you haven't shown me anything to make think that I'm wrong. — Metaphysician Undercover

Herein lies the problem. Being convinced that you are right there is nothing you can be shown to make you think you are wrong. Aristotle himself would give up.

But it is not clear whether you think you are explaining Aristotle or abandoning him.

If energeia (actuality) and dunamis (potentiality) are just concepts then there is nothing doing any work and nothing being worked on. And yet you say:

...everything indicates that there is potentiality and actuality. — Metaphysician Undercover

Does this mean simply that there is these concepts?

You say:

... his "Metaphysics" the need for an actuality which is prior to material objects, as the cause of the first material form. All material objects are preceded in time by the potential for their existence. But a potential requires something actual to actualize it and become an actual material form — Metaphysician Undercover

Which is it? Are energeia and dunamis just concepts? Are you claiming that there is a need for a concept which is prior to another concept? In what way does a concept cause the first material form?

I do think it is fair to say that Aristotle has no patience for the 'likely stories' and the devices of myth and poetry employed by Plato. — Paine

Perhaps. But perhaps he is using a different rhetorical strategy. His audience was most likely to have been familiar with Plato's likely stories.

In my opinion, both are Socratic philosophers, that is, zetetic skeptic.

Right, in the same way that my hallucination most certainly exists. — Metaphysician Undercover

The hallucination is that you are hallucinating.

Being convinced that you are right there is nothing you can be shown to make you think you are wrong. — Fooloso4

This is completely untrue. I've changed my mind on these issues more times than I can count. And I leave my mind open to further changes, that's why I'm so willing to return to the text, reread and reference relevant parts when someone presents me with a substantial objection.

I spent years comparing Aristotle and Plato, and thought that I had developed a reasonable understanding. But when I read Augustine I found I had to reread Plato to adjust my understanding to be compatible with his. And when I read Aquinas I found my understanding of Aristotle to be quite inconsistent with his, therefore I had to reread Aristotle.. So even after spending years in comparing Plato and Aristotle on my own, thinking that I had an adequate understanding of Aristotle, I had to go back and completely reread to see how I missed what Aquinas had picked up on.

The fact is that there is so much information in these texts, that many readings are required even for a base understanding. And, I know form my experience never to rule out further advancements to my understanding. However, I also know not to go back, and revisit old ideas which I've had in the past, and have been dissuaded of by other highly regarded philosophers. When an esteemed philosopher like Aquinas has already convinced me to go back and revisit Aristotle and this has readjusted my understanding to a higher level, it is probably pointless for you to request that I go back and reconsider descending to the lower level understanding again. I mean you need to at least produce a reason for me to reconsider.

So it is in your requests to reconsider something that I've already reconsidered, without giving me adequate reason, which produces the appearance that I will not budge. Since I've already been there, you need to show me something to make me realize that possibly I was wrong to leave that place. But simply insisting that I ought to go back to what I believe is a lower level of understanding because you think that it was wrong for me to ascend to what I believe to be a higher level, without showing me any reason for your belief, does nothing for me.

Which is it? Are energeia and dunamis just concepts? Are you claiming that there is a need for a concept which is prior to another concept? In what way does a concept cause the first material form? — Fooloso4

As I said, they are concepts used to describe the world. How accurately they describe the world is judged as truth and falsity. There has been volumes of material produced in an attempt to answer these questions which you ask so I think it's pointless to address them here, now. I suggest you spend a good long time reading Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, and delve into the separation between human ideas, abstractions, conceptions, which are forms in one sense, and the independent Forms, which are forms in another sense. Then you might develop an adequate understanding of the two senses of "form" which Aristotle lays out. It is due to this need for two distinct senses of "form', "actuality", "substance", to adequately understand the nature of reality, that we cannot escape the need for dualism.

they are concepts used to describe the world. — Metaphysician Undercover

The concept 'dog' does not bark and wag its tail. His concern with ousia is not a concern about a concept but the living being that barks and wags its tail.

... experience is knowledge of particulars, but art of universals; and actions and the effects produced are all concerned with the particular ... we consider that knowledge and proficiency belong to art rather than to experience, and we assume that artists are wiser than men of mere experience (which implies that in all cases wisdom depends rather upon knowledge); and this is because the former know the cause, whereas the latter do not. For the experienced know the fact, but not the wherefore; but the artists know the wherefore and the cause. (Metaphysics 981a)

The former, that is those who know the universal, know the cause. The cause is not a concept. Concepts do not have energeia and dunamis. Universals do not exist independently. They are not concepts, that is, they do not exist as things of the mind. They are what all things of a kind have in common. But things are not of a kind because they have something in common. All things that are blue are not a natural kind. 'Blue things' is not a universal, although we can have a concept 'blue things'. We can make a distinction between particulars and universals, but that does not mean that universals exist apart from those particulars they are the universal of.

The true form of the thing consists of accidents, — Metaphysician Undercover

Once again, the form of a man, what it is to be a man, is not to be tall. If to be a man is to be tall then short men are not men. If the "true form" of a man is a man's accidents, then there is nothing that is a man, only a bunch of accidents that can apply to a building or a man or anything else that is tall. The fact is, as Aristotle said:

man by man

not a bunch of accidents that might be an elephant or a hummingbird by man. There is something to be a man that is not a man's accidents.

Augustine — Metaphysician Undercover

Thomas Aquinas — Metaphysician Undercover

You may be persuaded by them, but to read Plato and Aristotle through the lens of Augustine and Aquinas, is to read Augustine and Aquinas, not Plato and Aristotle.

There is nothing to indicate that the world might be eternal. and everything indicates that there is potentiality and actuality. So that possibility, that the world is eternal and there no potentiality or actuality is easily excluded as unreal. — Metaphysician Undercover

Potentiality only refers to substances composed with matter:

But in fact, as has been said, the ultimate matter and the shape are one and the same, the one potentially, the other actively, so that it is the same to look for what is the cause of oneness or what is the cause of being one.946 For each thing is a one, and what potentially is and what actively is are in a way one. And so there is no other cause here, unless there is something that brought about the movement from potentiality to activity. Things that have no matter, though, are all unconditionally just what is a one. — Metaphysics,1045b20, translated by CDC Reeve

The matter is potential only in relation to what a substance actually is:

It is evident that even of the things that seem to be substances, most are capacities (dunami), whether the parts of animals (for none of them exists when it has been separated, and whenever they are separated they all exist only as matter) or earth, fire, and air (for none of them is one, but instead they are like a heap, until they are concocted and some one thing comes to be from them). — ibid. 1040b5

Living things are not eternal:

Hence, we must first speak about nourishment and reproduction; for the nutritive soul belongs also to the other living things and is the first and most commonly possessed potentiality of the soul, in virtue of which they all have life. Its function in living things, such as are perfect and not mutilated or do not have spontaneous generation, to produce another thing like themselves--an animal to produce an animal, a plant a plant---in order that they may partake of the everlasting and divine in so far as they can; for all desire that, for the sake of that, they do whatever they do in accordance with nature. (But that for the sake of which is twofold--the purpose for which and the beneficiary for whom.) Since, then, they cannot share in the everlasting and divine by continuous existence, because no perishable thing can persist numerically one and the same, they share in them in so far as each can, some more and some less; and what persists is not the thing itself but something like itself, not one in number but one in species. — De Anima, 415a26, translated by DW Hamlyn

Primary causes are eternal:

But if there is something that is eternal and immovable and separable, it is evident that knowledge of it belongs to a theoretical science—not, however, to natural science (for natural science is concerned with certain movable things) nor to mathematics, but to something prior to both. For natural science is concerned with things that are inseparable but not immovable, while certain parts of mathematics are concerned with things that are immovable and not separable but as in matter. The primary science, by contrast, is concerned with things that are both separable and immovable. Now all causes are necessarily eternal, and these most of all. concavity is without perceptible matter. If, then, all natural things are said the way the snub is (for example, nose, eye, face, flesh, bone, and, in general, animal, and leaf, root, bark, and, in general, plant—for the account of none of these is without [reference to] movement, but always includes matter), the way we must inquire into and define the what-it-is in the case of natural things is clear, as is why it belongs to the natural scientist to get a theoretical grasp even on some of the soul, that is, on as much of it as is not without matter. That natural science is a theoretical science, then, is evident from these considerations. Mathematics too is a theoretical one, but whether its objects are immovable and separable is not now clear; however, it is clear that some parts of mathematics get a theoretical grasp on their objects insofar as they are immovable and insofar as they are separable. But if there is something that is eternal and immovable and separable, it is evident that knowledge of it belongs to a theoretical science—not, however, to natural science (for natural science is concerned with certain movable things) nor to mathematics, but to something prior to both. For natural science is concerned with things that are inseparable but not immovable, while certain parts of mathematics are concerned with things that are immovable and not separable but as in matter. The primary science, by contrast, is concerned with things that are both separable and immovable. Now all causes are necessarily eternal, and these most of all. For they are the causes of the divine beings that are perceptible. — Metaphysics, 1026a10

But it is not clear whether you think you are explaining Aristotle or abandoning him. — Fooloso4

I have not heard this interpretation from any other commentator, ancient or modern. In the discussion last year, I realized that I was never going to be able to visit his planet when he said this:

Now, It is clear from the passage I quoted from De Anima, that Aristotle rejects this idea of the mind moving itself through eternal circular motion. He attributes this idea of the mind moving itself to Plato's Timaeus, and he rejects it, for the reasons given in the quoted passage. The description is spatial, and that which is immaterial cannot be described in spatial terms — Metaphysician Undercover

.

This comment was said to cancel the description of the agent intellect:

In separation it is just what it is, and this alone is immortal and eternal. (But we do not remember because this is unaffected, whereas the passive intellect is perishable, and without this nothing thinks. — Aristotle, De Anima, 430a18, translated by DW Hamlyn

To understand Aristotle you will have to ignore Aristotle.

The concept 'dog' does not bark and wag its tail. His concern with ousia is not a concern about a concept but the living being that barks and wags its tail. — Fooloso4

You've obviously not read Aristotle's Metaphysics. He discusses extensively what kind of existence ideas have.

There is something to be a man that is not a man's accidents. — Fooloso4

Yes, that is the concept of "man". So, why do you think Aristotle was not discussing concepts? He discussed both in the Metaphysics, what it means to be this particular man, and what it means to be a man. He showed that in each case it is a type of form. But, as he explained, the form of the individual is completely different from the form of the universal.


Are you trying to make a point here? It just looks like random quotes. And there is nothing in those quotes to indicate that Aristotle thought that the world is eternal. As I said already, he clearly thought that the world is composed of matter and therefore not eternal.

To understand Aristotle you will have to ignore Aristotle. — Paine

Like I explained at the time, it's not a matter of ignoring Aristotle, but a matter of distinguishing between the ideas which he discusses, and what his discussions, and demonstrations prove. Most often the ideas discussed are ideas of others, which end up being disproven by Aristotle's discussion of them. This is the same technique which Plato employed. In both these authors it is very difficult to distinguish which ideas we ought to support, from the one's we ought to reject. This requires extensive study. Many such discussions go on over numerous books, and it requires much attention to detail to determine what is being demonstrated by the discussion. Random quotes are generally not very useful.

The discussion of eternal circular motion is a very good example. In On The Heavens, it is indicated that eternal circular motion is a theoretical possibility. The logic which supports it is consistent. However, he says that anything which is moving in a circle must be composed of matter, and material things are generated, are corruptible, and will corrupt. Therefore we are left to conclude that Aristotle has demonstrated that eternal circular motion is not real. The thing moving in a circle must be material and is therefore not eternal. So in as much as he cannot dismiss the idea of eternal circular motion by attacking the logic which supports it, he introduces another principle, a premise which does reject this idea, that anything moving in a circle must be composed of matter. This is the principle which renders eternal circular motion as impossible.

Once you recognize that he is actually arguing against this idea of eternal circular motion, rather than supporting it, then what he says in On The Soul, about the possibility of the soul moving like an eternal circular motion, makes a lot more sense. He dismisses this idea, because it represents the soul as material, and he says that to understand the soul as eternal requires that the soul be properly understood as immaterial. And this is the point that he brings out in his Metaphysics, that anything eternal is necessarily actual, therefore prior to the potentiality of matter, and immaterial.

The point of that discussion I had with you, was that the representation of "the eternal" as a circular motion, was demonstrated by Aristotle to be a faulty idea. It's a faulty idea because according to Aristotle's cosmological argument anything eternal must be actual, and not potential. And since matter is potential, anything eternal must be truly immaterial.

This comment was said to cancel the description of the agent intellect: — Paine

I never canceled the agent intellect. I recognize the agent intellect as an extremely important concept. I just understand it in a way different from you. And that's not at all surprising because the proper way to understand the agent intellect has always been a matter of debate.

He showed that in each case it is a type of form. But, as he explained, the form of the individual is completely different from the form of the universal. — Metaphysician Undercover

Right, the universal and the particular are not the same, but the universal is not a concept. The form man, and not simply a particular man who is tall or is Socrates, is at work on every particular man. It is the formal cause and not a concept that does the work. The formal cause, what it is to be a man, is what each and every man is. This is by nature not by concept.

However, he says that anything which is moving in a circle must be composed of matter, and material things are generated, are corruptible, and will corrupt. — Metaphysician Undercover

On the Heavens, Book 1, part 2:

These premises clearly give the conclusion that there is in nature some bodily substance other than the formations we know, prior to them all and more divine than they.

Your argument, based on perishable matter, fails to account for this divine substance.

Metaphysics 1026a:

The primary science, by contrast, is concerned with things that are both separable and immovable. Now all causes are necessarily eternal, and these most of all. For they are the causes of the divine beings that are perceptible.

The primary science, what he calls theology, is about things that are separable from matter and not moved both in the sense that there is nothing moving them and in that they do not change. These divine beings that are perceptible are the heavenly bodies. Divine beings are not corruptible.

Book 2, part 1:

That the heaven as a whole neither came into being nor admits of destruction, as some assert, but is one and eternal, with no end or beginning of its total duration, containing and embracing in itself the infinity of time, we may convince ourselves not only by the arguments already set forth but also by a consideration of the views of those who differ from us in providing for its generation.

It is the formal cause and not a concept that does the work. The formal cause, what it is to be a man, is what each and every man is. This is by nature not by concept. — Fooloso4

Before Aristotle discusses actuality and potentiality in Book Theta, the problem of universals as causes is discussed in Book Zeta. Starting with:

But the universal too seems to some people to be most of all a cause, and the universal most of all a starting-point. So let us turn to that too. For it seems impossible for any of the things said [of something] universally to be substance. For first the substance of each thing is special to it, in that it does not belong to anything else. A universal, by contrast, is something common, since that thing is said to be a universal which naturally belongs to many things. Of which, then, will it be the substance? For it is either the substance of none or of all. And it cannot be the substance of all. — Metaphysics, 1038b9, translated by CDC Reeve

The discussion continues with:

If we get our theoretical grasp on the issue on the basis of these considerations, then, it is evident that nothing that belongs universally to things is substance, and that none of the things that are predicated in common signifies a this something but a such-and-such sort. If not, many other difficulties result, and especially the Third Man. — ibid. 1038b30

This argument touches on the distinction Joe Sachs makes between abstraction and separation in the language of the Physics:

If we are abstracting from tangible bodies, then they must in the first place be
made, in part, out of objects of thought. This is what I meant by saying that our usual idea
of abstraction is not tenable. It makes the thinkable things unmysterious only by doing just
the opposite to the visible things. It ends up claiming that our eyes see the invisible and our
hands hold the intangible, because it tells us that when we think one of those invisible and
intangible things, we have extracted it out of a body like a tooth. The idea of abstraction
answers no question, but only goes around in a circle and gets dizzy. Anything it gives us,
we already have; anything we don't already have, it can't give us. — Joe Sachs, The Battle of the Gods and the Giants, page 8

I never canceled the agent intellect. I recognize the agent intellect as an extremely important concept. I just understand it in a way different from you. And that's not at all surprising because the proper way to understand the agent intellect has always been a matter of debate. — Metaphysician Undercover

What became difficult for me to understand then and since then is:

As we proceed through Bk2 and 3, an explanation is provided. This is the actual/potential division. The way that the soul moves the body is by means of the powers, which are potentials. The potentials are not naturally active, they need to be actualized. So I do not think it is the case that we consider one to be a part of the other, but they exist in this relationship which is the active/potential relationship of hylomorphism, matter/form. — Metaphysician Underground

You seem to be putting the active principle outside of the combining of matter and form. The potentiality is somehow existing independently of what turns them on. This proposed separation runs afoul of how actuality and potentiality is used by Aristotle. As far as I can make out, you have nested one hylomorphism into another. The problem of the Third Man gets doubled and we are now up to Six of them. The antidote is to consider what Aristotle says is not potentiality and actuality:

What we wish to say is clear from the particular cases by induction, and we must not look for a definition of everything, but be able to comprehend the analogy, namely, that as what is building is in relation to what is capable of building, and what is awake is in relation to what is asleep, and what is seeing is in relation to what has its eyes closed but has sight, and what has been shaped out of the matter is in relation to the matter, and what has been finished off is to the unfinished. Of the difference exemplified in this analogy let the activity be marked off by the first part, the potentiality by the second. — ibid. Θ 6 1048a35–b6

If we could say exactly what this element is in each case, we would.

There are only potential powers when there are actual ones nearby.

All the instances where the analogy does a job involve situations where the potential is sometimes not activated. This condition does not apply to as quoted above: "Things that have no matter, though, are all unconditionally just what is a one."

This permits Aristotle to speak of an active principle that is immortal to directly activate what is not one:

In separation it is just what it is, and this alone is immortal and eternal. (But we do not remember because this is unaffected, whereas the passive intellect is perishable, and without this nothing thinks. — Aristotle, De Anima, 430a18, translated by DW Hamlyn

Do you think this element of Aristotle's metaphysics later became absorbed in the Christian doctrine of the immortality of the soul?

That idea is going to have a hard time getting past what I just quoted upthread:

Since, then, they cannot share in the everlasting and divine by continuous existence, because no perishable thing can persist numerically one and the same, they share in them in so far as each can, some more and some less; and what persists is not the thing itself but something like itself, not one in number but one in species.

So, less a matter of 'absorption' and more like swallowing a balloon filled with cocaine to get it through customs.

Serious question. The 'they' in 'they cannot share' are living things. But the 'active intellect' which is 'immortal and eternal' is a separate faculty of the intellect, is it not?

The active intellect in a living person is not a separate 'faculty' in the sense of a capacity that can be set side by side with another faculty of the intellect. What we experience as thinking cannot happen without the perishable and "passive" power to remember what is thought. We cannot observe the active principle as it is as itself. If we speak of active and passive powers, we need the structure of a soul (what makes living things live) to approach what the meeting of form and matter might entail for living things.

It is not as simple as shaping a stone into a statue. Living things are not like shaping things once and you are done. They require a continuous process that cannot stop and start when it gets tired. That is why Aristotle distinguishes between changes like making a house out of stuff from the act of seeing, which is an activity that involves a potential you are born with.

How to view this 'continuous process' is not brought up in the question of surviving death (as discussed in the Phaedo) but to explain the cessation of life. The 'continuous process' either stops because the active principle stopped or because of some defect in the perishable component. That is why I brought up this text when we discussed this last year:

The case of the mind is different; it seems to be an independent substance implanted within the soul and to be incapable of being destroyed. If it could be destroyed at all, it would be under the blunting influence of old age. What really happens in respect of mind in old age is, however, exactly parallel to what happens in the case of the sense organs; if the old man could recover the proper kind of eye, he would see just as well as the young man. The incapacity of old age is due to an affection not of the soul but of its vehicle, as occurs in drunkenness or disease. Thus it is that in old age the activity of mind or intellectual apprehension declines only through the decay of some other inward part; mind itself is impassible. Thinking, loving, and hating are affections not of mind but of that which has mind, in so far as it has it. That is why, when the vehicle decays, memory and love cease; they were activities not of mind, but of the composite which has perished; mind is, no doubt, something more divine and impassable. That the soul cannot be moved is therefore clear from what we have said, and if it cannot be moved at all, manifestly it cannot be moved by itself.
— De Anima, 408b, 18, translated by J. A. Smith

That is why, when the vehicle decays, memory and love cease; they were activities not of mind, but of the composite which has perished; mind is, no doubt, something more divine and impassable. — Paine

Thanks, the materials you provide are very informative. I wonder if in the above passage, 'mind' is the translation of 'nous'? And again, even if Aristotle is not discussing the immortality of the soul, it is easy to see how this would appear to be so for the medieval commentators, Islamic and Christian. (I'm very interested in the medieval conception of the rational soul, which seems very much aligned with these types of ideas.)

Thanks, the materials you provide are very informative. I wonder if in the above passage, 'mind' is the translation of 'nous'? — Wayfarer

It is. A lot of Aristotle's language is hard to decipher. Not this stuff.

And again, even if Aristotle is not discussing the immortality of the soul, it is easy to see how this would appear to be so for the medieval commentators, Islamic and Christian — Wayfarer

The status of this Easy is a matter of much dispute. We and many others have argued about this on many threads. What is a preservation of an idea versus a distortion of it.? Does the new use of words cancel the old?

(I'm very interested in the medieval conception of the rational soul, which seems very much aligned with these types of ideas.) — Wayfarer

I read Aristotle as a challenge to the idea of the person that many of the medieval conceptions of the rational soul are based upon. Perhaps this deserves its own OP.

Perhaps a distinction can be made between the active intellect at work and the active intellect when there is nothing for it to act on, that is, at death with the cessation of the passive intellect.

I think that distinction works in the absolute terms of the De Anima, 408b passage.

I read the focus on the actual compared to the potential in other contexts to point to a continuity of life despite the intermittent nature of some activities. To say "what is awake is in relation to what is asleep, and what is seeing is in relation to what has its eyes closed but has sight" is to look for a basis of continuity based upon something like the soul that keeps you alive through both phases.

I read Aristotle as a challenge to the idea of the person that many of the medieval conceptions of the rational soul are based upon. — Paine

'The soul' - not that I'm saying that I believe there is one - is not necessarily the same as (or simply limited to) 'the person'. Recall the origin of the word 'person' as the mask worn by the dramatis personae in Greek dramas.

You seem to be putting the active principle outside of the combining of matter and form. — Paine

That\s right, because there is more than one sense of "form" for Aristotle, therefore more than one type of actuality. So a material object is a combination of form and matter, and that form is proper and unique to the particular object, complete with accidents. This produces the law of identity. However, as explained in Metaphysics BK 7, it is necessary that something puts this form into the matter, in the way that the artist does in artificial things, even in natural things. I think that's the central issue of Bk 7, where does the form of the particular come from. So here we have an active principle, like intention, final cause, which is outside the combing of matter and form, as the cause of it.

This is the same principle as that of the cosmological argument. Material objects are a combination of matter and form. But there is necessarily an (eternal) actuality prior to the existence of material forms. It is "eternal" because it is outside of time. Notice that if we understand "eternal" as everlasting time, there is just an infinite regress of changing material forms, but this is what the cosmological argument puts an end to.

This proposed separation runs afoul of how actuality and potentiality is used by Aristotle. — Paine

This is not the case, because it is demonstrated in Metaphysics Bk 9 that actuality is prior to potentiality. Therefore there is necessarily a separate actuality, or Form. It's separate because it is temporally prior to potentiality. Without this we have an infinite regress of infinite time with changing material forms.

What we wish to say is clear from the particular cases by induction, and we must not look for a definition of everything, but be able to comprehend the analogy, namely, that as what is building is in relation to what is capable of building, and what is awake is in relation to what is asleep, and what is seeing is in relation to what has its eyes closed but has sight, and what has been shaped out of the matter is in relation to the matter, and what has been finished off is to the unfinished. Of the difference exemplified in this analogy let the activity be marked off by the first part, the potentiality by the second.
— ibid. Θ 6 1048a35–b6

If we could say exactly what this element is in each case, we would.

There are only potential powers when there are actual ones nearby.

All the instances where the analogy does a job involve situations where the potential is sometimes not activated. This condition does not apply to as quoted above: "Things that have no matter, though, are all unconditionally just what is a one."

This permits Aristotle to speak of an active principle that is immortal to directly activate what is not one:

In separation it is just what it is, and this alone is immortal and eternal. (But we do not remember because this is unaffected, whereas the passive intellect is perishable, and without this nothing thinks.
— Aristotle, De Anima, 430a18, translated by DW Hamlyn — Paine

Sorry, I don't understand what you're trying to show here.

So a material object is a combination of form and matter, and that form is proper and unique to the particular object, complete with accidents — Metaphysician Undercover

Even with my very limited knowledge of Aristotle, I’m sure this isn’t so. I think that a form by it’s nature is a universal, which is then individuated by ‘accidents’. If I’m mistaken, I’ll stand corrected.

It is the question of continuity that led me to the distinction. But a continuity from life to death is puzzling.

Even with my very limited knowledge of Aristotle, I’m sure this isn’t so. I think that a form by it’s nature is a universal, which is then individuated by ‘accidents’. If I’m mistaken, I’ll stand corrected. — Wayfarer

I believe this is similar to the issue which dfpolis and I disagreed on in an earlier thread. It is I think, best covered in Metaphysics BK 7, although like most subjects there is other material in other texts which serve to elucidate further. But Bk 7 is where the law of identity (a thing is the same as itself) is best exposed. This law affirms that the form of the thing (what the thing is), is not different than the thing itself, explaining why "substance" is properly associated with form rather than matter. Matter actually ends up providing nothing to the substance of a thing.

Do you agree that a particular object, an individual, is a composition of matter and form, according to Aristotle? And do you also agree that within the individual, there are accidents which are not conceived in the human abstraction? If so, then the question is where are these accidents, and how do they exist?

The short answer, is that the accidents must be part of the form of the individual, because Aristotle's conceptual space dictates that any distinguishing features must be aspects of form. As much as we speak of things like "brass", and "wood", as "the matter", if we analyze further, these are really formal properties still. So anything referred to as "the matter" of a certain item, can always be analyzed further as to the form of that matter. So if "matter were supposed to be the substratum, we'd have an infinite regress of analysis. Therefore, if it could truly exist deprived of all form (prime matter) it could have no distinguishing features. Therefore we must say that accidents, which are the features which distinguish one individual from another of the same type, are formal, not material.

I believe dfpolis was arguing that the accidents inhere within the matter itself so that when an individual thing comes into existence (generation), the form of that thing, complete with accidents, emerges from the matter. Dfpolis referred to the example of the acorn and the oak tree. But Aristotle describes in Bk 7 why the form of the individual, complete with accidents, must be separate, and put into the thing from an external source. So what dfpolis did not properly consider is the requirement for proper environmental conditions required for the acorn to grow into an oak, as well as the external factors put into the production of the acorn.

So, here's the longer answer now, in a brief display of the first part of Bk 7:

BK 7 Ch 1. Knowing a thing is to know "what" it is. Ch 2. Discussion of what various different philosophers refer to as "substance". Ch 3. A discussion on the nature of matter, and why matter is not substance. Ch4. A discussion of the essence of a thing, what a thing is by virtue of itself. Further, the problem with associating "essence" with categories, and species or genus, resulting in the situation that an individual thing could have no essence. Then there would be no such thing as what the thing is by virtue of itself. Ch 5. There is always a problem in making the essence a definition, because there is always required a further "determinate" which is outside the definition, and this produces infinite regress. Ch 6. A conclusion is produced representing the law of identity: "Each thing itself, then, and its essence are one and the same in no merely accidental way..." (193b, 18).

From this point onward, in Bk 7 he begins a discussion as to how the form or essence of an individual thing (complete with accidents) comes to be within the thing itself. He discusses natural and artificial things. The conclusion is that the form must come from a source external to the matter, like the form of an artificial thing comes from the mind of the artist, and is put into the matter. This is the case in natural things as well as artificial things.

Another thought on the active intellect:

How is it that Aristotle is mortal but his active intellect is not? Well, we still read Aristotle. His intellect is at work on us.

Even with my very limited knowledge of Aristotle, I’m sure this isn’t so. — Wayfarer

And you are, of course, right. As our friend Joe Sachs puts it:

Lassie is an ousia, and the ousia of Lassie is dog.

(https://www.greenlion.com/PDFs/Sachs_intro.pdf)

He seems to have a fondness for dogs.

He goes on to explain:

... being-what it-is does not have the same meaning as what-it-is-for-it-to-be. Lassie's being a dog is not the same thing as dog, and the latter is what she is.

@Metaphysician Undercover

There are two important points that you have ignored:

1.

The formal cause, what it is to be a man, is what each and every man is. This is by nature not by concept. — Fooloso4

2.

On the Heavens, Book 1, part 2:

"These premises clearly give the conclusion that there is in nature some bodily substance other than the formations we know, prior to them all and more divine than they."

Your argument, based on perishable matter, fails to account for this divine substance. — Fooloso4

Book 2, part 1:

"That the heaven as a whole neither came into being nor admits of destruction, as some assert, but is one and eternal, with no end or beginning of its total duration, containing and embracing in itself the infinity of time, we may convince ourselves not only by the arguments already set forth but also by a consideration of the views of those who differ from us in providing for its generation." — Fooloso4

Added: These are quotes from the text of On the Heavens.

Lassie's being a dog is not the same thing as dog, and the latter is what she is. — Fooloso4

Actually, "Lassie" is not a dog. It's a name of a dog. :smile:
Neither what you see below is Lassie or a dog:

... It's an image of a dog and its name, Lassie.

Actually, "Lassie" is not a dog. It's a name of a dog. :smile: — Alkis Piskas

In that case, Alkis Piskas is not a person. And, as he says, Magritte's pipe is not a pipe. Nor is it La Trahison des images, The Treachery of images. So what is La Trahison des images? Nothing more than the name of a painting?