My general sense is that you don't seem to take the Russian perception of NATO as a security threat very seriously.

The assumption seems to be, if we just raise the costs for Russia, they will eventually back out of this war because they have no legitimate reason to be in it in the first place.

My question is, how far would this war need to escalate for you to reconsider that position?

As already said, “likelihood” expresses to me an assessment of the degree of confidence. There is no formula about this. Just informal assessment about what I’ve read so far from different sources — neomac


Is there then a reason why you'd expect your "informal assessment" to be the same as anyone else's? You seem affronted by the fact that other people's views are different to yours. If you recognise it's all just "informal assessment" that should be expected. — Isaac

With your initial question, you seem to understand my claim out of its context. I was talking about “likelihood” as applied to expert feedback. This is an informal assessment expressing degree of confidence. That claim doesn’t imply nor presuppose that we all share the same degree of confidence for expert source.
The rest of your comment seems to go back to the reasons why we are here. This is a philosophy forum. A place where people can discuss their reasons for believing certain things and question them. Disagreements are occasions for anybody to review their beliefs and reasons, making them explicit, examine how they link together, find inconsistencies, inefficiencies, holes. And what makes this kind of exchange philosophical to me is that we can dig further into our background assumptions, especially our conceptual frameworks. That’s an intellectual exercise that can be enjoyed as such, without being pressed by any moral, political, affective, humanitarian urge. Like a game. So having opponents is not the problem or reason for animosity. I’ll take it as part of the game I am playing.
I’m just averse to intellectual dishonesty as in any game where rules are breached intentionally.

CSIS — neomac


... seriously?

CSIS is funded largely by Western and Gulf monarchy governments, arms dealers and oil companies, such as Raytheon, Boeing, Shell, the United Arab Emirates, US Department of Defense, UK Home Office, General Dynamics, Exxon Mobil, Northrop Grumman, Chevron and others. — https://fair.org/home/nyt-reveals-think-tank-its-cited-for-years-to-be-corrupt-arms-booster/


WilsonCenter — neomac


... uh huh

Approximately one-third of the center's operating funds come annually from an appropriation from the U.S. government, and the center itself is housed in a wing of the Ronald Reagan Building, a federal office building where the center enjoys a 30-year rent-free lease. — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Woodrow_Wilson_International_Center_for_Scholars


RUSI — neomac


https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/ourbeeb/why-is-bbc-presenting-rusi-as-objective-analysts-of-middle-east/

None of this is difficult to find. You just don't want to find it. — Isaac

By “well reputed” I didn’t mean that they are praised as anti-capitalist heroes by jacobins (here there is a whole package of deep assumptions of yours that would need some reviewing). I meant that in the domain of military/intelligence expertise they are “well reputed“ but if you have better source for military/intelligence expertise (indeed I wrote “(why aren’t they ‘well reputed’? What are better reputed domains-specific sources?)”), you can post it here.
BTW even opendemocracy is financed by grants from funds and trusts in the hands of philanthropic wealthy or ultracapitalists like Soros. And Soros isn’t so “well reputed“ either, is he?

I don’t think that non-US and non-Western administrations and media are immune from accusations about their honesty. The same goes for non-mainstream and anti-system source, not mention that they can absolutely be infiltrated, exploited and financed by foreign powers. What one can infer from such predicament or how we may cope with it is up for debate. — neomac

It's really very, very simple. Don't dismiss dissent from mainstream views as if it were the notions of some conspiratorial nutters.
If mainstream outlets can't be trusted (and they definitely can't) then views which dissent from the mainstream are not compromised simply because of that dissent. It is not a 'mark against them' in terms of credibility. — Isaac

“Mainstream” points to “medium” accessibility/popularity. Lots of academic source is not accessible by the widest audience yet it is trustworthy to me. Also within the “mainstream” world not all sources enjoy the same reputation or popularity. Alternative views, even fringe views, can find their way into the mainstream media. My criteria for placing trust in source of information is not based exclusively nor primarily on the distinction between mainstream and non-mainstream as you seem to suggest. And even in this case, it doesn’t need to be unconditional.
Besides your argument looks questionable for 2 reasons: on one side, it recommends not to be dismissive toward views alternative to the ones spread by mainstream outlets while suggesting to be definitely dismissive toward the mainstream outlets (“mainstream outlets can't be trusted (and they definitely can’t)” as if mainstream outlets are like astrologists). On the other, even if it was true that definitely mainstream outlets can’t be trusted, that doesn’t imply non-mainstream views can definitely be trusted, and notice that your argument is so general that it holds for any alleged non-mainstream view (islamists, nazis, anarchists, satanists, QAnon or flat-earth believers, etc.)

190,000 troops is completely insufficient to control Ukraine. Everyone, even your own preferred experts, seem to agree on that. So we've made some progress. — Tzeentch

No idea why you call it “progress”. I never argued that 190K troops are sufficient to control Ukraine.

Your option - that number is a product of astronomic Russian incompetence and wishful thinking. In other words: "the Russians are dummies".

My option - that number is a product of limited Russian goals. — Tzeentch

Even if the Russians had limited goals since the beginning, their poor execution didn’t shine as a paradigmatic example of military competency.
Russia failed to achieve what was likely its main political objective: to overthrow the Kyiv government in a blitzkrieg military operation. The Russian military also faced significant challenges seizing and holding territory. These problems contributed to the suspension or firing of several senior military officials, such as Lieutenant General Serhiy Kisel, commander of the 1st Guards Tank Army, for dereliction during the offensive against Kharkiv; Lieutenant General Vlaislav Yershov, commander of the 6th Combined Arms Army, for failing to capture Kharkiv; and Vice Admiral Igor Osipov, commander of the Black Sea Fleet, following the sinking of the flagship cruiser Moskva. In addition, roughly a dozen Russian generals and other senior officials were killed on the battlefield, such as Lieutenant General Andrei Mordvichev, Lieutenant General Yakov Rezantsev, Major General Andrei Sukhovetsky, Major General Vitaly Gerasimov, Major General Kanamat Botashev, Major General Andrey Kolesnikov, and Major General Oleg Mityaev.13 These firings and deaths may have exacerbated command and control problems that the Russian military was already experiencing.
Source: https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-ill-fated-invasion-ukraine-lessons-modern-warfare

Still Western source — neomac

Gee, really? You have a problem with western sources now? — Tzeentch

You said “I don't base my arguments on western media sources either.” But you do.

If you rely on the estimate of “21,000 troops” from that report why don’t you rely on the claim “the Russian military’s main effort remains seizing Kyiv in an effort to force the Ukrainian government to capitulate” ? — neomac

Because those estimates are not being contested by anyone, while the claim is.
Are you really going to hide behind random objections like these? This is getting a little childish. — Tzeentch

It’s not random at all. It’s still related to the issue of expert source reliability. I asked several times what your expert sources were. So far, in our recent exchange, you linked Mearsheimer’s video claiming it was supporting your “diversion” hypothesis. But Mearsheimer in the clips you posted didn’t make the argument that 21K troops deployed by the Russians make it outlandish to believe that “Russian military’s main effort remains seizing Kyiv in an effort to force the Ukrainian government to capitulate” in that video. Now you claim that “the Russian military’s main effort remains seizing Kyiv in an effort to force the Ukrainian government to capitulate” has been contested, I’m asking you again: link here the expert source you rely on.

The connection you fail to make is that all these western sources have one thing in common - they all spin the "Russian incompetence" yarn. CSIS, as ↪Isaac
pointed out, is funded by the US government and the DoD - that could be a clear sign of bias, but perhaps it is just something so simple as intellectual arrogance or tunnel vision.
In any case, the contradictions in their analysis are plain for all to see, and I've been pointing them out repeatedly. — Tzeentch

What doesn’t square in their analysis is “plain to see” if one shares your assumptions about how Russians might have planned this operation. But your assumptions can be questioned, without you being able to provide direct evidence that Russians had just the limited objectives you specified from the start. Yours remain guess work as mine.
Even if there is a “Russian incompetence” argument to spin (which I don’t need to exclude, after all “truth is the first casualty in war“), this is something the Russians should have taken into account in their years of preparation for this war. Wars are most certainly a showcase of military/intelligence/technological competence by geopolitical agents with hegemonic ambitions. And Russian poor performance on the ground plus Putin’s military/intelligence purges reinforced their infamous image of corrupted and incompetent system of power with foolish hegemonic ambitions. The poor execution of their maskirovka operation not only kind of squanders the credit of a smarter plan with limited goals but it also backlashed against their chances for a successful negotiation and a reputational promotion of their military power.
Not to mention that also the pro-Russian propaganda my be interested to spin the “feint” argument to minimise the reputational costs Russians have suffered on the ground.

Let's do a quick recap:

190,000 troops were insufficient to control large parts of Ukraine.
You argue instead that the Russians' main goal was to control Ukraine by installing a puppet in Kiev.
My objection to this is along two lines:

> A puppet regime is completely unfeasible under conditions that were known prior to the invasion. The amount of western influence in Ukraine, the threat of a western-backed insurgency, the lack of troops to maintain control, etc. Your experts at CSIS seem to believe a Russian puppet would have "lasted hours."

> The northern drive on Kiev in no way indicates either in its troop count or behavior that it comprised the Russians' main effort. If that had been the case we would have expected to see an attempt to overwhelm the Ukrainian defense through massed forces and firepower.

Note: I did not claim the drive was too small to capture Kiev, though it was likely too small to capture Kiev if any sizable Ukrainian defense was present, which likely there was since it's the Ukrainian capital, though the Ukrainian order of battle remains undisclosed.
Nor did I argue that the Russians didn't want Kiev. Just that the troop count and behavior does not imply the Russians were prepared to pay much of a cost to capture it, which in turn implies it was not of a high priority.

My alternative to this theory is as follows:

> Given the Russians' relatively low troop count in relation to the size of Ukraine and the Ukrainian military, their ambitions were likely limited to occupying strategically relevant areas in the south and east of Ukraine. Occupying small pieces of Ukraine mitigates the risk of insurgency.

> The drive on Kiev likely had multiple possible goals, the first of which was probably to try and force the West to negotiate. If this failed, the attack would still be functioning as a diversion to lure Ukrainian defenders away from the strategically relevant areas in the east/south. Had the Ukrainians left their capital largely undefended in favor of defending the east/south, Kiev could have been captured.

I've said all I have to say on the topic. I don't think further exchanges will yield much fruit, so I will leave it here. I suggest you try to make your case succinctly one last time like I did with my recap, so we end the conversation with a nice summary from both sides. — Tzeentch

What is missing in your recap is that you consider outlandish my view while I can acknowledge to your speculation some plausibility plus the benefit of being at least more economic (which doesn’t necessarily mean more plausible). So I might just add that a series of facts (like the assassination attempts against Zelensky, purges from Putin and Zelensky against high ranks in military and/or intelligence service, heavy losses of the Russian operation, Putin’s and Yanukovic’s calls, expert reports from CSIS, Wilson Centre, RUSI) and some background assumptions (like an economic/military/political network between Ukraine and Russia, an “illegally” ousted Ukrainian president to reinstate, besides the hazardous nature of Putin’s geopolitical ambitions and personalistic chain of command) support the idea (shared by Mearsheimer too!) that Russians might have actually tried to pursue regime change in the earliest phase of the war.

YouTube versus Seymour Hersh aside, this bit ...

Let me pass on his tale and then make the connection with Hersh’s exposé of the Biden regime’s Nord Stream op and the other cases I have mentioned. — Patrick Lawrence (Feb 20, 2023)

... isn't quite where Lawrence says.

No conclusive evidence Russia is behind Nord Stream attack
^{— Shane Harris, John Hudson, Missy Ryan, Michael Birnbaum, Souad Mekhennet, Meg Kelly · The Washington Post · Dec 21, 2022}

The Nord Stream incident is less clear, which kind of makes it more interesting. (I'm still not quite convinced the saboteur(s) must be a state actor, for that matter.) Puzzle... — Feb 21, 2023

Anyway, censorship being bad might be another reason the Ukrainians aren't into being ruled by the GKremlin?

Me personally, ...? I'm rather inconsequential, irrelevant, insignificant.

My general sense is that you don't seem to take the Russian perception Putin's claims of NATO as a security threat very seriously. — Tzeentch

I couldn't say exactly, but seriously enough I suppose, though not just (supposed) NATO-phobia, as per ↑ the thread. Back to this comment, this, this, ... (repeats). :/
In the same round, would Putin risk Russia over southeast Ukraine (perhaps by unleashing the nukes)...? Don't know, but I'd be surprised if Jane and Joe Russian would. Unfortunately, we can't free (their access) and ask them.

EDIT:

The UN isn't quite as inconsequential irrelevant insignificant as me. I don't know if anyone thinks they're a bunch of airheads, but here's a report from their assembly today (Feb 22, 2023) on the topic. The message is clear enough.

What's your (anyone's) take?

Disagreements are occasions for anybody to review their beliefs and reasons, making them explicit, examine how they link together, find inconsistencies, inefficiencies, holes. And what makes this king of exchange philosophical to me is that we can dig further into our background assumptions, especially our conceptual frameworks. — neomac

Bollocks. You've done none of those activities. All you've done is use the spectre of them to pour cold water on any counter-arguments you don't like. For example...

here there is a whole package of deep assumptions of yours that would need some reviewing — neomac

... is typical of your responses. No actual review, no actual analysis, and God forbid any comparison to your own assumptions. Just enough distraction to blunt the point that you have used US government funded sources to back up US government policy.

BTW even opendemocracy is financed by grants from funds and trusts in the hands of philanthropic wealthy or ultracapitalists like Soros. And Soros isn’t so “well reputed“ either, is he? — neomac

Indeed. And if ever I was arguing in favour of the General Theory of Reflexivity I wouldn't cite a Soros-funded think tank in support of such an argument as it would be obviously at risk of bias.

You cited US government funded think tanks to support your belief in a US government policy. It's not just intellectually dishonest, it downright dumb. You seriously think that an organisation funded by the US government and arms manufacturers is going to give you an honest assessment of the state of the war in which both are intimately involved?

My criteria for placing trust in source of information is not based exclusively nor primarily on the distinction between mainstream and non-mainstream as you seem to suggest. — neomac

No indeed, it also seems predicated on the extent to which they support your pre-existing ideas.

Besides your argument looks questionable for 2 reasons: on one side, it recommends not to be dismissive toward views alternative to the ones spread by mainstream outlets while suggesting to be definitely dismissive toward the mainstream outlets (“mainstream outlets can't be trusted (and they definitely can’t)” as if mainstream outlets are like astrologists). — neomac

How is that questionable. I'm saying don't trust mainstream outlets on certain issues because they're funded by the people who benefit from the issue in question. There's no contradiction there, no error of fact. So in what way is it "questionable"?

even if it was true that definitely mainstream outlets can’t be trusted, that doesn’t imply non-mainstream views can definitely be trusted — neomac

Absolutely. Which would be why I never made such a claim.

your argument is so general that it holds for any alleged non-mainstream view (islamists, nazis, anarchists, satanists, QAnon or flat-earth believers, etc.) — neomac

No it doesn't. I'm referring here solely to the use of expert opinion. Not lay opinion. If you can find me an expert in geology who thinks the earth is flat we can have that discussion, otherwise this is just more straw-manning. We hear this garbage argument every time someone brings up an alternative perspective; it's like you guys just pick these off the shelf.

Anyway, censorship being bad might be another reason the Ukrainians aren't into being ruled by the GKremlin? — jorndoe

Then why make (and benefit form allies who make) such copious use of it? It's clearly nonsense to say that a group of people are so opposed to censorship that they're willing to risk their lives to avoid it whilst at the same time use it to greater extents than we've seen since McCarthyism.

Me personally, ↪Tzeentch...? — jorndoe

Yea, why not?

I think your view that the war in Ukraine doesn't represent genuine Russian security concerns is the prevailing view in the West.

The worry I have with that view is that it seems to ignore the risk of escalation, because Russian threats of escalation are seen as a bluff by Putin.

My view is that this war does in some ways represent genuine Russian security concerns and that the risk of (nuclear) escalation is not trivial.

So my question is, should we continue to push Russia to escalate until eventually we get to the point they can no longer back up their 'bluffs'?

And is there any escalation big enough that would convince you the Russians aren't bluffing?

Since I think your view is the prevailing one, by asking you I am trying to get a sense of how close we might be to the precipice.

In the same round, would Putin risk Russia over southeast Ukraine (perhaps by unleashing the nukes)...? — jorndoe

How close do we want to get in order to find an answer to that question?

Would the United States have used nuclear weapons over Cuba?

I don't know. I'm glad we never found out.

The doomsday clock is now closer to midnight than it was back then.

The UN isn't quite as inconsequential irrelevant insignificant as me. I don't know if anyone thinks they're a bunch of airheads, but here's a report from their assembly today (Feb 22, 2023) on the topic. The message is clear enough.

What's your (anyone's) take? — jorndoe

What I would be looking for are the voting patterns and statements of BRICS countries and nations that have expressed interest in becoming part of BRICS or the BRICS development bank (NBD), because I think these nations represent a growing dissatisfaction with the western 'world order' ran out of Washington, and seem increasingly interested in forming a formal economic and political coalition against it.

Interesting take on various relevant subjects by a retired US Army Colonel.

the further we get from a plausible negotiating position on either side, which literally every expert consulted agrees is the only way out of this. — Isaac

The Treaty of Portsmouth is a perfect example what Russians can do when their war doesn't go the way they hoped.

Disagreements are occasions for anybody to review their beliefs and reasons, making them explicit, examine how they link together, find inconsistencies, inefficiencies, holes. And what makes this king of exchange philosophical to me is that we can dig further into our background assumptions, especially our conceptual frameworks. — neomac

Bollocks. You've done none of those activities. All you've done is use the spectre of them to pour cold water on any counter-arguments you don't like. For example...

here there is a whole package of deep assumptions of yours that would need some reviewing — neomac

... is typical of your responses. No actual review, no actual analysis, and God forbid any comparison to your own assumptions. Just enough distraction to blunt the point that you have used US government funded sources to back up US government policy. — Isaac

As usual, you put most of your intellectual effort in caricaturing me the way it suits you. It’s expected and boring to read, but it’s still an occasion to denounce your intellectual dishonesty.
I was making a general point there. And this is supported by what I have done in several past exchanges: conerning the clarification of my conceptual framework, e.g. I discussed my understanding of moral claims (with you a while back, almost at the beginning of our exchange in this thread), of the relation between morality and power in my infamous “wall of text”, of the way I understand my contributions here with its implied limits and possibility of agreement (about the meaning of the words, evidence-based reasoning, expert feedback). I also take my time to clarify my terminology when needed.
But of course I can’t expand on all points at the same time at any moment and with all the interlocutors (you may have missed a bunch of my points with other interlocutors). Even more so if on the other side there is an interlocutor who shifts the burden back to his opponent when invited to clarify his own deepest assumptions [1] , and who accuses his opponent to write “wall of texts” to provide the requested clarifications.
Not to mention that I’m not here to entertain you, I’m here to entertain myself.

BTW even opendemocracy is financed by grants from funds and trusts in the hands of philanthropic wealthy or ultracapitalists like Soros. And Soros isn’t so “well reputed“ either, is he? — neomac

Indeed. And if ever I was arguing in favour of the General Theory of Reflexivity I wouldn't cite a Soros-funded think tank in support of such an argument as it would be obviously at risk of bias.
You cited US government funded think tanks to support your belief in a US government policy. It's not just intellectually dishonest, it downright dumb. You seriously think that an organisation funded by the US government and arms manufacturers is going to give you an honest assessment of the state of the war in which both are intimately involved? — Isaac

OK let’s dig deeper into my conceptual assumptions.
First, it’s in the nature of the division of labor (material and intellectual) that there are cognitive asymmetries and conflict of interests. Cognitive asymmetries and conflict of interests are practically pervasive and overwhelming in a complex society like ours, and they may facilitate abuses depending on the circumstances (i.e. there are implied social or institutional costs in case of abuse). Somebody selling products and services may be prone to a dishonest marketing, but also consumers consuming products and services may be prone to dishonest reviewing. We can’t a-priori exclude that dishonest dispositions are present in anybody when their self-interest is concerned in any competition over scarce resources. And self-interest is very cheap to guess: e.g. Mearsheimer is an academic professional that has a self-interest in selling his theories as the best on the market, jacobins are militant agents self-interested in promoting their ideology as the best on the market, you are self-interested in promoting you as the the smartest guy in this forum. ===> Hence you can not impress me by denouncing some conflict of interest.
Second, when we have to cope with cognitive asymmetries plus conflict of interests, we are compelled to develop some trusting strategy (and trust doesn’t need to be unconditional) over time to prevent possible abuses of our trust. These strategies comprise informal cost/benefit assessments, risk/opportunity assessments for competition and cooperation, and through several iterations (dense and extended as anybody’s personal intellectual and social life) they end up building relatively stable informational social networks/channels. The point is that it’s part of our social survival to be able to integrate into our proximate informational habitat, and as long as we live in a Western capitalist society under the American hegemony we can’t likely spare ourselves from integrating with the available informational network/channels that this habitat offers to us (not matter how critical or self-aware we can possible be about this) ===> Hence you can not impress me by claiming I can’t definitely trust X because it’s an agent of American capitalism.
Third, in our society mainstream and non-mainstream media are mostly controlled either by government or capitalists. Even academic expertise is financed and marketed by government or capitalists, and in each domain pool of experts can self-organise in enterprises that government and economic agents can rely on, because it’s functional to their activity. Even anti-system and fringe informational network like the jacobins’ can be supported by political/economic forces antagonising government or capitalists, NOT because they want or can fix the world injustice but because they want to grab power. ===> Hence you can not impress me by saying expert views that conflict with dominant economic/political elites’ main narrative are more trustworthy because they are not financed/supported by dominant economic/political elites.
Fourth, since there is a “physiological” drive for self-perpetuation in any power system and practically any ideology needs power to win over the competition, it’s important for us to understand how agents of any power system reasons over power ===> Hence it's not just intellectually dishonest, but also downright dumb to take political/economic elites’ narratives (like US government funded think tanks to support your belief in a US government policy) exclusively as a function of a specific ideology or specific power system, and “deconstruct” them accordingly. It’s intellectually dishonest because ANY ideology needs power to be promoted (jacobins included), it’s downright dumb because such narratives offer relevant clues on how ANY power system could reason as a function of power needs in similar conditions (e.g. security dilemmas, militarisation, technological/military/intelligence performance, and how economic, demographic, social factors can shape them etc.)

Besides your argument looks questionable for 2 reasons: on one side, it recommends not to be dismissive toward views alternative to the ones spread by mainstream outlets while suggesting to be definitely dismissive toward the mainstream outlets (“mainstream outlets can't be trusted (and they definitely can’t)” as if mainstream outlets are like astrologists). — neomac

How is that questionable. I'm saying don't trust mainstream outlets on certain issues because they're funded by the people who benefit from the issue in question. There's no contradiction there, no error of fact. So in what way is it "questionable"? — Isaac

It’s questionable because it generically suggests a trusting strategy that discriminates between mainstream and non-mainstream outlets on the preposterous ground that a conflict of interest suffices to make the point. It’s like me saying: your baker has a conflict of interest in marketing his products, and for that reason he definitely can’t be trusted, you better go to a fruit shop.

even if it was true that definitely mainstream outlets can’t be trusted, that doesn’t imply non-mainstream views can definitely be trusted — neomac

Absolutely. Which would be why I never made such a claim. — Isaac

But it was implicated in what you claimed. If you suggest that mainstream should definitely not be trusted because X has conflict of interest better listen to non-mainstream, the implicature is that latter is worth trusting. The problem is that the latter too may have conflict of interests.

your argument is so general that it holds for any alleged non-mainstream view (islamists, nazis, anarchists, satanists, QAnon or flat-earth believers, etc.) — neomac

No it doesn't. I'm referring here solely to the use of expert opinion. Not lay opinion. If you can find me an expert in geology who thinks the earth is flat we can have that discussion, otherwise this is just more straw-manning. We hear this garbage argument every time someone brings up an alternative perspective; it's like you guys just pick these off the shelf. — Isaac

I didn’t commit a strawman, because you are clarifying now what you meant before, and I warned you already several times about the fact that your general objections are decontextualised wrt the current exchange.
So if you want to be better understood, you better make a bigger effort in that direction. Indeed, your accusation is still without clear reference:
No idea what you are referring to. In our most recent exchange Tzeentch didn’t point at any expert source for his “diversion” hypothesis, except for Mearsheimer. But we interpret Mearsheimer somewhat differently. In any case, I didn’t claim that Mearsheimer is running pro-Russian propaganda, nor deny that what he says in that video should be discounted or ignored.
Besides if Tzeentch can question experts, I can do the same. But, for the moment, he is the one questioning the experts I’m citing, while I’m just defending them.
You opportunistically jump into an exchange I had with another interlocutor to resume your most general objections in such a completely decontextualised way that demotivates any attempt to answer. For example, can you quote claims or objections of mine where your conditional (“if you want to claim 'likelihood' you need to show how your sources are more likely to be right than others”) is supposed to apply? Because I have no idea.
Source: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/782980
In any case, feel free to post here military/intelligence experts that have a different view wrt mainstream narrative about Putin’s objectives in the first phase of the war.

[1]

It’s important you answer those questions because you are the one who claimed “the rich oppress the poor far more consistently than one nation oppresses another” and believes it’s pertinent in the debate about the war in Ukraine. — neomac

Your argument relies on this not being the case, so it is incumbent on you (if you want to support your argument) to disprove it. I’ve not interest in supporting my case here (I don't even believe it's possible to support such a case in a few hundred words on an internet forum, and even if I did, I wouldn't make such a case as I've no expertise in the matter). — Isaac

Besides your argument looks questionable for 2 reasons: on one side, it recommends not to be dismissive toward views alternative to the ones spread by mainstream outlets while suggesting to be definitely dismissive toward the mainstream outlets (“mainstream outlets can't be trusted (and they definitely can’t)” as if mainstream outlets are like astrologists). — neomac

When your argument is weak, that is something that you have to do.

Comes very well to mind how on this thread people believed Putin and laughed at American and Western warnings that Russia was going to invade Ukraine. The "alternative outlets" believed (as some PF members) that this was just hype that US was manufacturing.

Scott Ritter on prior to the Russian invasion (in December 2021): Russia won't invade Ukraine, it's a manufactured crisis (by the West) and if there would be war between Russia and Ukraine, Russia would defeat Ukraine in 6 to 7 days (If Ukraine made an attack in the Donbas). And so on...

Scott Ritter on prior to the Russian invasion (in December 2021): Russia won't invade Ukraine, it's a manufactured crisis (by the West) and if there would be war between Russia and Ukraine, Russia would defeat Ukraine in 6 to 7 days (If Ukraine made an attack in the Donbas). And so on... — ssu

what a guy:
On April 6, 2022, Ritter was suspended from Twitter for violating its rule on "harassment and abuse" after he posted a tweet claiming that the National Police of Ukraine is responsible for the Bucha massacre https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scott_Ritter

Am I the only person out here who feels that there is plenty of blame to spread around on both sides for causing this tragedy?

You might be surprised that the countries comprising the majority of the world's population (China, India, Brazil, Pakistan, among others) do not seem to believe in the one-sided image of this war that is so dominant in the western media.

So no, you're not the only person. Though, if you're been reading western newspapers I don't blame you for feeling that way.

Am I the only person out here who feels that there is plenty of blame to spread around on both sides for causing this tragedy? — EricH

Please inform us what blame the Ukrainians have / the country of Ukraine has for this war.

The one "blame" I can think of is being so naive to give it's nuclear deterrence away and trust Russia (and the US and UK) for sticking to treaties they have signed. (In fact, Mearsheimer's earlier argument).

Yet I wouldn't blame a country of being so naive that believing when one Superpower, one ex-Superpower and a great power promise to uphold your territorial sovereignty.

I think the NATO expansion argument has been quite extensively been discussed. Very enthusiastically from a small part of the crowd here.

One year mark.

Few to go?

Depends on who wins the US presidential election in 2024, right?

I guess I wasn't clear. When I said "out here"? That was directed at the folks engaging back and forth conversations here in the forum. There seem to be two prevailing positions I would summarize:

Putin/Russia bad --- USA/Ukraine good.
USA bad --- Ukraine a pawn --- Putin/Russia forced into doing bad things.

Yeah, yeah - this is over simplifying and there are a thousand and one details/nuances. But as I read the back & forth conversations? Both sides make some legit points - hence my comment that both sides share blame.

It is interesting how there are no Europeans in your summary.

The thing that is being ignored is that none of us are Russian.

This isn't about blame. It's about what we can do (or pressure our leaders to do) to end this war.

All those who want to do nothing but talk about how bad Russia are are basically deciding not to help. If only one country is to blame, then only one can do anything about it. That's not our country, so we just sit back in our armchairs and wait.

Since we are, almost universally, Europeans and Americans, the only relevant question right now is what course of action do we need to campaign for.

We can tally up the score of who caused what when the shelling has stopped. Right now, anything that isn't actively trying to stop it is a waste of time.

Depends on who wins the US presidential election in 2024, right? — frank

Oooh... the omnipotent American President and the godly powers that he has to fix things in the World. Or create every problem there is or has been. Right? :smirk:

One year into a war instigated and prolonged by the United States.

Looks like China is pushing for a ceasefire. So that’s how grown-ups behave…

Anyway— how disappointing it is that the majority in this thread refuse to question the Western narrative, even if it appears to them 99.9% obvious and certain. Given this is a philosophy forum and all.

I think it shows how reading a lot of philosophy books is probably a complete waste of time for most people. C’est la vie.

frank
Oooh... the omnipotent American President and the godly powers that he has to fix things in the World. Or create every problem there is or has been. Right? :smirk: — ssu

Pretty much, yeah. :cool:

Please inform us what blame the Ukrainians have / the country of Ukraine has for this war. — ssu

Pretending the world is something it's not.

I ought not have to worry about bad drivers, but if I send my kids out to play in the road, are you seriously suggesting I share none of the blame if an accident happens?

Ukraine ought to be able to enjoy its sovereignty without being threatened by powerful neighbours. Pretending that's how the world is when it blatantly isn't is reckless.

But then everyone knew that, back before we had to pretend we live in Disneyland.

Anyway— how disappointing it is that the majority in this thread refuse to question the Western narrative, even if it appears to them 99.9% obvious and certain. Given this is a philosophy forum and all. — Mikie

The issue is 99.9% obvious and certain for you. Any disagreement could only be ventured upon by complete morons.

It is rare to see a point of view so convincingly presented.

One year into a war instigated and prolonged by the United States.

The issue is 99.9% obvious and certain for you. — Paine

That's not even 99.9%. No room for questioning of the narrative is left here.

On the other hand, this isn't much better:

Yeah, yeah - this is over simplifying and there are a thousand and one details/nuances. But as I read the back & forth conversations? Both sides make some legit points - hence my comment that both sides share blame. — EricH

I understand that not everyone is invested into this issue to the same extent. But if you are not willing to make the effort, then the honest response to a controversy should not be "I don't know enough to have an informed opinion, so I'll just split the difference."

One year mark.

Few to go? — ssu

Lots of analyses and retrospectives in the press, as one would expect.

FT published a large investigation with juicy details: How Putin blundered into Ukraine — then doubled down (open access for now, or use this link: txtify.it). Some accord with what was already known or supposed (only a very narrow circle knew anything about the invasion right up until the fateful date). Some are pretty sensational: "According to two people close to the Kremlin, Putin has already gamed out the possibility of using a nuclear weapon in Ukraine and has come to the conclusion that even a limited strike would do nothing to benefit Russia."

As ever, this is all based on anonymous insider information, so use your sound judgement.

The Financial Times spoke to six longtime Putin confidants as well as people involved in Russia’s war effort, and current and former senior officials in the west and Ukraine for this account of how Putin blundered his way into the invasion — then doubled down rather than admit his mistake. All of them spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive matters. — FT

The issue is 99.9% obvious and certain for you. — Paine

It’s not close to being 99.9% certain and obvious to me.

Whatever point you’re trying to make — if there is one — utterly fails. Both as sarcasm or satire.

But thanks for proving my point.

Statement: “Even if 99.9% certain, one should question.”

Response: “You’re 99.9% certain!”

Maybe Twitter’s influence.

Ukraine ought to be able to enjoy its sovereignty without being threatened by powerful neighbours. Pretending that's how the world is when it blatantly isn't is reckless. — Isaac

Unless you are confusing "ought" claims with "is" claims, aren't you?