I'm challenging this framework itself. — plaque flag

Then I think it's disingenuous of you to characterise your position as being direct realism.

Sellars or Brandom would distinguish between (for instance) smoke detectors and parrots and human beings. All can react differentially to smoke. The detector beeps. The parrot 'says' smoke. The human applies the concept smoke. The crucial move from parrot to human is the inferential relationship of the concept smoke with other concepts. 'There's smoke, so we should make sure the house is not on fire.' Or 'I had this crazy fear on my walk that our house was burning down, but I got to our block and didn't see smoke. What a relief!'

I have no objection to uses of the word 'see' that don't involve the application of concepts. I don't see why humans can't operate (for various reasons) at the level of a parrot. A baby might be trained to reach for a blue and not a red block.

The human applies the concept smoke. — plaque flag

What's a concept? All you appear to have done is replaced the notion of phenomenal character with that of cognition. I'm not sure how that helps you avoid the "private" aspect that you take so much issue with.

Then I think it's disingenuous of you to characterise your position as being direct realism. — Michael

I don't know. I said I was a postHegelian direct realist. I claim that we talk about the tree and not an image of the tree.

It's a deeper point than that, to do with the fact that in situations of perceiving we are always already linguistic, because of what we are. — Jamal

I agree we are always already linguistic once having been inducted into a language; I just don't think it follows that we are therefore linguistic through and through, and I also don't take you to be arguing that we are; I'm just clarifying what I tend to think about it.

I claim that we talk about the tree and not an image of the tree. — plaque flag

Which has nothing to do with perception. I can see footprints in the snow and talk about the animal that left them. I can see mental imagery and talk about the tree that is causally responsible for it.

Seeing something and talking about something are two different things. One involves the eyes and the occipital lobe, the other the mouth and the frontal lobe.

Yes, I see. I'm flexible on this point, probably because I'm confused about it.

What's a concept? All you appear to have done is replaced the notion of phenomenal character with that of cognition. I'm not sure how that helps you avoid the "private" aspect that you take so much issue with. — Michael

Deep question ! My (cobbled together) oversimplified tentative view is that concepts are norms.

Concepts are norms we perform, norms we embody. They are not semantic atoms. Instead it's claims that claim this role, for a claim is the minimum 'piece of meaning' that I can be held responsible for. Claims are inferentially related, and concepts get their meaning from the role they play in this inferential structure. Forget anything immaterial or private. Instead watch discursive primates trade symbols and gestures and deeds (all 'material') with a maddening complexity that allows for dazzling self-reference --what we as philosophers are doing now, talking about talking about talking.

To be a discursive primate (have a self) is to be held to a coherence norm. The totality of claims which I am held responsible for ought not contain contradictions. I can disagree with you. I cannot (or rather ought not) disagree with myself.

I don't understand what you're getting at.

As a simple example, I can think of a number and not tell you (or anyone). I don't have to perform any kind of overt action to do this. I just think.

Do you accept this?

As a simple example, I can think of a number and not tell you (or anyone). I don't have to perform any kind of overt action to do this. I just think it.

Do you accept this? — Michael

I claim that 'just thinking' a number not truly but only relatively immaterial and private. Artificial intelligence is learning to read 'internal' monologues (tiny throat movements, etc.) and record dreams.

Thinking is a minimal kind of talking, basically. [This was phonocentric, sorry. A person using signlanguage might minimally wiggle their hands, etc. ]

I claim that 'just thinking' a number not truly but only relatively 'immaterial' and private. — plaque flag

That's fine. You can say that thinking of a number is reducible to brain activity if you want. The point is that it involves no overt action that ordinary humans going about their ordinary lives can recognize as happening.

The point is that it involves no overt action that ordinary humans going about their ordinary lives cannot recognize as happening. — Michael

Sure. As a practical matter, for now, you can mutter to yourself so quietly that nobody hears what you say.

You can say that thinking of a number is reducible to brain activity if you want. — Michael

I'm not claiming that. The concept of thinking gets its meaning from norms governing inferences. That's my thesis.

Sure. As a practical matter, for now, you can mutter to yourself so quietly that nobody hears what you say. — plaque flag

I don't "mutter" to myself when I think. I just think. The mute can think.

Let me also say that these norms are very much liquid and self-referential. Philosophy is something like the questioning of these norms within these norms (Neurath's boat.)

Exact synchronic snapshots look to be impossible. Writing dictionaries is hard uncertain work.

I don't "mutter" to myself when I think. I just think. The mute can think. — Michael

I'm not phonocentric. So we can just talk about sign language if you want. We can think of claims as equivalence classes (they can be spoken or signed or written, etc.)

But what's the point ? How is this related to my claim that concepts are norms ?

:up: I don't see how it is possible not to be confused about it.

How is this related to my claim that concepts are norms ? — plaque flag

The point is that, whether you want to talk about perception as involving phenomenal character or as involving concepts, I can see things without saying anything, and without performing any covert action that others can recognize. Even if it's not private in principle, it's private in practice. When going about your ordinary life you can't open up my head and check to see what my brain is doing.

..

I can see things without saying anything, and without performing any covert action that others can recognize. Even if it's not private in principle, it's private in practice. — Michael

Of course. But who ever denied it ? I already said that humans don't always have to apply concepts when they see. Babies can just grab the red block and not the blue. Differential responsiveness can even be attributed to thermostats and smoke detectors.

I said that humans don't always have to apply concepts when they see. — plaque flag

Good. Then can you finally stop talking about language and start talking about seeing?

Good. Then can you finally stop talking about language and start talking about seeing? — Michael

To talk about seeing is just as much to talk about talk about seeing. Concepts are norms. To talk about seeing is to link the concept of seeing with other concepts inferentially.

To talk about seeing is just as much to talk about talk about seeing. — plaque flag

No it's not. These are two different claims:

1. John can see the apple
2. John can talk about seeing the apple

The problem of perception concerns making sense of 1), not 2).

The problem of perception concerns making sense of 1), not 2). — Michael

I see the difference between 1 and 2. We can talk about other things than talking, but we are still talking about those other things, making claims, asking questions.

Can you give me an example of sensemaking which isn't linguistic ? Doesn't involve claims ?

That we have to use language to talk about perception isn't that when talking about perception we talk about language.

We can talk about the world and just be wrong sometimes. — plaque flag

Which world are you referring to, the world as we perceive it, or the world as it is independent of our perception of it.

These 'private experiences' are tooth fairies. The 'mindindependent world' is Candyland. — plaque flag

Are you saying you have no private experiences, you stub your toe and feel no pain ?
Are you saying the Universe didn't exist for the 13.8 billion years before humans appeared on Earth, 315,000 years ago ?

I think Kant gets something right. — plaque flag

I agree with the Kant passage about cognition, in that the mind needs information from the other side of our senses, but this doesn't address the question as to whether this information is indirect or direct.

That we have to use language to talk about perception isn't that when talking about perception we talk about language. — Michael

I'm saying that as philosophers we are negotiating conceptual norms (by appealing to them), arguing for the rational and proper way to apply concepts (for instance, the concept of perception).

I agree with you that, explicitly, the talk is about perception. I suggest that implicitly, it's just as much (or also, or equivalently ) about how to use the concept perception properly, such as deciding when its application is warranted.

Which world are you referring to, the world as we perceive it, or the world as it is independent of our perception of it. — RussellA

Neither ? Either answer will feed into exactly the presupposition I'm challenging. There's just the world, our world, the one we talk about. Inasmuch as we are philosophers, we impose on shared semantic norms. To deny our world as a philosopher is to engage in a performative contradiction.

Are you saying you have no private experiences, you stub your toe and feel no pain ? — RussellA

No, it's not that. The point is that concepts are public norms. The concept pain doesn't get its meaning from private experience. Bots have already learned how to use the concept pain from reading examples. It's all there in the linear structure of the dead traces we humans left on the web for it. Deaf people can understand the concept of color. Blind people can understand the concept of sound.

Are you saying the Universe didn't exist for the 13.8 billion years before humans appeared on Earth, 315,000 years ago ? — RussellA

I trust the latest models well enough. Now we can endlessly clarify what it might mean to say so --- and what 'the world as it in itself' is supposed to mean.