The ultimate nature of matter is irrelevant to the field of Neuroscience. — Nickolasgaspar

If the ultimate nature of matter is mental (i.e., idealism is true), doesn't that blow neuroscience out of the water? Isn't the whole point of neuroscience based on the assumption that mind and consciousness are produced by a physical brain?

At an elegant dinner party, Lady Astor once leaned across the table to remark, “If you were my husband, Winston, I’d poison your coffee.”
“And if you were my wife, I’d beat the shit out of you,” came Churchill’s unhesitating retort. — Michael O'Donaghue - The Churchill Wit

Churchill was a butcher, and a vile human being, but even he doesn't deserve his words to be mutilated by an obvious moron like Mr O'Donaghue.
Churchills actual response to Astor was: “If I were married to you madam, I would drink it.”

Mr O'Donaghue also murders Churchill's response to Bessie Braddock, when she said “Sir, you are drunk.” His reply was actually 'Madam, you are ugly, and in the morning, I shall be sober."

He did not respond with the infantile phrases Mr O'Donaghue suggests on the website you cited.

His reply was actually 'Madam, you are ugly, and in the morning, I shall be sober." — universeness

That's a true burn.

Yeah, I think it was an example of his conscious, demonstrating it's prowess, from a neuroscientific standpoint. Churchill was indeed a wordsmith, but that did not stop his consciousness manifesting a narcissistic, sociopathic, self-aggrandising character.
Perhaps he received too many, 'negatively charged' panpsychist quanta!

Consciousness (the process), seems more like a post hoc storytelling of self-identity, it's a way of bringing together otherwise disparate and often contradictory mental processes into a coherent whole by re-telling what just happened seconds ago with this single character as the protagonist. — Isaac

That seems plausible to me, although I don't think it answers the question of experience that bother some people any better than other theories. As I said, the question of experience is not one that I worry about.

I'm something of a (slightly reformed) behaviourist, so I'm also in agreement with you in that it is our behaviours which reveal to us mental processes. Later on in my career, however, I was lucky enough to work with some excellent neuroscientists on issues around visual perception and they changed a lot of the way I think about cognitive processes. Now I consider it to be a bit more OK to talk about a mere cognitive state (sans behaviour) as being a real state of affairs, but I'm still not as comfortable with it as I am with behaviour. — Isaac

Maybe I overstated my case. I'm not a behaviorist and I think there's more to mind than just behavior. But I do think a person's behavior, including language, is a valid way to know aspects of their mental life we don't have direct access to. And I also think it makes sense to talk about cognitive states without behavior.

He did not respond with the infantile phrases Mr O'Donaghue suggests on the website you cited. — universeness

I don't think Churchill's reputation needs to be protected against obvious satire.

If the ultimate nature of matter is mental, doesn't that blow neuroscience out of the water? Isn't the whole point of neuroscience based on the assumption that mind and consciousness are produced by a physical brain? — RogueAI

In respect of your time and effort to communicate with me I will include the answer to your previous question in the end of my answer to your last set of questions.

Now I don't know what the statement "matter is mental" means and even if the the ultimate nature of the fundamental elements of Matter were (allow me this absurdism) farts by cosmic pixies that changes nothing on how we execute our Systematic observations. After all, Empirical Regularities and External Limitations is what we observe in Matter something that is not true for Mental states as we know them.
What goes on beyond our Cataleptic Impressions can never affect our Descriptions and Law Like Generalizations.
There is a good reason why science is based on the auxiliary principles of Methodological Naturalism allowing us to avoid all ifs and maybes of the Supernatural narrative.
We do our best with what we can work with and able to verifywith our high standards of evaluation and leave the burden for the Supernatural to the materialists and supernaturalists!

previous questions.

I will grant you that there is a prima facia case that a simulated or mechanical brain should be conscious.. — RogueAI

I didn't really say that. I only drew lines between their similarities and differences.
Mechanical brains lack specific properties to ever achieve biological consciousness (intuition, feelings, biases, expectations, intention, meaning, urges etc). They lack a fluctuating limbic system and past experiences shaping their heuristics . So a "mechanical" experience can never have a subjective quality...or better if we produce the same exactly machinery with the same software the "experience" will be objective for every machine.
So maybe we are in agreement on that.

My question is: how would we scientifically go from there? How would science "nail down" the question of whether X is conscious or not? What tests could we perform, that would give us conclusive proof of consciousness (or lack thereof) — RogueAI

I find this question really good and challenging!!!!
The steps are the following
1. identify a sensory system that feeds data of which the system can be conscious of.
2.Test the ability of the system to produce an array of important mind properties
3. Verify a mechanism that brings online sensory input and relevant mind properties.(conscious state)
4. evaluate the outcome (in behavior and actions)

Trying to introduce the supernatural in a discussion about a property of mind is a pseudo philosophical practice.
Whether farting pixies are the ultimate nature of reality , consciousness or not it doesn't make a difference.
Science has figured that out ages ago. What goes on beyond our cataleptic impressions is irrelevant.
This is the beauty of Methodological Naturalism. Believe, assume and speculate whatever you want.....but when it comes to the act of producing knowledge or understanding our reality through wise claims the only way available to us is to test our hypotheses against the reality that is available to us.
The underlying reality can not change the formulations that describe and predict things, this is why we don't use supernatural explanations in our frameworks. They are indescribable,unfalsifiable and they don't have prediction power.

And this is something that is still poorly understood and subject to substantial revision. — Fooloso4

You need to educate your self on what we know, how we know it and how our Technical applications verify our current knowledge.

I don't need to go to a happy place, you need to play with the rules and respect specialized knowledge.
IF you are not interested in basing your "philosophy" on credible knowledge then I am not interested in listening to Pseudo philosophical ideologies.

You are talking to a guy who had a motorcycle accident (August 2010)where he lost his ability to be consciously aware of his experiences for 2 weeks, with interruptions for more than six months while few of my abilities were never regained. This is the reason why I got interested in this field of study and why I can easily detect vague bovine manure when I read it. (i.e."(And this is something that is still poorly understood and subject to substantial revision)".
You have a poor understanding of what we understand about the brain and you try to make it appear as it is universal.

There are many things we don't know about the mind, but you don't get to dismiss what we DO know.

I disagree on what I am confusing. — Benj96

I didn't accuse you of being confused. I said you are confusing different properties of mind with consciousness.

For me there is no confusion; the brain is basically the product of evolutionarily compounded/refined intelligence.. — Benj96

That's an other topic. Intelligence is a property of the brain,but our ability to be consciously aware of our experiences isn't affected when our intelligence is impaired The same is true for memory, symbolic language, reason, pattern/face recognition, heuristics in general etc.
i.e. guys can be conscious while being unable to remember or recognize their wives!

Consciousness involves this ability to be intelligent but in the context that it refers to how it is applied to the beholder/self. — Benj96

first definition I found: "Intelligence is the ability to learn from experience and to adapt to, shape, and select environments."
Brain injury can remove the above ability but still the individual can be conscious of his experiences.
I don't say that intelligence doesn't elevate the quality of our conscious experiences, but you need to understand that intelligence demands good use of memory/past experience, reasoning, use of symbolic language etc all properties that can be lost due to brain pathology or injury while the individual can s till enjoy conscious experiences. Haven't you ever interacted with a victim of brain trauma?????

In simple terms then consciousness is intelligences awareness of self - it's specific appearance, definition and this it's limitations. Ie humanness. Human consciousness is the awareness of what it feels like to be Human (limited in ability but unlimited in imagination/creativity). — Benj96

You understand something limited and specific by that term.
You are addressing a specific content of consciousness not the general mental ability to be conscious aware of different experiences..every single moment. ( whether it is our human nature, an itch on the butt, a piece of cake in the freezer, economic difficulties, the loss of a loved one etc etc).

Thanks for the response. I have to think about it.

:up:

apokrisis suggested a switcheroo, which was quite interesting, basically saying that the burden of proof not on the neuroscientist to say why some or their function of the brain is consciousness, but on the neuro-skeptic to say why it isn't. — bert1

Also @Isaac.

I don't like default position chess when the grounds of a substantive disagreement isn't established. I think it's a responsibility of everyone with a position not to treat it as correct by default in this context. Because there are respected ways to interpret bodies as having a subjective awareness with an inherently qualitative, first person perspective which needs different methods of study (like Chalmers), people who want to do away with the whole thing on an ontological level (like Patricia Churchland), people who see mind states in a functional equivalence with body states (Dennett, Sellars?), and those who see it as a feedback relation (Clark?). Even the idea that brainstates generate representational states of mind as corollaries is contested.

While these debates might inform speculation in philosophy, and in neuroscience, the issue isn't settled. As far as I know all the ground in this intersection is contested.

It's always the same nonsensical questions because one tends to ontologize the own phenomenology. That is unscientific. If you want to know why we experience something, ask evolution. It will tell you that we experience something because it serves the orientation of living beings in their environment - like a navigation system. So it's not a mystery, it's just reality.
It's only mystical because it's us who experience something. And that quickly leads us to the idea that such a great experience must contain something mysterious, something metaphysical. But it doesn't. It is nothing more than an art-specific excitability of nerves that converge into a central nervous system.

Trying to introduce the supernatural in a discussion about a property of mind is a pseudo philosophical practice. — Nickolasgaspar

You keep making claims that have nothing to do with what I said. What supernatural claims have I introduced?

And this is something that is still poorly understood and subject to substantial revision.
— Fooloso4
You need to educate your self on what we know, how we know it and how our Technical applications verify our current knowledge. — Nickolasgaspar

If you think we are anywhere near an adequate understanding of consciousness, matter, mind, brain, then you do not even know enough to know what you don't know. But go ahead, show me that I am wrong. Identify where there is widespread scientific consensus on any of these things.

In the opening paragraph of his review of Solms' book "The Hidden Spring: A Journey to the Source of Consciousness", Anil Seth says:

Despite a revival in the scientific study of consciousness over recent decades, the only real consensus so far is that there is still no consensus.

Link

I can easily detect vague bovine manure when I read it. (i.e."(And this is something that is still poorly understood and subject to substantial revision)". — Nickolasgaspar

Show me the consensus on this:

Different properties of Mind have distinct causal mechanisms in our brain. — Nickolasgaspar

Identify the properties of mind and the distinct causal mechanisms in the brain.

Although I responded to your post where you told someone else:

You are confusing different properties of mind with Consciousness. Consciousness, according to Neuroscience is the third basic mental property./quote]

my response was general. But let's look at what Mark Solms says in this video:
— Nickolasgaspar

293.5
I’m going to argue that this something else, this third defining property of a mind, is intentionality, intending towards something, aiming toward an object. This is possible to do without being aware that you’re doing it. There is such a thing as having unconscious intentions, unconscious aims, unconscious volitions.

According to Solms in this video, intentionality not consciousness is the third property of mind, a property he says that does not require consciousness. Solms is not "Neuroscience". There is no ordinal properties of mind. Solms himself notes that there is not widespread agreement with some of his ideas.

For me its' dishonest to pretend that we have no clue how subjective conscious states feel like especially when the free market is making big money through this knowledge. — Nickolasgaspar

Perhaps we all know how subjective conscious states feel because we all have them. If you had no subjective conscious states you would not know how they feel no matter how much brain research you undertook (assuming that you would be able to carry out brain research without having subjective conscious states yourself).

The famous beetles and boxes passage suggests why. 'Consciousness' refers to a box that could contain anything or nothing. Or it says what it should not be able to say. — green flag

I know my "box' contains something, and I assume that you know yours does, even though I cannot know that for sure. So, there is private experience, and we all know that, because we can entertain thoughts and feelings that others cannot know about.

I know my "box' contains something, and I assume that you know yours does, even though I cannot know that for sure. So, there is private experience, and we all know that, because we can entertain thoughts and feelings that others cannot know about. — Janus

In the ordinary way of speaking, I basically agree. That's what makes this issue so tough to discuss. Our mentalistic language of private experience evolved because it was and is useful. So on that usual and undeniably useful level, I agree.

But when I put my technical-metaphysical hat on, I emphasize how I think this mentalistic language obscures how meaning works between cooperative and competitive bodies on the surface of a planet. As I see it, it's an accidental motte-bailey blending. But it has very little practical significance.

Now ,we can rule out panpsychism or consciousness in structures without similar biological gear, because such structures lack sensory systems(no input) or a central processing units capable to process drives and urges (which are non existent),emotions, capability to store info (memory), to recognize pattern, to use symbolic language, to reason, etc etc. — Nickolasgaspar

We can't if Boltzmann brains and brain simulations are a possibility. Or just simply performing the functions that are correlated with consciousness. Doesn't have to be human either. Could be an alien kind.

In the ordinary way of speaking, I basically agree. That's what makes this issue so tough to discuss. Our mentalistic language of private experience evolved because it was and is useful. So on that usual and undeniably useful level, I agree. — green flag

Doesn't Wittgenstein advise of the bewitchments that come with language going on holiday? I would say our "mentalistic" language of private experience evolved also out of a desire to communicate private experience, and to find commonality with the private experiences of others. This language is only possible on account of the commonalities of private experience as I see it.

I don't like default position chess when the grounds of a substantive disagreement isn't established. I think it's a responsibility of everyone with a position not to treat it as correct by default in this context. — fdrake

I agree, but, for my part I don't think it's so much about default positions as coherent ones. I cannot make sense of a complaint that a question has not been answered for which the complainant cannot provide any clue as to what the answer would look like. It seems to me to be an essential ground for knowing the question hasn't been answered. Otherwise, maybe it has, who knows?

The biggest problem I have with these neuroscience vs consciousness debates is the lack of clarity, not the burden of proof. There are two main dimension to this lack of clarity:

1) We're dealing with 'why?' and 'how?' questions, both of which are unfixed in their scope - they're about satisfaction, not some objective, pre-determined criteria, so they need to be accompanied by a measure of satisfaction (or dissatisfaction) in order to be coherent complaints.

One could (as the apocryphal child) keep asking "...but why?" after every response. It never ends, yet this feature doesn't hold up, say, investigation into how cells transport ions across the membrane. There it is sufficient to describe the function of various membrane channels with reference to matters like where they get their energy from, the protein structure etc. This is normally considered a sufficient explanation of 'how?'

Likewise in biology, various evolutionary, or functional accounts are usually considered sufficient answers to the question 'why?'. The answer to the question "why do membranes transport ions?" is that these ions are either functional components or waste products, the build up of which would damage the cell. This is considered a sufficient answer. We could expand on it to evolutionary theory as to why the cell appears designed to avoid damage.

Yet when it comes to brain functions, this normal level of satisfaction seem to go out of the window and be replaced by an unreasonable hankering after a level that no one involved can even specify. No longer are functional or evolutionary accounts satisfactory (despite those same accounts being satisfactory for other functions of the same entity). And worse, this dissatisfaction is not replaced by a higher (or different) standard appropriate, perhaps, to philosophy, or 'consciousness studies' - it is replaced by absolutely no standard at all. It is considered perfectly good intellectual practice to simply register one's dissatisfaction with the answer and leave it there.

Quite frankly, I find the whole approach quite disingenuous, and I don't think it overly cynical of me to suspect nothing more than a gut displeasure at having our 'special' natures reduced to biology.

2) The extent to which first person introspection provides evidence is arbitrarily applied - again with inconsistency erring only on the side of mystifying consciousness. There is a persistent sense that if one 'feels like' one has a private experience of red, then there must be such a step in the process of seeing red. Simply 'feeling like it' counts as irrefutable evidence that it exists as an entity to be found.

But merely 'feeling like' one's phantom limb is present doesn't oblige the physician to keep searching for it. Merely being convinced one is hearing voices doesn't make that an accurate description of schizophrenia. In both these cases, when contrary evidence is presented, we adjust our account. Not that introspected models are all useless, they're a good starting point, but normally, they're informed by other evidence.

Not so, it seems with consciousness, where one's 'feeling' that one 'experiences red' trumps absolutely everything else. Never mind that decades of searching for a locus to this 'experience' has yielded nothing. Never mind that the very pathway of neural firing (which in normal circumstances we're quite happy to take as a proxy for mental events) precludes any such thing. In this case (and in this case alone), if neuroscience doesn't find the experience of red, it is neuroscience that is wrong.

No one is saying such things about phantom limbs, spotlight bias, false memories, Capgras syndrome, Kahneman's famous economic misjudgements, Asch's conformity results, the conviction one has prior to realising one has miscalculated are large sum... In none of these cases to we assume it is the external/emprical/mathematical correction that is mistaken because it doesn't match our own feelings. We are instead, intrigued, and often delighted, to learn how things are not quite as they seem (like finding out how a magic trick is done)

I don't find made up ifs to be useful philosophy, especially when the phenomenon in questions is way to complicated and demands so many different systems to emerge.
Sensory systems, dozens of Mind properties that enable a brain to produce conscious content , storage mediums etc.
The term consciousness or our feeling to be conscious may appear something that can be overlooked by bystanders, but when realizing the "hardware" needed for the conditions to be right for such a state to emerge, its pretty difficult to be hidden from our systematic methods of investigation. And all that is without even addressing conscious behavior....which is more than obvious.

Perhaps we all know how subjective conscious states feel because we all have them. If you had no subjective conscious states you would not know how they feel no matter how much brain research you undertook (assuming that you would be able to carry out brain research without having subjective conscious states yourself). — Janus

Well you identified the problem in that "if". We have no way to carry any type or research without the ability to connect memory, reasoning, judgment, intelligence, heuristics etca which all come together during a conscious state.
We know that we all have conscious states because we can observe it in out interactions, our behavior, verify that we all have the same hardware necessary for the emergence of those states and we know that those states have a subjective feeling because not all biological setups and previous experiences are the same. i.e.One may enjoy spicy foods while a super taster hates the same experience.
We not only share same or similar experiences with other people, we even have Mirror Neurons that replicate the whole brain function as if we were the individual who we observe.

Makes sense. Construing the debate as unfounded is also part of the debate unfortunately. See "Quining Qualia" by Dennett and Strawson's responses to Dennett's entire project. The unclear/self refuting opponent game. Saying what you just said puts you onto one side of the issue. And you rose to the challenge with an argument.

Regardless, you've left out the specifics about what "function" means in the abstract, what it means to give a functional account in the abstract, whether functional accounts can be made consistent with what you're criticising and so on. There isn't any clear ground to stand on.

Edit: I don't want to go much farther down this road, though. The only point I'm making is what would count as an answer in this debate is also a contested concept in the debate.

I cannot make sense of a complaint that a question has not been answered for which the complainant cannot provide any clue as to what the answer would look like. It seems to me to be an essential ground for knowing the question hasn't been answered. Otherwise, maybe it has, who knows? — Isaac

I'd like to be able to provide you with some answer. I can't, I don't think. What I can do is say something else which might help. The word 'produce' has been used a few times in the thread so I'll go with that for now. Consider:

a) Consciousness is produced by a brain (or at least a body with a brain in it)
b) The universe was produced by an eternal cosmic unicorn that spewed forth quarks and what-have-you from it's horn.

Obviously, (a) is a serious claim and (b) is ludicrous. However, I actually find (b) more intelligible in a way. I can sort of imagine it. We have a physical unicorn, a structure which does things, producing more structure which in turn does more stuff. The producer is broadly the same kind of thing as the product. (a) on the other hand, I can't even get my head around. The producer is so different from the product it seems impossible that they are the same kind of thing. But maybe that's my failing.

I wonder if we could usefully do an analyisis of 'levels' of possibility, and what trumps what.

Logical impossibility, e.g. (- (a & -a))
trumps
Conceptual impossiblity (possibly including linguistic impossibility, e.g. I can't be both a bachelor and married)
trumps
Empirical impossibility (can't go faster than the speed of light)
trumps
Technological impossibility (can't build a dyson sphere - but perhaps could be overcome in time)
trumps
Epistemic impossibility (it may be possible but we can't know how - perhaps this doesn't fit neatly in the list)

I don't think I've done a good job of that at all, others may be able to tidy that up, but you get the idea. I'm sure there must be a SEP article dealing with this stuff. @Banno? @fdrake?

EDIT: Here we go:

Sentences (1)–(10) instantiate different kinds of modality. (1–3) are most naturally interpreted to be about metaphysical modality; (4) about logical modality, (5) about conceptual modality, (6) about epistemic modality, (7) about physical modality, (8) about technological modality, and (9–10) about practical modality. — SEP

So, for me at least, the unicorn creator would be conceptually possible, but empirically impossible, knowing what we do about the world from our scientific investigations.

The idea of consciousness arising from brains seems logically possible, but, at least for me, it gets stuck at the conceptual stage. So the science of it doesn't even get off the ground, as conceptual impossibility trumps that. But of you don't find any conceptual issues, them perhaps it does become a scientific matter, and neuroscience gets traction.

EDIT: So maybe I can give you an answer. What I would like is an argument, or observation, or evidence, that shows the emergence of consciousness from human bodies is conceptually possible.

I find this question really good and challenging!!!!
The steps are the following
1. identify a sensory system that feeds data of which the system can be conscious of.
2.Test the ability of the system to produce an array of important mind properties
3. Verify a mechanism that brings online sensory input and relevant mind properties.(conscious state)
4. evaluate the outcome (in behavior and actions) — Nickolasgaspar

If you were part of the 'jury' deciding on whether or not the 'android' character of 'Data' on Star Trek was conscious and deserved the same 'rights' as 'basic human rights.'
How would you vote?

I would vote: "watch less SciFI" lol.
I don't know and I don't think consciousness is the main criterion on who deserves rights or not.
We provide special rights to fetuses which do not have the "hardware" to be conscious or to people in vegetative states.
I my self respect anything with or without conscious states and allow the right of existence..... from the humble grass-blades to my...... retro collection of micro computers.(something useless for most people on earth).
Maybe your example would be more useful by questioning the ability of that character to be conscious . And by conscious we are asking whether he can experience the world through mental states that include finding meaning in biological feelings and concepts.
Do you agree? if yes my answer would be no.
My additional remark is that there can be different types of conscious states which do not include reflecting to how we feel about our existence or what is moral.
The core in our consciousness is our biological emotions that we reason in to feelings and concerns about our existence, relationships, morality, position in society etc. We can introduce an algorithm in a machine to care for his existence but I am not sure an algorithm can produce similar feelings to those produced by stress hormone or endorphins.
An extensive simulation of the workings in a biological mechanism might do the trick someday. In any case we will need to inspect the hardware before arriving to a conclusion. Behavior alone is not enough for that judgment.

. They are not facts, they are ways of thinking about something. As I see it, they are not useful ways of thinking, but that is certainly opinion, not fact. — T Clark

And what is a "fact" verses "belief". I believe facts. That belief is a fact. See what I did there? So there is a connection and interplay.

Or I believe a cat can be ginger. Cue fact that ginger cats exist and are empirical. Therefore my belief that they can be ginger runs parallel to the fact that they can be. Both statements are equally valid/logical despite interchanging the word believe for know/are (fact).

If everyone unanimously believed in something objectively untestable. And no one was there to contradict such a belief. It would be agreed unanimously to be fact (because everyone believes it so) .

Historical facts are now beliefs. Historical beliefs are now "proven objectively" as facts. Current beliefs may become facts and current facts may become beliefs. They interchange status with paradigm shift (change in societal awareness) during our education and application of meaning to reality/new theories and discoveries.

Climate change was once a mere belief of a select few that went against the grain of collectively assumed fact. It is now fact and anyone who "doesn't believe it", well, that's just a belief isn't it?

Science believes in energy as a fact underlying physics.

But we run into the problem of true objective non-testability as in scientific method cannot be applied to the question of the existence of energy as fact.

Because we can only observe the action of energy indirectly by perception (which is subjective and thus subject to debate). Furthermore you cannot see energy that doesn't enter your eyes (light) nor can you fully objectify it as not all energy is in the state of being matter/objects otherwise no action/time could occur, and no one could observe (as this also requires energy - specifically that which is not manifest as matter).

Thus there is a certain irony that scientific dogma is based on something untestable and unobservable as a standard singular entity. Unstandardisable. Non objectifiable. Only indirectly observed (what it gives rise to).

Spiritual and theistic views also begin with an entity that cannot directly be seen/observed in its true form but rather it's multiplicity of manifestations/iterations.

Taoist philosophy states that whatever you know of the tao (force vital or primary existant) is not the fundamental tao, only one facet of its total ability to be/do.

Something that has possibility to be something else (as energy does) can only every be in a state of constant possibility/change/transformation and thus never definitive nor static "fact".

I love that episode. It's stayed with me all my life. I would give Data human rights.

I would vote: "watch less SciFI" lol. — Nickolasgaspar

How unconscionable of you! :scream: :grin:

I don't know and I don't think consciousness is the main criterion on who deserves rights or not. — Nickolasgaspar

Perhaps not exclusively but it's the over-arching criterion for me. I am open to arguments such as all natural flora and fauna deserves some 'rights' or 'protections,' which are not merely for the benefits of all lifeforms who display OUR LEVEL/gradation of consciousness.

Maybe your example would be more useful by questioning the ability of that character to be conscious . And by conscious we are asking whether he can experience the world through mental states that include finding meaning in biological feelings and concepts.
Do you agree? if yes my answer would be no. — Nickolasgaspar

That would depend on how you are defining 'mental states' and whether or not they can be 'emulated' or 'reproduced' to such an extent that the proposed future tech of a 'positronic brain state' is 'equivalent' to a human brain state and that all possible human brain states can be reproduced, emulated within a positronic brain. Would the 'all' part be truly required? If data's positronic brain can replicate 75% of all possible human brain states, would you change your vote? If no, do you have a % cut off point?

We can introduce an algorithm in a machine to care for his existence but I am not sure an algorithm can produce similar feelings to those produced by stress hormone or endorphins. — Nickolasgaspar

But a machine can be biobased. How much do you know about biological computing?

I love that episode. It's stayed with me all my life. I would give Data human rights. — RogueAI

Yep, I agree, a great episode. Perhaps your last sentence above is all that will really matter in the end, especially if the majority of sentient stakeholders at the time, agree with you. I would vote the same way as you! This would mean however that I would have to vote the same for Data's nasty 'brother,' Lor.