Even if they don't have words to describe the colours, they nonetheless see them, just as I can distinguish between a variety of different smells despite not having words for each individual kind of smell. — Michael

I'm not so sure. It's not the sort of thing we can check, right? What is it like to be a bat? What is it like to not have language while we imagine that scenario with language?

On what grounds can we possibly say that the dress must either be Blue/Black or White/Gold as an external data point. Why cannot it be both? What fact do we know about the data points of the external world which we can use to say with certainty that they cannot be two colours at once? — Isaac

Yup.

The dress is black, white, gold, and blue. And we don't know what perception is like without language, due to our indoctrination into a linguistic culture.

In the categories I posited earlier, we're just looking at different parts of the surface of reality. And reality ends up being surprising.


*****

I feel like I'm approaching, in my stumbling way, Derrida's criticism of Husserl, as far as I understand it. (there's always this strange interplay between continental-analytic that I see. One of the reasons I doubt it's anything more than a historical category)

I'm not so sure. It's not the sort of thing we can check, right? — Moliere

I know from my own experience that I can smell the difference between two different flowers despite not having a word to describe each smell.

I know from my own experience that I can see the difference between two different hues of red despite not having a word to describe each hue.

I know from my own experience that I can see the colour of my wall despite not knowing whether to call it pale blue or grey.

The sensory quality of an experience and English vocabulary are two very different things and I just don't understand why so many here seem to disagree with this. It's like they've been so bewitched by Wittgenstein that they deny the patently obvious.

I'm more coming at this from the continental side, where language-soup-as-reality isn't too far off (but put differently -- a reduction might put it the difference is between putting intension or pragmatics first)

But the notion of language is wider than English. It's sense-making. Perceptions of the world without words is thought to be a part of our overall meaningful experience -- so meaning, Big-L Language, is still a part of our cognitive apparatus just by the fact that we're able to discriminate at all. There are, after all, parts of the world we had to develop instruments to be able to discriminate. And those instruments get folded into Big-L Language and sense-making.

At least, that's where I'm thinking from.

Even if they don't have words to describe the colours, they nonetheless see them, just as I can distinguish between a variety of different smells despite not having words for each individual kind of smell. — Michael

Not necessary.

If I have a color detecting machine where when I place a colored object in front of it, it will report the color in its display. However, one day it stops reporting the color on the display. We checking the display and is functioning fine. What sense is there in saying “Nevertheless the machine is still detecting the color even when we place it in front of the machine”

The same goes for a person looking at the colored balls.

If I have a color detecting machine where when I place a colored object in front of it, it will report the color in its display. However, one day it stops reporting the color on the display. We checking the display and is functioning fine. What sense is there in saying “Nevertheless the machine is still detecting the color even when we place it in front of the machine”

The same goes for a person looking at the colored balls. — Richard B

I can tell you for a fact that I can see the colour of my carpet even though I'm not describing the colour of my carpet.

I can tell you for a fact that I can see the colour of my carpet even though I'm not describing the colour of my carpet. — Michael

And I would say, I agree with you as long as I can ask you what color your carpet is, and you get it right.

But if you are incapable of routinely getting this right, I not to sure what sense can be made of saying "I still see the color of the carpet even though I am not describing it."

So if I refuse to answer your question then I'm blind? Or I'm not blind but the carpet is transparent? Or the carpet isn't transparent but also not coloured (and so not white or black either)?

This is clearly ridiculous. Me seeing something has nothing to do with you and nothing to do with speech.

I really don't think you're being honest with me at all. You can't actually believe these things you're saying.

It would make sense that the brain evolved to make us believe we are directly interacting with the world even if it is really a virtual world. We feel an itch in our left arm and scratch it. We dont scratch an image in our brain. For all intents and puposes we act "as if" interacting directly with objects in the world even when we believe it is only indirectly that we perceive and interact with things. In the phantom limb illusion an amputee thinks he has an itch or pain in his arm even though the arm is gone. We can say his feeling is in a virtual body image / schema. But perhaps in active imagination / thinking we are directly interacting not with the outside world but with the virtual models in our brain.

It would make sense that the brain evolved to make us believe we are directly interacting with the world even if it is really a virtual world — lorenzo sleakes

:up:

I can tell you for a fact that I can see the colour of my carpet even though I'm not describing the colour of my carpet. — Michael

If saying "what ever I believe is a fact is a fact" is not ridiculous, I think we should study what "ridiculous" means.

If saying "what ever I believe is a fact is a fact" is not ridiculous — Richard B

I haven't said that, so not sure the relevance of this.

If saying "what ever I believe is a fact is a fact" is not ridiculous
— Richard B

I haven't said that, so not sure the relevance of this. — Michael

No, I'm saying so because I believe it to be a fact. And because it is a fact, what I say is true. — Michael

No, I'm saying so because I believe it to be a fact. And because it is a fact, what I say is true.
— Michael

Why do you say it is a fact and it is true? — Richard B

Why do you say it is a fact and it is true?
— Richard B

Because I believe it to be so. — Michael

It seems that you have this position.

This resource offers what I am talking about (or close enough).

Direct realism, also known as naïve realism or common sense realism, is a theory of perception that claims that the senses provide us with direct awareness of the external world. In contrast to this direct awareness, indirect realism and representationalism claim that we are directly aware only of internal representations of the external world.
...
Direct realists might claim that indirect realists are confused about conventional idioms that may refer to perception. Perception exemplifies unmediated contact with the external world; examples of indirect perception might be seeing a photograph, or hearing a recorded voice. Against representationalists, direct realists often argue that the complex neurophysical processes by which we perceive objects do not entail indirect perception. These processes merely establish the complex route by which direct awareness of the world arrives. The inference from such a route to indirectness may be an instance of the genetic fallacy. — plaque flag

We both agree with your resource laying out Direct and Indirect Realism. But you must admit it makes no reference to language, linguistics or language games in distinguishing Indirect from Direct Realism.

The direct realist tries to do without this internal image, but not without sense organs. The direct realist is not so much focused on how the eyes see the tree and not the image of the tree, even if they will put the event this way. What really matters are linguistic norms. The 'I' that sees the tree exists within the space of reasons. The 'I' is like a character on a stage among others egos. Direct realists aren't worried about the internal structure of this 'I.' That's not the point. Language is fundamentally social, world-directed, and self-transcending. To see the tree is more usefully understand as to claim 'I see a tree.' We now think of this claim as a move in a social game. — plaque flag

So why keep introducing references to language, linguistics and language games.

Why say that what really matters are linguistic norms, when linguistic norms are not part of what distinguishes Indirect from Direct Realism, according to your resource.

My only real gripe is that most theories of mind and consciousness are dualistic, or fractured, whereas a human being is not. For some reason we try to reduce it to some organic or spiritual locus within the body, maybe in the brain and nervous system, or maybe just floating around jn there somewhere. But blood, oxygen, hormones, brain, bones, energy, flesh, and so on, are all so integrated into it that any large absence of one leads to the absence of consciousness, mind, and indeed the death of the entire. By the time they find their locus, consciousness is gone because they've thrown it out with the bath water.

It's the sort of thinking that leads us to utter absurdities such as brains in vats and p-zombies, and in my opinion indirect realism. There is really no reason to fracture the body in any abstract way, or include some sort of intermediary, in order to better understand the body's mysteries, especially when all conscious humans are by-and-large whole.

It seems that you have this position. — Richard B

There’s a difference between me asserting “X is a fact” because I believe it to be so and me asserting “X is a fact because I believe it to be so”.

There is really no reason to fracture the body in any abstract way, or include some sort of intermediary, in order to better understand the body's mysteries, especially when all conscious humans are by-and-large whole. — NOS4A2

I think most parties in philosophy of mind would agree with you. They really are respectable philosophers, not shaman shaking rattles the way we on this forum depict them.

The standard approach right now is non-reductive physicalism. And that's basically because reduction just doesn't work.

The p-zombie argument is an answer to functionalism, which is a rare, now defunct approach. The point of that argument is a subtle, logical wedge into functionalism. If you weren't an advocate of functionalism to begin with, you don't need to worry over p-zombies.

Indirect realism is part of our philosophical heritage. It comes from the days that originally defined the word "physical" for us. That word was originally a medical term that distinguished physical ailments from mental ones. Don't be offended by the way they categorized things. They were doing the best they could.

f I refuse to answer your question then I'm blind? Or I'm not blind but the carpet is transparent? Or the carpet isn't transparent but also not coloured (and so not white or black either)?

This is clearly ridiculous. Me seeing something has nothing to do with you and nothing to do with speech.

I really don't think you're being honest with me at all. You can't actually believe these things you're saying. — Michael

Not if you refused, but that you never used any colored words correctly to demonstrate to anyone that you can see the colors, discriminate between colors, etc. It is our routine use of these words, our common agreement in judgment, that bring this language game alive and meaningful. If humans never agree on this use, this judgment, what sense is there to say that they "see colors". None!

There’s a difference between me asserting “X is a fact” because I believe it to be so and me asserting “X is a fact because I believe it to be so”. — Michael

Ok, you "believe the fact is true " is different that "the fact is true." But to say...

can tell you for a fact that I can see the colour of my carpet even though I'm not describing the colour of my carpet. — Michael

Does not sound like a belief in this quote.

Does not sound like a belief in this quote. — Richard B

When someone believes that something is true it’s normal for them to assert what they believe rather than that they believe it.

I don’t usually say “I believe it’s raining”. I just say “it’s raining”. I don’t usually say “I believe I’m in pain”. I just say “I’m in pain”.

So I wouldn’t normally say “I believe that I can see colours without describing them to someone else”. I just say “I can see colours without describing them to someone else”.

Why say that what really matters are linguistic norms, when linguistic norms are not part of what distinguishes Indirect from Direct Realism, according to your resource. — RussellA

See how you are holding me to linguistic norms, asking me to justify/defend my moves in social space ?

So why keep introducing references to language, linguistics and language games.

Why say that what really matters are linguistic norms, when linguistic norms are not part of what distinguishes Indirect from Direct Realism, according to your resource. — RussellA

Yes, I accept that provided definition of direct realism as good enough for now.

My defense of this direct realism (of the claim that we have and talk about the world directly) is in terms of semantic norms, what our talk is aimed at, the 'public' tree or chair in our world, the world.

So the linguistic defense is something that I am bringing to the table, in order to defend direct realism, which was already there when I arrived to defend it.

What does "directly" mean? — Michael

It adds nothing, methodically. It's like 'unmediated.' It denies the middle man. Scraps postulated metaphysical phlogiston.

It's like atheism. Doesn't need or believe in god. It negates god. Let's look at the dead metaphor that's hidden in the word.

direct (adj.)

c. 1400, "straight, undeviating, not crooked," from Old French direct (13c.) and directly from Latin directus "straight," adjectival use of past participle of dirigere "to set straight," from dis- "apart" (see dis-) + regere "to direct, to guide, keep straight" (from PIE root *reg- "move in a straight line"). Meaning "plain, expressive, not ambiguous" is from 1580s.

To repeat again what I said earlier, this is the “illusion” of experience (and in particular sight), and is I believe the driving force behind direct realism. — Michael

Respectfully, you seem to just not yet understand what I'm getting at. It's possible that some direct realist fit that picture, but it should be obvious by now that I do not. No one thinks that the stars we talk about are in our skulls. We know that light travelled vast distances to be interpreted so that scientific judgments are made about entities known as stars. We talk about those distant stars, not about their effects on our nervous system --- even though we depend on our nervous system to do so.

You say: the “illusion” of experience...is the driving force behind direct realism.

Are you not talking about our world, here ? The actual, public concept of direct realism ? Driving forces in others' souls ? External to your own ? Philosophy is normative imposition. It says we ought to think of thinks this way [ if we a rational ]. You appeal to norms to persuade me that your approach is better, more rational.

'Outward'/'externally' directed language.

And to repeat something I said earlier: consciousness, whatever it is, doesn't extend beyond the brain, and so it's physically impossible for an apple and its properties to be constituents of my conscious experience. It might be causally responsible for conscious experience, but that's all it can physically be. — Michael

I suggest that consciousness isn't doing much work here. Wouldn't awareness be better ? We are aware of distant stars, apples just out of reach.

The light from an apple reaches my nervous system, making it possible for me to talk about it. The apple is not in my nervous system. But the apple I intend (think about, talk about) is indeed the one just out of reach. I lean over to grab it. I don't reach through my ears to take a bite of an image.

Well yeah, there’s an irreducible subject-object dualism for sure. I am not the apple. — Jamal

Maybe (?) we could also add that this is not an empirical discovery. 'Dasein' (a person) is not an occurrent object like an apple. We treat 'em different.

We talk about those distant stars — plaque flag

But again, direct and indirect realism are positions about the nature of perception, not about what we talk about.

I suggest that consciousness isn't doing much work here. Wouldn't awareness be better ? We are aware of distant stars, apples just out of reach. — plaque flag

I’m aware of the cat hiding under the covers. Doesn’t mean I directly see it.

I’m aware of the cat hiding under the covers. Doesn’t mean I directly see it. — Michael

Why would it ? No one promised a clear line of sight to every intentional object.

This is why I consider 'we talk about the cat and not about our image of the cat' as a less confusing approach to direct realism.

But again, direct and indirect realism are positions about the nature of perception, not about what we talk about. — Michael

I'm defending direct realism by focusing on implicit semantic norms. Other direct realists may hate my defense. I do not identity direct realism with my defense of it.

Clearly what is meant by 'perceive' is relevant here. I don't see how to avoid the involvement of semantic norms. I claim that we are negotiating how public concepts ought to be applied.