Anything internal is me, though. What else mediates it? — NOS4A2

Depends what you mean by 'mediate'. Again, if you don't want to make a distinction between conscious mediation and subconscious mediation then the distinction between direct realism and indirect realism will be irrelevant. The distinction is very much about such a distinction.

Do you believe that from this position there is a 'reality as it is in itself' or do you consider such a term incoherent - 'reality' being a constructivist process, dependent on a point of view for its meaning? — Tom Storm

The latter. I think what we call 'reality', or 'the world' is the construction. The external states are just a theorised cause of that reality, a model of how it might have come about.

I think it's a kind of category error to call the theorised external states 'reality'. After all, they themselves can, by this very theory, only be a prediction.

Makes sense. Cheers.

Depends what you mean by 'mediate'. Again, if you don't want to make a distinction between conscious mediation and subconscious mediation then the distinction between direct realism and indirect realism will be irrelevant. The distinction is very much about such a distinction.

I’m trying to distinguish between the perceiver and what he perceives. Perception is either mediated by the perceiver, and thus direct, or it is mediated by something else, thus indirect. I think this problem can be illuminated by answering the question, “who perceives what”?

What does the perceiver directly perceive? When I see a photo of a tree, I indirectly perceive the tree, but directly perceive the photo, for example.

I’m trying to distinguish between the perceiver and what he perceives. — NOS4A2

I respect that, but it's a very deep question. I'm suggesting that the way you're going about it is in terms of trying to assume a perspective or point of view outside both perceiver and perceived. You're trying to imagine the issue in objective terms. But you can't do that, because you're inextricably part of the picture. To quote a hackneyed phrase by Max Planck, 'Science cannot solve the ultimate mystery of nature. And that is because, in the last analysis, we ourselves are a part of the mystery that we are trying to solve.'

The way I'm approaching it is through nondualism. It starts with a recognition of the fact that 'the eye cannot see itself'. Of course there’s then a lot more too it, but it’s a very different mindset to that of the objective sciences, although it can be understood as being complementary to them. You find some of those in e.g. the ‘consciousness conferences’ of David Chalmers et al.

I'm suggesting that the way you're going about it is in terms of trying to assume a perspective or point of view outside both perceiver and perceived. You're trying to imagine the issue in objective terms. — Wayfarer

Given how often we come back to this key conceptual frame there really ought to be a simple 'sticky' on it here. Many people find it hard to conceptualize. I got there through French thinker Michel Bitbol. It takes repetition and a speculative imagination.

The way I'm approaching it is through nondualism. — Wayfarer

Which is a non-physicalist monism. Do you have a useful definition of reality that comes out of this model or do you think 'reality' is a vexed term?

Non-dualism - not two or non-divided - is not necessarily monistic in outlook. Buddhist non-dualism is not monistic, it doesn’t assert a unity to which all returns.

I think Michel Bitbol is a good source - incidentally I found his writings through this forum. But also @Joshs has a lot of understanding of the phenomenological approach. It’s not the same as the non-dual approach, but there’s an emerging consensus, arising from the seminal book The Embodied Mind (Thomson Varela et al) which attempted to combine elements of both.

Non-dualism - not two or non-divided - is not necessarily monistic in outlook. — Wayfarer

That's an important point I wasn't aware of.

It’s true; I do assume that perspective because I can witness both perceiver and perceived from outside their relationship, and see only direct interaction. But I also assume it subjectively because I can find no intermediary between me and the rest of the world. Whether through thick-headedness or naïveté, I cannot pretend that that is not what is occurring and assume some other relationship.

An excellent series of posts.

Seems to me that commences with, and insists on, a division between perceiver and perceived. But your replies, Isaac, show this not to be the case.

I’m trying to distinguish between the perceiver and what he perceives. — NOS4A2

If Isaac is right then such a distinction cannot, on close examination, be maintained. The Cartesian Theatre is an illusion.

'the eye cannot see itself'. — Wayfarer

Seems to me that that is what a mirror is for. That is, once we see that "we ourselves are a part of the mystery that we are trying to solve" we might be able to take that into account, to make another iteration.

The external states are just a theorised cause of that reality, a model of how it might have come about. — Isaac

I must take exception to the "just". The tree remains a tree, and even if it is a construct of our neural nets and shared grammar it is more than a mere "theory".

Whether through thick-headedness or naïveté — NOS4A2

Neither - it’s through cultural conditioning.

Seems to me that that is what a mirror is for — Banno

You see a reflection of the eye in the mirror, but you do not see the act of seeing.

you do not see the act of seeing. — Wayfarer

@Isaac sees the act of seeing in the scans of the neural networks he deals with. In the third, not the first, person.

You see a reflection of the eye in the mirror, but you do not see the act of seeing.

Sure I do. I am seeing. I see myself. Therefore I see myself seeing.

I think it worth emphasising our agreement here rather than our differences. I suspect we (Wayfarer, Tom, Isaac) see mind as embedded in the world, and reject the hard distinction between perceiver and perceived that underpins the question of the OP, "Who perceives what?".

If there is no distinction between perceiver and perceived then it seems to me indirect realism is redundant.

Pretty much.

The discussion moved on in the eighties to a more formal (logical) play between realism and antirealism, where realists claim that sentences about the world are either true or they are false, and antirealists say that some sentences are neither true nor false. So a realist will say the tree has a trunk and three branches, even when no one is looking, and the antirealist will say that the sentence " the tree has a trunk and three branches" is neither true nor false when no one is looking.

The conversation has doubtless moved on since then.

I’d go along wth that, although even within that consensus, there’s room for divergent perspectives.

Therefore I see myself seeing. — NOS4A2

No you’re not. You’re seeing an external image of an inner process. If you were in pain you would see your expression of pain in the mirror, but you wouldn’t see the pain in the mirror.

It’s moved on since Locke and Berkeley too. Then again I just read a book called “The Case Against Reality” by a prominent cognitive scientist utilizing much the same arguments. If analytic philosophers were able to think about anything other than words or sentences now and then, they might notice that it hasn’t really moved on.

No you’re not. You’re seeing an external image of an inner process. If you were in pain you would see your expression of pain in the mirror, but you wouldn’t see the pain in the mirror.

I have been conditioned to believe that the act of seeing and that which sees is the same thing. I can see my eyes at the same time I use my eyes to see. Seeing and pain are activities of the very same body that stands before the mirror.

It gets pretty complex - that is, dependent on the details.

There's a tendency amongst those of the neuro-scientific* persuasion to sell books by making claims along the lines of "reality is just a mental construction!". It's a good sales pitch, but bad thinking. Not that Hoffman is wrong, I haven't read what he actually says. But I very much doubt that he, a scientist, would be suggesting that there can be no true sentences about the world.

*...and quantum...

Seeing and pain are activities of the very same body that stands before the mirror. — NOS4A2

Yes, but from different perspectives, and here the matter of perspective is significant, surely. Nobody will say that an image of a grimacing face is the same as the first-person experience of pain, would they?

(Incidentally, I want to add a meta-philosophical point here. My own approach to this issue is very much a product of my own interest in counter-cultural philosophy which was in turn influenced by popular Eastern philosophy. So it is a different orientation to that of ‘canonical Western philosophy’. Within the context of counter-cultural philosophy, the ‘separateness of knower and known’ is more than a matter for cognitive science - it represents the existential plight of individualism. It was this sense of isolation and existential angst which various counter-cultural movements intended to address. That pre-occupation is not nearly so obvious in canonical Western philosophy although it is addressed by various existentialist and phenomenological philosophers. I’m saying this to try and bring out why these kinds of dialogues often result in participants ‘talking past’ one another.)

I appreciate the background. Consider me a representative of the Charvaka school.

Yes, but from different perspectives, and here the matter of perspective is significant, surely. Nobody will say that an image of a grimacing face is the same as the first-person experience of pain, would they?

You’re right. No one would. But the pain is no doubt contingent on some physical aspect of the being that experiences it, and therefor that aspect is visible from both perspectives. Unfortunately the person does not have transparent skin and his eyes do not point inward, so it is no wonder he seeks another’s input.

Why do you think that? — Isaac

That's a hard question to answer. I suppose it's partly because I'm a panpsychist, and I think that an experience happens when something undergoes a change (@unenlightened helped me with that idea a bit). Any act of perception involves a change to the perceiver's body (I'm taking that as a given - counter-examples are welcome if you can think of any), that change constitutes the perception in the most direct and visceral way. Of course we can then go on to model a world based on these, I don't doubt that. And then we talk about perceiving in its more usual sense, like me perceiving a tree, in which the perceiver is separate from and largely conceived to be independent of and unaffected by the object of perception - we build a model of the world that isn't the world. And out aquaintance with those objects, if they can be called objects, is mediated by this process of construction. Questions of consistency, illusions, object permanence and so on that bedevil various realisms are then reducible to how useful and accurate our models are. Not sure what that makes me really, apart from a wanker. Does this view have a name? I'm not totally convinced I'm right, but it seems the most coherent line to take to me at the moment.

I have been conditioned to believe that the act of seeing and that which sees is the same thing. I can see my eyes at the same time I use my eyes to see. Seeing and pain are activities of the very same body that stands before the mirror. — NOS4A2

The mirror metaphor is apt here. The question of who perceives what presupposes that perception consists of a mirroring or representing of an outside by an inside. An alternative approach ditches the mirror metaphor in favor of a model of perception as knowledge-guided active sensory-motor exploration.

“Imagine a team of engineers operating a remote-controlled underwater vessel exploring the remains of the Titanic, and imagine a villainous aquatic monster that has interfered with the control cable by mixing up the connections to and from the underwater cameras, sonar equipment, robot arms, actuators, and sensors. What appears on the many screens, lights, and dials, no longer makes any sense, and the actua-tors no longer have their usual functions. What can the en-gineers do to save the situation? By observing the structure of the changes on the control panel that occur when they press various buttons and levers, the engineers should be able to deduce which buttons control which kind of motion of the vehicle, and which lights correspond to information deriving from the sensors mounted outside the vessel, which indicators correspond to sensors on the vessel's ten-tacles, and so on.

There is an analogy to be drawn between this example and the situation faced by the brain. From the point of view of the brain, there is nothing that in itself differentiates ner-vous influx coming from retinal, haptic, proprioceptive, ol-factory, and other senses, and there is nothing to discrimi-nate motor neurons that are connected to extraocular muscles, skeletal muscles, or any other structures. Even if the size, the shape, the firing patterns, or the places where the neurons are localized in the cortex differ, this does not in itself confer them with any particular visual, olfactory, motor or other perceptual quality. On the other hand, what does differentiate vision from, say, audition or touch, is the structure of the rules governing the sensory changes produced by various motor actions, that is, what we call the sensorimotor contingencies governing visual exploration.” (O'Regan & Noë: A sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness)

The reason I wanted to conceptually remove the perceiver from the man—in your example, the brain—and place it on a table is to imagine if it can perceive.

The brain in a vat, for example, assumes the brain is a perceiver that can still perceive even if removed from the rest of the body, but then goes on to include in the scenario some sort of life-suspending liquid and electrical inputs, to act in the place of the body. In this I think they show that the rest of the body is required for perception to occur, but rather than admit it, they attempt to disguise it by replacing it with some synthetic organism.

But I’ve seen real brains in vats and would be speaking nonsense if I said either of them still perceived. Brains cannot live, let alone perceive, on their own. So perception is an act of an organism, brains and all.

. Brains cannot live, let alone perceive, on their own. So perception is an act of an organism, brains and all. — NOS4A2

What if we considered this particular act of the organism, what we call perception, not as the act of representing external objects or stimuli, but the act of manipulating and changing an object, and anticipating the feedback from the changes we make in our environment. Then the necessity of a body would not be merely for keeping a brain alive, but for allowing it to physically move itself relative to objects , and move those objects relative to the embodied brain. This account of perception explains why it is that young animals deprived of the ability to manipulate objects in their environment don’t develop normal perceptual capacities in spite of having normally functioning sensory receptors.

Perception is either mediated by the perceiver, and thus direct, or it is mediated by something else, thus indirect. — NOS4A2

You've still not described what your 'direct' perception would look like. Looking at a tree, the light from it might be mediated by the atmospheric conditions, other light sources, partially blocking objects... is that now an 'indirect' observation? Because if so, then most observations are (being as we live in a crowded world). You seem to be wanting to ask simply "Does anything get in the way of light?" and make a philosophical question out of it.

When I see a photo of a tree, I indirectly perceive the tree, but directly perceive the photo, for example. — NOS4A2

Again, if that's your definition of 'indirect' then I cannot for the life of me think why you're asking the question. You're asking if we're really looking at trees or at photos of them? You're asking if the world is a hologram of some other 'real' world?

If you're asking "is there something like a photo in the process of perception?", then yes. We could possibly say any of the stages in visual processing were 'like a photo' depending on how alike you'd need them to be to qualify. Just as the photons from the actual tree form a pattern on the photographic paper, the photons in perception form a pattern of excitement in the ganglia of the retina which the visual cortex then 'reads'. But then you've dismissed anything happening inside the body as not the object of your questions.

If you're saying "is there something like the photo, but outside of the human body?" then obviously not. It's a daft question, you can see that for yourself.

You seem to trying to make something out of nothing in the fact that the process of perception is stepwise, and then ignore the only interesting part of that discovery - which is the extent to which our expectations bias how we perceive.

I must take exception to the "just". The tree remains a tree, and even if it is a construct of our neural nets and shared grammar it is more than a mere "theory". — Banno

My clumsy wording there.

Its important to recognize that this is not an ontological theory, its not claiming that there are really things called external states (or worse, that thereby trees and cars are not really real). It's a theory about process. It's answering the question of how we come to detect the world around us. What the method is - and how that method affects the end result - behaviour.

'External states' in this theory are data points, so nothing with any material existence. It's simply saying that if we conceive of a 'tree' as a series of points of data, how is it we come to perceive the tree from those data points. That's why I referred to external states as 'theoretical', because they're not yet accepted as part of our external world in the same way trees are. A bit like atomic theory before it was confirmed.

So yes, the tree is real. Has to be, or else nothing is. But we don't yet have a full picture of how it is we come to know there's a tree there, and that's what this model of perception is describing.

The slightly anti-realist angle to the theory (which some take much further than I do), is that if the model is correct and this is, indeed, how we know of the external 'tree', then we have to accept a good deal less consistency than we perhaps naively expected there to be. That if the model is correct, then our expectations (cultural and personal) play a larger part than we previously thought in what we do (speech, interaction, conception) with the signals we're getting from outside of ourselves.

For me, when modelling, there's no 'tree'. I don't even have a step in the process where there's a thing I could call a tree. It's just about signals and responses. One of those responses might be to form the word 'tree', or to act in such a way I'd personally recognise as responding to a tree, but in the model, there's no tree. It's just data>>response.

That's why I'm so enamoured of the anomalous monism idea you introduced me to. I think it really helps to make sense of the work I do (used to do), insofar as I don't need to ever find 'the tree' in the neurological process. It's not there. It's in our day-to-day world.

When looking at a green tree, does the Direct Realist directly perceive the colour green or directly perceive the wavelength 500nm ? — RussellA

I suspect that he directly perceives all of the above, and everything else within his periphery. — NOS4A2

Sunlight hits the leaves of a tree, wavelengths from the blue and red spectrum are absorbed by the Chlorophyll in the leaves and green, yellow and orange are reflected off the leaves towards our eyes. A wavelength of, say, 500nm then travels from the tree to our eyes, which we can then perceive as the colour green.
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How is it possible to not only perceive the colour green but also to perceive the cause of our perception of the colour green, ie the wavelength of 500nm ?

Pretty good explanatory nutshell, right there.