How do you handle splitting problems when it comes to personal identity? For example, it is theoretically possible to split the brain and put them into cloned bodies of yourself. So, which one is you, Leftie or Rightie?

You'd have to post it here or someplace that I don't have to sign up for.

First of all, I'd like to quote Hume:

We're all just ever changing bundles of impressions that our minds are fooled into thinking of as constant, because they're packaged in these fleshy receptacles that basically look the same from one day to the next.

Second of all, your ideas are largely based on the idea that consciousness or simply the mind is a physical thing which subsequently determines the direction of your thought.

I think the Allegory of Theseus' Ship is a great talking point, however not that relevant when comparing it to the human mind. For starters, it totally depends on the subject and their own opinion as to when the ship is still the original ship and when it is a new ship. In my opinion, the soul of the Theseus is lost if you were to replace all the boards at the same time. However replacing a few boards and living with it for a while would indicate a change; the same ship, but evolved (for better or for worse).

Now that I type it out, I suppose it is kind of relevant to the mind.

I'm thinking about the book Zen (ATAOMM) and how the antagonist subsides to electro-therapy to rid himself of an overloaded philosophically troubled mind. In this way, his outlook has been completely changed and he appears to be a totally different person. His way of thinking is different and over time his body regenerates and so in my mind has become someone else.

However, for the most of us that are able to switch off that philosophical voice that riddles our thoughts and go about our day to day without having a nervous breakdown, we are constantly changing - evolving. Even after you have read this very post, your bundle of impressions will be changed even if ever so slightly. And I say, if you look at yourself 10 years ago and believe you are the same person, then I believe you are mistaken. Not only is your skin is different but your bundle of impressions are different. That's not to say that you don't retain certain parts of who you are (Batman has always been my favourite hero, however I used to hate hip hop and now I am an avid listener. Likewise with the physical aspect: I've always had the same little mole on my tummy but my body has grown larger and hairier).

This doesn't really give any more of a direct answer than yours, but these are my thoughts.

To quote from the summary page:

"I believe that .self. and .mind. have been conflated to give rise to this problem. It is not that the mind is physical such that the self is physical. The mind is the collection of experiences that make up my qualitative existence. The self is a more nuanced concept, identifying the relationship between previous versions of me.

Because there is nothing physically the same about me now and me ten years ago, there is no thing that is the same about me now and me ten years ago. Therefore, the concept of self cannot be a part of the category of thing. To borrow the language of Gilbert Ryle, I think considering the self as a thing would be to make a category mistake"

I can reasonably agree with this. Free will debate also results from a similar category error. But there is a functional 'self', so what is it that makes this physical instance of a person responsible for say some act done by some different physical instance in the past? That is an identity, and what makes it stick when parts are replaced?

This kind of splitting of the body would be sufficient to prohibit continuity of identity such that neither is really 'you'. I think anyway... it's a confusing area and full of problems I keep running into!

Totally agree - I wrote an article recently about free will and actually concluded that it's simply impossible in the sense that people think of it normally. Not sure what you think of determinism haha a lot of people tell me to stop being stupid when I spurt on about how there is no legitimate choice!

To say that it isn't relevant because Theseus' Ship is based on opinions I think is flawed - the ship cannot be both X and not X, and as such some people's opinions must simply be wrong - this is the law of noncontradiction.

Your second point is interesting. I'm not sure how else you can vindicate your position of the body having totally changed, and the mind having totally changed ('impressions') but there still remaining certain parts of who you are. This is the thing I am trying to tackle in my article and I feel like your response cannot accommodate how this happens.

Has that changed your opinion at all or am I still missing your point?

I wrote an article recently about free will and actually concluded that it's simply impossible in the sense that people think of it normally. — James McSharry

So you had no choice but to register here and post exactly what you posted, right? And I had no choice but to ask you about it; couldn't have done otherwise.

To say that it isn't relevant because Theseus' Ship is based on opinions I think is flawed - the ship cannot be both X and not X, and as such some people's opinions must simply be wrong - this is the law of noncontradiction. — James McSharry

Consider a tennis ball. Is it big or small? It's small to us, but big to a snail. Identity can be a relative matter. So by the same token, the ship might be the same ship to some people but a different ship to others. This doesn't deny the law of contradiction because the "to X" part is a relevant qualifier: "the ship is the same to me" and "the ship is different to others" are not contradictions, just as "the game is fun to me" and "the game is not fun to others" are not contradictions.

Totally agree - I wrote an article recently about free will and actually concluded that it's simply impossible in the sense that people think of it normally. Not sure what you think of determinism haha a lot of people tell me to stop being stupid when I spurt on about how there is no legitimate choice! — James McSharry

You didn't answer the question. OK, we both think identity, or the 'self', is not a thing. But what then makes me now responsible for an act done by a person yesterday (with whom I do not share numeric identity), but which is consisdered 'me' ?

This is a SoT thread, so would I no longer be responsible if enough 'parts' have been replaced? I have little to none of original matter I had when I was a child so does that mean I am not responsible for the acts I did then? I bring up responsibility because that is the primary use of what the ship has: a legal identity. To claim you've solved the problem is to be able to track the legal identity of a ship through it getting its parts (all) replaced, through the discarded parts being built into a new ship, and through cloning events. If I am cloned, which half gets to keep the job?

Anybody can claim the self is not a phyiscal 'thing'. That's not a solution if you stop there.

If I am cloned, which half gets to keep the job? — noAxioms

Get both clones to present a case and let a panel decide who was the most persuasive.

To say that it isn't relevant because Theseus' Ship is based on opinions I think is flawed - the ship cannot be both X and not X, and as such some people's opinions must simply be wrong - this is the law of noncontradiction. — James McSharry

I don't agree with this at all. In my view, there are no objective facts re whether something is the Ship of Theseus at time Tx or not. It's simply a matter of whether an individual considers it the Ship of Theseus or not.

Or in other words, I'm an antirealist when it comes to essentials/essential versus accidental properties, etc.

What it is for some x to be an F is simply that someone has a concept, F, where x meets their necessary and sufficient criteria to count as an F.

So the same x can be the Ship of Theseus to one person, but not to another person. Neither is right or wrong. It simply tells us something about their individual concepts.

But why is splitting sufficient? Consider the following scenarios:

1) Yesterday, I had a full brain. Today, I have a full brain. I am the same person I was yesterday in terms of identity.

2) Yesterday, I had a full brain. Today, I lost the one hemishpere of my brain. I am still functional and, though I have some problems, I retain enough of my traits that psychological continuity is not broken. I am the same person I was yesterday in terms of identity.

3) Yesterday, I had a full brain. Today, I under went an operation and had the two hemispheres of my brain seperated and put into cloned bodies of me. Neither of these two clones are me, as psychological continuity is broken.

You need to explain why 2) is okay while 3) is also okay. Each clone maintains psychological continuity with the original me, such that if you to hypothetically remove one clone from the scenario, we would be in an identical situation as 2).

Exactly; that's the spirit!

I think I have come up with the solution to dilemma of the Ship Of Theseus. — James McSharry

This "paradox" is exactly the kind of artificial issue that much of Western philosophy is based on. I think a quote from the Tao Te Ching is relevant

Thirty spokes unite at the single hub;
It is the empty space which makes the wheel useful.
Mold clay to form a bowl;
It is the empty space which makes the bowl useful.
Cut out windows and doors;
It is the empty space which makes the room useful.

It is the holds, cabins, positions of the cannons, and sails that make the ship. The wood and iron are just what is used to form and support the needed empty space. Heraclitus river is still a river if it has run dry. It is the empty space of the channel that makes it a river.

For one, aside from whether "space makes x useful" is true for everything or even (at least unequivocally) for all of the examples you present, it seems like you're conflating usefulness and identity.

We can assume that space makes a river useful, but that's different from saying either that (a) space is what makes a river a river, or (b) space is what makes that particular river that particular river, with a constant identity.

And accepting the "space makes it useful" perspective, we can simply ask to what extent the space has to change for the Ship of Theseus to not still be the (same) Ship of Theseus.

For one, aside from whether "space makes x useful" is true for everything or even (at least unequivocally) for all of the examples you present, it seems like you're conflating usefulness and identity. — Terrapin Station

I disagree. I don't think you've thought through what "identity" really means on a practical basis.
The space is what the boat was designed and constructed for. It is the objective of the boat building process. How a ship will be used and continues to be used is a bigger part of it's identity than some specific piece of wood.

We can assume that space makes a river useful, but that's different from saying either that (a) space is what makes a river a river, or (b) space is what makes that particular river that particular river, with a constant identity. — Terrapin Station

Many rivers are dry for long-periods during the year. They don't stop being rivers. If there's a flood, and water starts running in locations where it doesn't normally, is that suddenly a river?

And accepting the "space makes it useful" perspective, we can simply ask to what extent the space has to change for the Ship of Theseus to not still be the (same) Ship of Theseus. — Terrapin Station

Ok, but if that were the question we are trying to answer, I doubt whether Theseus would have been interested.

I disagree. I don't think you've thought through what "identity" really means on a practical basis.
The space is what the boat was designed and constructed for. It is the objective of the boat building process. How a ship will be used and continues to be used is a bigger part of it's identity than some specific piece of wood. — T Clark

The reason you seemed to be making a conflation was that you simply jumped from statements about usefulness to statements about identity.

Many rivers are dry for long-periods during the year. They don't stop being rivers. If there's a flood, and water starts running in locations where it doesn't normally, is that suddenly a river? — T Clark

As I explained earlier, on my view, this is simply a matter of learning about how individuals formulate their concepts. There are not right or wrong answers.

As I explained earlier, on my view, this is simply a matter of learning about how individuals formulate their concepts. There are not right or wrong answers. — Terrapin Station

I agree, except... Except that there are no paradoxes outside of the human mind. The non-human world doesn't have any. Paradoxes are caused by humans tying their words into knots and believing that manipulating words has an effect on the physical world.

If it looks like there is a paradox, someone has defined something wrong. Or not defined it clearly at all.

Yeah, I agree with that.

Yeah, I agree with that. — Terrapin Station

I'm not sure anyone has ever agreed with me before. I don't know how to react.

lol

Sometimes on boards like this people disagree almost as if it's their duty to do so. That can be frustrating.

The solution seems to be that any ship that Theseus owns would be a ship of Theseus. Are we simply talking about ownership (which also applies with grandfather's axe)? or are we talking about a particular object that had all of it's parts replaced?

The fact that we keep referring to it as the same ship, and that we use language in such a way that we refer to it as the ship of Theseus and having the ship of Theseus's parts replaced, should imply that it is the same ship. After all, if the meaning of words is how they are used, then it should be perfectly clear what the answer is to this "paradox". I'm wondering if the "meaning-is-use" crowd is going to be consistent here.