I'm certainly not claiming any kind of enlightenment on my part, but I'm not prepared to agree that the whole Platonic tradiition merely ends with questions that can never be answered.

Well, to claim that they can never be answered is to presume a kind of answer. This is one difference between Socratic and modern skepticism. While the latter makes claims about what we cannot know the former sticks with what we do not know.

... the whole Platonic tradiition merely ends with questions that can never be answered — Wayfarer

It could be said that this is where it begins and does not end.

In both cases there is not only an awareness of something lacking but a desire to obtain it, but we have found no way to move past the aporia raised in these texts. — Fooloso4

Who is "we"? Aristotle solved a number of the problems, and others have been resolved since.

Such as?

Such as? — Fooloso4

The problem of change, the source of universal knowledge, the nature of time, the reality of mathematical objects, etc., etc.

I would not say that any of these problems were solved by Aristotle.

Yes. Still, we can abstract aspects that are common to a species or genus, and these aspects are grounded in the form of the species or genus members. — Dfpolis

I think I would disagree with this. When we abstract what is common to a species, this is grounded in the individual instances. That is inductive reasoning, making a general statement which is derived from observation of a multitude of individuals. We do not derive the universal from an independent Form which is the form of the species, we derive it from the individuals. Then we can produce a statement of definition, and the definition of the species can serve as a grounding, as Aristotle's secondary substance. But never is the human abstraction said to be grounded in an independent Form of the species in Aristotelian conceptual space.

Here is a fragment about the principle of individuation from an article I am working on: — Dfpolis

I must say that I can't really interpret what you are saying in these passages, by simply reading them with no context.

Timaeus identifies two kinds of cause, intelligence and necessity, nous and ananke. Necessity covers such things as physical processes, contingency, chance, motion, power, and the chora. What is by necessity is without nous or intellect. It is called the “wandering cause” (48a). It can act contrary to nous. The sensible world, the world of becoming, is neither regulated by intellect nor fully intelligible. — Fooloso4

Plato on causation is not clear at all, and I don't agree with your interpretation here. You cannot make a clear cut and dry division like you do because prior to Aristotle defining the distinct senses of "cause", there was ambiguity and mixing of the senses, equivocation. So when Plato said "necessity" is a type of cause, this was not meant to indicate a physical process, as we might say today. It was meant to represent something distinct from a rational choice. The sense of "necessity" here is more like need. So when a very thirsty person is caused to drink water, knowing that the water may be contaminated, for example, this is caused by necessity rather than rational choice. This sense of "need" was imposed onto the physical world by the ancients, such that what we call physical necessity was understood as what was needed by the gods.l

They are two different ousia with the same form, man. There difference is not with regard to form but with regard to accidents. — Fooloso4

It is made very clear by Aristotle, that accidents are part of a thing's form. Even dfPolis and I agree this far. As I explained to Wayfarer above, if we can apprehend accidental differences as differences, then they must be formal, because form is the only aspect of the thing which is intelligible to us. If the difference were not formal we could not perceive them as differences.

This is precisely why the individual is not a form.

The cause of accidents is chance:

But chance and spontaneity are also reckoned among causes: many things are said both to be and to come to be as a result of chance and spontaneity. (Physics, 195b) — Fooloso4

This opinion strikes right to the very heart of the issue. The cause of accidents, in human actions is ignorance, not chance. And any cause in the wider world, which is unknown to us, will appear to us as chance. So chance is not a cause at all, it's just the way we portray and represent our own ignorance. Aristotle dismissed chance as not properly a cause, and that's why there are four senses of "cause" rather than six (chance and luck being excluded).

Notice in your quote, "many things are said...to come to be as a result of chance". This is what I mean about the need to be careful to distinguish between the ideas of others which Aristotle is rejecting, and the ideas which he is actually promoting. He rejects chance and luck as properly causal.

He does not say beyond the bodies but:

something beyond the bodies that are about us on this earth,
— Fooloso4 — Fooloso4

Looks like he's saying "beyond the bodies" to me, as the quote says "beyond the bodies". I suggest that's what he means. If he meant 'beyond these bodies there's another body, he would have said that. But. he didn't, he said "beyond the bodies".

They are a different kind of body. As I previously quoted:

These premises clearly give the conclusion that there is in nature some bodily substance other than the formations we know, prior to them all and more divine than they. (On the Heavens Book 1, part 2) — Fooloso4

Sorry Fool, but I read through this section and could not find your reference. In this chapter he is discussing the problems of other philosophers, atomists in particular. He discusses the possibility of infinite divisibility, and the problems involved with this idea. He characterizes this sort of division as resulting in dividing a body until there is nothing left, no body left to divide any more. This he says is impossible. But he also says that it is impossible to keep dividing forever, because there will be physical limitations to how far a body can be divided. I see no mention of a different kind of body, prior to this type of body which poses us with those problem. If I missed it though, he's probably talking about the proposed atoms which are supposed to be an indivisible type of body. But it appears like I need to remind you again, he is showing the problems with these other ideas, not necessarily supporting them.

We have been over this. From the introduction to Joe Sachs translation of the Metaphysics:

By way of the usual translations, the central argument of the Metaphysics would be: being qua being is being per se in accordance with the categories, which in turn is primarily substance, but primary substance is form, while form is essence and essence is actuality. You might react to such verbiage in various ways. You might think, I am too ignorant and untrained to understand these things, and need an expert to explain them to me. Or you might think, Aristotle wrote gibberish. But if you have some acquaintance with the classical languages, you might begin to be suspicious that something has gone awry: Aristotle wrote Greek, didn't he? And while this argument doesn't sound much like English, it doesn't sound like Greek either, does it? In fact this argument appears to be written mostly in an odd sort of Latin, dressed up to look like English. Why do we need Latin to translate Greek into English at all? (https://www.greenlion.com/PDFs/Sachs_intro.pdf)

The word translated as substance is ousia. It always refers to something particular, whether an individual or a species. — Fooloso4

I don't see how this is relevant.

We have been over this before. If each individual is a form and each individual form is different then how do you account for the fact that human beings only give birth to human beings? There is something by nature common to all human beings that at the same time distinguishes them from all else that is not a human being. What that is is the form man or human being. — Fooloso4

This is not relevant either. I could turn around and say to you, that evolution is clear proof that your supposed "fact" is a falsity. That a being can only give birth to the same type of being is proven false by the reality of evolution. You are obviously making wild, outlandish, and completely irrelevant assumptions because you think they might support your position.

Look, the fact that the mother bares a being similar to herself, has no bearing on the fact that each being is distinct and different from every other being, therefore having a distinct "form". How and why this similarity occurs is studied in the science of biology, through chromosomes and genetics. And there is no mention of an independent Form of the species which causes the mother to bare a baby similar to herself. In biology the species are as defined. They are human conceptions.

There is a reason the forms are also known as universals. If they were specific to each and every particular, the whole idea would crumble. — Wayfarer

The idea does not crumble, it is just clarified by Aristotle to better represent reality (be more truthful). There are two principal senses of "form" for Aristotle, hence primary and secondary substance. The one sense refers to human abstractions, conceptions, the formulae which we employ. That is secondary substance. The other sense refers to the forms of individuals. These are separate Forms, existing in the world independently from us, as the cause of the fact that natural things are the exact things which they are, and nothing else. This is primary substance. The whole idea doesn't crumble, it's just restructured into a more realistic form of dualism.

DfPolis' rejection of Cartesian dualism is right on the mark. The simplistic mind/body dualism has severe limitations and problems as Plato demonstrated. But the resolution is not to dismiss dualism altogether, it is to move toward a more complex dualism, which can properly represent reality. Under Aristotle's conceptual space we can understand all the aspects of reality, including both mind and body, as consisting of both parts of the dualism. This is why, following Aristotle, the mind consists of both passive, and active aspects. Even the mind itself is divisible into the two aspects of the dualism now. And the same is true of material things, they each have a formal (active) aspect, and a material (passive aspect.

There are two principal senses of "form" for Aristotle, hence primary and secondary substance. The one sense refers to human abstractions, conceptions, the formulae which we employ — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm going to stop arguing this point, you've been telling me this over and over for years, and I just don't think it stacks up. Over and out.

As I previously quoted...


These premises clearly give the conclusion that there is in nature some bodily substance other than the formations we know, prior to them all and more divine than they. (On the Heavens Book 1, part 2) — Fooloso4

A simile comes to mind: imagine that 'the idea of the cat' is a silhouette in front of a light-source through which light is projected so as to create an image of the cat on a surface. But the surface on which the light is projected is irregular, so the image is always slightly different each time it is projected. In this simile, 'the silhoettte' is 'the form', but the actual impression is 'the particular' - due to the irregularities on the surface on which it is projected each image is slightly different, thereby making each one 'an individual'. The key point being, there is only one silhouette, but the resultant images are all different due to the irregularities - 'accidents' - of the surface on which it is being projected.

Valid simile, do you think?

Most briefly, human wisdom is knowledge of ignorance. Philosophy, as described in Plato's Symposium is the desire to be wise. — Fooloso4

I see. OK.

[Re Aristotle] "All men naturally desire knowledge" — Fooloso4

The above translation --which I have located in the Web --with the only difference "by nature" instead of "naturally" which mean the same thing-- sounds as if Aristotle was sexist. The original Greek text is "πάντες ἄνθρωποι τοῦ εἰδέναι ὀρέγονται φύσει", which means --if correctly translated-- "All people by their nature desire knowledge". The main idea is the same, but the difference between "men" and "people" is enough to insinuate sexism. Either of the person who made that statement or the person who translated it. Here, it's the second case. But not cessarily, of course. It can be also because of just carelessness. This is why:
The English word "man" refers to both "human" in general and a "male individual", which makes it ambiguous. This does not happen in ancient (or modern) Greek, in which there is a specific word for the second case: "άνδρας". For that reason, a professional and/or serious translator, would chose "people" over "men".

That's why I believe that in philosophy, one has to use words that do not make a statement --or parts of it-- ambiguous, so that it can be correctly interpreted and evaluated by others as a whole and in its parts. However, this "principle" is very often violated, mainly because of carelessness. I'm careless myself of course sometimes ...

[Re Aristotle and Plato] In both cases there is not only an awareness of something lacking but a desire to obtain it, but we have found no way to move past the aporia raised in these texts. — Fooloso4

Indeed. Good point.

I would not say that any of these problems were solved by Aristotle. — Fooloso4

Again, we must agree to disagree.

I'm going to stop arguing this point, you've been telling me this over and over for years, and I just don't think it stacks up. Over and out. — Wayfarer

Basically it's the reason why Aristotelianism is not Platonism. I believe Aristotle gave us an improvement, some do not think so.

A simile comes to mind: imagine that 'the idea of the cat' is a silhouette in front of a light-source through which light is projected so as to create an image of the cat on a surface. But the surface on which the light is projected is irregular, so the image is always slightly different each time it is projected. In this simile, 'the silhoettte' is 'the form', but the actual impression is 'the particular' - due to the irregularities on the surface on which it is projected each image is slightly different, thereby making each one 'an individual'. The key point being, there is only one silhouette, but the resultant images are all different due to the irregularities - 'accidents' - of the surface on which it is being projected. — Wayfarer

The problem with this is that the irregularities are due to the form of the surface, and the silhouette is not independent from the surface, it is part of the surface. So in analyzing the silhouette's form, we couldn't separate the silhouette's form from the form of the surface. But if we did get that far in the analysis, we come to apprehend the projection, as independent from the surface, according to the reality of what you describe.

It is quite likely though that this is what Plato had in mind, judging by the cave analogy. And, in the Timaeus, it seems like the passive matter which the divine mind puts the form into already has some form or properties which could be the cause of accidents in the created things. But Plato apprehends, and turns toward the act of projection itself, as "the good", seeing that the silhouette is just a silhuoette.

This is consistent with the way that human beings create thing's. We are restricted in our creations by the form which the matter already has, when we project our intentions. In art, this is the medium. But as our knowledge increases, and we get down to the fundamental particles, we are less and less restricted. The mediums of today's artists is far different from the mediums employed in Plato's time. The principle is the same though, the artists are restricted by the form already within the medium employed, and if we could get down to a formless "prime matter" to work with, we would have absolutely no restrictions from the medium.

But that is not Aristotle's projection. He places a restriction on the matter itself, there is no prime matter. He clearly places an immaterial form as prior to material bodies altogether, as the cause of existence of material bodies. This means that all matter by its very nature of being matter is already restricted by the prior immaterial form which causes it to come into being.

From this perspective, even the most fundamental particles of matter are produced in the divine act of creation, and the forms which act causally in this creation are properly immaterial. This is the position adopted by Christian theology. Notice that the acts of God's Will are supposed to be perfect. There are no accidents in God's creation. The accidents are only in the way that things appear to us. These accidents are where the deficient human intellect fails to grasp God's creative act. The failure is due to our dependence on the body, sense observation, which cannot perceive the immaterial act which is prior to material existence. That's what I just pointed out to fooloso4, chance is not the cause of accidents. That accidents are caused by chance is how our own ignorance appears to us. The perfect Being, God, does not do anything by chance, and the appearance that He does is only our own ignorance influencing how we apprehend things. And the materialist perspective, which denies the reality of the prior immaterial cause, insisting that anything real must perceptible to the senses, only reinforces this ignorance.

Yes. Still, we can abstract aspects that are common to a species or genus, and these aspects are grounded in the form of the species or genus members. — Dfpolis
I think I would disagree with this. When we abstract what is common to a species, this is grounded in the individual instances. — Metaphysician Undercover

The species or genus members are

. — Metaphysician Undercover

The individual instances of the species or genus.

That is inductive reasoning, making a general statement which is derived from observation of a multitude of individuals. — Metaphysician Undercover

Abstraction is not inductive reasoning. Abstraction is a subtractive process, in which we focus on certain notes of intelligibility to form a concept, while prescinding from others. Induction is an additive process in which we add the hypothesis that the cases we have not examined are like the cases we have. No hypothesis is added in abstraction. Rather, we see that certain things do not depend on others, e.g. by seeing that counting does not depend on what is counted we come to the concept of natural numbers and the arithmetic axioms. In the case of species, if a new individual has all the notes of intelligibility required to elicit a species concept, it is a member of that species. If not, not.

We do not derive the universal from an independent Form which is the form of the species, we derive it from the individuals. — Metaphysician Undercover

I did not say that we did.

I must say that I can't really interpret what you are saying in these passages, by simply reading them with no context. — Metaphysician Undercover

Try reading it by first skipping the footnotes. I am saying that sometimes Aristotle uses matter to individuate form, and sometimes he uses form to individuate matter. So, he has no single principle of individuation. Aquinas is forced to do the same.

The above translation --which I have located in the Web --with the only difference "by nature" instead of "naturally" which mean the same thing-- sounds as if Aristotle was sexist. The original Greek text is "πάντες ἄνθρωποι τοῦ εἰδέναι ὀρέγονται φύσει", which means --if correctly translated-- "All people by their nature desire knowledge". The main idea is the same, but the difference between "men" and "people" is enough to insinuate sexism. — Alkis Piskas

I translate, "All humans naturally desire to know." Still, Aristotle was a racist and a sexist. He opposed Alexander's liberal policy of granting citizenship to conquered races and explicitly thought females were defective males, ranking women between men and slaves.

The perfect Being, God, does not do anything by chance, and the appearance that He does is only our own ignorance influencing how we apprehend things. And the materialist perspective, which denies the reality of the prior immaterial cause, insisting that anything real must perceptible to the senses, only reinforces this ignorance. — Metaphysician Undercover

Must be quite an A**hole to create humans that way just to make them suffer. In that way Descartes seemed to have a valid concern: It leads to way less contradictions to assume a demon pleased by human suffering instead. It would make perfect sense to trick humans into believing he was a good entity just for the laugh and "devotion" to the endless suffering and cruelty executed day by day.
If the misery brought onto humans was only bad luck and ignorance there could be hope. If it's
metaphysical it has to be ignorant or malignant in first place and we are doomed.

Abstraction is not inductive reasoning. Abstraction is a subtractive process, in which we focus on certain notes of intelligibility to form a concept, while prescinding from others. Induction is an additive process in which we add the hypothesis that the cases we have not examined are like the cases we have. No hypothesis is added in abstraction. Rather, we see that certain things do not depend on others, e.g. by seeing that counting does not depend on what is counted we come to the concept of natural numbers and the arithmetic axioms. In the case of species, if a new individual has all the notes of intelligibility required to elicit a species concept, it is a member of that species. If not, not. — Dfpolis

"Abstraction" is an extremely broad, and vague term, covering a wide variety of mental processes. I see no point to restricting "abstraction" to a subtractive process and denying that it involves any additive processes. To me, this would be like restricting "understanding" to analysis, and denying that it involves any synthesis. It's just not a reasonable approach to "abstraction", to deny all additive processes when abstraction clearly involves both.

No hypothesis is added in abstraction. Rather, we see that certain things do not depend on others, e.g. by seeing that counting does not depend on what is counted we come to the concept of natural numbers and the arithmetic axioms. — Dfpolis

Notice, you say that no hypothesis is added in abstraction, but you start from a hypothesis "counting does not depend on what is counted". This, in itself is derived from inductive reasoning, when it is seen that "all counting involves counting something" is a failed inductive principle. So you take the failed results of an inductive conclusion as to produce your hypothesis as your premise, then build your supposed "abstraction" on top of this. Then you claim that abstraction is something independent from, and not dependent on induction. Your claim is not justified, inductive reasoning inheres within abstraction, no matter how you present it, and it is fundamental to any empirical principles.

You could go the Kantian route, and separate out the a priori from the a posteriori. But a priori principles without rules for application provide no means for making empirical judgements. Furtther defining features are required.

I did not say that we did. — Dfpolis

Sorry, I misrepresented you again. But that is what Fooloso4 was arguing, and you seemed to be arguing the same point. My question then, is what do you mean by the following?
"Still, we can abstract aspects that are common to a species or genus, and these aspects are grounded in the form of the species or genus members." It appears strangely circular to me, so how do you propose a grounding here?

Lets say there is a named species, and it has some designated members. The definition of the species dictates which aspects are common to the members. Yet it is only through abstraction from the particular members that the definition of the species is produced. Where is the grounding you propose, and how is the designation of which beings are properly called members of the species anything more than arbitrary?

Try reading it by first skipping the footnotes. I am saying that sometimes Aristotle uses matter to individuate form, and sometimes he uses form to individuate matter. So, he has no single principle of individuation. Aquinas is forced to do the same. — Dfpolis

I would be very much inclined to agree with you on this, and that's why a thorough reading of much material is required, to establish consistency in the conceptual structure. What I see is an issue with the nature of "matter", as fundamentally unintelligible through the violation of the excluded middle law. So whenever we look at two distinct individuals, and ask what makes one different from the other, when the answer is not obvious, the simple solution is to say "the matter". They have different matter. That is a replacement for "I don't know". So for example, if we take two products manufactured from a production line, which appear to be exactly the same, the easy answer as to how they differ is "the matter". But this is really just a way to avoid answering.

Because of this way that "matter" is used, as the simple answer, and an escape, the meaning of "matter" is very much context dependent. Aristotle goes into this at one point in the Metaphysics. If we look at wooden furniture, we say that the matter is wood. The suffix "en" signifies the matter in the most simple way. But if we analyze deeper, we see that wood itself is a specific form, and there must be a further "matter" which underlies the wood allowing it the potential to exist as different forms. This is the issue of the divisibility of the material world. Each time we divide, we get a different form, and if we assume that there is always matter which underlies the form, then there is always also the need for a further underlying matter which supports the newly divided for form.

I discussed this briefly in my reply to Fooloso4 above, concerning where it is covered by Aristotle in On the Heavens. It is unrealistic to assume that bodies can be divided forever, infinitely. And, it is unrealistic to assume that there will eventually be a point in the division process where there is no more body. So the atomists propose a fundamental indivisible, which Aristotle describes in his Metaphysics as a "prime matter". But the problem is that unless the prime matter has true infinite capacity for producing different forms, there would need to be a multitude of distinct "atoms", to produces all the different forms. If the atoms are themselves distinct, then they each has a different form, and further divisibility is implied. If all the atoms are exactly the same as each other, and truly indivisible being without form, then they would have infinite potential to produce all the different forms. But such infinite potential is ruled out by the cosmological argument.

Because these two different ways of looking at prime matter, or atoms, both lead to problems, Aristotle leads us in a different direction. He implies that at the base, or foundation, of material bodies, is something truly immaterial. This is the only way to escape the infinite regress caused by the assumption of an underlying matter as the substance of the universe.

So in our common discussions we tend toward the easy solution to individuation, we simply attribute the differences to the underlying matter. But in metaphysical analysis, and ontological studies we come to understand that this produces an infinite regress of always needing a further underlying matter, and this renders the basis of material existence as fundamentally unintelligible. So we need to escape the infinite regress which is caused by assuming that the easy solution is the true solution, and Aristotle proposes that the true grounding of the material world is in something immaterial.

Must be quite an A**hole to create humans that way just to make them suffer. — Heiko

Actually I disagree. Suffering is caused by the same condition which allows for free will, the condition which produces the need to decide. I'd much rather have free will along with the associated suffering, than to live without feeling, like a stone.

Must be quite an A**hole to create humans that way just to make them suffer.
— Heiko

Actually I disagree. Suffering is caused by the same condition which allows for free will, the condition which produces the need to decide. I'd much rather have free will along with the associated suffering, than to live without feeling, like a stone. — Metaphysician Undercover

Cannot see that - truly free will is not concerned with worldly affairs or affect. The formulation of a "need to decide" already makes clear that the world is forcing itself upon you. Truly free will creates it's only choice by it's decision and does not pick from given alternatives like a hunted animal that can either flee left or right.

Cannot see that - truly free will is not concerned with worldly affairs or affect. The formulation of a "need to decide" already makes clear that the world is forcing itself upon you. Truly free will creates it's only choice by it's decision and does not pick from given alternatives like a hunted animal that can either flee left or right. — Heiko

This makes no sense to me "Truly free will creates it's only choice by it's decision". Choice is the cause, decision the effect. Are you saying that the decision determines the choice, as if the effect determines the cause.

Also, why would free will not be concerned with worldly affairs? You appear to put these things backward. The "need to decide" can only be a property of the capacity to decide. And as I said, I'd far prefer to have the capacity to decide, and the consequent "need to decide" because the world is forcing itself on me, then to be as a rock, where I would have no capacity to resist or manipulate what the world is forcing on me.

This makes no sense to me "Truly free will creates it's only choice by it's decision". Choice is the cause, decision the effect. Are you saying that the decision determines the choice, as if the effect determines the cause.

Also, why would free will not be concerned with worldly affairs? You appear to put these things backward. The "need to decide" can only be a property of the capacity to decide. And as I said, I'd far prefer to have the capacity to decide, and the consequent "need to decide" because the world is forcing itself on me, then to be as a rock, where I would have no capacity to resist or manipulate what the world is forcing on me. — Metaphysician Undercover

Having to choose from given alternatives means you did not decide to choose, nor did you decide which alternatives there are to pick from. Where is freedom in that?
Free Will has no external cause and hence _cannot_ even target a worldly thing or be forced to decide. It either has a given focus(content) or it is not there at all.

Plato on causation is not clear at all, and I don't agree with your interpretation here. — Metaphysician Undercover

He is quite clear about the two kinds of cause. All of this can be cited in the text. I have discussed this in more detail shaken to the Chora

But chance and spontaneity are also reckoned among causes: many things are said both to be and to come to be as a result of chance and spontaneity. (Physics, 195b)
— Fooloso4

This opinion strikes right to the very heart of the issue. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is Aristotle's opinion. It is a quote from the text. He calls it a cause.

Aristotle dismissed chance as not properly a cause — Metaphysician Undercover

Where does he say that it is not properly a cause?

Notice in your quote, "many things are said...to come to be as a result of chance". This is what I mean about the need to be careful to distinguish between the ideas of others which Aristotle is rejecting, and the ideas which he is actually promoting. He rejects chance and luck as properly causal. — Metaphysician Undercover

He gives a sustained argument that chance is a cause. He concludes:

Spontaneity and chance are causes of effects which, though they might result from intelligence or nature, have in fact been caused by something accidentally. (198a)

I read through this section and could not find your reference. — Metaphysician Undercover

http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/heavens.1.i.html
about 9 lines above part 3

I don't see how this is relevant. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is relevant because at least part of your confusion seems to be based on the translation of the term ousia.

You are obviously making wild, outlandish, and completely irrelevant assumptions because you think they might support your position. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is not me but Aristotle who you are accusing:

... for the actually existent is always generated from the potentially existent by something which is actually existent—e.g., man by man (1049b)

How and why this similarity occurs is studied in the science of biology, through chromosomes and genetics. — Metaphysician Undercover

Once again, you demonstrate that not even Aristotle could convince you that you are wrong. Man by man according to Aristotle because of the form 'man'.

The issue here is whether there is some bodily substance other than the formations we know. MU says no, Aristotle says yes. The underlying issue is the eternity of the heavens.

For that reason, a professional and/or serious translator, would chose "people" over "men". — Alkis Piskas

In the not too distant past, the term 'man' was not assumed to be used in a gendered way. For example, 'mankind' is not used in distinction from 'womankind'. But even the term 'woman' retains a trace of sexism. Most would not accuse someone of sexism for using the term woman.

There was, and maybe still is, a contentious argument about changing the gendered language of the story of Genesis.

And God saith, `Let Us make man in Our image, according to Our likeness , and let them ...
And God prepareth the man in His image; in the image of God He prepared him, a male and a female He prepared them.

Attempts to neuter the language hide some of what is at issue. The word translated as man is Adam. Note that there is a switching back and forth between between the singular 'man' and dual 'them', male and female. But it is not just the human beings who are talked about in this way but God as well.

Still, Aristotle was a racist and a sexist. He opposed Alexander's liberal policy of granting citizenship to conquered races and explicitly thought females were defective males, ranking women between men and slaves. — Dfpolis

Ha! Quite interesting!
So, always referring to @Fooloso4's quote. maybe Aristotle's translator knew that and has chosen the right word! :grin:
(Still, it's an incorrect/bad translation.)

In the not too distant past, the term 'man' was not assumed to be used in a gendered way. — Fooloso4

But it is still used in that sense. In fact, "a human" is even the first meaning that you find in some dictionaries.

But even the term 'woman' retains a trace of sexism. Most would not accuse someone of sexism for using the term woman — Fooloso4

Certainly. Maybe the word started to be used as as "wooerman" (one who courts women) --> "wooman" --> "woman" :grin:
Just joking. In Wiki, I found that it originates from "wifmann" (sounds like a man's wife) and also that there was once a neuter-gender name, "Mann", which we often meet today as "Man" (capital). I use this form whan I want to refer to humans from an historical veiwpoint. I find it OK. But in general I prefer the term "human beings" by far.

BTW, the English language faces today a big problem with the use of "he/she" and "his/her". Because repeating these scheme is quite burdensome, they've chosen to resort to violating their grammar by shifting number from singular to plural: "Every person have their own opinion." Terrible!
I don't know if this has anything to do with the "man" issue, but it seems the English people have indeed a problem with sex(ism)! :grin:

There was, and maybe still is, a contentious argument about changing the gendered language of the story of Genesis. — Fooloso4

Too late. That ship has sailed!

"And God prepareth the man in His image" — Fooloso4

Ah, this infamous Bible quote produces a much more serious problem and consequences than just the interpretation of the word "man"!
I'm sure you know what I'm thinking about ...
(It makes a whole chapter in the critique of the Bible and the history of the Chritian religion. And I'm really fed up with talking about it.)

Note that there is a switching back and forth between between the singular 'man' and dual 'them' — Fooloso4

Ha! I just mentioned this problem, before I reached this point! What a timing! (Ad meeting of minds.)

it is not just the human beings who are talked about in this way but God as well. — Fooloso4

Of course. And don't forget about the Devil. And Satan. And the (Arch)angels ,,,

But it is still used in that sense. — Alkis Piskas

It is. What has changed is that some now assume that the term 'man' is sexist and so whoever uses it is sexist.

In fact, "a human" is even the first meaning that you find in some dictionaries. — Alkis Piskas

Even the term 'human' retains 'man'.

"Abstraction" is an extremely broad, and vague term, covering a wide variety of mental processes. — Metaphysician Undercover

That is why I defined it for you.

I see no point to restricting "abstraction" to a subtractive process and denying that it involves any additive processes. — Metaphysician Undercover

Then you are talking about something else, not responding to what I said.

"Still, we can abstract aspects that are common to a species or genus, and these aspects are grounded in the form of the species or genus members." It appears strangely circular to me, so how do you propose a grounding here?[/q]
A species definition is not an inductive proposition because it is not a proposition. If a species definition is not grounded in the actual nature of some organisms, the result is not a false claim, but an empty taxon.
— Metaphysician Undercover

Lets say there is a named species, and it has some designated members. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is confused. We do not "designate" species members. We find them, or don't.

Where is the grounding you propose, and how is the designation of which beings are properly called members of the species anything more than arbitrary? — Metaphysician Undercover

Your hypothesis is contrary to fact. As I said, we do not "designate" species members, we find them. If we find an organism that does not elicit one of the species concepts already in our taxonomy, we form a new species concept. This is not "designation," but ideogenesis, because the instance comes before the concept. If and when we find other organisms that elicit the same species concept, we are justified in assigning them to the same species. Since the concept is based on the intelligibility of its instances, it is well-grounded, not "arbitrary." Could we develop a different taxonomy with different species definitions? Absolutely. In two recent Studia Gilsonianna articles, I noted that there are at least 26 ways of defining biological species and at least 5 of defining philosophical species. Each is based on intelligible properties of organisms or instances, and so has an objective, rather than an arbitrary, basis.

What I see is an issue with the nature of "matter", as fundamentally unintelligible through the violation of the excluded middle law. — Metaphysician Undercover

There would only be a violation of Excluded Middle if matter/potentiality existed in the same way as form/actuality. It does not.

the easy answer as to how they differ is "the matter". But this is really just a way to avoid answering. — Metaphysician Undercover

Not at all. We know they are different because they are not in the same place, and they cannot be in the same place because they are made of different stuff. So, we have a causal explanation for their non-identity. Of course, that different bits of stuff cannot be in the same place is a contingent fact, known a posteriori. But, then, we know everything a posteriori.

Also, you are confusing two meanings of "matter." Aristotle does not say that Socrates differs from Callias because they have different hyle (potency), but because they have different flesh and bones -- different "stuff," not different potencies.

So the atomists propose a fundamental indivisible, which Aristotle describes in his Metaphysics as a "prime matter". — Metaphysician Undercover

The atomists proposed an indivisible stopping point, atoma. Aristotle roundly rejects the hypothesis of atoma, and answers instead that potential division is not actual division, so there is no actual infinite regress.

Also, will not find "prime matter" in Aristotle. It is an invention of the Scholatics, found in Aquinas, and confuses Aristotle's hyle with Plato's chora. (See my Hyle article.)

He implies that at the base, or foundation, of material bodies, is something truly immaterial. — Metaphysician Undercover

By "implies" I take it you mean that there is no text in which Aristotle actually says this. If there is, please cite it.

But in metaphysical analysis, and ontological studies we come to understand that this produces an infinite regress of always needing a further underlying matter, and this renders the basis of material existence as fundamentally unintelligible. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is not Aristotle's position, and your reasoning is flawed for the reasons I gave.

(Still, it's an incorrect/bad translation.) — Alkis Piskas

Yes, now it is. When it was made, the sexist connotation escaped notice.

This is not "designation," but ideogenesis, because the instance comes before the concept. — Dfpolis

It does not seem to make sense to argue about this. One can make the argument that there is something like a space of all possible concepts. Like the rules of mathematical syntax. It is already defined which concepts can be formed and which cannot. The mathematician writes some set or class symbol and just "has" all possible "individuals" - except for cases where this does not make sense (like computational decision systems maybe). After identifying such different assumptions the abstraction was put further and mathematicians now deal with "programs" that - for example - can either decide to take the continuum hypothesis for granted or not. There is always a bigger fish.

some now assume that the term 'man' is sexist and so whoever uses it is sexist. — Fooloso4

I know. Same with "he". Esp. women. Once, I received a big protest from a female interlocutor because I a had used the word "he" ... She was offended! It was from carelessness. I only use to do this sometimes, but only in "relaxed" exchanges and with males only! :smile:

Even the term 'human' retains 'man'. — Fooloso4

Right! "Middle English humain, from Anglo-French, from Latin humanus; akin to Latin homo human being" (Merriam-Webster)

We can go on bringing up more and more ...
And ... we must not forget all superheroes, except Catwoman and --the less known-- Batwoman.
And, of course, Pacman! :grin:

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BTW, I checked https://www.vocabulary.cl/Basic/Nationalities.htm. All the nationality names ending in "-man" have also a "-woman" version, except "German". Should we award them the prize of sexism? :smile:

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BTW #2, this discussion pertains more to the recently launched one "'Sexist language?' A constructive argument against modern changes in vocabulary" by @javi2541997.