As I stated earlier, Putins (hence Russia's) position is quite opportunist. If ideologically imperialist Russia is close to ultra-conservatism and the far right, naturally the left/extreme left in it's hatred of US hegemony aligns perfectly with Russia. So with the left, it's more of a "working relationship" on a shared enemy, not ideological partnership.

And again, the real leftist "Putinistas" can be found in the People's Republics of Luhansk and Donetsk. Where the two-headed eagle of Russia is in harmony next to the hammer and sickle.

Al Jazeera puts it well, with the example of Brazil:

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine led to an unexpected convergence in the political arena. Indeed, all over the world left-wing parties, activists and even prominent leftist politicians are joining the far right in voicing their support for – or at least excusing – the Kremlin’s brutal, imperialist aggression against a much smaller sovereign nation.

This strange phenomenon is perhaps most visible in Brazil, where supporters of far-right President Jair Bolsonaro and his left-wing rival, former president Lula da Silva, are both working hard to demonstrate why Russia should not be blamed for the devastation we are witnessing in Ukraine today.

Just like their counterparts on the right, left-wing supporters of the Kremlin insist that it was NATO that “provoked” the war and that Russia is simply “defending itself” (they, of course, refuse to explain how this so-called act of “defence” is different from the West’s past “pre-emptive” strikes against countries of the Global South that they vehemently condemned). They are also dismissing credible reports of war crimes, crimes against humanity and even genocide coming from Ukraine as Western “distortions” and “NATO propaganda” funded by George Soros (ironically also the bogeyman of the anti-Semitic far right), in defence of Ukrainian “Nazis” trying to destroy Russia.

Lula has said that Zelenskiy is "as responsible as Putin for the war".

Here you are no longer delving into hypothetical thoughts, you clearly state as a matter of fact “war is totally provoked”, “these are definitely Nazi institutions with enormous power and influence in Ukraine”, “The rights of Russian speaking minorities that, fact of the matter is, Ukraine started oppressing”, “There have been war crimes also by the Ukrainians”. — neomac

These are just facts. I don't claim these are hypotheticals.

And you count them as “legitimate grievance”. Besides since you talk about “entirely justified grievance” and “in total contradiction to the West's ‘values and policies’” (unquestionable proof of Western hypocrisy right?), the gap between “legitimate grievance” and “justified grievance” seems now bridged by the reference to Western shared rules. You look pretty convinced about all this. — neomac

Yes, these totally factual things, documented by our own the Western media (before they got the memo that these subjects were off limits), and are legitimate grievances.

Legitimate grievance does not mean "justified". It's a concept you need to negotiate with people.

For example, a murderer, who's just confessed to a murder, could have a legitimate grievance that the police didn't bring him his coffee as they said they would.

Now, if the police don't want anything more from the murderer and seeing as coffee isn't a right, no one recorded the promise of coffee anyways and even if they did there's no damages or relevance to the confession and legal process etc., they could just walk away and say fuck the murderer and his coffee, I ain't doing shit for this sack of crap. So, the coffee remains a legitimate grievance of the murderer but in the grand scheme of moral things a broken promise of coffee is in no way comparable to murder and there's no legal consequence to breaching this contract.

However, let's say the police want the murderer to keep talking: where's the body? Who else was involved? What was the motivation? etc.

Now, the murderer says "I won't talk more until I get my coffee". I'm pretty sure any detective on the planet would get this murderer a coffee, even if they don't really want to be nice to the murderer. Why? It's a legitimate grievance that needs to be resolved in order to agree on a cooperative action to keep conversing about the murder.

Had the murderer said "I'll talk more, but police are wearing the colour blue, and I hate blue, and to compensate that I want to be let go, all charges dropped etc." doubtful any detective would view this a legitimate grievance reasonable and reasonable demand to resolve this grievance, to continue the conversation.

So, back the Russian and Ukrainian war. If you don't want to negotiate with Russia then there is no need to reflect on their legitimate grievances. However, if you do want to negotiate (want to convince the other party you're dealing with to do something using mere words) then resolving legitimate grievances (in one way or the other) is an essential part of the negotiation process.

The reason the word "legitimate" appears instead of just saying "grievance" is because in a negotiation people start high and settle lower; so, first off, there maybe a whole list of grievances and perhaps many are just padding the negotiation position and aren't really thought of as legitimate by the party presenting them (things they plan to let go of in basically horse trading). Likewise, some grievances maybe authentically felt by the counter-party, but our own side views them as illegitimate and will never satisfy them; but maybe it's possible to come to an agreement anyways if there remains overall enough "compensation" for letting go of the grievances. For example, right now Turkey is making all sorts of demands on Sweden to join NATO, and maybe they will "stick to their guns" or maybe they are just trying to maximise purely economic compensation (NATO: solve our inflation problem if you want Sweden) and so just throwing out these other grievances as it would be "impolite" for Turkey to directly say what they are actually after; so, if that were the case, the grievances are purely nominal and Turkey will just say whatever until their implied economic demands are met (and not by Sweden, but the the EU and US who could solve their inflation problem).

Of course, you can argue that Russia's grievances don't matter, even if some are true, as there is no reason to negotiate.

However, if you want to negotiate, they it's necessary to reflect on how the counter-party views things and what issues need to be resolved (for them, not for you) in order to reach an agreement (you negotiate with "the other" not yourself). Of course, it is the same for Russia negotiating with Ukraine and the West, and a successful negotiation is going to adequately resolve the grievances in the context of the other important factor which is leverage. The more leverage you have in a negotiation the more of your grievances you can seek to have resolved and the less grievances of the counter-party you need to care about. For example, perhaps 2 nuclear bombs being dropped on Japan for no military reason is a legitimate grievance, but they lost the war and had no leverage so the US could and did ignore that little detail.

Of course, if your goal is:

Sure, here I restate it again and bolden it: The end game for NATO/US involvement in this war doesn’t need to be to stop Russia or overturn its regime. But to inflict as much enduring damage as possible to Russian power (in terms of its economic system, its system of alliance, its capacity of military projection outside its borders, its its technology supply, its military and geopolitical status) to the point it is not longer perceived as a non-negligible geopolitical threat to the West. Outrageous right?! Yet if the endgame was stopping Russia, the quickest effective way would be for the West to force Ukraine to surrender to all Russian demands, or not even start a “proxy war” against Russia in the first place, right?! But that’s neither the Western endgame nor the Ukrainians’. So YES concern for the Ukrainian welfare is LITERALLY and REASONABLY compatible with not stopping Russia if that means Ukrainian surrender.
As always, I’m responsible for what I write, not for what you understand. — neomac

Then there is no reason to want Ukraine to negotiate with Russia, but rather it's better to just spread propaganda to increase the will for Ukrainians to fight even if they don't "stop" Russia and their country is completely wrecked as well as increase motivation of the West to supply arms and so on.

So, it's understandable that you are unable to follow any conversation about the steps of negotiating a resolution to the conflict, as you do not want the conflict to end until "as much enduring damage" is inflicted on Russia.

And again, "not stopping the Russians" includes an immensely costly the war for the Ukrainians and then simply losing the war. This is not compatible with Ukrainian welfare. Even in a losing position, one party to a war still has the leverage of being able to inflict more damage and can use that to get more concessions than total military defeat.

That just says exactly what I argued. 'Allied with Putin' is being defined as 'anything which disagrees with US policy'

Lula is not 'allied with Putin' in any way shape or form. He disagrees with US foreign policy and thinks it resulted in the war. He disagrees with the US narrative.

It is one of the more disgusting aspects of the Facebook generation that there can be no room for disagreement any more. If you're not pro-US, you must be pro-Putin. It's pathetic.

To me other notions to clarify are those of “victory” and “loss”. They may have a meaning on the battlefield — neomac

They definitely do have meaning on the battlefield, but I understand since Ukraine isn't achieving these "victories" as of late you've made up some different meanings for victory to cope with that.

Anyhow such geopolitical victory doesn’t depend just on Russian means, resolution, or escalation threats, but also on Western cohesion, resolution and vision in addressing the Russian security and economic challenge. This will also be an example also for other authoritarian regimes, like China. And an important premise to repair or rebuild more convenient relationships between the West and the Rest in the interest of everybody. — neomac

You are just completely delusional. The West does not represent the "interest of everybody" and is not seeking, in this war or any other policy dimension, solutions that are in the "interest of everybody".

Even more bizarre, you don't hesitate to just flat out say US's actions are justified due to their hegemonic position (and just ignore the fact that if Russia wins, then they are the hegemon, and therefore justified in your framework, in the region).

Here the problems I see:
First, you seem asking me to solve an equation whose form and variables are unknown. What does “lose” for Ukraine mean in quantifiable terms? What’s the likelihood of loss and win and how did you calculate it? What’s the time range you are considering? What’s the cost threshold that if exceeded will make the cost unreasonably high? What quantifiable parameters would make you consider a Western plan a “‘coherent workable’ plan to actually ‘beat’ Russia”? — neomac

These are your problems, not mine. I don't care about beating Russia.

I'm not a Russophobe. I didn't live in fear of Russia before this war, I don't live in fear of Russia now. I do fear US escalating the conflict to essentially accidental nuclear war, but this is a fear of the international dynamic that's been put in place, mostly by the US "meddling" in Ukrainian elections and internal affairs.

My position in this debate is that a negotiated peace is preferable to more war, Zelensky is an idiot, but the West (US / EU) easily has the leverage to negotiate a resolution to the conflict and just ignore the fact Zelensky is an idiot.

And, "loss for Ukraine in quantifiable terms" is easy to define: tens of thousands, or even hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians dead, economy wrecked, massive emigration, and not even achieving anything further on the battle field since last spring but forced to accept Russia control over it's current occupied territory, maybe more. This would definitely be a loss for Ukraine.

Now, if you want to wax whimsically that even if Ukraine loses the war Russia is harmed "enough" geopolitically and there's some Western geopolitical victory of some sort, then even if that were true, Ukraine gets no benefit, so the end result is using the Ukrainians for our own geopolitical ambitions: aka. sacrificing Ukraine to harm Russia.

I am entirely willing to sacrifice an entire country in war campaign, wars take sacrifice, I am the kind of person who would not hesitate to sit down and write an "equation" concluding millions, or hundreds of millions of people must be sacrificed for what I believe to be right (if it makes sense of course), but I am only willing in a war in which I am actually fighting in and my own country takes losses in the country being sacrificed. This was the old way: "you want us to make a fanatical stand to slow down and attrit the enemy, you get your fucking asses fucking here and do some dying too, otherwise we're suing for peace or straight up surrendering and not damaging our country for nothing".

For example, the UK wanted France to resist Nazi invasion, and so sent an expeditionary force to help with that. It's common sense.

Without that, we are not "allied" with Ukraine, we are cynically manipulating and exploiting them for entirely different geopolitical reasons (in the case of Europe, self-defeating geo-political reasons) with minimum risk to our own soldiers lives and so minimum cause to sit down and really reflect on what are doing and the consequences of our leaders decisions.

If you're not pro-US, you must be pro-Putin. It's pathetic. — Isaac

As long as I can be pro-US while disagreeing with their foreign policy many/most times, and still not be pro-Putin.

As long as I can be pro-US while disagreeing with their foreign policy many/most times, and still not pro-Putin. — creativesoul

I believe this is the point @Isaac is making. Criticism of US foreign policy isn't "pro-Putin".

Yup. I was being facetious. He and I agree there.

Ah ok, I haven't been following the conversation for a couple of weeks.

It is truly a bizarre transformation of it being totally normal to criticise US foreign policy, this entire last century, to any criticism is now pro-Putin. Likewise, for the arms industry, and not just in the US but also in Europe, who don't benefit from the war and it's purely ideological and informed by propaganda ... which, ok, most people view the world that way, but European leaders one would assume have a more sophisticated view of the world and would be pushing propaganda due to some underlying motivation. Motivation of the US is pretty clear, but it's really hard to interpret European leadership's motivation in this and come up with a different interpretation to: they're both really dumb and don't really understand anything and / or then just cowards in the face of social media pressure.

Exactly. What we're being asked to believe is that..

a) the US despite funding, arming, and training Ukraine, despite providing intelligence, despite a propaganda and media censorship campaign the likes of which hasn't been seen for decades... are in fact barely involved in this war

b) Lula, mentions something which Putin also mentioned in one of his speeches...and thus is now an ally of one of parties in this war.

Motivation of the US is pretty clear, but it's really hard to interpret European leadership's motivation in this ... — boethius

The majority of European "leadership" is an ideologically driven bunch inspired by the likes of Klaus Schwab. Authoritarian to the core, they'll jump on every crisis opportunity to further their personal agenda and tighten the reigns on the population of Europe.

Crises give governments extraordinary powers, and they are currently using those to pass all sorts of far-reaching legislation, from attempts at forced vaccinations during covid, to mass-surveillance, digital IDs and digital currencies. Notice the common thread - control, control, control.

The majority of European "leadership" is an ideologically driven bunch inspired by the likes of Klaus Schwab. Authoritarian to the core, they'll jump on every crisis opportunity to further their personal agenda and tighten the reigns on the population of Europe.

Crises give governments extraordinary powers, and they are currently using those to pass all sorts of far-reaching legislation, from attempts at forced vaccinations during covid, to mass-surveillance, digital IDs and digital currencies. Notice the common thread - control, control, control. — Tzeentch

Although I agree with the basics, they still require economic strength to pursue their personal and legislative agendas, which for decades has involved the "realpolitik" move of accessing Russian resources.

If it was purely ideological driven they would have broken with Russia a long time ago, not made new pipelines and so on. There's been clear disagreement with the US on policy for decades, clear motivation to stay on friendly terms with Russia and trade. It would not be plausible that EU leaders build up dependence on Russia just to have a crisis and push through their agendas.

I would completely agree when it comes to Boris Johnson, but there weren't other European leaders joining him in Kiev to convince Zelensky to keep fighting.

In other words, it's difficult to interpret European leaders, apart from Boris and maybe Poland, as being motivated to cause the war to happen and escalate it, there's just also a complete lack of evidence of any motivation to prevent the war, or pressure a peace settlement once it started.

Additionally, we now get mixed messages from these same leaders about the war now.

Rather, it seems to me the central European leaders really did have a mentality of scolded school children.

Lula has said that Zelenskiy is "as responsible as Putin for the war". — ssu

Which is stupid alright.

Lula has said that Zelenskiy is "as responsible as Putin for the war". — ssu

He is right.

Zelensky (and many Ukrainian presidents before him) was so foolish to think he could play the United States and Russia against each other.

They predictably did not succeed in beating the great powers at their own game, and got used as a pawn instead. The United States is doing the minimum it can to maintain its credibility as a military ally, while mostly just watching as Ukraine gets clobbered by the gorilla it told the Ukrainians to pick a fight with.

Even if they had succeeded at causing a United States intervention, did they honestly believe Ukraine wouldn't pay a horrible price for that?


I wouldn't go so far as to say Zelensky is as responsible as Putin for the war. Russia is principally responsible for the war. Zelensky, his predecessors and the United States are principally responsible for the conflict that sparked the war.

Also Poland was as much responsible for WWII as Hitler and Stalin.

Also Poland was as much responsible for WWII as Hitler and Stalin. — SophistiCat

The subject is different. While Poland is country with his own history, language, culture and system, Ukraine is basically a little Russia. Putin's behaviour is not good and he is responsible of criminal wars.
But please... don't let the nationalists as Zelensky say that they are "Western world" and so "different from Russia" when they even share the same alphabet. In the other hand, we do not see any move by Ukraine to end this war... he is acting selfish and is choking the world economy just for his nationalist business. He is acting like the rest of the world is not in trouble...

Did Poland act as Ukraine is now acting? I think not...

This war has to end and Ukraine must accept his reality.

The subject is different. While Poland is country with his own history, language, culture and system, Ukraine is basically a little Russia — javi2541997

Ookey... So Ukraine does not have its own history, language and culture and does not have a right to exist as a sovereign nation (no matter what its people think). In that case they totally deserve to be invaded and subjugated. Got it :roll:

we do not see any move by Ukraine to end this war... he is acting selfish and is choking the world economy just for his nationalist business. He is acting like the rest of the world is not in trouble... — javi2541997

Very selfish indeed. Why can't they just quit their resistance to the invasion and let Russia rampage over the rest of the country? No one would care (except for Ukrainians, but they aren't even a people, so they don't count).

Why can't they just quit their resistance to the invasion and let Russia rampage over the rest of the country? No one would care (except for Ukrainians, but they aren't even a people, so they don't count). — SophistiCat

Not all the Ukranians are opposed to Russia. The more closer you go to Russian border you would see that their citizens root for Russia instead of Western world or NATO. This is a complex issue and it is not about all Ukrainians are against the invasion. Probably, the citizens of Kiev are nationalists but I doubt if the citizens from Jerson or Crimea have the same feelings.

The situation is dynamic. Whatever sentiments were prevalent before the 2014 annexation of Crimea, the Russians have been busy. There is the departure of Ukrainians and the theft of their property as noted here:

Since 2014, Russia has been employing traditional Soviet resettlement practices and forcibly changing the demographic composition of the population in Crimea (see EDM, May 30, 2019 and August 6, 2019). The imposition of Russian Federation citizenship on residents of Crimea (nearly all residents of the peninsula had Russian citizenship less than a year after the annexation), forced deportations, the unlawful conscription of local men into the Russian military, persecutions and imprisonments of pro-Ukrainian activists who stand against the occupation, repressions against the Ukrainian Church, as well as closures of Ukrainian schools triggered a mass departure of Ukrainians (including Crimean Tatars) from Crimea. According to the Prosecutor General’s Office of Ukraine, almost 48,000 people left the peninsula for Ukraine during the last seven years (Krymr.com, January 6, 2021). The number of those who moved to other countries may be higher. — Alla Hurska

The same article notes the influx of population into Crimea:

Since illegally annexing Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula, Russia has been forcibly shifting the region’s demographic composition and trying to replace the native Crimean population with its own loyal citizens. Moreover, these transformative migration flows enable the occupying authorities to create a Trojan Horse against any future efforts by Kyiv to return the peninsula to its control. The saturation of Crimea with siloviki and military personnel is also done intentionally, helping further militarize the region and populate Crimea with trusted armed people. According to Article 49(6) of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 and Article 8(2)(b)(viii) of the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), “the transfer, directly or indirectly, by the Occupying Power of parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies” is completely prohibited and considered a war crime (Crimeahrg.org, January 6). — ibid

Before the 2022 invasion, the problem of Internally Displaced Population in Ukraine was still a major issue years after the annexation and the establishment of the Independent Republics. It is difficult to find exact numbers of IDP's and refugees who have fled the country since 2/2022.

According to the 2001 census, the breakdown of ethnic identity in Kherson was:

Ukrainians - 961.6 (82.0%)
Russians - 165.2 (14.1%)
Belarusians - 8.1 (0.7%)
Tatars - 5.3 (0.5%)
Armenians - 4.5 (0.4%)
Moldavians - 4.1 (0.4%)

Gosh, that can't be right. When Russia annexed it recently, they had a vote where over 90% of the population approved. That is a lot of heart and mind to win over in just 20 years.

Some bare basics (observations):

("Everyone bad" —the thread :grin:)
Putin + team responsible for attacking. Kyiv responsible for defending.
Attackers decide actions for defenders to deal/contend with. Responsibility/blame uneven, asymmetric.
Attackers' background increasingly autocratic, suppressive, ... Defenders move toward more transparency, democratic standards, ...
Invasion/attacks multipronged, like conventional (e.g. artillery), intimidation/terrorism-like (bombing throughout, building instability, insurgency), cultural (e.g. re-enculturation, suppression), political (e.g. narrative-hijacking, annexations by fakery, land grab, propaganda). That's what the defenders then have on their hands, but have a good deal of foreign aid/support.

Argumentative commentary losing sight of this stuff is kind of suspect.

Putin + team more or less blame "the West" (a couple or so continents I guess), which they cast as out to destroy Russia, a dire existential threat. Kyiv cast Putin's Russia as a threat to Ukraine (and others), and wants them to leave.

These are some of their public rationales/justifications.

Ukraine does not have its own history, language and culture — SophistiCat

Of course Ukraine does not have its own history, language and culture. It's an arbitrary line on a map, it's absurd to think it somehow contains a natural grouping of language, history and culture.

Tell me, how did the people who determined where the line should be ensure that it encompassed such a natural grouping? Were studies done, where polls taken? Because as I recall learning it, it was some politicians in a negotiating room that drew the line. Did Lenin consult ethnographers in 1922? Did Krushchev cede Crimea because his anthropologists insisted the 'culture' there belonged to Ukraine?

No country's boundaries are carefully drawn around natural breaks in culture and language. It's one of the reasons we have so many fucking wars.

In this case, you'd be blind to ignore the fact that the Russian-speaking population in the east of Ukraine have a different language to the rest, the suppression of which was instrumental in the pre-2022 war.

Here you are no longer delving into hypothetical thoughts, you clearly state as a matter of fact “war is totally provoked”, “these are definitely Nazi institutions with enormous power and influence in Ukraine”, “The rights of Russian speaking minorities that, fact of the matter is, Ukraine started oppressing”, “There have been war crimes also by the Ukrainians”. — neomac

These are just facts. I don't claim these are hypotheticals.

And you count them as “legitimate grievance”. Besides since you talk about “entirely justified grievance” and “in total contradiction to the West's ‘values and policies’” (unquestionable proof of Western hypocrisy right?), the gap between “legitimate grievance” and “justified grievance” seems now bridged by the reference to Western shared rules. You look pretty convinced about all this. — neomac


Yes, these totally factual things, documented by our own the Western media (before they got the memo that these subjects were off limits), and are legitimate grievances.

Legitimate grievance does not mean "justified". It's a concept you need to negotiate with people. — boethius

What did you just write?! If the “concept” (intention or extension) of “legitimate grievance” needs to be negotiated then you yourself can not claim as a fact that those I listed are “legitimate grievances”: main parties didn’t negotiate anywhere what “legitimate grievances” Russia may be acknowledged to have.

For example, a murderer, who's just confessed to a murder, could have a legitimate grievance that the police didn't bring him his coffee as they said they would.

Now, if the police don't want anything more from the murderer and seeing as coffee isn't a right, no one recorded the promise of coffee anyways and even if they did there's no damages or relevance to the confession and legal process etc., they could just walk away and say fuck the murderer and his coffee, I ain't doing shit for this sack of crap. So, the coffee remains a legitimate grievance of the murderer but in the grand scheme of moral things a broken promise of coffee is in no way comparable to murder and there's no legal consequence to breaching this contract.

However, let’s say the police want the murderer to keep talking: where's the body? Who else was involved? What was the motivation? etc.

Now, the murderer says "I won't talk more until I get my coffee". I'm pretty sure any detective on the planet would get this murderer a coffee, even if they don't really want to be nice to the murderer. Why? It's a legitimate grievance that needs to be resolved in order to agree on a cooperative action to keep conversing about the murder.

Had the murderer said "I'll talk more, but police are wearing the colour blue, and I hate blue, and to compensate that I want to be let go, all charges dropped etc." doubtful any detective would view this a legitimate grievance reasonable and reasonable demand to resolve this grievance, to continue the conversation. — “boethius

The example starts with an actual (not merely alleged) promise by the police to the murderer to satisfy a petty demand (a coffee) that grants plausibility to the “reasonable” “legitimate grievance” by the murderer (can there be unreasonable “legitimate grievance” then? Or “legitimate grievance” means “reasonable grievance”?) whose relevance ultimately depends on its instrumental value in furthering police goals.
I guess you have in mind the “not one inch eastward” promise which NATO enlargement has putatively violated. But it should be clear why that example is no good analogy: as far as I know, there are no records of such promise (so its actual content and its implications remain unknown, even if it actually happened). In other words, we are talking about an "alleged" promise. One could still concede that there were at least informal assurances, however they didn’t involve the US and Russia, but representatives of the American administration and representatives of the Soviet Union administration, so those assurances were realistically bond to political fate of those administrations (like the JCPOA which, differently from this alleged promise, was a very much recorded agreement and Putin’s “outstanding” and “talented” orange-faced girlfriend withdraw from). The alleged promise or informal assurance wasn’t a petty demand at all since its about critical security concerns of two major nuclear-weapon states, so top priority (and for top priority things informal assurance isn't ideal unless there is no material time to formalise the assurance, of course). Besides Russia is far from being as impotent and self-discrediting as a confessed murderer in a police station: indeed, it's a sovereign state with self-entitled expansionist ambitions and means to make lots of human, material and economic damage to other countries. So question of “legitimacy” can make a difference in terms of propaganda and international recognition wrt peer competitors. Russians could have averted the perceived threat from NATO enlargement by becoming more democratic and less corrupt to the benefit of Russian economy and welfare after the end of the Cold War, yet Putin preferred to invest Russian economic resources and Western trust to nurture Russian oligarchs&siloviki, military buildup and play a power game on the world stage at the expense of the West, most certainly of the US. Unfortunately “if you take a stick and you poke a bear in the eye, that bear is probably going to fight back” right?
Finally, if “promise” is your paradigm case to clarify the notion of “legitimate grievance”, I don’t see how this could clarify other Russian “legitimate grievances” you were talking about.

So, back the Russian and Ukrainian war. If you don't want to negotiate with Russia then there is no need to reflect on their legitimate grievances. However, if you do want to negotiate (want to convince the other party you're dealing with to do something using mere words) then resolving legitimate grievances (in one way or the other) is an essential part of the negotiation process.

The reason the word "legitimate" appears instead of just saying "grievance" is because in a negotiation people start high and settle lower; so, first off, there maybe a whole list of grievances and perhaps many are just padding the negotiation position and aren't really thought of as legitimate by the party presenting them (things they plan to let go of in basically horse trading). Likewise, some grievances maybe authentically felt by the counter-party, but our own side views them as illegitimate and will never satisfy them; but maybe it's possible to come to an agreement anyways if there remains overall enough "compensation" for letting go of the grievances. — “boethius

My point still is that if one side will see the “authentically felt” request (which is different from “legitimate”, “justified” or “reasonable” request, right?) as “illegitimate” but there is a possibility to find an agreement anyways then there is no need to acknowledge the grievance as legitimate AT ALL. Agreeing on a compensation doesn’t equate to acknowledging the legitimacy of the grievance (so no pre-established moral, legal, contractual right/rule that has been violated) but to offering a cost-effective and non-coercive way to let the grievance go away. The semantic link you suggest (“The reason the word ‘legitimate' appears instead of just saying "grievance" is because in a negotiation people start high and settle lower”) is confused and misleading because “legitimacy” is normally understood wrt a pre-established moral, legal, contractual set of rights/rules, and not wrt the acceptability of a negotiated outcome as negotiated prices are on a horse trading. It’s precisely because these are 2 different things that “maybe it's possible to come to an agreement” (negotiated outcome acceptable to both parties) even if “our own side views them as illegitimate” (wrt a pre-established moral, legal, contractual set of rights/rules).

Of course, you can argue that Russia's grievances don't matter, even if some are true, as there is no reason to negotiate. — “boethius

I’m arguing against your notion of Russian “legitimate grievance” even if Russian grievances may be grounded on partial truths. And even if there are no Russian legitimate grievances as far as I understand them, there might still be a good reason to negotiate at some point if the negotiation has a cost-effective way, acceptable to all involved parties, to let the grievance go away.

Of course, if your goal is:

Sure, here I restate it again and bolden it: The end game for NATO/US involvement in this war doesn’t need to be to stop Russia or overturn its regime. But to inflict as much enduring damage as possible to Russian power (in terms of its economic system, its system of alliance, its capacity of military projection outside its borders, its its technology supply, its military and geopolitical status) to the point it is not longer perceived as a non-negligible geopolitical threat to the West. Outrageous right?! Yet if the endgame was stopping Russia, the quickest effective way would be for the West to force Ukraine to surrender to all Russian demands, or not even start a “proxy war” against Russia in the first place, right?! But that’s neither the Western endgame nor the Ukrainians’. So YES concern for the Ukrainian welfare is LITERALLY and REASONABLY compatible with not stopping Russia if that means Ukrainian surrender.
As always, I’m responsible for what I write, not for what you understand. — neomac


Then there is no reason to want Ukraine to negotiate with Russia, but rather it's better to just spread propaganda to increase the will for Ukrainians to fight even if they don't "stop" Russia and their country is completely wrecked as well as increase motivation of the West to supply arms and so on. — “boethius

I don’t see any evidence in support of the idea that Ukrainians will be significantly encouraged to fight by foreign propaganda. The evidences available to me support the idea that all the Russian atrocities Ukrainians are suffering from (that strikingly echoes Russian historical oppression) constitute well enough motivation for Ukrainians to keep fighting. Western propaganda is mainly for domestic consumption to boost cohesion and support for Ukraine, precisely because the West is not experiencing what Ukrainians are experiencing, do not understand all the relevant stakes as strategic decision makers do, and the West is still plagued by info-war and pro-Russian propaganda like yours. Indeed, the very reciprocal claim of yours is true: it's Ukrainian propaganda which is very much active to encourage Western administrations and general public to support Ukrainian even more. Not surprisingly, there are people here who even complain about such "selfish" and "childish" attitude on the Ukrainian part at the expense of the West (so the Ukrainians are the ones to exploit the Westerners, go figure!) .

"not stopping the Russians" includes an immensely costly the war for the Ukrainians and then simply losing the war — “boethius

That’s your speculation whose plausibility is questionable for the many reasons I pointed out. And this won’t change no matter how many times you repeat it.

To me other notions to clarify are those of “victory” and “loss”. They may have a meaning on the battlefield — neomac

They definitely do have meaning on the battlefield, but I understand since Ukraine isn't achieving these "victories" as of late you've made up some different meanings for victory to cope with that. — boethius

If you have this wrong impression, it's because you do not understand my reasoning. Or more likely you are playing dumb. Since your analysis is poor on facts, logic and depth, the best you can do is to rely on arbitrary speculations, sophisms and accusations, like the attack ad hominem you just offered.
Indeed, questioning the notion of “victory” and “defeat” is not only very much legitimate wrt all analysable dimensions of this war (military, political, economic, moral, strategic, etc.) as I’ve been discussing for a while now, but absolutely nothing unheard of (https://www.npr.org/2018/01/29/580811124/military-victory-but-political-defeat-the-tet-offensive-50-years-later). There is even a very well known expression that relativizes the notion of “military victory” to other relevant contextual considerations: “a Pyrrhic victory is a victory that inflicts such a devastating toll on the victor that it is tantamount to defeat. Such a victory negates any true sense of achievement or damages long-term progress” (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pyrrhic_victory).
So e.g. “Putin should heed Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s recent advice to him – that this is not an era of war – and desist before Russia sinks while trying to achieve a Pyrrhic victory.”
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/toi-editorials/ukraine-escalation-russia-is-only-looking-at-a-pyrrhic-victory-putin-must-heed-modis-advice/

Anyhow such geopolitical victory doesn’t depend just on Russian means, resolution, or escalation threats, but also on Western cohesion, resolution and vision in addressing the Russian security and economic challenge. This will also be an example also for other authoritarian regimes, like China. And an important premise to repair or rebuild more convenient relationships between the West and the Rest in the interest of everybody. — neomac

You are just completely delusional. The West does not represent the "interest of everybody" and is not seeking, in this war or any other policy dimension, solutions that are in the "interest of everybody”. — boethius

Why delusional?
I did not claim anywhere that “the West does represent the ‘interest of everybody’”, yes?
It’s reasonable to expect that sovereign states have their national interest as top priority, yes?
And that doesn’t exclude the possibility of cooperation among sovereign states pursuing each their own national interest, yes?

Even more bizarre, you don't hesitate to just flat out say US's actions are justified due to their hegemonic position (and just ignore the fact that if Russia wins, then they are the hegemon, and therefore justified in your framework, in the region). — boethius

You are messing up with my claims again. As I said many times, justification depends on shared assumptions. Justification in strategic terms is not the same as justification in moral or legal terms, although they may converge. Russia and the US are competing for hegemony, i.e. extending their sphere of influence beyond their borders at the expense of the competitors to the point of becoming dominant. This is somehow “physiological” to geopolitical entities and geopolitical theories may explain why is that. One can still question the rationality of geopolitical agents’ strategic choices based on pertinent and reasonable strategic assumptions. I discussed Russian vs American strategic reasoning wrt both threat perception and response. And my conclusion is that overall the US is following a more reasonable and effective strategy than Russia (compare just the military, economic, reputational damage is Russia suffering wrt the US so far). On the other side, the aftermath of this war will more clearly determine whose strategy was more effective and likely update the hegemonic status of the competitors. But also notice that doesn’t exclude the possibility that aleatory or now hidden factors may favour the US or Russia’s hegemonic struggle at some point independently from the relative rationality of their respective strategy. Anyways, I’m interested to discuss about rational strategies (that’s what I mean by “strategically justified”) and outcomes that depend on them. That’s all.

Here the problems I see:
First, you seem asking me to solve an equation whose form and variables are unknown. What does “lose” for Ukraine mean in quantifiable terms? What’s the likelihood of loss and win and how did you calculate it? What’s the time range you are considering? What’s the cost threshold that if exceeded will make the cost unreasonably high? What quantifiable parameters would make you consider a Western plan a “‘coherent workable’ plan to actually ‘beat’ Russia”? — neomac

These are your problems, not mine. I don't care about beating Russia. — boethius

What?! You are expecting from me to provide such an “account” but I find your request unreasonable, especially because it’s not me playing the geopolitical game. All I can discuss is how I understand the game being played and my reasons to support one side or the other, but as I argued neither require such unreasonable accounting. So no, it’s not “my problem”.

I'm not a Russophobe. I didn't live in fear of Russia before this war, I don't live in fear of Russia now. I do fear US escalating the conflict to essentially accidental nuclear war, but this is a fear of the international dynamic that's been put in place, mostly by the US "meddling" in Ukrainian elections and internal affairs. — “boethius

So you are not Russophobe but Americanphobe?

My position in this debate is that a negotiated peace is preferable to more war, Zelensky is an idiot, but the West (US / EU) easily has the leverage to negotiate a resolution to the conflict and just ignore the fact Zelensky is an idiot.

And, "loss for Ukraine in quantifiable terms" is easy to define: tens of thousands, or even hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians dead, economy wrecked, massive emigration, and not even achieving anything further on the battle field since last spring but forced to accept Russia control over it's current occupied territory, maybe more. This would definitely be a loss for Ukraine.

Now, if you want to wax whimsically that even if Ukraine loses the war Russia is harmed "enough" geopolitically and there's some Western geopolitical victory of some sort, then even if that were true, Ukraine gets no benefit, so the end result is using the Ukrainians for our own geopolitical ambitions: aka. sacrificing Ukraine to harm Russia. — boethius

Ukrainians may still disagree with you because they managed to preserve their sovereignty, made a future aggression against them (or any other country at risk) by Russia more unlikely, and may rely on Western partnership for rebuilding their countries. Besides, depending on what “some Western geopolitical victory of some sort” for “our own geopolitical ambitions” actually implies for the Ukrainians, the fallout could be the collapse of Putin’s regime and then this in turn may benefit Ukrainian claims over annexed territories, or if Ukraine is stable enough (with or without annexed territories) the West can integrate it more deeply to its economy, political and security system as it happened to other Eastern European countries previously under Soviet Union influence.

I am entirely willing to sacrifice an entire country in war campaign, wars take sacrifice, I am the kind of person who would not hesitate to sit down and write an "equation" concluding millions, or hundreds of millions of people must be sacrificed for what I believe to be right (if it makes sense of course), but I am only willing in a war in which I am actually fighting in and my own country takes losses in the country being sacrificed. This was the old way: "you want us to make a fanatical stand to slow down and attrit the enemy, you get your fucking asses fucking here and do some dying too, otherwise we're suing for peace or straight up surrendering and not damaging our country for nothing".
For example, the UK wanted France to resist Nazi invasion, and so sent an expeditionary force to help with that. It's common sense.

Without that, we are not "allied" with Ukraine, we are cynically manipulating and exploiting them for entirely different geopolitical reasons (in the case of Europe, self-defeating geo-political reasons) with minimum risk to our own soldiers lives and so minimum cause to sit down and really reflect on what are doing and the consequences of our leaders decisions. — boethius

Dude, I don’t really see the point of making it personal. I don’t know you and even if what you claim about yourself was true (and not just virtue signalling), it would be irrelevant to me. BTW you can always enlist in the international legion for Ukraine (https://fightforua.org/ ) where you will certainly find American and British people volunteering to fight for Ukrainians as courageously as you claim to be (and you don’t like virtue signalling, right?), or else you can recommend greater engagement from the West in support of Ukraine instead of recommending against it.
Anyways, the kind of beliefs you suggest such as “Westerners are coward because they are not sending their troops” or “Westerners can’t truly call themselves Ukrainian allies until they send their troops” or “Westerners are exploiting the Ukrainians because they are not sending their troops” are really beside the point. By far. States are expected to prioritise their national security depending on threat perception, and if they do it rationally, they do not engage in random tests of courage just to make you happy. Western military interventions don’t need to be with boots on the ground if available air forces and long range missiles can do the job more effectively. The problem is that American decision makers have to be careful about (domestic and international) consensus much more than authoritarian regimes (e.g. the nuclear blackmail wasn’t available to Nazis as it is to Russians), and Western coordination is harder to achieve since the complexity and uncertainties of the game leads to non-negligeable unresolved conflicting interests/views within the West: e.g. French understanding of European security is very much different than the American one, Germany has currently limited military capacity/culture and is still struggling with the economic downsides of this war and its global implications, the US is struggling for domestic stability and concerned by the incumbent security threat represented by China. So the problem is more cohesion and vision, then cowardice.
Moreover Ukrainians are asking for Western support and Westerners are providing it, if that’s fine with them and for that reason they call Westerners their allies, I don’t see any terminological issue here. The idea that Westerners are exploiting the Ukrainians because so far they didn’t directly and officially engage in Russia with their military forces, is very much dependent on the moral compass one takes into account or committed to. As far as I’m concerned, the moral imperative for Western governments is still Western national security (NOT Ukrainian security, welfare, lives! Ukrainian security, welfare, lives is the moral imperative of Ukrainian government! So if they feel exploited it's on them to denounce and argue for it in the first place), and I believe Westerners would likely intervene more directly in Ukraine against the Russians, as the British intervened in support of the French against the Nazis, if the perceived threat from Russia was as intolerable as the Nazis threat was to the British. That’s why Ukrainian propaganda tries its best to show how serious the Russian threat to the West is and encourage the West to provide greater military support or even to substantially change the nature of the military engagement in favor of a more direct participation (e.g. by declaring no-fly zone). So while you claim that Westerners are Russophobe and cowards, I claim that Westerners do not seem, as you would say, enough “Russophobe” (by coincidence, you aren’t Russophobe either yes?) and that’s why they are more reluctant to engage (by coincidence, you are more for peace negotiation than greater Western engagement, yes?), but not necessarily cowards (by coincidence, you are not coward, yes?) unless one takes the Western fear of escalating the conflict to essentially accidental nuclear war as a form of cowardice (by coincidence, you fear the US escalating the conflict to essentially accidental nuclear war, yes?).
And even if these circumstances would still count as a case of “exploitation” (mainly thanks to those Westerners that, like you but only by coincidence, are not “Russophobe” and fear escalating the conflict to essentially accidental nuclear war, and therefore they do not want direct engagement, just peace negotiation and consensual surrender by the Ukrainians), for the Ukrainians the lesser evil is still to be “exploited” by the West, instead of cave in to Russian demands and “legitimate grievances”.
Finally, if we are talking about a strategic plan where consequences are taken in due account, suggesting that you are “entirely willing to sacrifice an entire country in war campaign” clashes with your “exploitation” objection against my views, since even in your case the sacrificed country would obtain no benefits anyways (no matter if your own country takes losses in the country being sacrificed, still your country will survive while the other is entirely sacrificed). And suggesting that you “would not hesitate to sit down and write an ‘equation’ concluding millions, or hundreds of millions of people must be sacrificed for what I believe to be right (if it makes sense of course)” overlooks the fact you can not even offer intelligible examples of such ‘equation’ in the Ukrainian case (BTW what was the British ‘equation’ for deciding to support the French with their troops against the Nazis back then?). If we are talking about principles independently from the consequences, then the ‘equation’ would be trivial since we are allowed to ignore the consequences by default, and there would be no costs to calculate. So for example if Ukrainians are fighting for recognition of their self-determination no matter what, they may fight until their country and people are entirely sacrificed to that cause. And the Westerners would not be exploitative if they were committed to the Ukrainian cause no matter what, so e.g. by sending as many troops as necessary to prove they really care about the Ukrainian cause beyond any doubt (to you of course). The problem is that you also dismissed the Ukrainian fight for principle (just “territory and national pride”) given the number of casualties (“the cost to Ukraine is immense”, and notice that the root meaning of “immense” is “immeasurable” so no soluble “equation” whatsoever) as if no “fighting for principle no matter what” justifies any number of casualties (unless it’s for denazifying for good and exclusively Ukraine, maybe?). And since one can’t realistically expect that Western states fight for the sake of Ukrainian national interest (BTW did the British send troops in support to France against the Nazis just for the sake of it no matte what, or for their national interest?), any support of the Ukrainian fight by the West would be exploitative by default, with or without sending its own troops. In other words, your conjecture is just wishful thinking even within your frame of thoughts.

The problem here isn't just that you are ignorant of the facts (you are). The problem is that you think that it's OK for one country to invade and subjugate another if from 2000 km they all look pretty much the same to you, and besides, gas prices are more important, so why are they being so selfish about resisting brutal occupation? In other words, this is an issue of values, not an issue of facts. If you don't get it, you don't get it, and there's nothing for us to talk about.

Sorry my ignorance but I only see two big problems in this issue: inflation and a huge waste of taxes on defence spending just because a country (nobody ever cared about) is childish to not accept his reality and acts selfish with European Union.

Wow, I wish the world cares about Syria, Afghanistan or Africa as much as with Ukraine. Everything would be so damn different.

Yes, these so-called supporters of Ukraine really, really care for them - so much so that they don't mind how much blood is spilled in exchange for a piece of land.

It's good that they don't care nearly as much about those other countries you mention. With friends like these, who needs enemies?

I wish the world cares about Syria, Afghanistan or Africa as much as with Ukraine. — javi2541997

We've done caring about Africa, did you not see Band Aid? Africa should be all sorted now. It's Ukraine's turn. I shouldn't wonder a lot of flag-waiving and social media posts will have that problem knocked into shape with no lesser a lasting success.

It's good that they don't care about nearly as much about those other countries you mention. With friends like these, who needs enemies? — Manuel

The US 'befriending' Libya...

Did Poland act as Ukraine is now acting? I think not... — javi2541997

?

The obvious answer is yes, they did fight also, but didn't get the needed aid to continue the fight. Poland was overrun and divided by Hitler and Stalin (the latter who invaded Poland 16 days after Hitler).

Nearly every fifth Pole died in WW2. That is the highest casualty rate of any country during WW2.

And Polish fighters, who could get away from the country fought in various theaters of WW2 and the Polish underground resistance made the famous Warsaw uprising, wrongly thinking that Stalin would come to their help. Only in that uprising over 15 000 resistance fighters were killed and about 150 000 to 200 000 civilians were killed.

So bit confused on what you are trying to say here...

With friends like these, who needs enemies? — Manuel

I couldn't have said it better.

We've done caring about Africa, did you not see Band Aid? — Isaac

Oh please you made me laugh :lol: after colonial era we left those countries killing themselves for tribe issues. Nobody took part on Rwanda civil war, Egyptian Coup de État; Republic of Congo bloody wars; Liberia conflicts with diamonds, and a big etc... the media simply doesn't care because they are "far away" from us. In those African countries only went some humanitarians without the back up of their countries.
Saying that Rwanda had the same support as Ukraine in nowadays is denying the reality.