All that would have to be true is that somehow information is affecting reality (which it clearly does) and is capable of being stored in such a way that it is not trivially evident, but is accessible and amenable to neural processing. — Pantagruel

I think the distinction between data and information, becomes paramount here.
Information being data with an associated meaning.
We know that meaning, depends on the reference frame of the observer.
Interpreting meaning from data creates an individuals reality. Carlo Rovelli talks about this a lot, when he discusses time. My interpretation, of some of what he is proposing, suggests that time is something that each human being experiences, quite independently, and that the notion of a universal time frame is almost useless. So for me, it seems that data/information IS my reality and certainly does affect it.

If every spatial coordinate in the universe can 'collapse' into a 'data state,' which my brain can interpret, and assign meaning to, then to me, that does not mean that every coordinate in the universe CONTAINS or IS an aspect of consciousness. To me, it means that my brain can INTERPRET any event that I witness, as having significance to me, because I can assign a time and a place to it, that makes sense to ME. Other people and other measuring devices can then confirm or conflict with MY interpretation of the event. That's MY reality and MY experience of consciousness, but I don't see any aspect of that description, that suggests that every universal spatiotemporal coordinate, inherently contains a quantum of consciousness, that should be a recognised part of the standard model of particle physics or quantum field theory.

Other people and other measuring devices can then confirm or conflict with MY interpretation of the event. — universeness

Yes, but intrinsically there is a social dimension to cognition, which then is an additional factor to consider. Hive minds evidence this clearly. There is no reason to suppose that higher species lose or abandon these capacities. It's a pretty common systems-theoretic gloss to expand the concept of consciousness in the way you criticize, but there is no need to assume it or even address it. The systems-phenomena speak for themselves.

Yes but such a proposed 'social dimension,' does not provide any significant evidence for such posits as panpsychism. If some kind of 'natural telepathy' is proved to exist between such 'networks,' as a hive mind or even if such can be artificially emulated/achieved via wireless signals via such as Elon Musk's Neuralink etc, once we are all 'connected.' This would still not demonstrate that consciousness is quantisable. Even though I DO think it probably is, at least to some extent.
I am not suggesting that any level of 'telepathy' between humans is impossible, but it is true, that from a 'naturalist' position, and from a quantum physics position, science would be tasked to find the 'carrier particle' that causes telepathy and consciousness. Just like the search for the graviton, currently continues.
This is probably why I still love string theory.
Consciousness could then be just another vibrating string state! Easy peasy! :halo:
String theory at is base is a great KISS theory. Keep It Simple Stupid :grin:

I am not suggesting that any level of 'telepathy' between humans is impossible, but it is true, that from a 'naturalist' position, and from a quantum physics position, science would be tasked to find the 'carrier particle' that causes telepathy and consciousness. Just like the search for the graviton, currently continues.
This is probably why I still love string theory.
Consciousness could then be just another vibrating string state! Easy peasy! :halo:
String theory at is base is a great KISS theory. Keep It Simple Stupid :grin: — universeness

I feel that way about systems theory. You don't need to over-specify the nature of the mechanism (behind social consciousness) given its evident operation. Again, exactly how neural networks function. They work by exploiting hidden (abstract) information, for which their own successful operations are the best expression or evidence.

So I suppose the extent to which one is content with an evolutionary frame is the extent to which one is willing to allow for other influence. With behaviour that might be culture. With anything we might have randomness, or God, or our alien simulation managers... — Isaac

I remember an essay by Stephen Jay Gould. In it he described what happens when animals get larger. Their brains tend to get larger at a faster rate than their bodies in general. Conclusion - selection for a larger body might coincidently select for a even larger brain. Not really random, but not selected either.

For me, I think evolutionary psychology is almost all bollocks. I think that because cultural influences are just too obviously at least a possible factor. — Isaac

What Stephen Pinker says about language makes sense to me - humans have an instinct to learn language. The structures of our nervous systems and minds are built that way. Obviously, social factors also are involved. Pinker's views are not accepted by everyone. @apokrisis in particular believes language behavior can be explained by a generalized cognitive function. As always, apokrisis, forgive me if I misrepresented your views.

With consciousness, however, I can't really think of that conflicting influence. We could invoke randomness (it just turned up), but then we'd also have to explain why humans who didn't have it weren't easily able to outbreed those that did.

We could argue, as Dennet does, that it's an illusion, there's nothing to find a purpose to. But I dislike defining things away.

I don't dispute the plausibility of non-evolutionary accounts, they just seem far more complicated, have more loose ends, and don't seem to explain anything that isn't covered in a functional account. — Isaac

I seems to me, with no specific evidence, that consciousness could arise out of interactions between abilities for abstract thinking, language, and other higher level neurological function. Again - that's speculation. Which isn't to say that consciousness doesn't provide an evolutionary advantage.

Then how can there be any consciousness in the body, if we can remove so much of it, without becoming a less conscious creature? — universeness

I don't think it's the quantity of body as the quality.The full interaction of its parts despite how many these parts are.As a system.
Even less parts can interact even better together.
I m not fan of the moto "the more the better"

I mean, do you think their cortex would have a reduced ability, to play it's role in perception, awareness, thought, memory, cognition, etc due to having an artificial blood pump, instead of a natural one (such as a heart transplant)? — universeness

Well i guess it woud be even a slightly different consciousness compared to the one before.
But as you mentioned the artificial heart will play the exact role of the normal heart.
So i guess the rest of the body will continue to coordinate with a similar way as before.Not exact the same though.But i don't think the change would be so dramatic as someone to become a totally different person.
.

BUT do you therefore think that if before you die, we could take out your brain and connect it to a fully cybernetic body. That there is no way and no sense that the creature produced would still be you?
Still be your 'conscience?' — universeness

No I don't think it would be me if the whole body changed.Who am i is connected to my own body also and the experience i have from whole of it.
A cybernetic body would mean a total different experience.Maybe due to the same brain we might have some things in common.But i wouldn't consider myself same as my new "cybernetic self".
How for example the senses that my body has now and give data to my brain and form my consciousness be the same with the cybernetic senses that I would have?The data from them would be totally different.

It's a very hard to grasp concept — Dawnstorm

What is?

A p-zombie and a person with first-person experience would both behave the same, and thus share the same evolution. What sort of test could we devise to tell if one is a p-zombie or not? If p-zombies are impossible, how can we conceptualise evidence for this? — Dawnstorm

That's begging the question. The evolutionary frame (in my example) comes first so that we can ask - what's the benefit of being conscious - to get at our "why?" question.

If you don't like the evolutionary frame, then there may well be another, but I'm arguing it would still be of the same form, there'd be something which constitutes a measure of satisfaction with the reasons given.

When I say that my keyboard is made up of atoms, I can conceptualise this a matter of scale. It's easy. When I say, consciousness is made up of neural activity (which is my default working assumption), all I have is a correlation; the nature of the connection eludes me. — Dawnstorm

But that's just a matter of willing, not of some deep conceptual problem. After all, if you're able to imagine your keyboard is really made of atoms by seeing it as just a matter of scale, then you're just imagining atoms wrong. They're not (so I'm told) just smaller bits of keyboard. they're these weird energy particles and probabilities and quantum maths I don't even understand.

You're willing to simply 'allow' that rule (weird quantum stuff can become keyboards), not, I'd suggest, because it's somehow easier to conceptualise, but because it's not a mystery you find particularly interesting that it remain one. It's a less good story, in other words.

I remember an essay by Stephen Jay Gould. In it he described what happens when animals get larger. Their brains tend to get larger at a faster rate than their bodies in general. Conclusion - selection for a larger body might coincidently select for a even larger brain. Not really random, but not selected either. — T Clark

Yes, I like that idea. It's what would go into my category of 'random' still though. Random, as in coincidence, no reason.

But, importantly for this discussion, it doesn't give an alternative 'why?', it just gives no 'why?'

It may be before you came into this conversation, but I started out down this evolutionary route as an attempt to firm up @bert1's original dissatisfaction with the explanations given, his sense that there was a 'why?' still unanswered. Drawing that feeling together into something coherent automatically rules out anything random or without reason. There'd be no sense of wrongness in the question 'why?' being unanswered if there was also a sense that the feature arose randomly.

What Stephen Pinker says about language makes sense to me - humans have an instinct to learn language. The structures of our nervous systems and minds are built that way. Obviously, social factors also are involved. Pinker's views are not accepted by everyone. apokrisis in particular believes language behavior can be explained by a generalized cognitive function. As always, apokrisis, forgive me if I misrepresented your views. — T Clark

I agree with neither, but that's a topic for another conversation.

consciousness could arise out of interactions between abilities for abstract thinking, language, and other higher level neurological function. Again - that's speculation. Which isn't to say that consciousness doesn't provide an evolutionary advantage. — T Clark

I agree, I think that's perfectly likely, but as I said above, in the context of this question in the OP, it wouldn't even arise if randomness (or lack of reason) were one of the options.

So if we include it as a frame for answering "why do we have consciousness?" answers could be of the form that;
1) 'there are no reasons (it just happened)' - the sort of option you're suggesting
2) 'because it confers some evolutionary advantage' - the kind of functionalist account
3) because God gave us it - the theological account

... but @bert1 (as representative of the consciousness mysterians) seems unhappy with either of these, and yet cannot say what is wrong with each (should any turn out to be true). that's the incoherence I'm trying to iron out.

A cybernetic body would mean a total different experience.Maybe due to the same brain we might have some things in common.But i wouldn't consider myself same as my new "cybernetic self". — dimosthenis9

Personal identity is a very complex area in general. I am not the same person as I was as a teenager or as a twenty something etc. But the proposed '7 stages of man,' are still in a sense, all me. Why would a new stage, an 8th cybernetic stage, not maintain enough of me for me to recognise and accept the new me?

How for example the senses that my body has now and give data to my brain and form my consciousness be the same with the cybernetic senses that I would have?The data from them would be totally different. — dimosthenis9

I assume your sight, smell, taste, touch and audio senses would function in the exact same way your original senses worked. I agree they may be enhanced and you may even get some new ones but you quickly become familiar and accepting of new tech all the time. So why would it be so different to have some of it embedded as part of you. Some humans have pacemakers, cochlear implants etc.
This guy below uses his embedded tech to 'hear colours.' I think his sense of himself via his, brains conscious ability to make slight adjustment to 'who he is,' is not something that would be as problematic as you suggest, even in the case of a human brain/person, continuing to exist as a cybernetic YOU.


From wiki: Neil Harbisson
Neil Harbisson (27 July 1982) is a Catalan-born British-Irish-American, cyborg artist and activist for transpecies rights. He is best known for being the first person in the world with an antenna implanted in his skull. Since 2004, international media has described him as the world's first legally recognised cyborg and as the world's first cyborg artist. His antenna sends audible vibrations through his skull to report information to him. This includes measurements of electromagnetic radiation, phone calls, and music, as well as videos or images which are translated into audible vibrations. His WiFi-enabled antenna also allows him to receive signals and data from satellites.

In 2010, he co-founded the Cyborg Foundation, an international organisation that defends cyborg rights, promotes cyborg art and supports people who want to become cyborgs. In 2017, he co-founded the Transpecies Society, an association that gives voice to people with non-human identities, raises awareness of the challenges transpecies face, advocates for the freedom of self-design and offers the development of new senses and organs in community.

That’s because consciousness is a property of organisms, which are a great deal more than brains and nervous systems. Sapiens, for example, have digestive, endocrine, skeletal, respiratory and other systems. Each of these are required for human consciousness. — NOS4A2

Humans are, indeed, required for human consciousness. What is required for rock consciousness? A rock?

I classify phenomenal consciousness as a mental process. That's the kind of a thing I say it is. The category I say it belongs in. One of the characteristics of a mental processes is that they are behaviors or at least that they manifest themselves to us as behaviors.

If it's not a mental process, what kind of a thing is it? What category does it fit in? — T Clark

That's an interesting question. Lets have a run through of the obvious possibilities (some of which may overlap):

- substance
- matter/field
- entity/object (persistent behaviour of a field)
- property (x-ness)
- process
- action/behaviour
- function
...any others?

You can define it by fiat however you want, but that risks going off topic. The dictionary definition I gave in the OP is arguably compatible with any of these options. I vote 'property'. That fits most naturally with language as well.

We know by analogy. We know what our experience feels like, how it makes us act. It would be silly for us not to interpret other people's similar behavior as something other than the same type of experience we have.

I'm sympathetic to the argument from analogy, but I know some find it unconvincing.

Much of our behavior, I would say most, is not driven by consciousness.

That may well be true of us-as-human. But the behaviour we don't drive might be driven by the consciousness of other entities.

@Nickolasgaspar

Right, I have got around to looking at a couple of those articles you linked to. Thank you for doing that. I was relieved to discover they were concise and clear summaries, which makes my job a lot easier. Starting with this one:

https://neurosciencenews.com/l5p-neuron-conscious-awareness-14997/

This article very encouragingly and clearly stated the distinction between state consciousness and contents of consciousness:

Most neuroscientists chasing the neural mechanisms of consciousness focus on its contents, measuring changes in the brain when it thinks about a particular thing – a smell, a memory, an emotion. Quite separately, others study how the brain behaves during different conscious states, like alert wakefulness, dreaming, deep sleep or anesthesia.

Great! It goes on to say that most neuroscientists think the two are indivisible, but I'm not sure if they mean conceptually indivisible or physically indivisible.

This distinction is also reflected in dictionaries, e.g. dictionary.com has these in its first two definitions:

State consciousness:

"the state of being conscious; awareness of one's own existence, sensations, thoughts, surroundings, etc."

Contents of consciousness:

"the thoughts and feelings, collectively, of an individual or of an aggregate of people"

The article offers some neurological findings about the connection between the two. State consciousness is thought to be linked closely to the 'thalamo-cortical' circuits:

Our conscious state is thought to depend on the activity of so-called ‘thalamo-cortical’ circuits..... Thalamocortical circuits are thought to be the target of general anesthesia, and damage to these neurons due to tumors or stroke often results in coma.

Whereas the content is thought to depend on the cortex:

...functional brain imaging studies locate the contents of consciousness mostly within the cortex, in ‘cortico-cortical’ circuits.

And they are linked, and this is the new bit:

Aru and colleagues believe that L5p neurons are uniquely placed to bridge the divide.

So the punchline is that there is an anatomical connection between the neurology of state-consciousness and content-consciousness.

I have no problem with the science of all this. What they are calling state-consciousness I suspect includes an assumed phenomenal consciousness but also includes observable arousal levels. In this thread I am concerned phenomenal consciousness, which is much closer to the concept of state-consciousness than content-consciousness.

The difficulty I have is, again, conceptual. First, the neuroscientists have found correlations between brain function and (assumed or reported) experience and arousal levels. That doesn't tell us what the relationship consists in, it only tells us there is a reliable relationship. The relationship between legs and walking is clear, the latter is what the former does. But in the case of experience and brain function it is not so clear what verb we should use (e.g. 'is', 'realises', 'gives rise to', 'produces', 'instantiates' 'manufactures', 'entails', 'causes', 'encodes', etc etc...). Secondly, consideration is not given to the conceptual difference between the self and consciousness. What, phenomenologically, is the difference between x losing consciousness, and x ceasing to exist (where x is defined functionally)? As far as I can tell, there's no difference. No experience either way. It is conceptually less problematic to suppose that, under anaesthesia, the self is dissolved, even though we speak of 'losing consciousness'. I can argue why that is less problematic in another post.

So that's the first of the two articles I'll look at. I do another one from @Nickolasgaspar's list when i get a mo.

Do you believe rocks are conscious? I can’t help ya there.

Yup. The one in my avatar has been a good friend. Reliable. Good listener.

The relationship between legs and walking is clear, the latter is what the former does. — bert1

Is it? Why? (by which I mean why is it clear?)

It's not at all clear to me. Legs don't always walk. I wouldn't say "my legs are going for a walk", I might say they're moving, or that walking is the result of me moving my legs just so. I might say moving my legs produces the effect of 'walking'. I might say such movement gives rise to a 'walking' person.

Saying that legs 'do' walking doesn't seem any less fraught than saying neurons 'do' consciousness. It's just that there's little woo potential in pretending the relationship between legs and walking is deeply mysterious so we just accept it as simple.

It's just that there's little woo potential in pretending the relationship between legs and walking is deeply mysterious so we just accept it as simple. — Isaac

What woo am I trying to monger?

Yes, I like that idea. It's what would go into my category of 'random' still though. Random, as in coincidence, no reason. — Isaac

That's a bit of an overstatement. Enlarged relative brain size might contribute to increased intelligence, but what that does is provide a new trait for natural selection to work on. Many of our most important traits started out that way. The bones that transmit sound in our ears started out in one of our ancestors jaw.

It may be before you came into this conversation, but I started out down this evolutionary route as an attempt to firm up bert1's original dissatisfaction with the explanations given, his sense that there was a 'why?' still unanswered. — Isaac

I generally reject "why" as a legitimate question for science. Science does "how." The image I see is one of a push from behind rather than a pull towards something specific. Like I said previously - It's an engine, not a steering wheel. We get where we get, but there was never a plan or reason for it. We make up the destination after the trip is done. This is a major theme in the history of theories of evolution - rejection of any directionality or teleology. That's one of the reasons it was so radical a theory. There's no room for purpose.

that's a topic for another conversation. — Isaac

Yes.

I agree, I think that's perfectly likely, but as I said above, in the context of this question in the OP, it wouldn't even arise if randomness (or lack of reason) were one of the options. — Isaac

Randomness is an essential factor in Darwin's theory and continues as one in modern understandings of evolution. Again, that's why it was such an overwhelming understanding.

1) 'there are no reasons (it just happened)' - the sort of option you're suggesting
2) 'because it confers some evolutionary advantage' - the kind of functionalist account — Isaac

Perhaps the ultimate point in evolutionary theory - Useful outcome does not imply goal, purpose, or reason. This is a fight that has been going on at least since 1859.

Great! It goes on to say that most neuroscientists think the two are indivisible, but I'm not sure if they mean conceptually indivisible or physically indivisible. — bert1

It means that people with existential anxieties will always find excuses to embrace a comforting idea able to separate their existence from their a biological body with an expiration date.

I've run into materialists who swear by this:

https://xkcd.com/505/

It means that people with existential anxieties will always find excuses to embrace a comforting idea able to separate their existence from their a biological body with an expiration date. — Nickolasgaspar

I do explicitly say in my post the self can be distinguished from consciousness. I'll die, and nothing of me will be left over, except my products I suppose. And my profound influence on Western culture.

Yet if one asks "why do we have consciousness?" I think the answer needs to consist of a set of satisfactory reasons, simply by the structure of the question, no?

And so if a set of reasons are given, they can only be rejected on two grounds; they're not reasons, or they're not satisfactory. — Isaac

I think this misses a step. If you don't already agree what consciousness is, roughly, then it's difficult to ask discriminatory questions one way or the other. Or to put it another way, if we're quibbling about necessary and sufficient conditions for consciousness, sentience, experience, having a perspective and so on, how and why we would have a consciousness of any indicated sort would be determined by the conceptualisation fixed "upstream".

Ideally, you'd want the "downstream" results to put constraints on the "upstream" conceptualisation - the bridge between the scientific and manifest images. Which I think does happen. But it still may be that philosophical concepts of consciousness can miss things out. Imagine if nobody was an enactivist in neuroscience work, and the overwhelming majority of neuroscientists thought in representational terms. A dialogue could well go:

Enactivists; "Mate, there's no room for dynamic feedback between environment and body to be principally determinative in your theory, you can't just treat everything as succession of representation"

Representationalists: "In order for us to have a productive discussion, you'd need to agree on what state* of the body corresponds to an instant* of consciousness"

The enactivist might bring up that "state" and "instant" may be loaded terms. In which case they could be accused of not being able to form productive terms for the debate... Then vice versa. Even though eg. Friston speaks like an enactivist.

I could see that the qualia people may have a similar move available to them. Like the enactivists did in my fictional example above. If an enactivist criticised the state of neuroscience as being unable to study the dynamic interplay of body, brain and environment in a meaningful way, it similarly makes sense to allow the qualist to accuse neuroscience of the same, unjustified, filter. Which isn't a filter on the level of data, it's a filter on the level of conceptualising data and how people ask questions.

I think, eg Chalmers, has tried to show that there really is this gap between what can be accounted for with (current) descriptions from neuroscience - assuming they are physical. And if that's true, there'd need to be a new but related science regarding how qualia and brains track each other, and how qualia correlate with others. Conceived of in this way, Chalmer's arguments play the role of the enactivist in the above example. And, I think, be treated with the same courtesy.

If I could at least get as far as understanding the type of measure of satisfaction missing, that would be progress. The kind of reason that would suffice. But I'm so far missing even that. — Isaac

So the kind of reason is less about function and more about possibilities for function. Given you have a fixed concept of function, which is identified with what may be produced by physical laws, that constraints how and why questions to that realm. If you think about it, when you're asking questions about "how" and "why" there's a context for each question which conceptually constrains the proposed answers. If you believe that "how" and "why" are being equated with "how" and "why" in a context which, it sees, necessarily removes relevant things from its study, you'd be contesting the entire context, which is roughly anything which seeks to explain everything about consciousness with physical laws.

How would that work physically? Who knows, that's part of the point.

I do explicitly say in my post the self can be distinguished from consciousness. — bert1

I don't know what that means. Our consciousness is the author of our self.
So why are you using our gaps in our knowledge as an excuse to argue in favor of an alternative nature of our conscious states.?

Our consciousness is the author of our self. — Nickolasgaspar

Claiming the one conceptually ambiguous concept is the author of another conceptually ambiguous concept gets us nowhere, and fast.

I vote 'property'. — bert1

Here's how Wikipedia defines "property." "In logic and philosophy (especially metaphysics), a property is a characteristic of an object; a red object is said to have the property of redness." That's consistent with what I mean when I say "consciousness." As I see it, "conscious" is a characteristic, but consciousness is not. It seems clear to me that consciousness is a thing of some sort. We usually treat it as such.

I'm not sure if we can take this any further.

That may well be true of us-as-human. But the behaviour we don't drive might be driven by the consciousness of other entities. — bert1

I'm not sure what you mean.

Claiming the one conceptually ambiguous concept is the author of another conceptually ambiguous concept gets us nowhere, and fast. — Fooloso4

I have posted many times a specific scientific definition of the term. Try to keep up or don't waste my time.

I have posted many times a specific scientific definition of the term. Try to keep up or don't waste my time. — Nickolasgaspar

Your definition is theory-laden. It's not the definition in the OP of the thread. I don't recall you offering a definition of the self. Fooloso4's statement is well within the bounds of reasonable. If you feel Fooloso4 is wasting your time, I suggest in future you cut your losses at the moment you finish reading a time-wasting post. It seems to me that that you compounded your lost time by further investing in a reply.

I have posted many times a specific scientific definition of the term. — Nickolasgaspar

First of all, it is two terms. Second, your posting a definition of one of them, even a scientific definition, does not mean that the terms are not ambiguous. Contrary to what you may believe, there is no widespread scientific agreement as to what either consciousness or the self is. No consensus on a scientific definition of consciousness and no scientific definition of the self.

I constantly post the link of the definition I use so you have no excuse.You are wasting my time Fooloso4.

Ok all of you are trying to hide behind vague and undefined terms because they serve your magical ideologies. Sorry I don't have time for this and I am bored.

I constantly post the link of the definition I use so you have no excuse — Nickolasgaspar

Once again, there is no consensus on the definition of the terms. Without such consensus the claim remains ambiguous.

It is ironic that you say:

trying to hide behind vague and undefined terms — Nickolasgaspar

when you make claims about these undefined terms. Giving a definition does not settle anything.

Don't take my word for it. Anil Seth says:

Despite a revival in the scientific study of consciousness over recent decades, the only real consensus so far is that there is still no consensus.

Is he wrong? If some neuroscientists say that consciousness is X and others Y and still others Z, how are we to evaluate your claim? It is not the case that consciousness is what you define it to be because you have defined it that way. What it is remains ambiguous.

Don't take my word for it. Anil Seth says:

Despite a revival in the scientific study of consciousness over recent decades, the only real consensus so far is that there is still no consensus. — Fooloso4

:up: