in what sense number (and by implication universals generally) can be said to be real. In scholastic realism, universals are understood to be real, and this is what underwrote scholastic metaphysics. The mainstream view today is very much that numbers are discovered not invented, they’re human artifacts. And that is in part because if the reality of such things as number can’t be accommodated in the presumptive materialism of modern philosophy.

Mathematical platonism has considerable philosophical significance. If the view is true, it will put great pressure on the physicalist idea that reality is exhausted by the physical. For platonism entails that reality extends far beyond the physical world and includes objects that aren’t part of the causal and spatiotemporal order studied by the physical sciences.[1] Mathematical platonism, if true, will also put great pressure on many naturalistic theories of knowledge. For there is little doubt that we possess mathematical knowledge. The truth of mathematical platonism would therefore establish that we have knowledge of abstract (and thus causally inefficacious) objects. This would be an important discovery, which many naturalistic theories of knowledge would struggle to accommodate. Mathematical platonism has considerable philosophical significance. If the view is true, it will put great pressure on the physicalist idea that reality is exhausted by the physical. For platonism entails that reality extends far beyond the physical world and includes objects that aren’t part of the causal and spatiotemporal order studied by the physical sciences.[1] Mathematical platonism, if true, will also put great pressure on many naturalistic theories of knowledge. For there is little doubt that we possess mathematical knowledge. The truth of mathematical platonism would therefore establish that we have knowledge of abstract (and thus causally inefficacious) objects. This would be an important discovery, which many naturalistic theories of knowledge would struggle to accommodate. — SEP, Platonism in Philosophy of Mathematics

(I’m pursuing an idea that they are real in the sense of Terrence Deacon’s ‘absentials’, i.e. acting as logical constraints within the domain of possibility.)

All of which is completely besides the point of this thread so I will end it there.

the tendency to deprecate reason as simply an evolved capacity is an indicator of a kind of deep irrationality. — Wayfarer

Seems harsh !

Trying to explain how reasonable creatures emerged in the first place from simpler conditions is perhaps the most spectacular use of reason so far. Reason is honored in the use of it.

Deciding that 'X did it', with X being more complex and mysterious than ourselves, is moving in the wrong direction. It is even perhaps anti-explanation. Or, more generously, it's an emotionally orienting myth.

Trying to explain how reasonable creatures emerged in the first place from simpler conditions is perhaps the most spectacular use of reason so far. Reason is honored in the use of it. — plaque flag

Evolutionary biology is an account of how species evolve, but I don't see it as an account of the nature of reason. Should be a different thread, though.

Which has among other things resulted in the scientific revolution. — Wayfarer

I'm not sure if this is meant to be approval or disapproval.

My tentative answer is that the world is the experience-of-the-world, and so the order we find in reason, is also the order we find in the world, because they're not ultimately separable (a lot rides on 'ultimately' in that sentence.) — Wayfarer

I agree this is true in regard to the collective representation we refer to as 'the phenomenal world'. But we don't know, can't know, whether that representation tells us anything about the world as it is independent of our representations of it.

Logical necessity is nowadays often deemed to be a separate issue to physical causation (something I explored in this offsite post.) But that doesn't seem to me to address the 'unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in the natural sciences' which time and again has produced predictions for which at the time there wasn't even the empirical means to test (e.g. relativity, Dirac's discovery of anti-matter.) I think these are all examples of Kant's synthetic a priori and a testimony to the power of reason. — Wayfarer

I don't believe there is any convincing argument that causation is logically necessary. Apparently, the idea is necessary for us to make sense of our experience. It's true that math does seem to be effective in producing models which enjoy great predictive success. What are the impications of that for metaphysics? Beats me.

Nagel's point is that if we are to be considered rational beings, then this is because we accept the testimony of reason, not because we are compelled to do so by the requirements of adaptation, but because we can see the truth of its statements. I think it is that power to discern apodictic truths which caused the ancients to grant it a kind of quasi-religious status, and conversely the tendency to deprecate reason as simply an evolved capacity is an indicator of a kind of deep irrationality. — Wayfarer

I think we are compelled to think according to the principles of reason, that is to think in ways which are consistent with our premises, if we want to think well. But again, I would say our premises are not themselves underpinned by pure reason. What seems self-evident is not so on the basis of some chain of argument, otherwise it would be relying on some further premises that chain would necessarily be based upon. The buck has to stop somewhere. It's on account of that that I think the dream of working it all out via reason is just that; a dream.

Well, there is mysterianism which takes a similar view. But I am not a philosopher - just interested in what the themes and issues are and what some people believe and why. — Tom Storm

Yes, but Mysterianism takes the "know nothing" approach only for very select few questions, such as "God" & "Consciousness". Which are mystifying simply because they are immaterial & metaphysical, hence beyond the scope of empirical evidence. But they are not beyond the scope of rational inference, from what physical & metaphysical evidence we do have access to.

For example, Cosmologists used the astronomical evidence then available -- surprisingly indicating expansion of the universe, long assumed to be static & eternal -- to trace the expansion back to a point where their calculations gave infinite outputs. Yet, the general consensus of a Big Bang beginning, left a Big ("god") Gap to be filled by reasonable speculation*1. AFAIK, metaphysical (why?) questions are all that's left for philosophical minds to do, since empirical methods replaced theological scholasticism centuries ago. "What some people believe and why" is a metaphysical question, that won't be answered with empirical evidence.

I too, am not a formally trained philosopher, but merely a curious layman. And I only began to spend time on "philosophical" non-empirical (why?) questions after I retired from productive work. I don't get paid for my time posting mini-essays that may be read by one or two people. Nevertheless, I enjoy engaging with mysteries that have baffled better minds than mine. For me, philosophy is a cheap hobby. :smile:


*1. Why some cosmologists found the Big Bang offensive :
Today, we speak of the Big Bang model of cosmology, but it was not always so. For two decades, the Big Bang model battled against the steady state model. This pitted a Universe with a beginning against an eternal Universe. In the absence of data, philosophical prejudice often drives research.
https://bigthink.com/13-8/steady-state-universe-big-bang/

"What some people believe and why" is a metaphysical question, that won't be answered with empirical evidence. — Gnomon

I think you are over complicating. It is answered when they say what their beliefs are and why they believe them.

Yet, the general consensus of a Big Bang beginning, left a Big ("god") Gap to be filled by reasonable speculation — Gnomon

Or unreasonable and uneducated speculation. I am not a cosmologist and the poorly named Big Bang is of minimal interest. Anyone can read Paul Davies, Roger Penrose or Lawrence Krauss if they want a range of simplified conjecture based on expertise. I leave the matter there. :wink: