If Russia finally captures Ukraine by mass murder, torture, and nuclear threats, then everything the world has gained since the defeat of the Axis in 1945 and the end of the Cold War in 1991 will be in mortal peril. Putin will prove to himself and to every dictator on the planet that nothing has changed since Hitler, that lawless nations can achieve their aims by using force at will, by killing and raping innocent people and then literally grinding their ashes into the dirt. This is no longer about Russia’s neo-imperial dreams or Ukraine’s borders: This is a fight for the future of the international system and the safety of us all. — To Defend Civilization, Defeat Russia - The Atlantic

Annexations of many parts of Ukraine are quite obvious evidence if this for all to see. — ssu

In what world is that evidence for imperial ambitions?

The Kremlin has never been shy about their motivations - it's a matter of national security for them. Basically what you're doing is saying they're lying, and then taking your own statement as evidence.

Imperialism is the state policy, practice, or advocacy of extending power and dominion, especially by direct territorial acquisition or by gaining political and economic control of other areas, often through employing hard power (economic and military power), but also soft power (cultural and diplomatic power).

Yes.

We have to face the uncomfortable reality that we haven't progressed from the 20th or the 19th Century to something else.

Still no shred of evidence.

gaining political and economic control of other areas, often through ... soft power (cultural and diplomatic power)

Then what fucking country isn't imperialist?

the future of the international system — To Defend Civilization, Defeat Russia - The Atlantic

What "international system" do you take this to refer to? International Law (that the US has refused to ratify)? The authority of the UN (that he US has ignored whenever it feels like it)?

I'm intrigued as to what 'international system' you think was soundly in place through America's invasion of Iraq, the bombing of Kosovo and Libya. The support for Saudi Arabia and Israel... what 'international system' allows the starvation of millions of children, but it suddenly "in mortal peril" over a border war.

Then what fucking country isn't imperialist? — Isaac

A lot of countries don't want political and economic control of other states. They just want to sell stuff to them and have normal, working relations. Not meddle in their internal politics with the objective to control them.

But it's good that at least you noticed from the definition the part "Imperialism is the state policy, practice, or advocacy of extending power and dominion, especially by direct territorial acquisition" that @Tzeentch isn't willing or capable to pick up.

These actions should be obvious and evident, even without going into what Putin actually says, which makes it even more clear what Putin's objectives are. Just to take one example:

June 9 (Reuters) - Russian President Vladimir Putin paid tribute on Thursday to Tsar Peter the Great on the 350th anniversary of his birth, drawing a parallel between what he portrayed as their twin historic quests to win back Russian lands.

"Peter the Great waged the Great Northern War for 21 years. It would seem that he was at war with Sweden, he took something from them. He did not take anything from them, he returned (what was Russia's)," Putin said after a visiting an exhibition dedicated to the tsar.

In televised comments on day 106 of his war in Ukraine, he compared Peter's campaign with the task facing Russia today.

"Apparently, it also fell to us to return (what is Russia's) and strengthen (the country). And if we proceed from the fact that these basic values form the basis of our existence, we will certainly succeed in solving the tasks that we face."

Very directly said from the man himself.

Why would it be impossible for a nation to seek to acquire territory in pursuit of a national security goal?

You keep making the leap to "imperialism", pretending that it is the only explanation when it clearly isn't. Why?

A lot of countries don't want political and economic control of other states. — ssu

Wishful thinking.

But it's good that at least you noticed from the definition the part "Imperialism is the state policy, practice, or advocacy of extending power and dominion, especially by direct territorial acquisition" that Tzeentch isn't willing or capable to pick up. — ssu

No. The point was that your definition becomes pointless by being too inclusive. If Russia is 'imperialist' in your sense, then it's nothing to worry about. Most countries are. The US certainly is.

You want 'imperialism' to mean something so much more sinister. Something more like Hitler, Elizabeth I, Alexander... But then you've not got any evidence to support such a claim, so you fall back on the weaker definition, only that has no teeth. We don't care that the US is imperialist in that weaker sense. So why should we care if Russia is?

Why would it be impossible for a nation to seek to acquire territory in pursuit of a national security goal? — Tzeentch

To seek to acquire territory in pursuit of a national security has been the modus operandi for Russia basically for all it's entire existence.

As Catherine the Great put it plainly and simply “I have no way to defend my borders but to extend them.” Russian imperialism has always been viewed itself as a defensive posture simply because there is on geographic obstacle that would give a natural border for Russia...other than the goddam Pacific ocean. But that "defence" has meant colonizing other people and invading and annexing other countries. Which simply is imperialism, no way to say otherwise.

The error you seem to think is that somehow the Russian security goals and imperialism couldn't coexist. Yet basically they are part of each other. And that makes Russia so dangerous because it still is an Empire: Even just in the Russian Federation there are 35 regional semi-official languages and about 100 minority languages. There is something like 199 ethnic groups in the country. It's not actually something that you would call a clear nation state.

It seems inevitable that the only ending to this war can be great disaster - either great disaster for Putin, or great disaster for the whole world. It's plain that he's not going to back down because any acknowledgment of defeat will cause his own collapse. He doesn't care how many die on either side, so he has to keep attempting to advance at all costs, like a shark who can't stop swimming forwards lest it drown. Hopefully the very worst-case scenario of actual nuclear war conducted by ICBM missiles will not be triggered, but I'm sure there is no easy ending.

Wishful thinking. — Isaac

There are many smaller countries who think so. Not every country is like the UK, Russia or the US.

No. The point was that your definition becomes pointless by being too inclusive. If Russia is 'imperialist' in your sense, then it's nothing to worry about. — Isaac

A country that just has invaded in the past decades two of it's neighbors and annexed territories from them? Yeah, well, you'll be on there on your own peaceful island, not sharing a border with Putin.

You want 'imperialism' to mean something so much more sinister. — Isaac

Nonsense, likely you have imperialism either in the woke category of things like "racism" or likely as the nearly religious satanism as it's used by the Marxists. Russia is basically still an Empire, so it's really no wonder that it has imperial aspirations.

there is [no] geographic obstacle that would give a natural border for Russia...other than the goddam Pacific ocean. — ssu

Or neutral (double emphasis) border states - what Ukraine was and threatened to no longer be as a result of continued United States foreign policy.

The error you seem to think is that somehow the Russian security goals and imperialism couldn't coexist. — ssu

I never said was the case. I never even said that Russia wasn't imperialist. Rather, there is no evidence for it, so why would I believe it when there is a lot of evidence pointing towards the fact that Russia did indeed view the matter of Ukraine as a very serious security issue. In fact, there's 15 years of evidence to back that up.

Even just in the Russian Federation there are 35 regional semi-official languages and about 100 minority languages. There is something like 199 ethnic groups in the country. It's not actually something that you would call a clear nation state. — ssu

So? Is this a problem to you? Proof that Russia "must" be imperialist? I don't see where you're going with this.

For the sake of keeping things interesting:

Since the United States cannot have been surprised by the Russian invasion and also does not seem overly committed to a Ukrainian victory, I am entertaining the hypothesis that the United States intentionally sought to provoke long-lasting conflict between Europe and Russia.

Europe and Russia were cozying up to each other too much, while it is in America's best interest to keep the Heartland divided.

With China and Russia in an alliance that was futher strengthened by the American push for Ukrainian incorporation into NATO, the Eurasian continent was basically already 2/3's united. There was an actual threat of the Heartland uniting completely - with Europe becoming apathetic towards the United States and fairly neutral towards Russia and China, and with Russia and China being markedly anti-American.

The war in Ukraine attempts to establish Europe as a committed American ally, and a counterbalance against Russia in case a large-scale security competition breaks out between the United States and Russia and China.

Far-fetched? Sober big-picture thinking? You be the judge. ;)

It seems inevitable that the only ending to this war can be great disaster - either great disaster for Putin, or great disaster for the whole world. — Wayfarer

Or for Russia. Already as the Russian military is failing in Ukraine, it is having ripple effect in the Caucasus and in Central Asia with the former Soviet Republics. If everything goes bad, it can be extremely bad.

A good summary of why now only after two years since the last war tensions are again rising in Nagorno Karabakh:


And then there's Kazakhstan:

Or neutral (double emphasis) border states - what Ukraine was and threatened to no longer be as a result of continued United States foreign policy. — Tzeentch

Likely Moldova, which has a frozen conflict and Russian troops inside it or do you refer to my country in the past? Well, I think I know what that means.

there is no evidence for it, — Tzeentch

You really don't see the annexations of territory done through force as imperialism, really?

I am entertaining the hypothesis that the United States intentionally sought to provoke long-lasting conflict between Europe and Russia. — Tzeentch

You have to first tell just why, if this all was an American provocation, why did Putin be provoked? That fact is that Russia is meddling similarly in former Soviet republics that aren't coming to NATO. And being member of Russia's alliance, the CSTO, doesn't work like you would think in a defense pact. In fact the picture of what you have of NATO and the US would be far more appropriate to the relation of Russia and the CSTO.

You really don't see the annexations of territory done through force as imperialism, really? — ssu

Not without actual evidence, no. The fact remains that Ukraine is an important region for the Russians and they have made that clear over the course of fifteen years.

What you're asking me to believe is that the security concerns the Russians have voiced are part of a fifteen year long ruse.

Now that is far-fetched.

You have to first tell just why, if this all was an American provocation, why did Putin be provoked? — ssu

Because, unlike you apparently, I do believe the matter of Ukraine becoming part of the American sphere of influence represented a legitimate security concern to the Russians.

How could a government govern if it does not have the means that allow it to govern?! — neomac

There’s no moral requirement for any specific government to govern any specific peoples or land. — Isaac

If that’s an objection to the quotation, it doesn’t make much sense, because the quotation is not even talking about moral requirements. If that’s a moral claim you believe, is it supposed to be self-evident or do you have an argument for it? As far as I’m concerned governments of people and lands can be morally justified, of course. And that’s all I care arguing for (more on this below).

Governing in compliance with some moral commitment still needs enabling means to govern. — neomac

No it doesn't. Clearly some other government could bring about the same committent. If I'm committed to building the biggest sandcastle ever, I can easily step aside and let someone else finish the job. Building the biggest sandcastle doesn't require that I have the ability to build sandcastles, only that someone does. Likewise a government committed to a moral objective does not require that they have the means, only that someone does. — Isaac

That’s a random objection. The claim of mine you quoted is NEITHER stating a bi-univocal relation between governments and moral commitments, NOR logically implying such a bi-univocal relation, NOR suggesting it. In a Western democracy, several governmental administrations with different political leanings can succeed one another, and yet they all may be morally committed to same moral principles like respect/support for human rights and respect/support for democratic institutions, and then govern accordingly. To the extent they do that and the people they rule over morally care about it, they gain moral legitimacy. In Russia, the same territory was governed by an emperor, by a soviet regime, by a post-soviet regime. To the extent they supported shared moral views and ruled people were morally approved it, they gained moral legitimacy.
BTW nobody can easily step aside from commitments taken with people, if those people do not agree or there is a price to pay for that. So it depends on what there is at stake and the trust between involved parties (see my example of the care giver). What's more is that governments have their own social and historical reasons that pre-exist and support specific administrations with or without any specific commitments. Therefore as long as governments are the products of a society, no society changes local governments for foreign governments just because it's possible to do that or test if foreign governments can be better. If it happens this is typically through imposition by the foreign government.

The territory delimits the community and the resources within a government’s reach, the perimeter of its sovereignty. — neomac

So? This clearly has no impact whatsoever on a government's ability to commit to programmes of any sort since borders are always changing. I listed above over 40 major internation changes in border in the last 30 years. In no case did the governments of those countries cease to be able to carry out their objectives in their remaining territory. — Isaac

Right, so Putin could still govern Russia without grabbing Ukrainian land. So why is he doing it? Why isn’t Putin giving all Siberia to China, Putin will still be able to govern Russia without Siberia right? Why Putin needs to govern at all? He could let Biden govern Russia, what’s the problem with Putin? Since you can already guess all answers from the international relation theory you champion, namely Mearsheimer’s “offensive realism”, I’m just getting to the conclusion: political governments are security maximisers over territorial resources wrt perceived threats, so much so that they may even need to project their power outside their land borders, and can do it offensively not just defensively. This is what history and geopolitical theories are teaching us. So the point is not the outlandish observation that government can still be able to govern if they suffer territorial resources losses (after all people can also live in prison or with a revenue below the poverty line, can’t they?), but what precisely history and geopolitics can tell us about states’ expected “securing” dispositions when facing security threats from rival states, their expected readiness to use coercive force to repel invasions and land grabbing, and the price to pay for failing that. BTW we may expect that even suffering land grabbing with little or no economic/logistic/demographic importance can likely trigger coercive responses from states if they perceive their authority threatened, and/or encouraging further land grabbing or invasions (as it likely happens for the smaller territories of the Sino-Indian border dispute).

even if different governments share the same commitments they would still need to secure a territory. — neomac

Why?

All Western, Ukrainian, Russian governments of all political regimes needed to secure their territory against invaders and/or separatist forces in their history. — neomac

This is just bare assertion. — Isaac

Yours is just bare assertion too. If your point is that you need examples backing up my claim, then check wikipedia. That’s basic history trivia which I can leave you waste your time on.

Nonsense. A government is not morally required to carry out all actions it's citizens request. Again, this just obvious nonsense if given even a moment's thought. If the Russian population unanimously voted to bomb a hospital, it would still be immoral for the government to do so and it would still be a war crime. Things are not made right by voting for them and governments are not automatons devoid of moral responsibility. — Isaac

Your objection is evidently grounded on a huge misunderstanding of my claims:
First of all, I didn’t make anywhere the moral claim that “a government is morally required to carry out all actions it's citizens request”. I’m being descriptive in talking about moral behavior, and relativizing the notion of “moral standard” to communities. So with the expression “moral legitimacy” I’m descriptively referring to the possible situation in which the government is committed to support (by means of its governmental functions) the moral standard X shared by the community X within the territory under its control: e.g. say Putin is committed to protect the Russians from annihilation by Ukrainian nazis and Western satanists. This would let Putin gain moral legitimacy among ordinary Russians who believe that Ukrainian nazis and Western satanists are set out to annihilate Russians. And if all the Russian population unanimously voted to bomb a Ukrainian hospital for those reasons, then it would be “morally legitimate” (it would be even if they didn’t vote at all: approving it might just be enough!).
Since the expression “morally legitimate” is ambiguous wrt its descriptive/normative usage, and despite all of my clarifications you can’t process my claims correctly, let’s put it this way: if the Russian population unanimously voted to bomb a hospital, it would be PERCEIVED as “morally legitimate” if the Russian population unanimously voted to bomb a hospital for their own PERCEIVED legitimate moral reasons. “Perceived” means that related moral claims may be right or not, and this epistemic possibility is all I care to maintain at this point of my analysis. But notice that anybody sufficiently mentally sound and convinced that his moral claims are right may in parallel only conjecture that his moral claims are merely “perceived” (i.e. ultimately or likely wrong/unjustified). And precisely because those who are really convinced their moral claims to be right won’t change their belief or falter by simply conjecturing in parallel the possibility of being wrong/unjustified, the word “perceived” may be misleadingly suggesting lack of conviction, or readiness to re-examine moral claims, that’s why we may as well avoid using the word “perceived” in describing moral behavior. In any case, I’m here describing a moral behavior irrespectively of what anybody’s moral claims and convictions actually are (so I don’t even need to exclude the possibility that some may believe the moral duty of a government is to do all people voted for, including destroying hospitals).
Secondly, you offered a decontextualised hypothetical example (“if the Russian population unanimously voted to bomb a hospital, it would still be immoral for the government to do so”) to support your a-priori moral claim, without considering the possible contextual and a-posteriori reasons Russians may have had, to morally justify their decisions. Maybe they have been convinced by the Russian propaganda that the hospital was a cover for stocking biochemical weapons to annihilate Russians, or building a nuclear bomb in an underneath bunker that would certainly have escalated the situation to nuclear world war so bombing the hospital was the lesser evil. One could argue that the decision may still be moral, if moral evaluation is limited to intentions, or immoral if it comprises consequences but maybe excusable by ignorance. Or, else, maybe it wasn’t propaganda at all: some Ukrainian neonazi with the help of Zelensky as a cynical henchman of American evil financial/military/oil lobbies did really stock biochemical weapons in or build a nuclear bomb under that hospital. Would this still be a good moral reason to bomb the hospital at the risk of committing a war crime? Would this be nearly as bad as Americans nuclear bombing Japan (and yet they got away with it)? Or maybe: bombing a hospital was a retortion for terroristic bloody attacks Russians suffered in 10 of their hospitals, so their retorition is even subproportional wrt what they suffered from the Ukrainian nazis. Would this still make Russian bombing unquestionably immoral? You may say yes, others may say no. The point is that real moral cases can be trickier than your a-priori assessments of decontextualised examples suggest, and that people (honestly or dishonestly) disagree over moral standards, over how they apply moral standards in different often unexpected circumstances, over how they assess them in isolation or in comparison with past cases, etc. Refusal to acknowledge this intellectual predicament may lead to outright rejection of opposing views. While acknowledging this intellectual predicament may trigger more civilised discussions over moral reasons for the disagreements. But at the end of the day discussions do not necessarily lead to convergence, they may escalate into heated disputes and can persist even after long hostile arguing. They may split communities or create bitter rivalries, even in everyday life, nurturing resentment and intolerance, or worst, leading to civil wars. Or agreement can be reached at some point but without significant impact on society at large or where it matters, because maybe competing moral views are having greater significant impact on society at large or where it matters. And even the fact that shared convictions about what is morally right don’t have significant impact on society at large or where it matters, can trigger deeply felt personal disappointment and outrage (at worst, along with fear of discrimination, persecution, oppression). Why is that? Why can’t anybody (including Isaac) just blissfully enjoy having intellectually identified what is morally right to do in all circumstances, and contemplating the sheer logically possibility that everybody acts in accordance with it, even in the hypothetical case that nobody acts, has ever acted, or will ever act like this (including Isaac)? After all, as Isaac will sermonize, “oughts” are different from “facts” so who gives a shit if they never match? Or else why can’t anybody (including Isaac) having intellectually identified what is morally right to do in all circumstances, act in accordance with it INDIFFERENTLY from whatever other people’s actually do or believe? Or keep their outrage for themselves? Or live a misanthropic eremitical life if outrage is so intolerable? After all, if one single person on earth is acting according to what is morally right, why should anybody be outraged if there aren’t more people acting morally?
Maybe because moral claims concern also what other people’s do or believe, and/or because PROMOTING morality among people against “moral bankruptcy” (starting with showing moral outrage to protest against immoral people) is part of the morally right things to do. And failing to do that would be immoral. However, the problem is that if discussing, disputing, evangelising, confronting at grass-root level is not enough to promote collective morality or impact wherever it morally matters then, what to do? Maybe one smart thing to do is to get some support from those in power (e.g. asking Western governments to just sanction and diplomatically pressure Russia for aggressing Ukraine, right?), so unite with like-minded people to beg, plead with, pressure, sermonise, lobby governments to be supportive and take them morally accountable accordingly. In other words, there is a pattern that people with certain moral beliefs (you included) are drawn to follow by their own moral reasoning in interacting with governments that can lead to what I was referring to as “government moral legitimacy”.
So, despite the fact that you have such a hard time in processing the anthropological pattern I described and you yourself neatly follow, that anthropological pattern is very much real and related implications as well: 1. Even if moral ought claims and fact claims about society are distinct, still people (you included) may very much morally care if their claimed moral “oughts” actually inform social life de facto, but then considering chances of success may matter very much 2. The desirable moral impact one can have in informing society may be practically better achieved by having those in power (i.e. governments) morally accountable, therefore in condition of responding in compliance with moral standards shared by a ruled community. But then, power may very much matter to moral agents (whatever their moral claims are) when it’s instrumental to promote moral standards by increasing the chances of informing society, and it is therefore morally legitimised by those moral standards. The toughest part (for you to admit, if not even to understand) is that governmental power is essentially grounded on centralisation and capitalisation of scarce resources (arms, money, manpower, knowledge, etc.) which can be easier to be consumed than accumulated. So in order to keep relying on government power any competing moral community must pragmatically ensure that this power is not only consumed but also capitalised, that the ratio between capitalisation and consumption is positive and sustainable in the best interest of the moral community too. Governments will likely reciprocate the interest by finding more appealing those moral views and communities that can ensure them greater possibility of capitalising power (typical dynamics of security demand/supply). So moral communities already competing for incompatible moral standards or issues with rival moral communities, will additionally compete for the government support depending on their tolerance for capitalisation of power by governments, including all sorts of implied costs and risks (like possible abuses by cynical politicians and hijacking by powerful lobbies). On the other side, governments too suffer other forms of competition, on top of the competition between rulers and ruled: namely, the internal power competition for leadership (by leaders and lobbies) within a state government, and the power competition with other state governments. So governments too may compete for the moral communities' support depending on their tolerance for committing to moral communities (typical dynamics of moral legitimacy demand/supply), including all sorts of implied costs and risks for their power capitalisation and capacity of copying with security dilemmas. Conclusion: 1. one way or the other any moral community that morally cares to have a social impact is morally compelled to care for power capitalisation (not just consumption) to the extent it needs to rely on government power to morally promote shared moral views against competing moral views in a context of political power struggles and related security dilemmas. And even if we remove central governments from the equation, but moral communities still need to survive in accordance to their moral standards and in competition with rival moral communities, they will still need to directly engage in struggles for capitalisation of power and related “security dilemmas”, as forms of self-government 2. These are core logically interrelated claims that constitute my understanding of moral behavior. They are logically immune to the random objections you raised (failing to distinguish normative from factual, morally claiming to be right for governments do whatever voters demand). They are transversal to political, moral, ideological views, so by no means favour a-priori my own moral claims wrt rival moral views. They simply point to the fact that our moral claims don’t free float in a social space void of power struggles (between moral communities, governments, political leaders, social lobbies), on the contrary, their chance of informing social life very much depends on such power struggles in all their dimensions. And that’s logically compelling for all those moral views that morally care about informing social life, and therefore acknowledge the importance of increasing the chances of success. For those moral communities who don’t care, I’ll leave them to whatever fate the other moral communities will let them experience.

I argued that “national security” can also be a government's moral imperative (this is true for all types of regime and ideologies). — neomac

No you didn't. You just said it. — Isaac

No, dude, I argued it abundantly (way more than you ever did in supporting your claims and objections). Here is where I summarised the argument:

To understand my point one needs to get one step back. Moral rules like legal rules do not grant compliance by themselves. What’s worse is that differently from any legal system moral rules do not offer a procedure to resolve moral disputes , so a community can rely on central governments that are committed to promote a certain moral code within their sovereign territorial domain. How can governments comply to their commitments ? Through power (coercion, wealth, propaganda, etc.). Securing power within a sovereign territorial domain is how governments can both exist/function and accomplish their moral commitments wrt their people. Notice that these are transversal considerations wrt regime/ideology (communist, fascist, capitalist, theocratic, democratic, authoritarian, etc.).
In other words, governments to gain moral legitimacy (whatever the ideology and regime are) are also morally compelled to pursue/secure power.
And that’s also how the notion of “sovereignty” can ground legal/political relations among states also in moral terms. — neomac

if Western governments believe (and I would add "reasonably so") to secure their sovereignty against Russian threats by supporting Ukrainian resistance, and act accordingly, they are morally warranted. — neomac

Nonsense. A government has no moral right to the territory it governs. All border changes would thereby become immoral. — Isaac

Again I’m describing and not making moral claims. If it helps I could rephrase it as follows: “if Western governments believe (and I would add "reasonably so") to secure their sovereignty against Russian threats by supporting Ukrainian resistance, and act accordingly, they are ‘PERCEIVED’ to be morally warranted by the community that morally approves it.
Here another conceptual claim: governments’ moral rights to the territory are grounded on governments “moral legitimacy”. And a government may have as much moral right to the territory it governs as an individual has a moral right to his owned flat. The normative notion of “sovereignity” is designed to conceptualise such right. And it’s false to claim that all border changes would thereby become immoral. Indeed there might be moral/legal legitimate transfers of territorial rights (e.g. the independent states resulting from Soviet Union collapse), as much as there are moral/legal transfers of flat ownership.

If states can’t act or are rationally expected to not act based on moral oughts as the offensive realism theory you champion would claim — neomac

Nothing about political realism says governments can't act differently. It's a descriptive theory, not a prescriptive one. — Isaac

Sure miracles can happen. Nothing in the standard model of physics says miracles can’t happen.
Yet the standard model of physics is taken to be a descriptive theory of physical phenomena. Related laws of physics rule out as most unlikely those possibilities that contradict such laws.
So the geopolitical theory of “offensive realism” is taken to be a descriptive theory of international relations. Related behavioural patterns of States facing “security dilemmas” rule out as most unlikely those possibilities that contradict such patterns. So when moral views prescribe actions that contradict such patterns they are most likely not going to be followed. Mearsheimer’s offensive realism theory doesn’t predict that Western states will stop military support Ukraine if the Ukrainian casualties or the Yemeni casualties or the zillions of dying African children for famine is morally intolerable by some people. It predicts that even if the Ukrainian casualties or the Yemeni casualties or the zillions of dying African children for famine is morally intolerable by some people, this will most certainly NOT be prioritised over security concerns that led to Western military support of Ukrainian resistance.
At best, one might argue that Western policy is the result of a miscalculation of Western security concerns because Russia is a declining power, while China is a rising power so the West increased security threat which China might profit from, and the like. Therefore the West could have processed better its security (not moral) concerns. On the other side, that argument doesn’t sound very much as a description because it’s a personal assessment of threat perception and response (suggesting related prescriptions), so they shouldn’t be part of a descriptive theory of international relations, right? Or worst, that argument is surreptitiously trying to hide a falsification of Mearsheimer’s “offensive realism” theory of international relations. Indeed, NATO enlargement could very much fit into the offensive realist pattern, if it wasn’t for the fact that “the West’s final tool for peeling Kiev away from Moscow has been its efforts to spread Western values and promote democracy in Ukraine and other post-Soviet states, a plan that often entails funding pro-Western individuals and organizations” [1] (in other words, certain States decide to support certain shared moral values, neglecting all relevant security concerns, contrary to the theory!)
Anyway, to recapitulate, a descriptive realist theory of international relations is not concerned with mere logical possibilities of states acting morally (as much as an empirical theory about human psychology is not concerned about the mere logical possibility of telepathy), instead it’s there to offer us empirical explanations and predictions on how states realistically behaved and most likely will behave, which in turn affects the chances for any moral standards to inform society. So that's why we may want to have reliable empirical theories in the first place, to inform our actions in a rational way and increase the chances for our actions so informed to succeed.
Conclusion: you are championing a theory of international relations that
1 - is predicting that Western governments will most certainly ignore any of your moral arguments/prescriptions in taking their decisions about security matters (Shit!)
2 - is totally irrelevant to morally justify what you claim Western states should do, and that makes perfect sense to you because of the logic distinction between “oughts” and “facts” (duh, right?), and absolutely nothing in that theory says that Western governments can’t act differently (but then why on earth are you championing it?! It’s like me saying: “I champion the Newtonian theory of gravity, but I’m gonna jump off that cliff anyway because nothing in that theory says I can’t fly!”)
3 - is totally relevant to question your opponents views of what Western states should do (ooooh, that’s why you are championing it!), because apparently you are mathematically certain that the already clumsy moves you just made to dodge the theory of international relations you yourself champion are some killer karate moves only you can master. Really impressive.

[1]
https://www.natur.cuni.cz/geografie/socialni-geografie-a-regionalni-rozvoj/studium/doktorske-studium/kolokvium/kolokvium-2013-2014-materialy/ukrajina-a-rusko-mearsheimer-souleimanov.pdf

it’s precisely because, according to your own understanding of international relations, oughts can never inform political action in the international arena that your claims about what states morally ought do in the international arena are irrational. — neomac — Isaac

It's not my claim... It's yours. Here...

I take national security to be the moral imperative of legitimate governments of sovereign states — Isaac[/quote]

I find your comment unintelligible, so until you rephrase it in English, I limit myself to add a few more clarifications to the two claims of mine you quoted.
Concerning the first quotation, as I previously argued, according to the theory of international relations you champion your moral prescriptions will most certainly never inform governments’ decisions about security matters. That’s what we should rationally expect by the theory. As far as I’m concerned, however, I do NOT champion Mearsheimer’s theory of international relations [1], nor his understanding of the interaction between moral and security concerns. That’s why I can argue for the possibility that moral oughts inform political action in the international arena in ways theoretically unavailable to you, and without believing in miracles as you need to do. Indeed, the second claim I made is precisely pointing at the solution of the riddle: only when national security concerns (and power capitalisation! [2]) are taken to be moral imperatives of governments, moral oughts can inform political actions while addressing “security dilemmas”. It’s very much realistically possible that governments act in support of shared moral views, if contextualised and a-posteriori moral reasoning can more “pragmatically” rely on governments’ in-built “security maximising” dispositions, instead of compulsively questioning them as your moral claims do in an a-priori, decontextualised, “idealistic” fashion. In other words, it can be moral for Ukrainians to keep fighting at the risk of sacrificing lives, and it can be moral for Westerners to support Ukrainians’ resistance if both are reasonably expected to effectively address security dilemmas favouring certain shared moral views (like the Ukrainian sovereignty and national identity, the Western countries’ sovereignty and democratic standards of life), despite all the other humanitarian emergencies the rest of the world is facing. Indeed I’m arguing for it and I morally support it (finally, these 2 are actual moral claims/commitments of mine!).

[1]

there are also non-pragmatic normative constraints (i.e. legal, moral) that one doesn’t need to ignore nor dismiss as Mearsheimer would do, like the ones related to the notion of “sovereignty”. — neomac

the goal is “national security” and not “to get hold of and keep as much stuff as I can”. And even if maximising national security would somehow equate “to get hold of and keep as much stuff as I can” under certain circumstances (like the ones prospected by Mearsheimer’s theory of International Relations that you champion) so be it. — neomac

[2]

“Capitalisation” and “power” and “capitalisation of power” must sound all “caca” expressions for exploitation of the working class to you, right?

A country that just has invaded in the past decades two of it's neighbors and annexed territories from them? Yeah, well, you'll be on there on your own peaceful island, not sharing a border with Putin. — ssu

Are Canada worried? Is Mexico? America is the single most interventionist country in the world, by a long, long way. no-one talks about fear that it's going to invade Mexico. Why? Because people make even the most basic assessment of its interests (primarily oil). Russia wants gas export routes to be securely in it's sphere of influence. The US wants them in its own. Unless Latvia suddenly discovers a massive oil field, it's got nothing to worry about.

Nonsense, likely you have imperialism either in the woke category of things like "racism" or likely as the nearly religious satanism as it's used by the Marxists. Russia is basically still an Empire, so it's really no wonder that it has imperial aspirations. — ssu

Now it's back to the weaker definition. You can't get anywhere with this flip-flopping. Either 'imperialism' is a uniquely worrying trait (in which case you need evidence Russia has it - as opposed to most other countries), or it's a normal trait of many larger counties (in which case you need to explain why we need to be uniquely worried about Russia having it).

As to... "just has invaded in the past decades two of it's neighbors"... are Israel imperialist? Is India, Pakistan, Bangladesh Myanmar, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Morocco, Spain, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Sudan, Syria, Turkey... All of whom have been involved in military clashes over border territory in the last two decades.

And if two countries in two decades is your evidence of rampant imperialism, then Finland must be quaking in its boots at the prospect of being invaded by Putin's tidal wave of imperial expansion...sometime in the next 160 years...

I’m describing and not making moral claims — neomac

Then your entire wall of text was a waste of time. If I want 'description' I'll consult an expert, not some bloke off the internet. If your ego is seriously so inflated that you think your armchair 'description' of how morality is manifest through society is better than any of the thousands of well-researched an informed papers, articles and books that have been written on the subject by sociologists, social psychologists and cognitive scientists, then I worry for you.

If I want a description, I'll consult an expert.

I'm asking for your moral view. the thing all of us are experts on, the thing for which there is no body of fact to draw on and so no expertise to be gained. What you think is right and why.

I’m describing and not making moral claims — neomac

Then your entire wall of text was a waste of time. If I want 'description' I'll consult an expert, not some bloke off the internet. — Isaac

I'm asking for your moral view. the thing all of us are experts on, the thing for which there is no body of fact to draw on and so no expertise to be gained. What you think is right and why. — Isaac

It wasn't a waste of time because my wall of text is very much part of the "why" i think military supporting Ukraine is morally right. What I described wasn't for the purpose of informing you about facts that require fact-checking and experts' advice. But for the purpose of illustrating to you the conceptual framework that makes intelligible any exchange on morality issues with you or others over Ukraine and any other political issues you may consider. It's essential part of my basic background knowledge (they are my "hinge propositions") and what was still missing in support of my moral claims about the Ukrainian war I argued for many times in our previous exchanges (so there was no point for me to rehash them). They are essential, because if we can't converge enough on conceptual frameworks, you simply do not make sense to me. So these very objections of yours are totally self-defeating. Not surprisingly though.

think military supporting Ukraine is morally right — neomac

Yet...

I’m describing and not making moral claims — neomac

Make up your mind.

Are Canada worried? Is Mexico? America is the single most interventionist country in the world, by a long, long way. — Isaac

If you would read correctly, it is about invading and annexing territories from neighbors. Hence when it comes to for example China, Vietnam can be worried about them (even if China hasn't called Vietnam an artificial country), but likely Portugal isn't worried so much about China. I think Mexico would mind if the US annexed let's say Baja California from them. And with US Presidents declaring Canada or Mexico to be artificial constructions.

Russia has treated similarly it's near abroad as the US does with Central America and the Caribbean. And now, as Russia is stuck in Ukraine, the regional policeman role isn't working anymore, as I referred with the videos from Nagorno-Karabakh and Kazakhstan.

As to... "just has invaded in the past decades two of it's neighbors"... are Israel imperialist? — Isaac

Classic case of a state annexing territory for defensive reasons. That still makes it so that Israelis have a map of their own while the other world accepts another map, which shows the discord. Even if Israel is a nation state and doesn't want to be multiethnic, it still has done things that are typical for imperialists. Right from it's inception.

Is India, Pakistan, Bangladesh Myanmar, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Morocco, Spain, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Sudan, Syria, Turkey... All of whom have been involved in military clashes over border territory in the last two decades. — Isaac

Needless to go over all the states as many have their own special cases. But for example Morocco is in the same category of annexing territories with Spanish Sahara. Imperialism isn't surely just limited to the Western countries.

And yes, I will stick to the definition of imperialism given, for example, in Merriam-Webster dictionary:

the policy, practice, or advocacy of extending the power and dominion of a nation especially by direct territorial acquisitions or by gaining indirect control over the political or economic life of other areas

You can continue to argue that the definition is false/meaningless or whatever. I'll leave you to do that alone.

think military supporting Ukraine is morally right — neomac


Yet...

I’m describing and not making moral claims — neomac


Make up your mind. — Isaac

There is no contradiction between those extrapolated claims, because I made both moral claims (like "I actually support the military aid to Ukrainian resistance" and repeatedly argued for in our earliest exchanges even months ago [1]) and claims about how I conceptualise moral claims (i.e. "national security can be a moral imperative" and the like which again are nothing new in our exchanges [2]). And since you have hard time to process them separately, or you are playing dumb, I'll add clarifications which you ignore to re-loop over your clumsy random objections.
Clarifying our conceptual framework to deal with ambiguities and misunderstandings is a form of intellectual cooperation useful to better understand each other (which again is nothing new in our exchanges [3]), if you care to have a fruitful exchange. In addition we are in a philosophy forum so that's the right place to discuss them, as far as I'm concerned.


[1]
I’m reasoning on a step-by-step basis :

• First step:human rights is an acceptable way to identify collective well-being? Yes
• Second step: are human rights better implemented within Western countries? Yes
• Third step: is Ukraine more pro-West than Russia? Yes. Asking to join NATO and EU, and be ready to suffer a war against Russia to defend their choice wrt anti-Western rhetoric and hostility from Russia are unquestionable evidences for that. And if this is no evidence I don’t know what is.
• Fourth step: how likely is that a pro-West country can implement human rights by being within the Western sphere of influence (so within NATO and EU) than by being within the sphere of influence of an anti-West Russia with a poorer implementation of human rights (see first step), if not now in the future? I say it’s more likely, based on historical evidence (see Germany, Italy and Spain after WWII) and ex-Soviet Union countries that joined EU and NATO after the Soviet Union collapse. Also the democracy index is telling (https://www.visualcapitalist.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/democracy-index-2022-europe.jpg, https://www.democracymatrix.com/ranking): Russian democracy index is lower than any country in the EU and Belarus which is under the sphere of influence of Russia is even lower than Russia, Kazakhstan better of Russia for few points. Is this enough evidence? If not why not?

[2]

No evidence, no 'proof'. — Isaac


No evidence, no 'proof' of what exactly? I was just exposing a conceptual framework.

The requests for 'proof only started when I objected to that position. — Isaac


That's false. Your objection started with: "How? I don't see the mechanism. Representation is definitely an important tool, but that's not the same thing as sovereignty" (https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/746158)
To which I answered: "I didn't equate representation and sovereignty anywhere. I was talking about pre-condition for the implementation of state institutions that support human rights. State institutions, as I understand them, presuppose authoritative and coercive ruling over a territory." (https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/746177)
So no, I didn't ask you for proofs in this case. On the contrary I exposed once again my conceptual framework. You might have objected that it's incoherent or with little explanatory power and consequently I would have asked you for proofs. But such a random objection like "representation is not the same thing as sovereignty" simply means you didn't understand what I was talking about. That’s all. — neomac

[3]

wanting a war to continue — Isaac


Then by your definition I'm not warmongering. I didn't want a war between Russia and Ukraine nor I want it to be continued. I was talking about my expectations about what the Ukrainians want not about what I want. BTW were the Russians warmongering when fighting back the Nazis out of their country in WW2? — neomac

No it isn't. I'm a member of the electorate in one of them, I hold them to account. It matters tremendously what I think they out to be concerned with. — Isaac


I wasn’t questioning the relevance of your moral standards to you nor the relevance of your political choices in a democracy. Again, I am questioning its relevance to establish what individuals, collectives or States are capable of. A part from that, people can surely have all the unrealistic expectations and set their moral standards arbitrarily high as they like, of course. — neomac

Since John Mearsheimer's opinions on the Ukraine war have been quoted here regularly, it seems some posters have gotten the impression that the perspectives that highlight the American role in causing the conflict in Ukraine are based solely on Mearsheimer's views.

This is of course false, and Mearsheimer is far from the only intellectual with these ideas. Noam Chomsky is another example, whose interviews have already been shared in this thread.

Another thinker that shares this point of view is Jeffery Sachs. His expertise is highly relevant as he was involved in the build-up of post-communist countries after the Cold War, and served as advisor to several Soviet/Russian and even Ukrainian presidents and (prime) ministers.




Several points made in this interview:

- Characterizes the conflict as being at its core about a clash between the United States and Russia.

- Integration of Russia into western economic systems failed primarily due to the United States demanding a subservient role from Russia, and when the latter refused such a role responded with antagonism.

- Western promises to halt NATO expansion eastward were hard promises, largely thrown to the wind when the neoconservatives took over American foreign policy in the early 90's. The neocons emphasized the preservation of complete United States dominance as unipolar hegemon.

Anyone that knows the archival record knows that it wasn't just a loose verbiage, but it was a decided policy of Germany and the United States to promise to Gorbachev: No NATO enlargement to the East - and not just East to the GDR. To the East.

Prominent scholars already warned of the dangers of neocon expansionism towards Russia in the mid to late '90s. George Kennan characterized it as the start of a new Cold War.

- The United States played a role in the successful effort to stage a coup d'etat in Ukraine in 2013-2014 to overthrow Yanukovyc. Sachs marks this event and the subsequent invasion of Crimea in February of 2014 as the start of the Ukraine war.

Jeffrey Sachs was well referred in the article given by . But Sachs naturally can have his US-oriented picture of it all (as can have Marjorie Taylor Green, etc). And have to say when it comes to the topic of global povetry, Jeffrey Sachs has a lot interesting to say, so he is a smart commenter.

The United States played a role in the successful effort to stage a coup d'etat in Ukraine in 2013-2014 to overthrow Yanukovyc. Sachs marks this event and the subsequent invasion of Crimea in February of 2014 as the start of the Ukraine war. — Tzeentch

Btw everybody puts the start of the war there with the annexation of Crimea and the Donetsk and Luhansk uprisings. February 24th last year was a dramatic escalation.

Yet even if US did play a role, I would disagree to call the Revolution of Dignity a "staged coup" starting with the Euromaidan protests. This wasn't some Operation Ajax, but naturally Russian propaganda portrays it to be so. That Yanukovych wasn't afterwards even accepted by the revolting Donetsk and Luhansk regions, which had been his core base, tells just how truly unpopular he was among Ukrainians. (Yanukovic heading Donetsk and Luhansk Republic etc. would obviously brought them legitimacy. Not like the people now: for example the ponzi-schemer that lead one of the "People's Republics".)

But of course, with the arrogant hubris of Westerners who see everything revolving around the US, actual domestic politics of foreign countries and their people don't matter, hence the finer details of the actual events are sidelined. But this has already been discussed earlier.

If you would read correctly, it is about invading and annexing territories from neighbors — ssu

So Britain wasn't imperialist?

I think Mexico would mind if the US annexed let's say Baja California from them. And with US Presidents declaring Canada or Mexico to be artificial constructions. — ssu

But Russia hasn't declared Finland to be an 'artificial creation'. You're losing the thread of the argument again. The article we're talking about paints Russia's attack as a problem for "civilization", not just for those countries Russia has declared 'artificial'. All countries.

So are we all worried about Israel? Are we all worried about Myanmar? Are we all worried about the US? Not just neighbours because the article doesn't say "Russia's neighbours who it thinks are artificial should be worried" the article is claiming that we all ought be worried about Russia's 'imperialist' war with Ukraine.

So did we all ought to be worried about Israel's imperialist war with Palestine?

Did we all ought to be worried about India's imperialist war with Pakistan?

If not, why not?

Second step: are human rights better implemented within Western countries? Yes — neomac

This step does not support your argument. To do so it would have to be possible for all countries to be like western countries, but if the human rights in western countries are bought at the expense of human rights in chattel countries, then it is not. You'd have to demonstrate not only that human rights are better in western countries, but that western countries do not worsen human rights elsewhere in achieving that state.

is Ukraine more pro-West than Russia? Yes. Asking to join NATO and EU, and be ready to suffer a war against Russia to defend their choice wrt anti-Western rhetoric and hostility from Russia are unquestionable evidences for that. And if this is no evidence I don’t know what is. — neomac

Seriously? A bit of pro-western rhetoric is the gold-standard evidence of a desire to adopt western human rights values?

The human rights record of Ukraine is on record for all to see. You can't bluff your way out of it. Read the reports.

anti-West Russia with a poorer implementation of human rights — neomac

It does not have a poorer human rights record. Again, this is all on record. Read the reports.

the democracy index is telling — neomac

Democracy is not exhaustive of human rights, not even close. It's one of 30 articles. Usually the one chosen by neoliberals like you to excuse nations for trampling over the other 29.

Is this enough evidence? If not why not? — neomac

See above. What could possibly make you think that the satisfaction on one out of thirty articles of human rights would be all the evidence needed?

Come back to this argument when you have any evidence whatsoever that Ukraine's human rights record (in all aspects) is better than Russia's, that it has more than a cynical Machiavellian desire to take advantage of western money, and that western countries have an approach to human rights that could improve the welfare of all, not just a privileged few.

... Oh, and then you've got to show how the deaths of tens of thousands is the best, or even morally acceptable, way of achieving this vague goal of 'westernization'.

I would disagree to call the Revolution of Dignity a "staged coup" starting with the Euromaidan protests. This wasn't some Operation Ajax, but naturally Russian propaganda portrays it to be so. — ssu

When considering the diversity of participants, both previously organized and spontaneously self-organized, this comparison between the 'Orange' and 'Maidan' shows the idea that they were all fronts for foreign governments very difficult to imagine.

One vital component to how quickly and far the revolution spread was the repression of the protests by the authorities. That does not come up much amongst the promoters of coup narratives.

this comparison between the 'Orange' and 'Maidan' shows the idea that they were all fronts for foreign governments very difficult to imagine. — Paine

...by Dr Olga Onuch. Currently consulting for the Ukrainian government. This is what you consider an unbiased source?