I figure what Sachs is asking is whether you can have your cake and eat it too in the matter of life "being wholes" or the result of a fundamental process that was set up to permit those beings. In that regard, Aristotle is starting with a connection rather than having to presuppose one.

The organism is nothing but its adaptive interactions.
— Joshs
Not quite. It is a structure able to interact in what was an adaptive way in its native environment. Whether its species will survive depends on the rate at which its progeny can adapt to environmental change. — Dfpolis

Is a bird simply what is contained within an outlined drawing? Or is it also the niche that sustains the animal
and in which it is embedded? Isnt it purely arbitrary to define a living organism by a slab of cells that form a contiguous mass? A living system isn’t a structure designed by a deity or nature and then dropped into a world, it is inseparable from its particular environing world. It is a system of processes in which the dividing line between niche and animal can only be drawn artificially.

The difference is that biological desire need not involve awareness, while will proper does. This is a move from the physical to the intentional theater of operation — Dfpolis

You mean the dualist split between matter and subjectivity? Where does awareness begin in the animal kingdom? Certainly not with humans. Does it emerge suddenly or gradually as a function of neural complexity? If will and awareness is a gradual evolutionary development, then, as been suggested by biologists and neuroscientists, then in some sense one may see it in incipient form already in single-called organisms that have sensory capacities and show learning and adaptive goal-oriented behavior.

Will in the proper sense is a conscious commitment, and as such transcends the merely biological.

You can see this from the fact that willed commitments can be extremely unadaptive and harmful -- both to the individual and to the species. E — Dfpolis

Willed commitments are organized on the basis not strictly of the survival of my organism, but as I have been arguing, are designed to maintain adaptive sense-making , which is as much a social as an individual process.

Now, how about an argument that shows that one conscious being cannot commit to the good of another, even if it is unadaptive for the one committing — Dfpolis

Humans evolved as cooperative social creatures. Like many other mammals, we are born with certain moral emotions , such as the protection of our young and the ability to experience pain at the suffering of others in our group. Sacrificing oneself for the protection of others is seen in other animals. Anthropologists hypothesize that conscience evolved in order to protect tribes from the violence of alpha males. Even behaviors which on the surface appear unadaptive, such as suicide or homicide, are driven by a combination of such moral emotions.

It is not the self strictly defined as a body, that our biologically evolved motivational processes are designed to preserve. Rather, it is social systems ( friendship, marriage, family, clan) that sustain us and that we are primed to defend.

All causation is reciprocal
— Joshs
Really? So an artist creating a work is acted upon by the work that does not yet exist? My learning a song causes the song? Perhaps you can explain what you mean. — Dfpolis

The creative process is a reciprocal back-and-forth between what we symbolize in thought in a particular artistic medium (exploratory chords on a piano, a sketch on a canvas, practice dance steps , a few lines of prose) , and the way these tentative symbolizations talk back to us ( and of course other with whom we share these creative first steps also talk back to us) and guide us with either positive or negative feedback.

Aristotle is starting with a connection rather than having to presuppose one. — Paine

Aristotle was a biologist. So, I think he came to his understanding of organic wholes from observation.

Agreed. I read De Anima as a continuation of that thought. Our life is this life too.

My argument is based on the premises laid down -- none of which are theological. — Dfpolis

Have you forgotten your own claims? I posted some above and here:

Evolution’s necessity derives from the laws of nature, which are intentional realities, the vehicle of divine providence.

Biological species, as secondary substances, are beings of reason founded in the natures of their instances. They are traceable to God’s creative intent ...

Logical principles essential to science require these laws to be maintained by a self-conserving reality identifiable as God. — Fooloso4

While none of these claims were made in the paper but not because there is no connection.

This confirms that many atheists are not open to rational discourse -- even when the subject is not theological. — Dfpolis

This may be difficult for you to understand because you are convinced of the truth of your own arguments, but not everyone is persuaded. Being open to rational discourse does not mean accepting the agency of a God.

Is a bird simply what is contained within an outlined drawing? Or is it also the niche that sustains the animal and in which it is embedded? — Joshs

I do not think this is an either or question. There are different ways of conceptualizing the world. In one, the bird is circumscribed and interacts with other circumscribed entities. In another, the bird is conceived in, and is an inseparable part of, its ecological context. Neither mode of conceptualization is wrong, because both are adequate to a set of human needs (and it is humans who are conceiving them).

The point I am making is that we can represent the same reality in diverse ways. This is very common in physics, where we use different coordinate systems depending on which makes a problem easier to deal with. In biology, we can think in terms of cells, organs, organisms, biomes, or ecosystems. None of these concepts is unfunded or useless. We just need to make sure that what we have abstracted away can be safely ignored in the case we are considering.

It is a system of processes in which the dividing line between niche and animal can only be drawn artificially. — Joshs

All distinctions are "artificial" in the sense that we do not find dividing lines in nature. Rather our mind must abstract two or more aspects of a single reality. That does not mean that the distinctions are not both well-founded and useful.

You mean the dualist split between matter and subjectivity? — Joshs

There is no such split. All knowing is a subject-object relation. Without a knowing subject and a known object, there is no knowledge. In other words, subjectivity never occurs absent objectivity -- the essence of each is to be a relatum in the relation of knowing.

Where does awareness begin in the animal kingdom? — Joshs

I do not know. Do you? I do know that humans are aware.

Certainly not with humans. — Joshs

There is no evidence to support this. We are ignorant of the possible experience of other species.

Does it emerge suddenly or gradually as a function of neural complexity? — Joshs

How do you know it is a function of complexity? We only have one data point. Human brains are complex and humans are conscious. Maybe that is a coincidence, or maybe it is not.

If will and awareness is a gradual evolutionary development, then, as been suggested by biologists and neuroscientists, then in some sense one may see it in incipient form already in single-called organisms that have sensory capacities and show learning and adaptive goal-oriented behavior. — Joshs

"Maybe" is a poor basis for conclusions.

Perhaps you would like to comment on my discussion of the in compatibility of the Standard Model and the evolutionary genesis of consciousness and environmental representation in my article (p. 99). Instead of blindly applying a standard explanation, it is good to reflect on how the mechanisms it proposes could apply to the case at hand.

Willed commitments are organized on the basis not strictly of the survival of my organism, but as I have been arguing, are designed to maintain adaptive sense-making, which is as much a social as an individual process. — Joshs

That would be nice if true, but many willed commitments make neither individual nor social sense, as I am sure you know. Some are destructive both to the individual and to society. Even if they did make sense, they are unlike the adaptive biological responses you originally called "will" because they involve conscious reflection.

moral emotions — Joshs

This is a very strange turn of phrase. Emotions are psycho-physical responses. As such, they have no "moral" value. Anger, for example, can be morally righteous or immorally vindictive. Sexual attraction can be destructive to both parties or the basis of a committed and supportive relationship. In any event, willed commitments are not emotions, although they may be responses to emotions. We can see that they are not emotions because they persist through emotional changes.

I am wondering how you define "moral"? I think of it in intentional terms as willing the self-realization of ones' self and others. Perhaps you are a consequentialist, thinking that intent doesn't matter, only outcomes. The problem with that is that we cannot fully predict outcomes, we only know what we intend to happen. So, we are brought back to intention.

Sacrificing oneself for the protection of others is seen in other animals. — Joshs

Of course. What we do not know is if these responses in other species are conscious or not -- and that is what is at stake in the discussion of will vs. instinct.

Anthropologists hypothesize that conscience evolved in order to protect tribes from the violence of alpha males. Even behaviors which on the surface appear unadaptive, such as suicide or homicide, are driven by a combination of such moral emotions. — Joshs

What about beta females who may add poisonous herbs or fungi to a stew? Unconfirmed hypotheses have little cogency. And, here is "moral emotions" again.

Rather, it is social systems ( friendship, marriage, family, clan) that sustain us and that we are primed to defend. — Joshs

This is true of socialized individuals, but untrue of those not properly socialized. So, it seems more a matter of nurturing than of immutable (biological) nature.

what we symbolize in thought ... the way these tentative symbolizations talk back to us — Joshs

You realize that these "tentative symbolizations" need not be the work created, but part of the agent and her agency -- her thought process? So, this need not be the work acting causally on its creator. My thoughts, creative or otherwise, are my acts of awareness. I have heard a number of film actors say that they do not look at the "rushes," "dailies," or their finished films.

There can be, and is, both causal reciprocity and feedback, but there can also be causality without reciprocity or feedback.

Thank you for sharing your reflections. It helps to have other views.

Have you forgotten your own claims? — Fooloso4

These are not the basis of the arguments made in my article. You will find no theology there.

One person can think on many topics. I think about science, philosophy and theology without mixing them up, as you seem to be. So, I affirm what you quoted. I only deny their logical relevance to the arguments in my article.

Have you heard of the genetic fallacy? It is a fallacy of irrelevance, and you are making it.

This may be difficult for you to understand because you are convinced of the truth of your own arguments, but not everyone is persuaded. Being open to rational discourse does not mean accepting the agency of a God. — Fooloso4

I understand and expect that my sound arguments may change few minds. Once people commit to a position, reason is a poor tool. My hope is to inform fresh, open minds.

As for God, the arguments in my paper neither assume nor conclude His existence. That you persist in the genetic fallacy only confirms my view that some atheists are closed to reason, even when the matter being discussed is not theological.

You mean the dualist split between matter and subjectivity?
— Joshs
There is no such split. All knowing is a subject-object relation. Without a knowing subject and a known object, there is no knowledge. In other words, subjectivity never occurs absent objectivity -- the essence of each is to be a relatum in the relation of knowing — Dfpolis

Kant said something similar to this: ‘Thoughts without content are empty; intuitions without conceptions blind’.
And yet he was a dualist. How does the Cartesian split manifest itself in his thinking? One can point to a split that evinces itself not merely in a lack of relation between subject and object, but in the way that each side of the binary is conceived in terms of its assumed internal composition. Kant attributed apriori categorical content to the subject. While these categories only function in relation to objects , their content is generated independent of exposure to objects and is of a different order with respect to objects.

By contrast , contemporary naturalist-evolutionary accounts of subject-object relations conceive the genesis and content of the subject pole in the same naturalist terms as the object pole. Essentially the subject pole contributes recall of previous states to the interpretation of objective sense. Furthermore, there is no transcendent or self-identical self, ego, ‘I’ underlying subjectivity. The ‘I’ that wills in each willing is never the same self, because its nature and identity is subtly reorganized as a result of each encounter with a world. So the self at the heart of subjectivity is an always changing construction. It changes alongside the objects which also change their sense due to the fact that , as you say, we can represent the same reality in different ways.

Where does awareness begin in the animal kingdom?
— Joshs
I do not know. Do you? I do know that humans are aware.
Certainly not with humans.
— Joshs
There is no evidence to support this. We are ignorant of the possible experience of other species… What we do not know is if these responses in other species are conscious or not. — Dfpolis

You should impart this important bit of news to the burgeoning field of consciousness studies in comparative psychology. Explain to them that their evidence doesn’t count for you as evidence. Or you could take your own words to heart: we can represent the same reality in diverse ways.

There is a long list of capacities that were assumed at one point to be associated exclusively with humans ( tool-making, language, cognition, emotion). Given the intimate proximity between cognition, emotion and awareness, now that multiple sources of evidence point to the presence of the first two capabilities in other animals, it is not a leap to hypothesize consciousness also. Furthermore, increased understanding of consciousness in humans reveals it to be a less important aspect of cognition than was previously thought to be the case. Most of our everyday activities are performed unconsciously, automatically. Consciousness is simply not needed for adaptive cognitive functioning in many situations.

what we symbolize in thought ... the way these tentative symbolizations talk back to us
— Joshs
You realize that these "tentative symbolizations" need not be the work created, but part of the agent and her agency -- her thought process? So, this need not be the work acting causally on its creator. My thoughts, creative or otherwise, are my acts of awareness — Dfpolis

The work created become part of the agent and her agency. This goes back to the issue of the Cartesian constancy of the self. Only if we assume that subjective agency is split off from the objects that it interacts with , only if we make the thought process into a solipsistic internal activity, do we construe acts of awareness apart from the work acting causally on its creator.

[re

Are they highly accurate? After all, for much of human history, we've had some kooky beliefs about what, exactly, the world is and is made of. — RogueAI

First of the content of a metaphysical belief(accuracy) about the nature of the world does not really play any role in our survival.
Accuracy is needed when we experiencing the world around us (not its underlying ontology), for spatial navigation and temporal navigation, to avoid obstacles or predators, identify patterns, find resources or mates,decode social cues and behavior and in general to avoid suffering and increase our percentage of survival.
We are the decedents of those organisms who were able to experience the world in the best possible way.

The fact that we're going back and forth on what consciousness is after I've read your paper should reveal to you that you didn't make a clear case of what it meant to you to your reader.
— Philosophim
No, it only illustrates the difficulty humans have in letting go of preconceptions. — Dfpolis

No, it really means you don't have a clear definition of consciousness that a reader can understand. Instead of simply retyping or pointing out the clear case to refute my point, you've huffed yourself up and just blamed me for not simply being open to considering how amazingly right you are. Not a good counter.

Can drugs alter our consciousness, yes, or no? If yes, then we can reduce consciousness to a physical basis.
— Philosophim
Non sequitur. It only shows that there is a dependence (which I affirm), not that the particular dependence explains all the known operations. — Dfpolis

That's not a non sequitur at all. If consciousness depends on a physical basis, then it is up to you to demonstrate aspects of consciousness that do not depend on a physical basis. I already mentioned that we do not have to know every little thing in how a physical process works to know it is still a physical process, so your point is moot here.

A very simple definition of what consciousness means to you could help here.
— Philosophim
Asked and answered. — Dfpolis

Again, "consciousness" is an analogous term. — Dfpolis

Analogous to what? That is neither a clear nor simple definition. This answers nothing.

The only organisms we know to experience awareness of intelligibility are humans. — Dfpolis

No, I just gave you an example of dog expressing intelligibility. I even gave you the opportunity to note that intelligibility only convers to spoken or written language, which you have neither confirmed nor denied. The fact you just make claims instead of explaining why your claims are correct persuades no one.

If anything, that would be odd to limit consciousness to only the human physical form while simultaneously denying it is linked to neurons, or any other physical basis.
— Philosophim
You persist in misrepresenting my position. That is not a sign of good faith. I have said repeatedly that conscious thought depends on neural representation and processing. — Dfpolis

No, your position is unclear. Your assumption that I am misrepresenting your position after a reader has told you your work seems unclear, is not a sign of good faith. Its your job when someone misunderstands your work to clearly and politely point out where they've misunderstood the position. If they've misrepresented it, explain the misrepresentation and move on. I am not intentionally trying to misrepresent your position. You have spent days of your life constructing and thinking on it. I have spent an hour. Point me to lines of your work that clarify the issue. See how I'm referencing your words in your paper, then saying why I think they're incorrect? Show me other words of your paper that clarify what you mean.

You are also misunderstanding my meaning. Reread the context of what I am saying again. I am noting your position was that it was logically impossible to link consciousness to a physical basis. By consequence, that means you are claiming it is impossible to link consciousness to neurons. The way I understand it is you view neurons as creating the sensory "picture" that our consciousness intends to.

Two quotes from you:

"Aristotle’s bridging dynamic is the agent intellect (νοῦς ποιητικóς). Sensible objects engender a
physical ‘image’ he calls a phantasm (φάντασμα). We would call it a neural representation. Since
the phantasm’s intelligibility cannot make itself known, something else, capable of intentional
effects, must do so. This is the agent intellect."

"Since neural processing cannot effect awareness, an extra element is required, as Aristotle
argued and Chalmers seconds."

So here you seem to be implying that consciousness is separate from neurons, or the physical. As if it is some other thing apart from neuronal activity that analyses and intends to what those neurons provide. And if that is the case, then I believe my point has merit. If consciousness only has intentional effects on what neurons provide, but does not come from them, why would consciousness be only tied to intention upon neurons? Why not plants or dogs?

How is my experiencing the color red a particular way not my subjective awareness?
— Philosophim
I did not say it was not an instance of subjective awareness. Still, experiencing qualia is just one kind of such awareness. Knowing that pi is an irrational number is another, and it does not have a quale. — Dfpolis

Then don't tell me I'm ignoring subjective awareness.

If you want me to address other aspects of your work, you'll need to address the points I feel unclear or problamatic first.
— Philosophim
I have. I am growing impatient with going over the same ground with you, as it wastes my time. — Dfpolis

No, you have often been unclear in your answers, or dismissive by mentioning you've published a paper and have a book. You have not clearly pointed out areas in your work which would refute or clarify the issues you are trying to make. I am your reader. I am not wasting your time. When a person has spent days writing and no one responds, be it positive or negative, that is a waste of your time. You have a reader who is willing to engage with you. Someone to sell your idea to, to show the passion and outcome of your hard work to. It is very much worth your time. Why write anything if that is your attitude?

You may have wanted to devote more time to it then. At least to the point where you would have understood my reference was not claiming to be a fact or evidence, and a perfectly reasonable thing to mention.
— Philosophim
I suggest you read the section of my paper addressing information in computers. — Dfpolis

I did. It addressed a very cursory look at primitive computation and not the modern day analysis of advanced AI.

Never imply to your reader that they should just accept that you are right because you've published an article or written a book. Don't simply be dismissive of a reader's points, counter them with clarity and citation. Maybe you will have an audience larger than a forum one day. That will be your chance to make a name for yourself, don't screw it up by behaving like you are here. Publishing does not mean you've made it or that you've changed minds. You'll need to hear from others and be able to defend your work. So far, you have not done a great job at it. Be better.

I really don’t accept that. You’re talking about him as if he lived in Medieval Europe. He had a career spanning 50 years, which wasn’t even 100 years ago. — Wayfarer

It was almost 70 years ago Wayfarer. You may not be aware of how much information and discovery computers have opened up, but neuroscience back then really is the stone age comparatively. You really shouldn't be looking into neuroscience beyond the last 20-30 years honestly.

However on second reading, you’re differentiating life from chemistry, by saying that ‘life seeks to sustain and extend….’ So you’ve introduced the element of intentionality which I agree is necessary and which I don’t believe has any analogy in materialism. — Wayfarer

Sure, if you want to use intentionality to describe chemical reactions that attempt to keep the chemical reactions going, that's fine by me. I just think that's an aspect of the physical world, and not anything else.

I mean, at its basic Wayfarer, why is your consciousness stuck in your head?
— Philosophim

Don’t accept that it is. Conscious thought is an activity of the brain, but consciousness does indeed extend throughout your body and permeates all living things to one degree or another. — Wayfarer

That's perfectly fair. I had wondered if that was how you view consciousness, as its a bit of a subjective term. But once again the point I made remains. Can you extend your consciousness outside of your physical body? No.

So, I affirm what you quoted. I only deny their logical relevance to the arguments in my article. — Dfpolis

When you talk about "laws of nature", "biological species", and "logical principles essential to science", despite your denial, there is an obvious logical relevance to your paper.


Central to your argument is Aristotle's "active intellect", whatever that might be, and what it might be is not at all clear or agreed upon. But this much is clear, about the active intellect Aristotle says:

this alone is deathless and everlasting — De Anima Book 3, Chapter 5

Yet nowhere in your paper do you mention this important point. If, as you say, consciousness is the operation of the agent intellect, then consciousness is deathless and everlasting; a conclusion you fail to draw. Instead you say:

Like electron-electron repulsion, consciousness emerges in a specific kind of interaction: that
between a rational subject and present intelligibility.

But if consciousness (active intellect) is deathless and everlasting then it does not emerge in an interaction, it is employed.

You say the active intellect is a "personal capacity", as if the ongoing controversies have been settled. As Joe Sachs points out:

... in Metaphysics, Book XII, ch.7-10. Aristotle again distinguishes between the active and passive intellects, but this time he equates the active intellect with the "unmoved mover" and God. — Wikipedia, Active Intellect

In defense of your claims about the laws of nature you say:

If there were no laws operative in nature, anything could happen. In other words, there would be no difference between what was metaphysically possible (involving no contradiction) and what is physically possible (consistent with the laws of nature). It is metaphysically possible for a rock to become a humming bird, as there is no contradiction in being a at one time and b at another. — Dfpolis

Your appeal is to a notion of logic that abstracts from physical reality, as if it is perfectly logical to think that rocks can become hummingbirds. Of course you are free to use Aristotle when doing so supports your argument and abandoning him when he doesn't, but for all your talk of inadequate conceptual space, you have carved out your own. Your a priori metaphysical abstraction leads to a dream world in which there is a need for laws of nature to constrain whatever does not entail a logical contradiction from happening.

So, where Aristotle would say it is not in a hummingbird's nature to come to be from a rock, you abandon his phusis and teleology. You fault the SM for its failure to account for Aristotle’s final cause, but that is exactly what you do.

First of the content of a metaphysical belief(accuracy) about the nature of the world does not really play any role in our survival.
Accuracy is needed when we experiencing the world around us (not its underlying ontology), for spatial navigation and temporal navigation, to avoid obstacles or predators, identify patterns, find resources or mates,decode social cues and behavior and in general to avoid suffering and increase our percentage of survival.
We are the decedents of those organisms who were able to experience the world in the best possible way. — Nickolasgaspar

You have conflated easier problems with the Hard Problem. Easier problems deal with mechanisms for brain function. This can be tested and is amenable to empirical verification. The Hard Problem is how it is that there is a point of view. The problem is that people who try to handwave the question by purporting the easier problems as the solution, aren't getting it. They are ALREADY assuming the consequent without explaining it. It is the Homunculus Fallacy. Simply listing off physical processes doesn't get at things like subjective qualia or imagination. What IS that thing that mind-thing that I am doing when I am imagining a blue cube being rotated in my mind? What is THAT. You can say it is "such-and-such neural networks" and that it developed because of "such-and-such evolutionary reasons", but that is not answering the question. How is it that there is this rotating of the blue cube that is happening with the firing of the neurons. It is superimposed, and forced into the picture but without explanation, only correlation with various obvious empirical stuff that isn't getting any closer to the answer to the question.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Homunculus_argument

Kant attributed apriori categorical content to the subject. — Joshs

I am neither Kant, nor a Kantian. I think his approach is fundamentally wrong.

I am an Aristotelian. For Aristotle, the object informing the subject is identically the subject being informed by the object -- for these are alternate formulations of the same event. Thus, knowing is not a relation between the subject and a representation, as it is for Locke and Kant, but a case of shared existence. The sharing is limited because the subject and object are each more than their shared act. Still it is, and must be, an ontological union founded on the described identity.

By contrast , contemporary naturalist-evolutionary accounts of subject-object relations conceive the genesis and content of the subject pole in the same naturalist terms as the object pole. — Joshs

Yes, I am well aware of this a priori assumption. That is why I asked you to comment on my discussion of the genesis of representation and consciousness on p. 99.

Essentially the subject pole contributes recall of previous states to the interpretation of objective sense. — Joshs

I have no problem with this; however, it does not explain how we become aware of the relevant contents.

Furthermore, there is no transcendent or self-identical self, ego, ‘I’ underlying subjectivity. — Joshs

I have not suggested that humans have a "transcendental ego." Again, I am not a Kantian. As for "self-identical," whatever is, is identically itself. So, this is a nonsensical claim. As for an ego simpliciter, you have implicitly admitted that humans can be subjects in the act of knowing, and egos are simply the capacity to be a knowing subject, and this capacity, which is not a Cartesian res, is the 'I' required to be a subject. We could hardly know absent an underlying ability to know. Thus, I am unclear what is being objected to.

The ‘I’ that wills in each willing is never the same self, because its nature and identity is subtly reorganized as a result of each encounter with a world. — Joshs

Again, this is confused because of your physicalist bias. Self-identity over time, whether of a river or of an organism, does not mean material identity. It means dynamic continuity. My present self has few, if any, atoms in common with the baby that came from my mother's womb or with the zygote that preceded it; however, I am dynamically continuous with both.

You should impart this important bit of news to the burgeoning field of consciousness studies in comparative psychology. — Joshs

There is no need to. It has long been known that we cannot experience the first person experience of others. This is the so-called "problem of other minds." Also, the behaviorists roundly criticized the method of analogous introspection, by which some early psychologists claimed to study non-human minds.

None of this prevents the study of medical consciousness (a state of responsiveness). It is fully available to third-person observation. Still, it is the rankest form of equivocation to equate medical consciousness with subjective consciousness (awareness of intelligible contents).

Given the intimate proximity between cognition, emotion and awareness, now that multiple sources of evidence point to the presence of the first two capabilities in other animals, it is not a leap to hypothesize consciousness also. — Joshs

I have no doubt that medical consciousness is a purely biological phenomena.

only if we make the thought process into a solipsistic internal activity — Joshs

As I explained in my article, and at the beginning of this post, this is not the Aristotelian view. Rather than knowledge being solipsistic isolation, it is shared existence.

So far, you have not criticized one argument in my paper. Instead, you have accused me to the errors of others and made unsubstantiated claims. Perhaps if you addressed what I actually wrote, we could make more progress. For example, in an earlier post, I listed 7 problems I have with the Standard Model. You could explain why these are not real problems

That's not a non sequitur at all. If consciousness depends on a physical basis, then it is up to you to demonstrate aspects of consciousness that do not depend on a physical basis. — Philosophim

If you read my article, you will see that I did so.

Analogous to what? — Philosophim

"Analogous" is a logical classification of meaning. It means that a term is predicated in a way that is partly the same and partly different.

Its your job when someone misunderstands your work to clearly and politely point out where they've misunderstood the position. — Philosophim

I have done so. It is also my job to recognize when further explanation is a waste of time.

When a person has spent days writing and no one responds, be it positive or negative, that is a waste of your time. — Philosophim

I spent weeks writing my article, and you have yet to address its arguments. So, you are wasting my time.

I am noting your position was that it was logically impossible to link consciousness to a physical basis — Philosophim

I made no such claim. You continue to waste my time.

Analogous to what?
— Philosophim
"Analogous" is a logical classification of meaning. It means that a term is predicated in a way that is partly the same and partly different. — Dfpolis

Again, "consciousness" is an analogous term.
— Dfpolis

Yes, we all know what analogous means. You described consciousness as analogous. That means it is partly the same and partly different to what? Its like if you said, "Consciousness is a very term". Very what?

I am noting your position was that it was logically impossible to link consciousness to a physical basis
— Philosophim
I made no such claim. You continue to waste my time. — Dfpolis

I believe the exact quote was here: "I shall argue that it is logically impossible to reduce consciousness, and the intentional realities flowing out of it, to a physical basis." Part 3 page 100. But hey, if you didn't write that, ok then.

Congrats on publishing your article! *Pats you on the back*

You may not be aware of how much information and discovery computers have opened up, but neuroscience back then really is the stone age comparatively. — Philosophim

Find me a citation that shows that Wilder Penfield's experimental verification that subjects were aware that their own volitional actions were separate from those caused by the surgeon has been overturned. (Don't waste too much time, however, because you won't.)

However on second reading, you’re differentiating life from chemistry, by saying that ‘life seeks to sustain and extend….’ So you’ve introduced the element of intentionality which I agree is necessary and which I don’t believe has any analogy in materialism.
— Wayfarer

Sure, if you want to use intentionality to describe chemical reactions that attempt to keep the chemical reactions going, that's fine by me. I just think that's an aspect of the physical world, and not anything else. — Philosophim

You can't have it both ways. First you acknowledge that life seeks to extend the scope of 'ordinary' chemical reactions, and then as soon as that is pointed out, you say 'well, actually it doesn't, regular chemical reactions are doing that'. But this simply ignores the initial point, which is that living organisms possess attributes and qualities that are never observed in the inorganic realm. So the organic world is sharply differentiated from the inorganic, which you have no account for, other than the claim that it's not.

Can you extend your consciousness outside of your physical body? No. — Philosophim

You don't know that, it's simply an assumption because in the normal state of being we naturally associate with the body.

You may not be aware of how much information and discovery computers have opened up, but neuroscience back then really is the stone age comparatively.
— Philosophim

Find me a citation that shows that Wilder Penfield's experimental verification that subjects were aware that their own volitional actions were separate from those caused by the surgeon has been overturned. — Wayfarer

No, I agree with that fact. It was his conclusion that there must be some type of dualism that I'm contending has no basis today.

You can't have it both ways. First you acknowledge that life seeks to extend the scope of 'ordinary' chemical reactions, and then as soon as that is pointed out, you say 'well, actually it doesn't, regular chemical reactions are doing that. — Wayfarer

No, I'm not saying it doesn't. I'm saying that life = group of chemical reactions that seek to self-sustain. You seem to put some attribute beyond the physical to it. I don't. That's just one aspect of physical reality.

Can you extend your consciousness outside of your physical body? No.
— Philosophim

You don't know that, it's simply an assumption because in the normal state of being we naturally associate with the body. — Wayfarer

We both know that because we cannot do it. Its like saying I don't know that a unicorn that you cannot sense doesn't exist. No, I know such a thing does not exist. To know that we can do something is to have actually done it at least once.

Thank you for your engagement Wayfarer, its always a good discussion. However, I don't want to derail the OP's thread. Feel free to have the last word, or create a new thread and I'll join you there if you want further discussion.

Yet nowhere in your paper do you mention this important point. — Fooloso4

I am not writing a commentary on De Anima. I am discussing the Hard Problem.

But if consciousness (active intellect) is deathless and everlasting then it does not emerge in an interaction, it is employed. — Fooloso4

In one sense (its genesis) it does not emerge in interaction. In another sense (its actual operation) it does -- just like electron repulsion.

You say the active intellect is a "personal capacity", as if the ongoing controversies have been settled. — Fooloso4

I said it was controversial and offered my argument to resolve the controversy.

Your appeal is to a notion of logic that abstracts from physical reality, as if it is perfectly logical to think that rocks can become hummingbirds. — Fooloso4

You make my case. If we abstract away physical reality, anything can happen, so the reason many things cannot happen is an aspect of physical reality.

Of course you are free to use Aristotle when doing so supports your argument and abandoning him when he doesn't — Fooloso4

I am never using Aristotle as an authority. I am crediting him as a source.

Your a priori metaphysical abstraction — Fooloso4

By definition, an abstraction focuses on some aspects of experience while prescinding from others. As it is based on experience, it is necessarily a posteriori.

Yes, we all know what analogous means. You described consciousness as analogous. That means it is partly the same and partly different to what? — Philosophim

As I said, it is the different senses of "consciousness" that are analogous.

"I shall argue that it is logically impossible to reduce consciousness, and the intentional realities flowing out of it, to a physical basis." — Philosophim

That does not mean that there is no physical aspect. If you read the whole article, my position would be clear. For example, "Descartes drew the wrong line in the wrong place. It is the wrong line because discursive thought requires neural representations." (p. 109).

Thank you for the congratulations.

I'm saying that life = group of chemical reactions that seek to self-sustain. — Philosophim

So, you see life as teleological? Seeking the goal of being self-sustaining.

You seem to put some attribute beyond the physical to it. I don't. — Philosophim

By definition, chemistry seeking non-chemical outcomes transcends the physical.
.

You have conflated easier problems with the Hard Problem. — schopenhauer1

No I have not, I haven't suggested any problems. I am just addressing one of the pseudo philosophical "why" questions of Chalmers's supposedly "hard problem.[/quote]

Easier problems deal with mechanisms for brain function. — schopenhauer1

No they are not Neuroscience deals with far more difficult problems than Chalmers teleological fallacious questions.[/quote]

This can be tested and is amenable to empirical verification. — schopenhauer1

-Please watch Anil Seth lectures on the subject. You will learn about our difficulties.

The Hard Problem is how it is that there is a point of view. — schopenhauer1

Its like asking "why previously exited electrons produce a particle out of thin air"....the answer to all this type of questions is "because they do".

The problem is that people who try to handwave the question by purporting the easier problems as the solution, aren't getting it. — schopenhauer1

-The question is fallacious(teleology) since the answer can only be whatever the questioner desires.
The fact is that in Nature fundamental or emergent properties "exist" and asking ''why" they exist is a nonsensical question.

They are ALREADY assuming the consequent without explaining it. — schopenhauer1

If you study the scientific material of the interdisciplinary fields you will see that we are tackling far more meaningful and logical questions. As I wrote before,this why question can be answered by Evolutionary biology. Experiencing your Environment provides a Survival advantage to Organisms(animals) that aren't plants and need to move around and compete for resources. The fact that we have 2.5 milion of species (animals and insects) with different qualities of experiences verifies the evolutionary character of the property.

It is the Homunculus Fallacy. Simply listing off physical processes doesn't get at things like subjective qualia or imagination. — schopenhauer1

You are confusing the ability to be conscious with the quality of a conscious experience. That is a common error idealists do based on Bad Language Mode. You also confuse a secondary Mind Property with Consciousness which is the top 3 (According to Neuroscience).
Again I can not stress it enough. Individuals you want to understand the phenomenon they NEED to study our official Scientific knowledge on the topic. The second important step is to STOP using abstract concepts and assume that it points to a substance/entity/agent.

What IS that thing that mind-thing that I am doing when I am imagining a blue cube being rotated in my mind? What is THAT. — schopenhauer1

-That is a mental state. Your Central Later Thalamus has the ability to connect different areas of your brain, specialized in Memory/past experience, logic, Abstract thinking, Symbolic language, Critical thinking, Imagination etc and introduce content in that specific mental state....and all this is enabled by your Ascending Reticular Activating System.

You can say it is "such-and-such neural networks" and that it developed because of "such-and-such evolutionary reasons", but that is not answering the question. — schopenhauer1

-Of course it answers a huge part of that answer and not only that!!!! We can use this knowledge either to force a brain to recreate that specific state, we can read brain scans and based on the brain patter we can accurately (up to 85%) decode the conscious thought of the subject, we have designed Surgery and Medical protocols that can reestablish or improve specific mental states in patients and we can make Accurate diagnoses by looking at the physiology and function of brains and by analyzing the symptoms of a patient's mental states. We can predict mental malfunctions by studying the pathology of brains...and the list goes on.

How is it that there is this rotating of the blue cube that is happening with the firing of the neurons. — schopenhauer1

-brains are connected to a complex sensory system and they can store images. People who haven't observed such images are unable to reproduce them. The evolution in Arts , Music, Architecture, design etc verifies the importance of experiencing existing patterns in order to be able to modify and improve on them.
But your questions is a why question in disguise. In reality you are asking: why neurons have the ability to store and reproduce this optical stimuli. (why a silicon processor turn zeros and ones in complex pictures on a monitor). If they couldn't you wouldn't be able to see, remember and...ultimately survive.
The answer is simple your neurons can do that because you are the descendant of organisms with brains who could and they survived enough to pass this trait to the next generation.

It is superimposed, and forced into the picture but without explanation, only correlation with various obvious empirical stuff that isn't getting any closer to the answer to the question. — schopenhauer1

-Why gravity has the quality it has...why it pulls but never pushes. Why conductivity manifest solely in metals. Why electricity passing through silicon ICs can produce images on a TFT or LED panel.
Why molecules act differently in different temperatures.
The answer is always "because they do".

You are a modern Don Quixote who asks questions that are meaningless.

I am not writing a commentary on De Anima. I am discussing the Hard Problem. — Dfpolis

'Active or agent intellect' is a term of art for Aristotle. An adequate discussion of it does not require a commentary on De Anima, but if you claiming that consciousness is the operation of the agent intellect, then it requires a discussion of what Aristotle actually said about it rather than skip over an essential point. If what you mean by agent intellect is what Aristotle said about it then your claim that consciousness is the operation of the agent intellect is the claim that consciousness is deathless and everlasting. Seems like an important point to skip over.

I said it was controversial and offered my argument to resolve the controversy. — Dfpolis

You didn't offer an argument. You simply chose one side.

If we abstract away physical reality, anything can happen — Dfpolis

When talking about physical reality it makes no sense to abstract away physical reality. To abstract away from physical reality and claim that it is logically possible for rocks to become hummingbirds is sophistry.

I am never using Aristotle as an authority. I am crediting him as a source. — Dfpolis

You are doing more than that. You do not simply cite him as a source, your argument is based on his. You refer to him 36 times in the article.

You say in the discussion:

I am an Aristotelian. — Dfpolis

and response to someone

this is not the Aristotelian view. — Dfpolis

By definition, an abstraction focuses on some aspects of experience while prescinding from others. As it is based on experience, it is necessarily a posteriori. — Dfpolis

When you "abstract away physical reality" you are not focusing on some aspect of experience. It is an escape to never never land. There can be no experience of such a world where everything that is not a logical contradiction can and does happen. The claim is not a posteriori.

Its like asking "why previously exited electrons produce a particle out of thin air"....the answer to all this type of questions is "because they do". — Nickolasgaspar

Cool. End of philosophy.

You are confusing the ability to be conscious with the quality of a conscious experience. — Nickolasgaspar

No not it. Rather, how is it that experience is at all, along with biochemical processes. Just the piling on of more biochemical (or any physical) processes is not going to get you closer to that answer. It simply answers the easier problems of what events we can observe correlating with subjectivity/experientialness.

-That is a mental state. Your Central Later Thalamus has the ability to connect different areas of your brain, specialized in Memory/past experience, logic, Abstract thinking, Symbolic language, Critical thinking, Imagination etc and introduce content in that specific mental state....and all this is enabled by your Ascending Reticular Activating System. — Nickolasgaspar

Yeah now you are just making categorical errors all over the place.. You went from "mental state" (the thing in question), to its physical correlates, but no closer to how the correlates ARE the mental state (ontologically). Homunculus here and there and everywhere. You do not seem to be getting the hard problem or are obstinately ignoring it.

-Of course it answers a huge part of that answer and not only that!!!! We can use this knowledge either to force a brain to recreate that specific state, we can read brain scans and based on the brain patter we can accurately (up to 85%) decode the conscious thought of the subject, we have designed Surgery and Medical protocols that can reestablish or improve specific mental states in patients and we can make Accurate diagnoses by looking at the physiology and function of brains and by analyzing the symptoms of a patient's mental states. We can predict mental malfunctions by studying the pathology of brains...and the list goes on. — Nickolasgaspar

So now it really does show you do not know the difference between easy and hard problem and are repeating this error over and over. I can try to explain it better if you want, but I feel that I have in my last post so not sure what else to say but you are not getting it.

-Why gravity has the quality it has...why it pulls but never pushes. Why conductivity manifest solely in metals. Why electricity passing through silicon ICs can produce images on a TFT or LED panel.
Why molecules act differently in different temperatures.
The answer is always "because they do". — Nickolasgaspar

That's not scientific at all. The very thing that is most well known to us (our own subjective experience) you are just saying "It is". Not very scientific. The other stuff you mentioned, ironically can go straight into the realist versus idealist debate for if those phenomena (scientific or otherwise) are anything beyond our empirical observation of it.

Cool. End of philosophy — schopenhauer1

Well the end of Philosophy came with that "why" question. There is nowhere to go from there. If we embrace the right "how/what" question there is plenty of philosophy to be done on available scientific data.
Philosophy's goal is to produce wise claims on available facts and expand our understanding of the world. Fallacious questions don't really serve that purpose.

Rather, how is it that experience is at all, along with biochemical processes. — schopenhauer1

Again a disguised "why" question that doesn't really ask anything meaningful. Why Weak and Strong forces exist?......they just do. Why electricity exists....etc.
Now experience DOESN'T exist as an entity or a force or a substance. Experience is a process enabled by biochemical systems /structures(brain).
We need to be careful not to assume entities when using abstract concepts and to accept observable mechanism that are verified through Strong Correlations.

Just the piling on of more biochemical (or any physical) processes is not going to get you closer to that answer. — schopenhauer1

Even if that was true...How can you ever make claim that? BUt it isn't . For 35 years we have managed to get closer and closer to a descriptive framework about the Necessary and Sufficient role of a biological mechanism in our ability to experience ourself and surroundings.
Denying it is just scientifically wrong. The data are overwhelming.
As Laplace replied to Napoleon's question "where God fits in your model" we can say with certainty " We have no need for that hypothesis, the model works without it".(not only Describes accurate, it Predicts and it offer us Technical Applications)
Necessity and Sufficiency are met...and Chalmer's "why" questions aren't enough to justify any unnecessary entity/process/substance/force (unparsimonious).

It simply answers the easier problems of what events we can observe correlating with subjectivity/experientialness. — schopenhauer1

-Again, a "why question" that doesn't have an answer is not harder....its irrelevant and without meaning.
Teleological fallacies do not qualify as serious questions or helpful to our quest for wisdom....
Again you are committing the same mistake by addressing the quality some personal experiences have, not the actual ability(process) of a thinking organism. You take us back in time when Philosophy and early science were hunting Plogiston, Miasma, Panacea, Orgone Energy and many other discredited substances.

Yeah now you are just making categorical errors all over the place. — schopenhauer1

No I am not, I am pointing to the descriptive framework of a mechanism proven to be Necessary and Sufficient for that specific property to manifest in reality.

You went from "mental state" (the thing in question), to its physical correlates, — schopenhauer1

-No I pointed to Strong Correlations that render specific physical processes Necessary and Sufficient for a mental state to emerge. Strong Correlations in Science are the closest we can get to a proof(philosophy of Science-Paul Hoyningen). Of course Science is not a tool of Logic/mathematics(the other way around) so we can not prove 100% anything. What we can do is to try and falsify our working Hypothesis. For 35-40 years we are constantly failing to falsify and render thes biological mechanisms Unnecessary and Insufficient.
We can not disprove a universal negative (a source of the phenomenon beyond physical mechanisms) so we are forced to reject that claim(Null Hypothesis) and stay within our limits of observations and work with the current scientific paradigm and model. This is Logic 101

but no closer to how the correlates ARE the mental state (ontologically). — schopenhauer1

-For that question you will need to visit Neurosciencenews.org , put the search key phrase "How the brain does" and you will learn the "hows" and "whats" for many mental functions.

Homunculus here and there and everywhere. You do not seem to be getting the hard problem or are obstinately ignoring it. — schopenhauer1

-Again the "hard problem" is a made problem without an answer. We don't have a way to judge the truth value of an answer in favor of a teleological question. In addition to that, Intention and Purpose need to be demonstrated before they are asserted.

So now it really does show you do not know the difference between easy and hard problem and are repeating this error over and over. — schopenhauer1

-No I'm just pointing out that "why" questions (like why there is something rather than nothing) are pseudo philosophical questions. Just because we can not answer them it doesn't mean they are hard. They are nonsensical, fallacious and they are far from the real hard questions of the field.
Try reading Anil Seth's essay on AEON.

I can try to explain it better if you want, but I feel that I have in my last post so not sure what else to say but you are not getting it. — schopenhauer1

-Please do, but I think the problem here is that you ignore the latest science what fallacies are.

That's not scientific at all. The very thing that is most well known to us (our own subjective experience) you are just saying "It is". N — schopenhauer1

Of course it is. In science we are honest enough to say we don't know what gravity is, it behaves the way it does, but we won't make claims about a supernatural source for its properties. We just identity the necessary and sufficient mechanism for the emergence of the phenomenon, do our measurements and math and describe/ predict the phenomenon.
We use the exact same approach for the biological phenomenon of the mind. Its the most honest thing to do.
There is no need to commit an Argument from ignorance fallacy (just because we don't know why neurons have this ability and can't prove a universal negative..we can assume a supernatural source for the mind).

Not very scientific. — schopenhauer1

-Science is based on the Principles of Methodological Naturalism.That means our methods and description can only be within the realm we can observe and investigate and we are forced to keep supernatural explanations outside our frameworks until we are able to verify/falsify them.
So asking a "begging the question" fallacious question is unscientific and irrational.

The other stuff you mentioned, ironically can go straight into the realist versus idealist debate for if those phenomena (scientific or otherwise) are anything beyond our empirical observation of it. — schopenhauer1

-You shouldn't go to that debate. Idealism is a pseudo philosophical worldview that hasn't assisted our Epistemology or Philosophy. Philosophy's first stem is the evaluation of our Epistemology(what we know and how we know it). Unfortunately for idealists, we don't have any knowledge based on Idealistic principles.

Well the end of Philosophy came with that "why" question. There is nowhere to go from there. If we embrace the right "how/what" question there is plenty of philosophy to be done on available scientific data.
Philosophy's goal is to produce wise claims on available facts and expand our understanding of the world. Fallacious questions don't really serve that purpose. — Nickolasgaspar

You are missing his point. Rotating a cube in your mind is a phenomenon. Physiological/biological processes are a phenomenon. They are correlated. Yet that correlation, while no one is doubting its correlation through observation, has it such that a completely new kind of phenomena takes place that is different from all the other physical phenomena. That is, it is the fundamental phenomena of qualitative-ness/ experiential-ness. That such a unique thing exists that is so different than all the physical phenomena is the question. Why should neural networks be correlated with qualatitiveness? A purely physical description would simply be some sort of behaviorism. It would be like AI that has no qualitative experience but has inputs and outputs. But that's not the case, we have experience. You can play ignorant hobbit, and say we don't need to explain that, but then you are just pouting that it is such a hard question and then delegitimizing it because of its difficulty. Well, poo poo, it is a quite difficult question, and thus will remain a thorn in the side of your sour grapes that it cannot be explained. But to make the problem go away by simple fiat that philosophical inquiry just sucks is not going to do anything other than show your feeling about it.


You

Even if that was true...How can you ever make claim that? BUt it isn't . For 35 years we have managed to get closer and closer to a descriptive framework about the Necessary and Sufficient role of a biological mechanism in our ability to experience ourself and surroundings.
Denying it is just scientifically wrong. The data are overwhelming.
As Laplace replied to Napoleon's question "where God fits in your model" we can say with certainty " We have no need for that hypothesis, the model works without it".(not only Describes accurate, it Predicts and it offer us Technical Applications)
Necessity and Sufficiency are met...and Chalmer's "why" questions aren't enough to justify any unnecessary entity/process/substance/force (unparsimonious). — Nickolasgaspar

I don't know the answer to the hard question obviously. But what I do know is that there is a hidden dualism in materialist assumptions. Emergence/integration/binding it doesn't matter your phrasing, it is all stand ins for "magical experience takes place". You are always thus jumping from category physical to category mental activity. The assumption is simply just put there because we know indeed we experience. Nothing is explained otherwise as to the nature of this "experience" other than it is correlated with these physiological correlations.

-For that question you will need to visit Neurosciencenews.org , put the search key phrase "How the brain does" and you will learn the "hows" and "whats" for many mental functions. — Nickolasgaspar

No, again, that is not ontologically how they are one and the same, just that these physical processes correlate to these experiential ones. Those are indeed the easy problems Chalmers mentions.

-Please do, but I think the problem here is that you ignore the latest science what fallacies are. — Nickolasgaspar

Experience the very thing which observes the other phenomena. How is it this is the biological/physical substrate, and if it "arises" from the physical substrates, "what" is this "arising"?

Lectures - talks
Alok Jha: Consciousness, the hard problem? - Presentations
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=313yn0RY9QI

Anil Seth on the Neuroscience of Consciousness, Free Will, The Self, and Perception
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_hUEqXhDbVs — Nickolasgaspar

These talks don't seem to support what you're saying. For example, Anil Seth defines 'consciousness' just in terms of subjective experience, at least to start with.

You are missing his point. Rotating a cube in your mind is a phenomenon. Physiological/biological processes are a phenomenon. They are correlated. Yet that correlation, while no one is doubting its correlation through observation, has it such that a completely new kind of phenomena takes place that is different from all the other physical phenomena — schopenhauer1

-Yes that is his point and I am not saying he is not making that point. I am only saying that his objections are hugely misinformed! All Emergent properties BY DEFINITION do NOT share the same characteristics with mechanisms responsible for their "existence".
Physiological/biological processes are emergent phenomena. life,Metabolism, mitosis,self organization, Photosynthesis etc are emergent properties irrelevant how amazing or impossible they appear to us!

Again, Science doesn't arrive to conclusions through simple correlations. The systematic and methodological nature of Science allow us to identify Strong Correlations between a low level mechanism and its high level features even in complex biological systems. This is what makes those Strong Correlations capable to produce Meaningful Descriptions, Accurate Predictions and Technical applications.!

That is, it is the fundamental phenomena of qualitative-ness/ experiential-ness. — schopenhauer1

You are using way to many abstract concepts for your statement to make any meaning. I will try to break it down in known processes. "Yes the ability of the brain to receive internal or external stimuli through the workings of a complex sensory system and to reflect upon them through the unique biological setup of an organism and a large list of mental properties(memory, reasoning, imagination, symbolic language, pattern recognition etc) renders its role fundamental for our ability to experience the qualities of the worlds subjectively.

That such a unique thing exists that is so different than all the physical phenomena is the question. — schopenhauer1

All emergent phenomena are different from any other phenomenon. i.e. Cellular Self Organization is a unique feature! We just cherry pick the phenomenon experience to produce our narrative for our "special nature" or to justify our death denying ideologies.

Why should neural networks be correlated with qualatitiveness? — schopenhauer1

-Again, "why" questions are not good questions when it comes to understand Natural phenomena.
Neural Networks enable mental properties(like conscious experiences) to emerge. The subjective nature of our conscious experiences depends on:
1.our biological setup. i.e. A super taster(one with a huge number of taste buds on his tongue) finds the experience of spicy foods really bad compared to people with a smaller number of taste buds.
2.our previous experiences. i.e throwing up a meal for irrelevant reasons will make us hate that taste.
3. Physiological Anomalies. Eyes lacking specific color rods are unable to accurate convey the actual information of energy carried by a photons.
Childhood experiences are stronger, stress affects our ability to store info, feelings enhance our abilities to store memories, hormones and receptors work different on different individuals so people tend to experience things differently based on how their limbic system works and whether they had positive or negative childhood experiences.
We can NOT provide answers to those questions without proper scientific knowledge on the relevant mechanisms.

A purely physical description would simply be some sort of behaviorism. — schopenhauer1

-That is a false conclusion.First all we haven't verified any other realm so a physical description is the only thing we can evaluate. Such a description could NEVER be an ism (since it is a description)....It can only be Science.

. It would be like AI that has no qualitative experience but has inputs and outputs. But that's not the case, we have experience. — schopenhauer1

That's a wrong example. AI works on algorithms. We on an other hand work on emotions reasoned in to feelings which in turn inform our Actions.
Mark Solms, the founder of Neuropsychoanalysis in his latest Theory explains how emotions fuel our states and how advanced mental properties like Symbolic language and previous knowledge and experience introduce meaningful content in our conscious experiences.

You can play ignorant hobbit, and say we don't need to explain that, but then you are just pouting that it is such a hard question and then delegitimizing it because of its difficulty. — schopenhauer1

You are not listening , I am not saying "we don't need to explain that". I am only pointing out that "amazing properties" are what matter is capable off. The bigger the complexity of the structure and function is the more advanced these emerging properties get.
Asking ''why'' matter is capable of this thing is a nonsensical question. IF you have a way or a method to go beyond the physical realm (if of course there is a "beyond") and study whatever (if) lies beyond then be my quest.
From the moment you are unable to verify or study anything beyond the Physical realm, you are doomed to speculate without epistemology....and Philosophy without epistemology is Pseudo Philosophy.

Well, poo poo, it is a quite difficult question, and thus will remain a thorn in the side of your sour grapes that it cannot be explained. — schopenhauer1

Again these questions are not hard, they are fallacious (poisoning the well).
Its a huge argument from ignorance fallacy too...since they "create" a fake unknown and they use it as an excuse to introduce magic as a potential answer.

My answer is "we don't know" we can only observe empirical regularity in our Strong Correlations. Specific structures of Matter appear as Necessary and Sufficient for these phenomena .
You on the other hand claim...because we can not prove 100% the ultimate ontology of the phenomenon(ignorance fallacy) and because the phenomenon seems to us completely different (personal incredulity fallacy) we are justified to assume additional dimensions ,realms and agents (argument from magic).
The truth is that biology is not the smallest scale of our world. Its bigger than the quantum scale and the molecular scale. Phenomena like the mind can only emerge in this larger scale (biology).

So there is no reason to assume hidden scales or dimension and reject our current Scientific Paradigm just because we ask the wrong questions.

But to make the problem go away by simple fiat that philosophical inquiry just sucks is not going to do anything other than show your feeling about it. — schopenhauer1

Please, don't project your personal motivation!.I am not the one who really needs to have an answer even if it means to invent a completely new substrate (its not wise to attempt to answer a mystery with a bigger mystery). My approach is cold, scientific and in total agreement with the basic rules and principles of science.
The moment to assume an additional dimension/substance/agent as necessary and sufficient is ONLY after we manage to demonstrate its existence and role...not a second sooner.

I don't know the answer to the hard question obviously. But what I do know is that there is a hidden dualism in materialist assumptions. — schopenhauer1

For that...you will need to talk to materialists. I am not a materialist but a Methodological Naturalist. I reject all metaphysical worldviews and I try to keep out from our epistemology and working hypotheses all metaphysical artifacts that can't be falsified.
And yes I know you don't know the answer of the "hard question" because it doesn't have an answer. Its a "why" question. Teleology is useless when we are trying to understand natural phenomena.

Emergence/integration/binding it doesn't matter your phrasing, it is all stand ins for "magical experience takes place". You are always thus jumping from category physical to category mental activity. — schopenhauer1

-This doesn't make sense. Pls read about Scientific Emergence and Complexity science. It will help you understand the differences between Pragmatic Necessity ( to accept a empirical regular phenomenon without making ontological questions) and Idealistic preferences (making up claims for an assumed underlying ontological mechanism).
In Methodological Naturalism we don't accept made up Substances to explain a phenomenon. We know for decades now its a waste of time. Phlogiston , Miasma, Orgone energy etc etc derailed our efforts to understand the world by assuming these agents responsible for the phenomena in question.
We identify our limits in our observations and within the realm accessible to us we try to construct the best descriptions we can.
Materialists might say "there is nothing beyond Matter" , idealists might say "there is mind beyond matter"....Methodological Naturalists say who cares with your unfalsifiable stories...lets do science and provide justification to our knowledge claims.

You are always thus jumping from category physical to category mental activity. — schopenhauer1

Mental Activity is contingent to physical structure and function. Without the latter you can not have the first.
What may lie beyond our observations is something that both Materialists and Idealists need to justify free from fallacies before bringing their ideologies in Philosophy.

The assumption is simply just put there because we know indeed we experience. Nothing is explained otherwise as to the nature of this "experience" other than it is correlated with these physiological correlations. — schopenhauer1

-You need to study Neuroscience before making those false claims. Again don't talk about "correlations" . Science systematicity doesn't deal with simple correlations.

No, again, that is not ontologically how they are one and the same, just that these physical processes correlate to these experiential ones. Those are indeed the easy problems Chalmers mentions. — schopenhauer1

We Shouldn't care for any assumed, untestable metaphysical ontology.We only care about the observable ontology that enables a phenomenon to manifest in our realm.
You don't know and have no way to prove the existence of an underlying ontology so it is irrational to keep pushing this ideology on the excuse "conscious experience appear to be magical"!

Experience the very thing which observes the other phenomena. How is it this is the biological/physical substrate, and if it "arises" from the physical substrates, "what" is this "arising"? — schopenhauer1

-Be aware of your bad language mode since it derails and pollutes your train of thought. Experience is NOT an agent. Its a label we put on a biological process where sensory systems feed stimuli to the brain and the brain process them in to meaning through the consumption of metabolic molecules and by achieving connections to different brain areas specialized on different properties of mind..
Again you are asking "Why" questions and that is a fallacious practice.
Those questions do not address the same thing with what science tries to explain.
They go beyond our verified realm and ask questions on unobservable and unverifiable ontologies.
This is Pseudo philosophy.

ok bert...........

ok bert........... — Nickolasgaspar

Hi!