I don't see how. Chalmers famously labelled it the 'hard problem', didn't he? I'm suggesting it isn't a problem at all. I can't think of any way we could be much farther apart than that. — Isaac

Regardless, your view is similar to his.

So I would say that the difference is a difference of "world view". Science takes from the inside (theory), and applies what is taken from the inside, to the outside (practise). The application effectively proves and disproves what has been given by the inside, and this is the scientific method. Scientism denies the importance of the inside, insisting that the scientific method is all that is required for the existence of knowledge, thereby creating a blind spot for itself, its reliance on the inside. So science does not create the blind spot, nor does science reject dualism, it's the scientistic philosophy which rejects dualism, dissolving the difference between inside and outside, thereby producing a philosophical (not a scientific) blind spot. — Metaphysician Undercover

Your argument is interesting but I'm not sure I properly understand it - perhaps because it doesn't entirely mesh with my innate skeptical pragmatism. But differences of opinion don't phase me too much.

Science has limitations - as do most approaches. I wouldn't recommend prayer to manage diabetes or science to mend a broken heart - although there might be evidence based therapeutic modalities that can assist. :wink:

So it is completely incorrect to assume that science is the more reliable path towards understanding reality because it only has a method toward understanding a part of reality. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree to some extent, but most of the folk I know who privilege science would say it allows us to understand the aspects of reality humans have capability to understand, (or access to) not 'ultimate reality' - which is a different speculative metaphysical postulate. And science is an approach which develops and morphs.

What do you propose to be kinds of knowledge about reality we can attain without science? How would this apply to the hard question proposed here? Can you provide any examples? I'm assuming (from your description of inside derived knowledge) you are referring to higher awareness type directions.

Us being able to use a word in conversation is not an indicator that that word picks out some empirical object or event in need of a scientific explanation. — Isaac

you agree that we have experiences, and therefore some scientific accounting for them is necessary, to have a complete understanding of the world. — hypericin

Understanding of the world, not word. Experiences are events, whether or not they are somehow illusory. As such they require an explanation.

The boundary between two words that designate regions of a continuous phenomenon is very clearly not a event or property of the world. But our capacity to use such words as 'orange' to conceptually discretize continuities is subject to scientific explanation.

The use of the word 'consciousness' as it's used here and the study of neurons are not 'in the same world' they don't overlap in their activities. There's no need for one to explain the other, it wouldn't even make sense it'd be like expecting physics to explain what a googly is in cricket. — Isaac

Suppose you lost your ability to experience sight (assuming you have it), even though you can still clearly respond to visual events. In what "world" would you look for an explanation of your plight?

I think you're broadly in agreement with Chalmers here. — frank

I don't see how. — Isaac

For once I agree with @Isaac. For Chalmers there is an explanatory gap, for Isaac there is no gap, since consciousness is somehow a purely human construct, requiring no explanation.

I'm not looking to do a deep dive on what Isaac thinks because I'd probably bump my head on the bottom of the pool. But he said:

The use of the word 'consciousness' as it's used here and the study of neurons are not 'in the same world' they don't overlap in their activities. There's no need for one to explain the other, it wouldn't even make sense it'd be like expecting physics to explain what a googly is in cricket. — Isaac

The last sentence is not too far from Chalmers' view.

There's no need for one to explain the other — Isaac

There is absolutely a need for one to explain the other, if there was no need there would be no hard problem.

There is absolutely a need for one to explain the other, if there was no need there would be no hard problem. — hypericin

Chalmers doesn't think that science, in it's present state, is capable of addressing the hard problem. He thinks it will probably take some sort of paradigm shift.

Right, and that is a far cry from saying "science needn't bother answering this".

It's best to untangle the language first, at least to figure out what we're trying to talk about.

The word is an obvious nominalization, as evident by the suffix "-ness". Nominalizing adjectives and verbs is a natural and sometimes perilous part of language. So we'll have to look at the root word to gain any understanding here.

The word “conscious” (or "unconscious") has typically been applied to describe organisms, the body, the "physical correlates". In fact, there is little else on Earth the word can be applied to without raising serious absurdities. But, for whatever reason, the word has been nominalized along the way.

Knowing that "conscious-ness" is a nominalization, and "conscious" invariably describes conscious things, it follows that what we're speaking about is any number of conscious things considered in abstracto, that is, removed of every other physical properties for the purposes of analysis.

Unfortunately, having mentally excised the physical properties we're left with nothing to think about or even to apply the term. When the language turns a description of an object into its own "quality" or "essence", it makes it its own object, worthy of its own descriptions and so on. The problem is, the moment we look around, there isn't any extant object or substance or event or place upon which we can pin the word. So the "hard problem" is so difficult because you're trying to explain essentially nothing.

Right, and that is a far cry from saying "science needn't bother answering this". — hypericin

Yes, but Chalmers hasn't opined on what science should do, has he? Just on what it would have to do to address the hard problem.

If this were true there would be as many hard problems as there are nominalizations.

There are. It’s easy to describe someone as happy simply by looking at them. But how does one describe happiness, when we are no longer describing anything else?

The hard problem is not about consciousness in the abstract, it specifically asks how the biological reality of nervous systems relates to the first person reality of experiences.

The biological reality and the first person reality are one and the same thing. All we need do is answer the easy problems in order to answer the hard problem.

The biological reality and the first person reality are one and the same thing. — NOS4A2

This may be, but you'd need to provide evidence for it. It's not a logical truth.

If the OP wanted a within-paradigm discussion, then drawing in biology, chemistry, electricity, and quantum mechanics mightn't be the best way to go about that.

As usual, a claim is made against science, then when a scientific paradigm is invoked in the defense of that claim, the argument shifts to a non-overlapping magesteria one.

Well, if a scientific paradigm has no place in discussions about consciousness, then will everyone please stop going on about neuroscience (the failings thereof) in relation to it. — Isaac

There is a difference between thinking that findings within science have absolutely no bearing on our phenomenological self-understandings, which, if you were familiar with the phenomenological tradition, you would know is certainly not true, and thinking that findings within science trump our self-understandings when there appears to be a conflict between them.

So, ideas such as "non-overlapping magisteria", "forms of life", "fields of sense" and so on, are themselves subject to interpretation ranging from the idea that each "magisteria", "form" or "field" is hermetically sealed from the others, to recognizing that there is cross-fertilization, but that the imagined priority of any magisteria over any others is a matter of personal presupposition, preference and oftentimes, prejudice.

So, no claim is being made (by me at least) against science, against neuroscientific findings, I just question the notion that those findings trump our everyday self-understandings. And that notion itself is not something that could ever be established or refuted by empirical evidence. In that sense this discussion is already outside the magisteria we call science.

This may be, but you'd need to provide evidence for it. It's not a logical truth.

Take a look. That which is giving its first-person account is the exact same being to which we give a biological account.

I agree to some extent, but most of the folk I know who privilege science would say it allows us to understand the aspects of reality humans have capability to understand, (or access to) not 'ultimate reality' - which is a different speculative metaphysical postulate. And science is an approach which develops and morphs. — Tom Storm

The problem is that science consistently employs speculative metaphysical propositions, in the form of the hypotheses which it tests. The scientific method is to test hypotheses, but it dictates nothing about where these hypotheses are derived from. So, science plays a role in helping us to understand the aspects of reality which we are capable of understanding, but it does not provide that understanding by itself.

Now, consider your claim that science develops and morphs. Isn't it true that the directions which science goes in are greatly formed by the metaphysical hypotheses which are presented to it, to be tested. Your proclaimed "skeptical pragmatism" ought to help you to understand this. There is always reasons why the hypotheses which are drawn up, are drawn up, and this is what gives direction to the morphing and development of science. But what happens if science starts to get its direction from bad ontology, and bad metaphysics?

What do you propose to be kinds of knowledge about reality we can attain without science? — Tom Storm

I'm dualist, and I believe that all human knowledge requires both aspects, theory and practise. Science, as a method is a form of practise which validates theories. Theory without practise is not knowledge, nor is practise without theory. There is however a special type of knowledge described in Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics, which is called intuitive knowledge, and I believe it involves the relationship between practise and theory. I would not say that this type of knowledge is necessarily "about reality" but it is necessarily prior to science, and it is necessary in order to have any understanding of reality.

Take a look. That which is giving its first-person account is the exact same being to which we give a biological account. — NOS4A2

And you take this to show that phenomenal consciousness is equivalent to biological states? Could you explain how? Because I'm not seeing it.

The scientific method is to test hypotheses, but it dictates nothing about where these hypotheses are derived from. — Metaphysician Undercover

I get that. I don't think truth outside of human experience (in the Greek or Christian sense) is accessible so for me everything boils down to presuppositions you prefer to hold, which are usually based upon a worldview (theism/idealism/skepticism). For me science makes attempts at building testable knowledge and for the most part it delivers in was prayer or mediation can only dream of. I am comfortable with it's limitations which I think are the limitations of the human perspective.

There is however a special type of knowledge described in Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics, which is called intuitive knowledge, and I believe it involves the relationship between practise and theory. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is an example of one such presupposition I mentioned. Not one I personally subscribe to.

I would not say that this type of knowledge is necessarily "about reality" but it is necessarily prior to science, and it is necessary in order to have any understanding of reality. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is interesting to me. Even though don't think I can incorporate it into my worldview.

I'm dualist, and I believe that all human knowledge requires both aspects, theory and practise — Metaphysician Undercover

Interesting. I think I'm a monist - I just do things and rarely reflect (no doubt I am the unremarkable product of enculturation). :razz: The advantage I have found is that I am almost always content and in positive relationship with others. :wink:

But what happens if science starts to get its direction from bad ontology, and bad metaphysics? — Metaphysician Undercover

I may explore this idea with you more later if that's ok. I tend to be more sympathetic to Feyerabendian views on science (what little I understand of his project) and do not consider myself in the scientific method worship business. Personally I think metaphysics and ontology mostly come down to personal preferences (again those presuppositions you hold) and some of these are more useful in certain contexts than others. I really only care what people believe if they want to execute gay people, chop down our last trees or stack the supreme court with Methodists.

And you take this to show that phenomenal consciousness is equivalent to biological states? Could you explain how? Because I'm not seeing it.

For the simple reason that phenomenal consciousness is not equivalent to anything else. There is no other entity in the universe onto which we can affix the label "phenomenal consciousness" but the biology. The biology is speaking about itself, as we can observe and by its own admission. "I'm hurt", "I feel pain", "I'm hungry" says the biology. So we mend the biological state, console the biological state, feed the biological state. At no point need we concern with anything else.

So what would you take to show that they are not equivalent?

For the simple reason that phenomenal consciousness is not equivalent to anything else. There is no other entity in the universe onto which we can affix the label "phenomenal consciousness" but the biology. — NOS4A2

How do you know that?

So what would you take to show that they are not equivalent? — NOS4A2

Chalmers has a couple of thought experiments that show that the two are logically distinct. One is the p-zombie. This shows that we don't know apriori that the two are equivalent. We need evidence to show that.

To me, it's just that one can't extrapolate anything from the qualia of the brain. It's fleshy; it's gray. But one isn't immediately struck: Hey, that's life! That's consciousness!

The physical brain and consciousness aren't parallels. There's no way in which matter ever will "seem" like a sufficient explanation. It just can't happen.

This is interesting to me. Even though don't think I can incorporate it into my worldview. — Tom Storm

I think that the vast majority of knowledge is not "about reality". Knowledge mostly consists of how to do things. You being pragmatist must recognize this. But this gives moral philosophy a supreme position on the epistemic hierarchy, because it deals with what we should and should not do. But then we must go even higher than this, to ground our moral principles, so we turn toward understanding reality, and this is metaphysics.

Interesting. I think I'm a monist - I just do things and rarely reflect (no doubt I am the unremarkable product of enculturation). :razz: The advantage I have found is that I am almost always content and in positive relationship with others. :wink: — Tom Storm

Contentment is not always good. We ought not be content in a bad situation. And one cannot judge the situation by one's contentment, saying if I am content, then the situation is good, because we need to base goodness in a view toward the future. Understanding what "the future" is, is a subject of metaphysics, and this is why we need accurate metaphysics for a good moral philosophy.

Personally I think metaphysics and ontology mostly come down to personal preferences — Tom Storm

I perceive a little inconsistency between this (metaphysics and ontology are just personal preferences), and your earlier statement, that you are the "product of enculturation". How do you suppose that one's metaphysics and ontology could escape one's enculturation, to acquire the status of personal preference? See "personal preference" points to taste, but "metaphysics" points to an understanding of reality. So how could one's understanding of reality be more like the product of taste than the product of enculturation?

I perceive a little inconsistency between this (metaphysics and ontology are just personal preferences), and your earlier statement, that you are the "product of enculturation". How do you suppose that one's metaphysics and ontology could escape one's enculturation, to acquire the status of personal preference? — Metaphysician Undercover

I've always assumed that one's personal preferences are derived by enculturation. But I should have also said that there are likely to biological factors. I'm not really trying to nail down a totalizing explanation for all things.

I think that the vast majority of knowledge is not "about reality". Knowledge mostly consists of how to do things. You being pragmatist must recognize this. But this gives moral philosophy a supreme position on the epistemic hierarchy, because it deals with what we should and should not do. But then we must go even higher than this, to ground our moral principles, so we turn toward understanding reality, and this is metaphysics. — Metaphysician Undercover

Nicely argued. There's a lot unpack there. First take: I generally hold that my morality is based on preferences - derived from upbringing, culture, society, biology and aesthetics. I don't like the aesthetics of violence, abuse or 'will' being forced upon others. It's terribly ugly and unpleasant. For me morality is in the doing not in the theory. I generally hold to human flourishing as a key guide. Does it harm or help? This is not a science and should be an open, ongoing conversation.

I've always assumed that one's personal preferences are derived by enculturation. But I should have also said that there are likely to biological factors. I'm not really trying to nail down a totalizing explanation for all things. — Tom Storm

I think the common standard is to attribute personal preferences to genetic predisposition. This predisposition may get amplified through practise and enculturation.

For me morality is in the doing not in the theory. I generally hold to human flourishing as a key guide. — Tom Storm

Well, we surely need some theory to be able to judge the doing as good or bad. Whether or not "human flourishing" makes an acceptable principle is debatable. I suppose we'd need to start with a good definition of "flourishing".

This is not a science and should be an open, ongoing conversation. — Tom Storm

I agree with this.

You raise interesting points. I was struck by something Rorty said about truth. 'We don't need to define truth, we know how to use it.' I kind of feel the same about morality. I'm not generally big on definitions, actions are more interesting to me. Anyone can say any kind of guff about ethics and principles. But what is it that we do?

Well, we surely need some theory to be able to judge the doing as good or bad. — Metaphysician Undercover

Suffering bad. I can take each case as it comes, I don't need to write a paper on it. :wink:

How do you know that?

We’ve looked.

Chalmers has a couple of thought experiments that show that the two are logically distinct. One is the p-zombie. This shows that we don't know apriori that the two are equivalent. We need evidence to show that.

Do you find p-zombies convincing? I don’t even find them conceivable. I can’t even think about how such a being could be possible.

How to catch out a P-Zombie - ask them how they are.

:up: