But you could triangulate the height of the walkers with some distance data. I think that would qualify as direct.

The greatest argument for indirect realism is anatomy and physiology. Plain and simple. Whatever flaws it may have, that hurdle is insurmountable.

I have been arguing against the metaphysical positions of indirect realism. But that does not mean have been arguing for the metaphysical position of direct realism. I believe there is confusion being created on how this debate is using the words “direct/indirect”.

That said, I am puzzled by how you are characterizing the direct realist’s position with regard to your example of the person’s height as they walk away.

Are you claiming that for the direct realist to be consistent with their position that when the person walks away, their height must appear the same the further they move away from the observer?

The other, a metaphysical theory positing “sense data” which is in principle private, unaccessible, and with un-unverifiable claims. Lastly, as I have been arguing irrelevant to the meaning of the language used. — Richard B

The Indirect Realist agrees that private experiences are private, but as Wittgenstein explains in para 293 of PI, language games work because private experiences drop out of consideration as irrelevant: "That is to say: if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of 'object and designation' the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant."

Are you claiming that for the direct realist to be consistent with their position that when the person walks away, their height must appear the same the further they move away from the observer? — Richard B

Perhaps best answered by someone who believes in Direct Realism.

Why would you submit this as an example as a counter to direct realism if you don’t have idea what it is countering?

But there is a difference between these two explanations, one metaphysical and one scientific. The scientific explanation has physical theory behind it. Verified countless times by a community of scientist. It has power to predict future occurrences and the power to construct our environment. All verifiable in the public realm. — Richard B

Yes, and the science shows that objects don’t have colour properties, a la colour primitivism. It is just the case that objects reflect light of a certain wavelength stimulating the sense receptors in the eye which in term stimulate brain activity, creating the experience of coloured objects. I referenced an experiment earlier that explicitly determined that colour is a perceptual construct of this kind, not to be found in light or apples.

It’s no different to a low temperature causing me to feel cold or a punch to the face causing me to feel pain. A temperature of 0 degrees doesn’t have a property of coldness and fists don’t have properties of pain. I don’t know why anyone would think colour is any different given our modern science of the world and perception.

If you want to argue that the feeling of being cold isn’t some essentially private mental phenomena but is reducible to brain activity then fine, but the same must also be said of seeing colours. Sight isn’t a uniquely special sense. They key point is that colour, like coldness and pain, aren’t properties of the external stimulus that trigger such experiences.

Why would you submit this as an example as a counter to direct realism if you don’t have idea what it is countering? — Richard B

I gave my definition of Direct and Indirect Realism here.

Best answered by a Direct Realist, as I don't know of anything that a Direct Realist has direct cognition of that isn't a representation of something in a mind-independent world.

If you want to argue that the feeling of being cold isn’t some essentially private mental phenomena but is reducible to brain activity then fine, but the same must also be said of seeing colours. Sight isn’t a uniquely special sense. They key point is that colour, like coldness and pain, aren’t properties of the external stimulus that trigger such experiences. — Michael

Additionally, if we want to call the "scientific description" of what we call "perception of color" as indirect because it depends on light, how light reflects off an object, atmospheric conditions present, the quality of air, the biological condition of the eye, the functioning of the brain, etc...OK. But, I don't think this is saying much more the what was iterated. There is no other "scientific description" to contrast the aforementioned "scientific description" in order to call it an indirect or direct "scientific description". I just rather called it a "scientific description". Lastly, I do not believe that this "scientific description" supports the indirect realist's metaphysical position, as I have argued in the last several posts. It can't in principle.

I know! Crazy isn't it!

That anyone might think a thing you can't personally understand could actually be the case! Implausible.... — Isaac

I hope you are not falling into the dogmatic delusion that anyone who doesn't agree with you must not understand. Nothing difficult to understand there, just difficult to believe. But then you seem to have no difficulty believing it..it looks like we have different opinions about what seems plausible...go figure...

I've lost track of this discussion. By way of trying to pick it back up, I'll point out that what you are doing in the post linked is already engaging in a language game, the rules for which you are setting out and explicating.

And if you are already in a language game, you are already meaning things by what you do.

So if what you are doing - and I'm not sure what it is you are doing - is giving an account of meaning, havn't you missed the boat? You are already using meaning in giving the account...

As Wittgenstein pointed out, somewhere in PI, pointing at something only works if the other folk around you understand that they have to follow the direction of your finger - and that is already to be participants in a sign language.

All this by way of pointing out that at some stage any account of meaning will come down to: it's just what we do.

I just meant that there's no intermediate object, no 'representation' of an apple. — Isaac


I’m not saying that either. I’m saying that the reality of colour perception is like this: — Michael

That's a representation. Those objects in the thought bubbles are representations of apples.

The essential point is that the apple in between them isn’t coloured. It reflects a certain wavelength of light, but that’s all. Colour primitivism, which naive realists believe, is false. — Michael

I think this simply misunderstands what the words mean. What it means for a thing (in the external world) to have a colour. When we say "the post box is red" we don't mean that there's some thing 'redness' which the post box possesses, we're instead declaring and reconfirming our joint commitment to treating the post box a certain way. But it's the external post box that is the subject of that commitment, not some internal representation.

when the man uses the term “grue” to describe the colour of the apple, he’s referring to what’s present in his experience and not present in the woman’s (in the particular example of that image), not to the fact that the apple reflects light with a wavelength of 450nm. — Michael

Then why have representations at all? Why have the word?

In my preferred model of perception, we attempt to predict the external causes of our sensory inputs so that we might combat the entropy otherwise induced by external forces and maintain our integrity. You could put that in evolutionary terms as being a need to predict the environment so that we can survive what it's going to throw at us.

But this requires that what we're predicting is the external world, the actual thing outside of us which might impact our integrity. And when we live in groups, we do this socially. We co-operate to better predict external causes and make ourselves more predictable to others (in the hope they will return the favour). So the important thing about labelling something 'red' is the co-operation, the surprise reduction, entailed by doing so. It's important that we agree and it's important that what we agree about is an external cause.

If all we're labelling is our own private 'representations', then I really can't see the point. Why would you care? Why would I? What difference does it make to anyone what your private representation is called?

When we say "the post box is red" we don't mean that there's some thing 'redness' which the post box possesses, we're instead declaring and reconfirming our joint commitment to treating the post box a certain way. — Isaac

I don't think so. "The post box is red" is the answer to some question. Understand the question, and you'll understand the answer.

Ultimately all theories of meaning come down to: what was the question?

"The post box is red" is the answer to some question. Understand the question, and you'll understand the answer. — frank

The question is... "in what way are we treating the post box?"

The question is... "in what way are we treating the post box?" — Isaac

It could have been: "what's that red thing over there?"

It could have been: "what's that red thing over there?" — frank

Yes, but why?

I've given an account of the need to reduce external surprise from both an evolutionary perspective and from a purely systems theory perspective. any self identifying system has to combat entropy gradients (in terms of information) and those gradients are Gaussian. so we minimise surprise, we treat things consistently, and (to the best of our ability) in ways which give predictable results based on their actual external-world states.

I can't think of a single reason why would just go about asking each other what our private thoughts are called?

I've given an account of the need to reduce external surprise from both an evolutionary perspective and from a purely systems theory perspective. any self identifying system has to combat entropy gradients (in terms of information) and those gradients are Gaussian. so we minimise surprise, we treat things consistently, and (to the best of our ability) in ways which give predictable results based on their actual external-world states. — Isaac

None of which rules out the experience of redness. In fact, your view is more consistent with first person data than opposed to it.

can't think of a single reason why would just go about asking each other what our private thoughts are called? — Isaac

I can't either. We ask things like: what's that red thing over there?

That's a representation. Those objects in the thought bubbles are representations of apples. — Isaac

They are no more representations of apples than pain is a representation of fire or cold a representation of a temperature of 0°C. They are just an effect of stimulation.

When we say "the post box is red" we don't mean that there's some thing 'redness' which the post box possesses — Isaac

We do according to the (phenomenological) direct realist. They commit themselves to something like colour primitivism. Indirect realism is a response to such claims.

Then why have representations at all? Why have the word? — Isaac

I try not to use the word. I think it's a distraction. I have repeatedly said that the epistemological problem of perception – the very thing that gave rise to the distinction between the direct (naive) realist and the indirect realist – concerns the relationship between the phenomenology of experience and the mind-independent properties of external world objects.

The pain I feel isn't a mind-independent property of fire. The cold I feel isn't a mind-independent property of the air. The sweetness I taste isn't a mind-independent property of sugar. The colour I see isn't a mind-independent property of the apple.

It makes no real difference if we describe this as feeling or tasting or seeing "mental representations" or if we describe this as feeling or tasting or seeing fire and air and sugar and apples. That semantic argument is, really, a non-issue.

When I talk to my parents on the phone, it is perfectly acceptable to say that I talk to my parents on the phone, not to some representation of my parents; but it is also correct to say that our conversation is indirect; that their voice isn't actually "present" in my experience (given that sound can't travel that fast, and at the volume they speak also can't travel that far).

When I talk about my parents, it is perfectly acceptable to say that I talk about my parents, not about some representation of my parents; but it is also correct to say that there is no "direct" connection between my words and my parents; that they are not actually "present" in my conversation.

This is the problem I have with so-called semantic direct realism. It doesn't actually address the epistemological problem of perception, or the substance of the indirect realist's arguments. As was argued in the paper I referenced before, semantic direct realism is just an attempt to maintain direct realist terminology in the face of the insurmountable problems of illusion and hallucination, and to our current scientific understanding of the world and perception. It abandons the direct (naive) realist's claim that we see things as they (mind-independently) are, and retreats simply to the claim that we see things, which doesn't really say anything significant.

In my preferred model of perception, we attempt to predict the external causes of our sensory inputs so that we might combat the entropy otherwise induced by external forces and maintain our integrity. You could put that in evolutionary terms as being a need to predict the environment so that we can survive what it's going to throw at us.

But this requires that what we're predicting is the external world, the actual thing outside of us which might impact our integrity. And when we live in groups, we do this socially. We co-operate to better predict external causes and make ourselves more predictable to others (in the hope they will return the favour). So the important thing about labelling something 'red' is the co-operation, the surprise reduction, entailed by doing so. It's important that we agree and it's important that what we agree about is an external cause.

If all we're labelling is our own private 'representations', then I really can't see the point. Why would you care? Why would I? What difference does it make to anyone what your private representation is called? — Isaac

It's not an either-or. When you tell me that something is cold, I understand it both in the sense that the temperature is low and in the sense of how such things feel. I can make sense of someone being out in such temperatures and yet not feeling cold. I am able to recognize the distinction between cause and effect. The same with pain, and smells, and tastes, and colours. The mistake direct (naive) realists make is to project the effect onto the cause, e.g. in the case of colour primitivism.

As Wittgenstein pointed out, somewhere in PI, pointing at something only works if the other folk around you understand that they have to follow the direction of your finger - and that is already to be participants in a sign language. — Banno

It follows that Wittgenstein's language game is incompatible with Semantic Direct Realism.

Definitions of Direct Realism
I defined Direct Realism as either:
1) Phenomenological Direct Realism (PDR) is a direct perception of the object "tree" as it really is in a mind-independent world
2) Semantic Direct Realism (SDR) is an indirect perception but direct cognition of the object "tree" as it really is in a mind-independent world

Wikipedia on Naive Realism writes: "According to the naïve realist, the objects of perception are not representations of external objects, but are in fact those external objects themselves."

You wrote that: "Direct realism is where what we talk about is the tree, not the image of the tree or some other philosophical supposition."

In summary, some definitions of Direct Realism are limited to perception, free of language, and some definitions require cognition, involving language.

However, as the argument from illusion makes too strong case against Phenomenological Direct Realism, Semantic Direct Realism remains the only likely possibility.

The difference between perception and cognition
In perception, the brain receives sensory input through the five senses which it processes as simple and complex concepts, simple concepts such as the colour green, and complex concepts such as a tree. In cognition, the brain combines these concepts using memory, reasoning and language to understand what has been perceived, enabling propositions such as "the tree is green".

As language is part of cognition, I can perceive things without needing a language. There are many things in the world that I perceive that I have no words for.

The act of pointing
I agree that I have been assuming that the word "tree" in language is pointing at a picture of a tree existing in a mind-independent world.

However, you note that the act of pointing is already part of the language game, meaning that what is being pointed at exists in a world, but the world of the language game, not a mind-independent world.

Wittgenstein in para 31 of PI writes that the act of pointing only works if the observer has previous knowledge of what is being pointed out:
"Consider this further case: I am explaining chess to someone; and I begin by pointing to a chessman and saying: "This is the king; it can move like this, . . . . and so on."—In this case we shall say: the words "This is the king" (or "This is called the 'king' ") are a definition only if the learner already 'knows what a piece in a game is'".

Therefore, words being used in the language game are not pointing out objects in a mind-independent world, but are pointing out objects existing within the language game itself

However, Semantic Direct Realism is the position that we have a direct cognition of "trees" as they really are in a mind-independent world, allowing us to make the statement that "trees are green" is true IFF trees are green in a mind-independent world.

As Wittgenstein's language game says that the statement "trees are green" does not point to something in a mind-independent world but rather points to something already existing in language, Wittgenstein's language game is incompatible with Semantic Direct Realism, which says that "trees are green" does point to something existing in a mind-independent world.

Summary
IE, Wittgenstein's language game is incompatible with Semantic Direct Realism.

Argument against Direct Realism



Semantic Direct Realism (SDR) says that we have direct cognition of the object "apple" as it really is in a mind-independent world. Therefore, for SDR, apples exist in a mind-independent world, whether they are perceived or not.

However, as the apple rots, at what exact moment in time in a mind-independent world does the apple disappear from existence. A human observer may judge when the apple disappears from existence, but what is there in a mind-independent world that determines when the apple disappears from existence ?

As Wittgenstein's language game says that the statement "trees are green" does not point to something in a mind-independent world but rather points to something already existing in language, Wittgenstein's language game is incompatible with Semantic Direct Realism, which says that "trees are green" does point to something existing in a mind-independent world. — RussellA

I once heard John Searle say something which I believe prevents one moving down the road to confusion.

Words do not refer, but human being use words to refer.

I think sometimes folk forget this which causes folk to think a word is magically "connected" to some object.

None of which rules out the experience of redness. — frank

No. The experience of 'redness' is ruled out by there being no evidence, nor need, for any such thing.

In fact, your view is more consistent with first person data than opposed to it. — frank

Then you've misunderstood my view. First person data is useless. It needs to climb an entropy gradient and it can't do that by being self-referential.

They are no more representations of apples than pain is a representation of fire or cold a representation of a temperature of 0°C. They are just an effect of stimulation. — Michael

An 'effect' of the stimulation would be something like reaching for the word "apple". You're still inventing 'representations' but now just want to call them something else.

When we say "the post box is red" we don't mean that there's some thing 'redness' which the post box possesses — Isaac


We do according to the (phenomenological) direct realist. They commit themselves to something like colour primitivism. Indirect realism is a response to such claims. — Michael

Well then we'd jointly disagree with such a position, but I very much doubt it's that simple. I'd first want to know what kind of thing the colour primitivist thinks colour is before dismissing their position hastily.

The pain I feel isn't a mind-independent property of fire. The cold I feel isn't a mind-independent property of the air. The sweetness I taste isn't a mind-independent property of sugar. The colour I see isn't a mind-independent property of the apple.

It makes no real difference if we describe this as feeling or tasting or seeing "mental representations" or if we describe this as feeling or tasting or seeing fire and air and sugar and apples. That semantic argument is, really, a non-issue. — Michael

As above, you're still invoking representations. There's no such thing as 'the pain you feel' You don't feel pain, you feel the fist. It's the fist which your systems are trying to predict, it is the external state that is the subject of your speculations, otherwise those speculations are pointless, they have no purpose to the organism. It doesn't need to know how it's feeling, it needs to know what's going on outside (and this means 'outside' of the system - meaning areas of your own body that are not part of the CNS).

The whole model of how and why the CNS does what it does doesn't work if all it's doing is predicting the state of other parts within it's own Markov blanket. Seeing, feeling, hearing, smelling... these are all descriptions of hierarchical prediction processes for which the only plausible model of their evolution is the reduction of entropy from forces external to the system. there's just no need for a CNS to be organised the way it is otherwise. So the idea that is sees, feels, hears, and smells itself is either nonsense, or an idea which stand in need of a complete rebuild of cognitive science from the ground up.

None of which rules out the experience of redness.
— frank

No. The experience of 'redness' is ruled out by there being no evidence, nor need, for any such thing. — Isaac

I need it. My house has become a den of red, black, and white. I don't want curtains that cause me to reach for the word "red." I need red curtains.

Furthermore, I don't need red curtains that represent something I do. I just need the red curtains.

Let's dispense with the unnecessary abuse of language going on in this thread. :razz:

You don't feel pain — Isaac

Then we're at an impasse. Nothing you say can convince me that I don't feel pain. Headaches are real.

Nothing you say can convince me that I don't feel pain. — Michael

Unless we give you an anesthetic, right?

My house has become a den of red, black, and white. — frank

White Stripes fan?

Nothing you say can convince me that I don't feel pain. — Michael

Where is this 'pain' and what sensory nodes to you use to 'feel' it?

read this. — Michael

pdf, anyone?

Where is this 'pain' and what sensory nodes to you use to 'feel' it? — Isaac

The question is mistaken. Ironically Searle explains it well:

It is like the pain and the experience of pain. The experience of pain does not have pain as an object because the experience of pain is identical with the pain. Similarly, if the experience of perceiving is an object of perceiving, then it becomes identical with the perceiving. Just as the pain is identical with the experience of pain, so the visual experience is identical with the experience of seeing.

So it is not the case that "feeling" is one thing, that "pain" is another thing, and that the former is "done" to the latter; it is just the case that "feeling pain" is a single (possibly private) thing. The same with feeling cold and seeing red.

My house has become a den of red, black, and white.
— frank

White Stripes fan? — Isaac

:lol: I used to listen to "Ball and a Biscuit" on the way to work.

So it is not the case that "feeling" is one thing, that "pain" is another thing, and that the former is "done" to the latter; it is just the case that "feeling pain" is a single (possibly private) thing. The same with feeling cold and seeing red. — Michael

Now you seem to be going back to semantics. Sure, 'feel' can be used to describe more than directly sensing something. But we 'feel' the grass beneath our feet. We 'feel' the rough bark of the tree. You wanted to restrict the conversation to the epistemological problems of perception. The process of perception is one of estimating a surprise-reducing model of external states. So insofar as the epistemological question is concerned, you either 'feel' pain with pain being some external state, or that particular use of 'feel' is not the use we're concerned with.

So when I say you don't 'feel' pain, I'm using the term 'feel' in the same sense as it's used in perception - I 'feel' the grass, the trees, the wind etc.

Now you seem to be going back to semantics. — Isaac

And that's all semantic direct realism is: semantics.

The epistemological problem of perception that gave rise to the distinction between the direct and indirect realist concerns the relationship between the phenomenology of experience and the mind-independent properties of external world objects. That has nothing to do with the choice to describe our experience as "feeling pain" or as "feeling the fire", which is irrelevant to the substance of the disagreement, because it's not the case that either one or the other is "correct". They're just different ways of talking that emphasise different aspects of perception.

When I talk about seeing red I mean it in the same sort of sense as when I talk about feeling pain, and the red I see, like the pain I feel, isn't a property of external world objects. This is the indirect realist’s claim contra the (phenomenological) direct (naive) realist’s.