I've no idea what you're talking about.

That is to say panpsychists have to bite the bullet and say that non-living things have some sort of experientialness, however minute. — schopenhauer1

Bernardo Kastrup on why panpsychism is baloney (IaI TV, paywalled but allows one free article.)

The appeal of panpsychism is that, while preserving the physicalist notions that (a) matter has standalone existence and (b) material arrangements are responsible for human-level consciousness, it avoids the famous ‘hard problem’ by making lower-level consciousness fundamental. Notice, however, that instead of enhancing the explanatory power of physicalism, this merely avoids the need for an explanation by throwing one more element—namely, low-level consciousness—into the reduction base, while removing nothing from it. It can thus be argued that panpsychism is as arbitrary as it is unhelpful, for it would be trivial to ‘solve’ every metaphysical problem simply by declaring every aspect of nature to be fundamental. — Kastrup

It's the way empiricism and naturalism developed. History of ideas 101. — Wayfarer

This does not constitute not an argument; it is mere hand-waving.

I question whether there is or should be 'a scientific worldview'. Science is first and foremost a methodology. It has philosophical entailments, but often its practitioners are not aware of those entailments - which is part of what I'm saying. I'm saying that science deals mainly with contingencies and discoverable principles ('laws'), so as such doesn't really extend to Aristotle's 'unprovable first principles', but it is often taken as a metaphysic by 'scientism' (which you yourself have criticized on many an occasion.) — Wayfarer

Firstly, I said that it is to be expected that we see that our worlviews are in fact informed by science and you respond by saying there should not be a scientific worldview, and yet you also contradict yourself by saying this:

So if that's the wrong view, what's the right view. Rewind to what I've said a number of times already - 'the world' is, for us, you and me, Tom Storm and Wayfarer, generated or constructed by our fantastically elaborated hominid forebrain, which evolved at a breakneck pace over the last few million years. — Wayfarer

If that evolutionary view of the world is not scientifically informed then what is it informed by?

So I'm arguing that methodological naturalism, which is a perfectly sound in principle, doesn't support metaphysical naturalism, which is the attempt to extend empirical evidence to metaphysical propositions. It's often confused because our culture is on the whole not educated in metaphysics and has abandoned the conceptual space for metaphysics due to its rejection of religion.

As Kant has shown us, no metaphysical views are supported, because they are the erroneous attempt to extrapolate to an "ultimate" "god's eye" view of reality from what are merely empirical models. Religion cannot yield a true metaphysical view, a fact which is proven by the various mutually contradictory models it has produced in various cultures. Since you are a Buddhist, you should listen to your greatest philosopher Nagarjuna, who argues for the rejection of all metaphysical "views".

The whole idea of being educated in metaphysics is absurd, because there is no settled metaphysics and never has been. Metaphysics is just an exercise in the human imagination, and as I often say, it has creative value and can even help to lead to workable scientific discoveries and theories.

I objected to your way of framing the historical emergence of methodological naturalism and you respond with your "101" comment. You keep arguing that science has a "blind spot", as though at some point in history there had been a clear choice between two equally viable methodlogies and methodological naturalism was mistakenly or blindly adopted.

I said it is much more plausible to think that it was realized that if you want to investigate things then you must focus on the things themselves, as they present themselves to us, leave aside purely imaginative notions about how things might work, and attempt to discover how they actually do work This proved itself to be an unprecedentedly successful strategy as evidence by the dramatic rise of science.

Science is not in the business of investigating first person experience, instead it focuses on the third person observable nature of the world as it presents itself to us. Whether the scientist believes that we somehow construct the world or not is not at issue, and makes no difference to the actual practice. That question is bracketed just as the question of the independent existence of the external world is bracketed in the practice of phenomenology, and for similar reasons; what is needed in such investigations is focus not distraction with irrelevant issues.

Objects in the unobserved universe have no shape, color or individual appearance, because shape and appearance are created by minds. Nor do they have features, because features correspond to categories of animal sensation. This is the way the early universe was before the emergence of life—and the way the present universe is outside the view of any observer.

If objects had no shape then they would have no surface from which light could be reflected and they could not appear to us at all. In fact they could not be objects at all if they had no shape. If objects had no features then they could not appear to us as rough or smooth, as this colour or that colour, could not reverberate or fail to when you strike them, or smell or taste like this or that when you taste them. Pinter presumptuously purports to know what cannot be known: what things are or are not in themselves.

There are two main imaginable scenarios that could explain our human experience of the world. Either the Universe is a great energy field of diverse intensities that determine how it appears to us (who are indeed part of that great field) or the objects we experience are ideas in a universal mind. The irony is that if the latter were true then objects would have just the qualities that they appear to have, since those qualities would be part of the idea that is the object. This would be naive realism par excellence. Think Berkeley for this.

But we don't, and cannot, know whether either of these imaginable scenarios is true, or whether they are both nothing more than figments that correspond not all to what is independent of human experience. If we insist on holding a metaphysical worldview, then we have nothing better than science to inform us, as inadequate as science might be.

Spiritual practices are, in my view, about exploring the possibilities of altering consciousness. Experiences of altered states of consciousness cannot tell us anything discursive about the nature of what is, but we can certainly feel the world in different ways when we explore the limits of human experience. hence the great importance of the arts, and of phenomenology.

I have a sneaking suspicion that often "realists" and "idealists" of a certain variety, start to converge on some form of panpsychism. — schopenhauer1

No.

No — Banno

Way!!!

So what I'm arguing is that methodological naturalism - the idea that we see the world as it is completely separately from us, as if we're not part of it - is mistaken, if we believe that the world really is that way, that it can be real with no perspective. Perspective is essential to reality and it can only be provided by a point of view, by an observer. And again this validates Kant's contention that time and space have no intrinsic objective reality, but are furnished by the mind, and again by a passage from a cosmologist I've already quoted before in this thread. So I'm arguing that human being is intrinsic to reality, we're not an 'epiphenomenon' or a 'product'. So does that mean, in the absence of h. sapiens, the universes ceases to exist? Have to be very careful answering, but I'm arguing, it's not as if it literally goes out of existence, but that any kind of existence it might have is completely meaningless and unintelligible. The kind of existence it might have is very close, again, to what Kant describes as the unknowable thing-in-itself. — Wayfarer

Methodological naturalism is not the idea that we see the world as it is completely separately from us, it is simply the bracketing out of such questions and concerns in order to focus on investigating the world as it is presented to us.

The question as to whether the world can be "real with no perspective" is undecidable. It cannot be real for us with no perspective, because we cannot view the world non-perspectivally; that is just a truism. We think we know what the question could even mean, but do we really?

We don't know whether time and space are real absent human experience; all we can do is conjecture. How could we possibly know anything about anything outside the context of human experience and judgement?

You say that absent us it is not as though the world "goes literally out of existence, but that any kind of existence it might have is completely meaningless and unintelligible". Yes meaningless and unintelligible to us, but that goes without saying. What if it were meaningful and intelligible to God, for example? Can you rule that out?

If the world is just a realm of physical existents and nothing more, then what it was prior to the advent of humans would have been neither meaningless nor meaningful, but would have been, at least potentially, intelligible, as is proven by the fact that it is intelligible to us now. Analogously, the moon is not invisible when it is not being seen, it is just unseen. To be unseen is not the same as to be invisible.

Panpsychism is a terrible idea.

You need more? I tend to get stuck at the Incredulous Stare. But moving past that there is the problem of how little minds come together to make bigger minds, and of how seperate small minds come together to make the unified mind had by you and I.

and see Tallis's last line.

Much more elegantly expressed than my attempt at pretty much the same point.

The whole idea of being educated in metaphysics is absurd, because there is no settled metaphysics and never has been. — Janus

This statement is what is absurd. If there is a multitude of distinct attitudes toward metaphysics, then education in metaphysics is even more important in order that we get exposed to all the different possibilities.

This does not constitute not an argument. — Janus

The claim didn't warrant one.

Since you are a Buddhist, you should listen to your greatest philosopher Nagarjuna, who argues for the rejection of all metaphysical "views". — Janus

The principle of dependent origination and the Buddhist śūnyatā is a metaphysic. (I don't claim to be a Buddhist, although I did undertake an MA in the subject in order to understand it better.)

How could we possibly know anything about anything outside the context of human experience and judgement? — Janus

One of the principle subjects of philosophy.

You keep arguing that science has a "blind spot", as though at some point in history there had been a clear choice between two equally viable methodlogies and methodological naturalism was mistakenly or blindly adopted. — Janus

It's not only my argument. Methodological naturalism was in no way blindly adopted. It was the result of two thousand years of intellectual history. But it has it's blind spots, as many (not just myself, flattering though that might be) have begun to notice. That Aeon article on the Blind Spot of Science which I've often quoted, by Adam Frank, Marcello Gleiser and Evan Thompson (and for which I was subjected to an intense pile-on when I linked to it in 2019) is being published in book form next year, you'll no doubt be pleased to know ;-)

What if it were meaningful and intelligible to God, for example? Can you rule that out? — Janus

On the one hand, you assert that all metaphysical speculation is a contrivance, then you turn around and ask me to engage in it.

The claim didn't warrant one. — Wayfarer

That's nothing more than arrogant copout.

The principle of dependent origination and the Buddhist śūnyatā is a metaphysic. (I don't claim to be a Buddhist, although I did undertake an MA in the subject in order to understand it better.) — Wayfarer

Nagarjuna, if I recall correctly, rejects the principle of dependent origination and the śūnyatā is an apophatic rejection of any metaphysic, as I understand it. Are you wishing to reify emptiness now?

Also, I recall you saying on the old site that you had taken Buddhist vows, have you now renounced them?

One of the principle subjects of philosophy. — Wayfarer

It had been one of the principle subjects of philosophy up until Kant let the air out of all the tyres, showing it to be impossible. Are you claiming that it is possible to know anything outside of human experience and understanding? If so, then you contradict yourself by constantly reminding us that science is not outside of human experience and understanding.Can you point to any item of knowledge that is outside of human experience and understanding?

Methodological naturalism was in no way blindly adopted. — Wayfarer

Then why did you disagree with me without providing a counter-argument when I said just that, and then go on to say that it didn't warrant a counter-argument. Perhaps I misunderstood and you were agreeing all along. Or perhaps you mean to say that it was mistakenly, if not blindly, adopted. If so, I'm not sure I see the distinction, because if something is mistakenly believed is that not a kind of blindness?

On the one hand, you assert that all metaphysical speculation is a contrivance, then you turn around and ask me to engage in it. — Wayfarer

I have said we can imagine metaphysical possibilities, but we have no way of knowing whether any of them are, or even could be, true. You claim that the "in itself" is meaningless and unintelligible, and I agree that it is to us (apart from the fact that we can imagine it as a possibility).

"To us" is all we know, but if you don't want to rule out the possibility that God or some universal mind might exist, then surely you must acknowledge that in such an imagined scenario the in itself could have meaning and be intelligible to God or the universal mind.

This statement is what is absurd. If there is a multitude of distinct attitudes toward metaphysics, then education in metaphysics is even more important in order that we get exposed to all the different possibilities. — Metaphysician Undercover

If you are interested in metaphysics then learning about the history of metaphysical ideas would be a good idea. However it's arguable that most people don't give a flying fuck about metaphysics, so it's not likely to be on the school curriculum any time soon. I think metaphysics is a valuable study, for its imaginative and creative interest, I am only rejecting the idea that truth may be found there.

I think it would be more fruitful to see ethics being taught in school than metaphysics.

Much more elegantly expressed than my attempt at pretty much the same point. — Tom Storm

I don't know about that, but cheers Tom.

You need more? I tend to get stuck at the Incredulous Stare. — Banno

First off, I didn't say I myself am panpsychist, though I can sympathize with it.

Secondly, I said in my post about panpsychism that it is a "bullet" you would have to bite. So you see, it is something I am deeming as pretty out there.

Yes I notice you make arguments from fiat based on incredulity, but I'd like to remind you that incredulity is simply an emotional response and not an argument.

But moving past that there is the problem of how little minds come together to make bigger minds, and of how seperate small minds come together to make the unified mind had by you and I. — Banno

Most importantly here, to Whitehead, actual entities have a degree of sentience – of awareness, feeling and purpose – as do systems, or ‘societies’ as he names them, that are organically constructed from actual entities. Consciousness as we humans have it is therefore a complex nested system of subordinate sentiences: the redefined ‘organisms’ we traced in the path from Homo sapiens to subatomic particles, each of them being self-organising systems, are also sentient to degrees, according to the integrated complexity involved. Each cell in our body is such an instrument of sentience – instruments which focus their effects in the hall of the skull. Such consciousness requires a human brain because the brain channels together the awarenesses of the subordinate entities. Where actual entities have formed into non-self-organising aggregates – such as doors and windows – there is no unified sentience associated with the aggregate itself – only the myriad lesser sentiences of which the aggregate is composed: the sentiences of the molecules, atoms, and subatomic particles. Note the implication that although a brain is required for high-level animal-type consciousness, a brain is not required for mere sentience. Analogously, although an orchestra is required for a symphony, an orchestra is not required for a violin solo. Sentience, or experience, already exists as part of reality. — The Philosophy of Organism

To reply would be to give the notion more credence than it deserve.

Now you know how it feels every time I hit reply to you :wink:

Humble and helpful is not your MO. How you can posture as looking "more superior than thou" is though.

It's everything wrong with philosophy (academically) done out of bad faith and philosophy forums done generally. Just egos clashing and trying to posture themselves :roll:

As Kant has shown us, no metaphysical views are supported, because they are the erroneous attempt to extrapolate to an "ultimate" "god's eye" view of reality — Janus

Dogmatic metaphysical views, and metaphysical views as an empirical science, are not supported. And the metaphysical view regarding pure speculative reason’s attempts to obtain the unconditioned in any form, is not supported.

Some metaphysical views must be supported, otherwise transcendental philosophy as a doctrine grounded in synthetic a priori principles, is invalid. And even if the validity is subjected to dispute, it can only be from different initial conditions, which are themselves metaphysical views.
———-

There's an expression that captures what I was getting at: Cartesian anxiety….. — Wayfarer

I hadn’t considered Cartesian anxiety; just lending credence to….“the idea that we see the world as it is completely separately from us, as if we're not part of it - is mistaken”.

I'm not saying that our designation as 'beings' means that we are beings in the causative sense…. — Wayfarer

Cool. Just me, personalized conceptual analysis.

I think metaphysics is a valuable study, for its imaginative and creative interest, I am only rejecting the idea that truth may be found there. — Janus

I find things to be more complicated then this sentence presumes.

The empirical sciences would be nonexistent without the philosophy of science upon which they are founded, which in turn could not obtain without a philosophy of causation, and causation is in turn a metaphysical study. Hence, all modern science is founded upon metaphysical understandings, causation as one such. Hence, by logical derivation, if there can be no metaphysical truths, such as that pertaining to the reality and nature of causation, there could then be no scientific truths (the fallibility to the latter notwithstanding).

Are you indirectly advocating for general Pyrrhonism in regard to all existential truths?

In a sense I get what you might mean: metaphysical speculation can be a curse far more often that a cure. But then, what else but an awareness of metaphysical issues (such as that of causation), and the existential truths we thereby accept, sharply distinguishes the intellect of the human species at large from those of lesser lifeforms? Tool use, medicine, basic math skills, communication, comprehension of symbols, normative behavior in relation to what is given and taken (morality in this sense), all these can be found among lesser animals. But not metaphysical understandings.

Hey, for the record, I, as with most people, uphold the reality of causation. This then being one example of a metaphysical truth I subscribe to.

"Find a scientific man who proposes to get along without any metaphysics ... and you have found one whose doctrines are thoroughly vitiated by the crude and uncriticized metaphysics with which they are packed. ... Every man of us has a metaphysics, and has to have one; and it will influence his life greatly. Far better, then, that that metaphysics should be criticized and not be allowed to run loose."
- Charles Sanders Peirce

Nagarjuna, if I recall correctly, rejects the principle of dependent origination and the śūnyatā is an apophatic rejection of any metaphysic, as I understand it. — Janus

Doesn't make him a positivist. See the passage I quoted previously with the Buddha saying that both the views 'the world exists' and 'the world doesn't exist' are due to 'not seeing how the world really arises.' The 'ten undecided questions' of Buddhism are similar in many regards to Kant's 'antinomies of reason' (Murti, 1955.) But the 'chain of dependent origination' is most definitely what most would regard as a metaphysic.

Then why did you disagree with me without providing a counter-argument when I said just that, and then go on to say that it didn't warrant a counter-argument. — Janus

Because your objection to what I said then went on to basically re-affirm what I said:

methodological naturalism is the attitude that science ought to investigate the world as if it were strictly independent of the observer.
— Wayfarer

I think this is misleading in that it suggests the deliberate adoption of one attitude over another. On the contrary it seems much more plausible to think that it was discovered that investigating the world without concern for metaphysics or about questions regarding the subject of experience yielded the most fruitful methodology for investigating empirical phenomena. — Janus

So let's agree that 'it was discovered that....' It actually makes no difference to my argument.

Some metaphysical views must be supported, otherwise transcendental philosophy as a doctrine grounded in synthetic a priori principles, is invalid. And even if the validity is subjected to dispute, it can only be from different initial conditions, which are themselves metaphysical views. — Mww

I see a priori reasoning to principles as phenomenological and pragmatic, not metaphysical. But here we come up against the fact that exactly what is defined as metaphysics is unclear. My definition of what qualifies as a metaphysical claim would be that it purports to be a universal and absolute truth, independent of human experience and understanding. Is it the case that I can dispute a metaphysical claim only from the perspective of some other metaphysical counter-claim? I don't see that, I think all metaphysical claims can be disputed from the fact of their undecidability.

The empirical sciences would be nonexistent without the philosophy of science upon which they are founded, which in turn could not obtain without a philosophy of causation, and causation is in turn a metaphysical study. — javra

I would agree that it is true that science evolved out of a context of metaphysical dogma, but I don't see any reason to believe that the continuing practice of science relies on any metaphysical beliefs.

We cannot help understanding the world in causal terms, even animals do. So, I don't count that as metaphysics, but as a phenomenological fact about humans and other higher organisms.

You say that without metaphysics there can be no scientific truths, but I've already acknowledged that I don't see scientific conclusions and theories, apart from the most basic empirical observations, as true or false, but rather as workable guidelines.

You say you "uphold the reality of causation"; if you mean that it is real for us, then I agree; it cannot but be. If you want to claim it is real independently of us, I would say that I don't know about that because I can't see how we could determine that to be true.

:clap: :up:

Some metaphysical views must be supported, otherwise transcendental philosophy as a doctrine grounded in synthetic a priori principles, is invalid. And even if the validity is subjected to dispute, it can only be from different initial conditions, which are themselves metaphysical views. — Mww

:100:

:fire: Excellent.

Doesn't make him a positivist. See the passage I quoted previously with the Buddha saying that both the views 'the world exists' and 'the world doesn't exist' are due to 'not seeing how the world really arises.' The 'ten undecided questions' of Buddhism are similar in many regards to Kant's 'antinomies of reason' (Murti, 1955.) — Wayfarer

I haven't mentioned positivism, I am not remotely a positivist, so I don't know why you have brought it up. I think that metaphysics is undecidable, so I agree with the Buddha and the "ten undecided questions" of Buddhism, and as I have said that all metaphysical positions end in aporia, it should be obvious that I agree with Kant regarding the antinomies of pure reason.

Because your objection to what I said then went on to basically re-affirm what I said: — Wayfarer

It didn't, because as I originally said the way you framed it made it look as though the adoption of scientific method to understand how things as they appear to us work, was a mistake, and that we could have chosen some other unspecified methodology, or that the choice of methodological naturalism was driven by an attitude that that is what we ought to do rather than the choice happening gradually through finding out that it yielded more systematic and testable results.

Cheers 180. :cool:

I think it should be noted that Whitehead did not identify as a panpsychist, but as a panexperientialist.

Note the implication that although a brain is required for high-level animal-type consciousness, a brain is not required for mere sentience. — The Philosophy of Organism

From what I remember reading in Whitehead (many years ago) his notion of experience does not equate to sentience. He saw relationality and process as fundamental; things only are what they are in relation to other things and the processes that evolve out of their relations. So, an example would be that a rock experiences erosion on account of the wind, temperature differentials and the rain.

The rock has no identity apart from its dynamic ever-changing relationship with its environment. We are infinitely more complex and of course both sentient and sapient, but are we really any different, since we are really nothing apart from relations and processes within our bodies, and interacting with the environment, with culture and language?

Things are real for Whitehead insofar as they can experience being affected by other things, but this idea of experience does not entail consciousness or awareness of any kind. Even Whitehead's God is constantly evolving in response to the dynamic actuality of existence. If I am wrong about that, I am happy to be corrected by anyone more familiar with Whitehead's philosophy.

My definition of what qualifies a metaphysical claim would be that it purports to be a universal and absolute truth, independent of human experience and understanding. — Janus

I would agree that it is true that science evolved out of a context of metaphysical dogma, but I don't see any reason to believe that the continuing practice of science relies on any metaphysical beliefs. — Janus

It then seems that we hold different understandings of what constitutes the metaphysical. No biggie.

To me, generally speaking, the metaphysical signifies that which is but is not tangibly physical - the notions of space and time thereby being metaphysical subjects, for another example. At any rate, metaphysics as study is not to me defined by dogma but by the best inferences upon enquiry, and is always fallible. In my understanding, since science assumes the truth of causality, of identity and change, of time and space, etc., with certain understandings of what these signify, science then always relies upon metaphysical beliefs.

We cannot help understanding the world in causal terms, even animals do. — Janus

In a certain way, sure. One could argue that at least some lesser animals can discern things via the use of what we term other metaphysical subjects as well: being and nonbeing, identity and change, space and time. I'd even go so far as to offer that in some rudimentary way even unicellular organisms, such as ameba, discern the world via at least some metaphysical givens - else they could not survive. Still, only we humans can consciously comprehend these as abstracted concepts which we can then ponder and investigate for cogency and explanatory value. It is the latter which I intended by "metaphysical understanding".

As one example, only we can grasp the extrapolated notion of a cosmos/universe of which we are a part of; resulting issues such as whether the cosmos is infinite or finite are not an aspect of lesser animals' cognition.

----

BTW, in regard to:

My definition of what qualifies a metaphysical claim would be that it purports to be a universal and absolute truth, independent of human experience and understanding. — Janus

Since idealism claims all things to be either directly or indirectly dependent upon psyche, wouldn't that then make idealism a non-metaphysical construct? :razz: (kidding)

Nice quote, btw.

If you are interested in metaphysics then learning about the history of metaphysical ideas would be a good idea. — Janus

Learning the history of ideals is a lot different than actually learning the ideas. The former is like memorizing a list of named ideas, in chronological order, the latter requires actually understanding the ideas.

However it's arguable that most people don't give a flying fuck about metaphysics, so it's not likely to be on the school curriculum any time soon. — Janus

This all depends on what school you go to. If you have an honest interest in the ideas of metaphysics, you will choose a school with a curriculum suited to your desire, as is the case in any field of study. That there is a smaller percentage of the population who are interested in metaphysics than in some other studies, and so there are less schools offering a good curriculum, is really not relevant. The trends as to what the majority of people are interested in, change with the shifting sands. But there is never a time when a good metaphysical curriculum is not available to those who want it.

I think it should be noted that Whitehead did not identify as a panpsychist, but as a panexperientialist. — Janus

Yeah that's fine.

From what I remember reading in Whitehead (many years ago) his notion of experience does not equate to sentience. He saw relationality and process as fundamental; things only are what they are in relation to other things and the processes that evolve out of their relations. So, an example would be that a rock experiences erosion on account of the wind, temperature differentials and the rain. — Janus

Yeah his writing is dense so definitely room for interpretation, however the basic atoms of his ontology were called "actual occasions" which I've seen described as "drops of experience", but as you are implying, nothing like the human kind. I don't know what an "actual occasion" "feels like", but there is I guess something of a point of view I guess of that "actual occasion" as it prehends.

The rock has no identity apart from its dynamic ever-changing relationship with its environment. We are infinitely more complex and of course both sentient and sapient, but are we really any different, since we are really nothing apart from relations and processes within our bodies, and interacting with the environment, with culture and language? — Janus

Yes and no. While I agree with your relational framing of Whitehead, I do indeed think he thought there was a "there" there for the rock. There is a sort of experiential quality going on in the event of the rock. If there wasn't, then why even have a metaphysics? That would simply be describing the physics and chemistry of the rock. But that's not quite what Whitehead is saying. The event has a sort of experiential aspect to it in some sense I guess. The rock is experiencing as a rock, and not as the rock is measured by a human. The localized event is "event-ing" if you will. It's like if all physical processes had a first person point of view. At least that's how I'm interpreting it.

Things are real for Whitehead insofar as they can experience being affected by other things, but this idea of experience does not entail consciousness or awareness of any kind. Even Whitehead's God is constantly evolving in response to the dynamic actuality of existence. If I am wrong about that, I am happy to be corrected by anyone more familiar with Whitehead's philosophy. — Janus

I think I agree with this interpretation, based on your first sentence.

You don't have to be here. Nor are you obliged to read, let alone reply to my posts.

You don't have to be here. Nor are you obliged to read, let alone reply to my posts. — Banno

It is frustrating to give an answer and then instead of engaging with it, you simply cry "incredulity". It's not just that it is smug and condescending, but it's a bit unfair. Someone (and it's not just me) puts in time to answer you in earnestness, and you give a snarky quip as a response. I'd go as far to say it's a kind of trolling.

In my understanding, since science assumes the truth of causality, of identity and change, of time and space, etc., with certain understandings of what these signify, science then always relies upon metaphysical beliefs. — javra

I wouldn't count causality as metaphysical because I see causality as intimately tied with, indispensable to, the understanding of the physical, and I don't think we have any idea of causes which are not physical. I mean we can think the possibility of non-physical causes, but we have no grasp on what they would "look" like. Same thing with time and space; what could time be without physical existents, can we imagine a non-physical space? What changes if not physical things? As to identity I think that is a logical, not a metaphysical, notion.

So, again I think these notions are all intimately connected with experience of the physical or with logic.

Since idealism claims all things to be either directly or indirectly dependent upon psyche, wouldn't that then make idealism a non-metaphysical construct? :razz: (kidding) — javra

I know you said you are kidding, but I think this still warrants a response. If we say that all things, as experienced, depend on the psyche (or body/mind) then it is really just a matter of definition; a logical truth, if you like.

If you say all things, tout court, are dependent on the psyche then that would be a metaphysical claim.

Learning the history of ideals is a lot different than actually learning the ideas. The former is like memorizing a list of named ideas, in chronological order, the latter requires actually understanding the ideas. — Metaphysician Undercover

I would not count someone as having learned the history of ideas unless they understood the ideas.

I think we are in agreement basically. Perhaps the ""there' there" for the rock, in Whitehead's philosophy is God's experience of the rock.

Where actual entities have formed into non-self-organising aggregates – such as doors and windows – there is no unified sentience associated with the aggregate itself – only the myriad lesser sentiences of which the aggregate is composed: the sentiences of the molecules, atoms, and subatomic particles. — The Philosophy of Organism

Taking the interpretation expressed in this passage it would seem that the author believes that for Whithead there would be no ""there there" for the rock, but only for the "molecules, atoms and subatomic particles".

I don't know, though, it's a long while since I read Process and Reality, and the necessary secondary texts needed to understand it; Whitehead is difficult.

At least I offered an interpretation of the stuff I linked to. Your copy-and-paste from someone else simply repeating the error. :smile:

This bitching is far from edifying. Again, you do not have to reply.

But keep going. Write some more about me, not about the topic.