I'm not surprised. — Banno
You prefer a dualism? Then its over to you to explain the link between the two. How a decision moves a hand, and a bottle of plonk changes a decision. — Banno
Demonstrably, Isaac and his friends do stand outside of the act of cognition, looking in. — Banno
The modern mind-body problem arose out of the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century, as a direct result of the concept of objective physical reality that drove that revolution. Galileo and Descartes made the crucial conceptual division by proposing that physical science should provide a mathematically precise quantitative description of an external reality extended in space and time, a description limited to spatiotemporal primary qualities such as shape, size, and motion, and to laws governing the relations among them. Subjective appearances, on the other hand -- how this physical world appears to human perception -- were assigned to the mind, and the secondary qualities like color, sound, and smell were to be analyzed relationally, in terms of the power of physical things, acting on the senses, to produce those appearances in the minds of observers. It was essential to leave out or subtract subjective appearances and the human mind -- as well as human intentions and purposes -- from the physical world in order to permit this powerful but austere spatiotemporal conception of objective physical reality to develop. — Nagel, Mind and Cosmos
In recent years, therefore, “direct realism” has been usually reserved for the view that perceptual experience is constituted by the subject’s standing in certain relations to external objects, where this relation is not mediated by or analyzable in terms of further, inner states of the agent. Thus, the brain in the vat could not have the same experiences as a normal veridical perceiver, because experience is itself already world-involving. — Stanford
The transformations you listed are transformations of the perceiver, not the perceived. Until perceivers no longer have nerves and nerve signals, it cannot be said that these are transformations of anything else, let alone forms or sense datum. — NOS4A2
My diagnosis is that hereabouts - that is, on this forum - there are folk who begin by dividing things into a private world and a public world. They sometimes phrase this as internal vs external, or object vs subject, first person vs third person, and so on. They then proceed to conclude that there are two worlds, or to collapse the whole of the "external" world to some internal characteristic - the will, for example. they think they have presented an argument for one of the varieties of idealism when all they have done is to assume idealism. — Banno
The Philosophy of Perception and the Bad Argument. — Banno
The crucial step in the argument from illusion as stated is step 4. The step that says you do see something even in the hallucinatory case. But that is a mistake. In the ordinary sense of ‘see’ in which I now see the tree, in the hallucinatory case I do not see anything. That is what makes it a hallucination. The visual experience in the two cases can be exactly the same, by stipulation. But in one case some-thing is seen and in the second case nothing is seen. But surely one might say you did see something. It was after all a visual experience.I think we can introduce a sense of ‘see’ to describe our visual experiences but that sense of ‘see’ is quite different from the ordinary sense because the truth of the statement does not imply that there really is an independently existing object seen. Indeed, I want to make a strong claim now. Though the visual experience definitely exists, it is not and cannot itself be seen. When you consciously see something you have a visual experience but you do not see it. This is not because it is invisible but because in the veridical case it is the seeing of the object. And the seeing cannot itself be seen. In the hallucinatory case the experience, by stipulation, is exactly the same, but it is not a seeing but a seeming to see. Because it is a hallucination nothing is seen. In the hallucinatory case, there is no independently existing object causing the experience. — Searle
Then its over to you to explain the link between the two. How a decision moves a hand, and a bottle of plonk changes a decision. — Banno
A decision moves a hand intentionally, as we are capable of intentional action, and intoxication affects your judgement and also your motor skills. — Wayfarer
The contact between perceiver and perceived is direct, therefor his perception of the perceived is direct. — NOS4A2
Yep.but I don't hold out much hope of it's penetrating the darkness here. — Isaac
Yep.The important point (which your naive version misses) is that this 'making up' is part of the process of perceiving the tree and is predictive of the tree. It's not an indication that we perceive something other than the tree because if that were the case, there'd be no inference, no modelling, no testing and improving of models because there's be no access to an external uncertain state against which to test the model. — Isaac
You want me to defend direct realism, but insist in misdefining it. I have no need to play with your scarecrow.
Consider:
In recent years, therefore, “direct realism” has been usually reserved for the view that perceptual experience is constituted by the subject’s standing in certain relations to external objects, where this relation is not mediated by or analyzable in terms of further, inner states of the agent. Thus, the brain in the vat could not have the same experiences as a normal veridical perceiver, because experience is itself already world-involving.
— Stanford
Or instead of intentionalist or adverbialist views, should we we talk of disjunctivism, behaviouralism, functionalism?
Or embedded or embodied minds?
Or you could pay some attention to ↪Wayfarer's view, which will be more amenable to your anachronistic philosophical stand than anything I might offer you. — Banno
Representations, what more can be/should be said about them? — Agent Smith
Direct realism, how can it be proven to be better than idealism? — Agent Smith
That they aren't in the head. — bongo fury
In my mind the “internal stages” are a part of the perceiver and thus mediated by him. I don’t see why we need to include some other intermediary. If there is no intermediary the perception is direct. — NOS4A2
There is no mitigating factor or intermediary between perceiver and perceived, therefor the perception is not indirect. — NOS4A2
One of the strengths that folk ascribe to this idea that we "directly perceive sense data" is the certainty that they can not be in error. This is the great appeal. However, I don't believe that the veracity of this idea can be proven, and the idea itself incoheren — Richard B
Can you elaborate on this, defining instantiation here, and property and why one instantiation of property is not property? — schopenhauer1
"What is an event that is unperceived.................what does that even mean for space and time to be a placeholder for an event sans perceiver?" — schopenhauer1
he doesn't explain how one knows whether one's visual experience is an hallucination or a veridical visual experience — RussellA
when seeing a broken window on one's walk to work, it is impossible to know just from the broken window what caused it to break, just by having the perception of a green tree in one's mind it is impossible to know what caused that perception. — RussellA
Nothing interferes along the route and nothing is made up because there is no end state or product of perception in the body. There is no model, no modelling, and nothing analogous to it occurring in there. There is no perception, sense data, bundle of sensations. There is no hypothesizing, constructing, inferencing, predictive processing occurring anywhere between the perceiver and the perceived, nor any in the perceiver as well. — NOS4A2
The intermediaries you speak of are in the environment, which is still directly accessible, and therefor still entails direct realism. You seem to be stuck on this point. — NOS4A2
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