Response to Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism

GodlessGirl

Rather than defend naturalism I turn their own argument back on god.

Does the EAAN Refute God's Beliefs?

f the Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism by Alvin Plantinga provides the naturalist with a defeater for all of her beliefs, then an extension of it appears to provide God with a defeater for all of his beliefs. After bringing out this puzzle, we suggest several way sin which the proponent of the EAAN might solve it, but also show some potential weaknesses in these purported solutions. Whether the solutions to the puzzle that we consider ultimately succeed is unclear to us.

Plantinga argues that the person who accepts naturalism (N) the thesis that there is no God or anything at all like him and evolution (E) has a defeater for her belief that her cognitive faculties are reliable (R). This is because, he argues, the probability of R on N&E is low. His reasoning is, very roughly and briefly, that a belief on materialism(which he takes N to entail) will have neurophysiological properties as well as semantic properties.

Suppose that omniscience entails R (as is no doubt true). It follows from this that R will be necessarily true of God. But everything entails necessary truths, so everything willentail R. Thus, it is impossible for there to be any defeater-deflector for God if propositions entailing R are precluded from acting as defeater-deflectors. But this must be wrong: it is wholly implausible to suppose that God is not capable of having a defeater-deflector. And hence, it appears that we cannot rule out O as a candidate for being a defeater-deflector on account of it entailing R.We can circumvent this issue by noting that it is only in a section). This is because if God is omnipotent, then he is capable of ensuring the reliability of his cognitive faculties. And, as a rational being, he would no doubt seek to do this.So, when confronted with the claim that P(R/D*) is low, God could happily grant it but hold that he has no reason to accept D* he has no reason to think that he did not intervene to ensure that R holds for himself (since he is a rational being and is omnipotent). Of course, this does not commit us to saying that God has actually intervened to ensure that R holds for him; indeed, since his omniscience entails R, we may positively say that he did not intervene to ensureR. But, again, we have set O aside here as a possible defeater-deflector, andhence, he must look for a different candidate. (In other words, if O is inadmis-sible defeater-deflectors, the rejection of D* needs to be considered independent-ly of it.) But there is a serious problem with this reply: God, since he is actually omniscient, actually accepts D*. That is, the fundamental problem with this reply is that it assumes that God does not affirm something that he does, in fact, affirm(namely, D*). So, even if this strategy were to work, God would not, and could not, use it.Another problem with this reply is that one might think that is

impossible

for one to ensure R for oneself. Omnipotence does not include the ability to do impossible things;e.g., we can rule out the idea that God designed his own cognitive faculties, for he would need to have them causally prior to his designing them. And, if God can ensureR holds for him, could not the naturalist make a similar suggestion?

T Clark

↪GodlessGirl

I had a hard time following your argument. The use of letters to represent properties was especially confusing, e.g. I can't figure out what "the probability of R on N&E is low" means. Some of them were not defined. You also make a lot assumptions about God's characteristics without explanation. Not all gods are necessarily omnipotent, omniscient, or rational. Are you only talking about a Christian or Muslim God?

Plantinga argues that the person who accepts naturalism (N) the thesis that there is no God or anything at all like him and evolution (E) has a defeater for her belief that her cognitive faculties are reliable (R). — GodlessGirl

This is the only place in the body of the post you mention evolution. You don't really explain how it fits into the argument.

a belief on materialism(which he takes N to entail) — GodlessGirl

I don't think naturalism requires a belief in materialism.

universeness

↪GodlessGirl

I am sure elitist vernacular has its place amongst those who regularly employ the same, but it will not do much to help lay people understand what the hell you are typing about.
It's humans that assign omni abilities to god. Every claim about god or gods is sourced from humans.
Every manuscript or chisled clay tablet of glyphs and every decorated/painted/sculpted image was created by humans. No recorded memoria is signed 'Yahweh, Jehovah, Allah or even Jesus Christ.'
The musings of old conmen were simply recorded as a means of gaining nefarious control over a mass of people. Omnigod simply contradicts itself and results in paradox such as, 'can an omnipotent god create something more more powerful than itself?' If it can't then its not omnipotent, if it can then it was never omnipotent as something more powerful was always possible.
An omnigod is a logical contradiction. Is that your main point?

SophistiCat

This is the only place in the body of the post you mention evolution. You don't really explain how it fits into the argument. — T Clark

It doesn't. This is just a brief summary of Plantinga's original Evolutionary argument against naturalism. The OP attempts a parallel argument as applied to God, instead of naturalism.

I had a hard time following your argument. — T Clark

You'll have a hard time following it if you haven't read Plantinga. (I wouldn't blame you if you don't want to bother.)

T Clark

You'll have a hard time following it if you haven't read Plantinga. (I wouldn't blame you if you don't want to bother.) — SophistiCat

I did check it out at the Wikipedia link you provided. I found the argument... unconvincing. Thanks.

Bartricks

↪GodlessGirl

I am not sure I quite follow your argument. Plantinga's argument is that if naturalism is true, then our faculties of awareness would be selected for on grounds of their adaptive value, rather than on whether they provide us with accurate information about the world. This, he thinks, undermines their reliability. It's not yet clear to me that it does. But let's put that aside.

You're saying that a parallel problem can be raised for the theist (understood as someone who believes in God - an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent person). This I did not follow. What stops God from making our faculties broadly reliable? Nothing.

So, our reason tells us to default trust a deliverance of a faculty. That is, our reason tells us that our faculties are fairly reliable (though by no means wholly reliable). The issue is whether that is consistent with theism. Plantinga has argued that it is not consistent with naturalism. But is it consistent with theism? Note, it does not have to be positively entailed by it. It's sufficient that the worldview in question - theism - does not positively imply its falsity. The answer is clearly 'yes', for nothing stops God - an omnipotent being - from equipping us with broadly reliable faculties.

jospehus

When I debate Plantinga I tell him that I bought lobster with food stamps.

It angers him so.

Jokes aside

I don't see what P means, maybe I missed it but I read your post twice and didn't see it

P(R/D*)

Tom Storm

↪GodlessGirl

There's plenty of debunking of Plantinga on line if you google it. This particular argument is used - and often badly interpreted by presuppositional apologists - a particularly popular approach right now. Echoing Kant, they often argue that reason (maths, logic) is only possible because God acts as a guarantor - the random, blind forces of evolutionary naturalism can't possibly provide them. I've noticed some Muslims at this too in recent times. Hence the slogan; atheism is self-refuting.

One problem is you can make the same argument and just replace God with a magic man or alien intelligence or even pixies as the guarantor of reason. The best they can do is say the laws of logic and maths seem to be universally true, but it's almost impossible to get from there to Jesus.

Of course presups also argue that God is a properly basic belief which is self-evident and needs no justification. So if you need a gap in knowledge filled anywhere a self-evident god is always ready for use.

Wayfarer

might be worth checking out the associated profile.

I'm interested in the intersection between Plantinga and Donald Hoffman. Hoffman is a professor of cognitive science but his main argument, about how our cognitive faculties are ineliminably shaped by evolution, has something in common with Plantinga's albeit from a different perspective. Haven't been able to find much comment on that on the interwebs but I'm sure someone has thought about it.

Tom Storm

↪Wayfarer

I saw that. Isn't this one of your favourite arguments?

Agent Smith

might be worth checking out the associated profile.

I'm interested in the intersection between Plantinga and Donald Hoffman. Hoffman is a professor of cognitive science but his main argument, about how our cognitive faculties are ineliminably shaped by evolution, has something in common with Plantinga's albeit from a different perspective. Haven't been able to find much comment on that on the interwebs but I'm sure someone has thought about it. — Wayfarer

All this might be somehow connected to the hard problem of consciousness: if objectivity is so high on the agenda (for life), why, o why, did subjectivity evolve? It should've been on natural selection's hit list and bumped off a long, long time ago.

Wayfarer

↪Tom Storm

↪Agent Smith

The evolutionary argument against naturalism is derived from the 'argument from reason'. It posits the existence of God as the explanation for the existence of reason. The argument states that the capacity for reason cannot be explained by natural causes alone, and must instead be the result of a rational, intelligent creator. The argument is often attributed to C.S. Lewis - I'm not an admirer, by the way - who presented it in his book "Miracles: A Preliminary Study". I think this is the general family of arguments that was adapted by Plantinga.

One absolutely central inconsistency ruins [the naturalistic worldview].... The whole picture professes to depend on inferences from observed facts. Unless inference is valid, the whole picture disappears.... Unless Reason is an absolute – all is in ruins. Yet those who ask me to believe this world picture also ask me to believe that Reason is simply the unforeseen and unintended by-product of mindless matter at one stage of its endless and aimless becoming. Here is flat contradiction. They ask me at the same moment to accept a conclusion and to discredit the only testimony on which that conclusion can be based. — Wikipedia, The Argument from Reason

However while I believe the argument has merit, I don't appeal to it in support of belief in God or that it means the Bible is the 'word of God'. My view is simply that you can't provide a convincing naturalistic account of the faculty of reason, because such accounts invariably rely on the argument that reason is a product of evolutionary adaptation. But I prefer Thomas Nagel's approach:

The only form that genuine reasoning can take consists in seeing the validity of the arguments, in virtue of what they say. As soon as one tries to step outside of such thoughts, one loses contact with their true content. And one cannot be outside and inside them at the same time: If one thinks in logic, one cannot simultaneously regard those thoughts as mere psychological dispositions, however caused or however biologically grounded. If one decides that some of one's psychological dispositions are, as a contingent matter of fact, reliable methods of reaching the truth (as one may with perception, for example), then in doing so one must rely on other thoughts that one actually thinks, without regarding them as mere dispositions. One cannot embed all one's reasoning in a psychological theory, including the reasonings that have led to that psychological theory. The epistemological buck must stop somewhere. By this I mean not that there must be some premises that are forever unrevisable but, rather, that in any process of reasoning or argument there must be some thoughts that one simply thinks from the inside--rather than thinking of them as biologically programmed dispositions. — Thomas Nagel, Evolutionary Naturalism and the Fear of Religion

In other words, to appeal to evolutionary theory to justify reason, you're 'stepping outside' of reason, trying to find some other grounds on which to justify it - which undermines the 'sovereignity of reason'.

There's a lot more to be said, but that provides an indication.

Tom Storm

↪Wayfarer

Yes, I did read the Lewis a few years back. And his polemical work, Mere Christianity.

My view is simply that you can't provide a convincing naturalistic account of the faculty of reason, because such accounts invariably rely on the argument that reason is a product of evolutionary adaptation. — Wayfarer

I think reason is paradoxical in as much as we believe it has transcendent qualities, but how would we know? It's the language we all speak in, although some are more fluent than others. We generally build our ideas and reasoning upon their perceived results and this in itself is an interpretative act. This same impulse might include human sacrifice to keep the crops healthy, or COVID vaccinations to keep us well. While I privilege reason I have, paradoxically, no reason to think it build towards an Archimedean point.

Do you see reason as transcendent in as much as it, like math, has Platonic origins?

Wayfarer

↪Tom Storm

There's a very big-picture theme behind this line of argument.

I'm very interested by the evaluation of reason in Greek and medieval philosophy. There is a well-known expression of the 'rational soul of man' - the faculty of reason being that which enables the human to intuitively grasp the 'logos' of the Universe. Of course, that sounds medieval, in fact the only places you seem to really encounter it is amongst Christian intellectuals (mainly Catholic and Orthodox). But I'm inclined to think that this is due to their absorption of the Greek philosophical tradition, rather than on explicitly doxological grounds. But note this:

.'...we may be sorrrounded by objects, but even while cognizing them, reason is the origin of something that is neither reducible to nor derives from them in any sense. In other words, reason generates a cognition, and a cognition regarding nature is above nature. In a cognition, reason transcends nature in one of two ways: by rising above our natural cognition and making, for example, universal and necessarily claims in theoretical and practical matters not determined b nature, or by assuming an impersonal objective perspective that remains irreducible to the individual "I".'

~ The Powers of Pure Reason: Kant and the Idea of Cosmic PhilosophyAlfredo Ferrarin

Aristotle, in De Anima, argued that thinking in general (which includes knowledge as one kind of thinking) cannot be a property of a body; it cannot, as he put it, 'be blended with a body'. This is because in thinking, the intelligible object or form is present in the intellect, and thinking itself is the identification of the intellect with this intelligible. Among other things, this means that you could not think if materialism is true… . Thinking is not something that is, in principle, like sensing or perceiving; this is because thinking is a universalising activity. This is what this means: when you think, you see - mentally see - a form which could not, in principle, be identical with a particular - including a particular neurological element, a circuit, or a state of a circuit, or a synapse, and so on. This is so because the object of thinking is universal, or the mind is operating universally.

….the fact that in thinking, your mind is identical with the form that it thinks, means (for Aristotle and for all Platonists) that since the form 'thought' is detached from matter, 'mind' is immaterial too. — Lloyd Gerson, Platonism vs Naturalism

This is actually preserved in Aquinas' epistemology, but it soon dies out in the Western tradition.

Tom Storm

There's a very big-picture theme behind this line of argument. — Wayfarer

Indeed. And we thought the hard problem of consciousness attracted trouble! :wink:

Thanks for that perspective.

I'm inclined to align myself more with some postmodernist leanings here. Sorry. But I wish I was smart enough to read and understand Derrida...

Wayfarer

We generally build our ideas and reasoning upon their perceived results and this in itself is an interpretative act. This same impulse might include human sacrifice to keep the crops healthy, or COVID vaccinations to keep us well. — Tom Storm

Circling back to this point - that is obviously true, but I think 'reason' in day-to-day usage, in our cultural context, usually implies scientifically-sanctioned reason, and also a pragmatic sense of reason. A rational person weighs the odds, acts prudently, plans, and so on - all well and good and I'm not knocking it, but I think it reflects what has been called the 'instrumentalisation' of reason.

I don't know if our culture thinks that reason 'goes all the way down', so to speak. If you reflect on the meaning of reason for the Greek philosophers, I think their estimation of it was far more comprehensive, and more far-reaching. They were seeking, in their own way, a 'theory of everything' - seeking after the first cause or, if you like, the ultimate reason. But now that's all 'ancient history', as the saying goes.

On a more contemporary note, the question I would pose Donald Hoffman is the extent to which his claim that 'reality is an illusion' - the title of his book - can escape the very conditioning factors which support his claim. After all, he believes his book and argument pertain to something real, but how can they, if reality itself is an illusion? I think the proper title of his book ought to be about the fallacy of cognitive realism, although it wouldn't make nearly as catchy a title.

Tom Storm

↪Wayfarer

Good points.

Did the Greek understanding of reason generally identify this faculty as human or divine in origin?

In relation to Hoffman, I noted this exact question. He must have been asked this before and surely has responded. Do you see his hypothesis as basically a non-physicalist monism - a kind of modern spin on idealism? It seems to match Bernardo Kastrup's Analytic Idealism model in many respects. There seems to be a revival of idealist philosophy expressed in more contemporary language and metaphor

Badly worded questions coming: As far as we know, the laws of logic or logical absolutes (if we prefer) are universally true - but arguing against them, or in favour of them, is obviously circular. We seem to be trapped by their necessity. Is it your view that these axioms, like the maths they make possible, must be discovered rather than invented? Does this provide any other insight into the use of reason in addition to its ubiquitous utility?

Wayfarer

Did the Greek understanding of reason generally identify this faculty as human or divine in origin? — Tom Storm

That is the million-dollar question. Reason was appropriated by theologians as the 'divine spark' and equated with being an aspect of 'imago dei' - now, of course, deprecated as an archaic relic of pre-modern thought and discarded as 'religious'. But it still nags at me. I got a book out of the library, The Dream of Reason, by Antony Gottlieb, but I found it pretty dull to be honest. Looking for a better account. It's a work in progress.

Hoffman is one of the directors on Kastrup's Essentia Foundation, I think they're pretty close. I've read quite a bit of Kastrup the last few months. Overall, I'm an admirer, although I think he puts an awful lot of weight on a couple of sketchy metaphors. But I'm encouraged by the fact that he's on all these panel sessions and his work is appearing all over the place. I think he's becoming a formidable advocate for scientific idealism. (I joined the Kastrup forum while I was away from here, but alas it's been more or less overtaken by Rudolf Steiner fans so I left.)

The book that has most impressed me is the one I kept mentioning last year, Charles Pinter's Mind and the Cosmic Order. Very level-headed and grounded in solid science. Now I have to work out how that ties in with the faculty of reason, which neither Pinter nor Hoffman nor Kastrup really address (but I think Nagel does.)

Agent Smith

↪Wayfarer

The problem with naturalism is simply that evolution as the justification for reason is that it's circular (evolution justifies reason justifies evolution justifies reason ... round and round in the merry-go-round) and self-contradictory (reason needs a justification because we don't trust it, but then to justify it(self) with evolution or anything else for that matter means we trust it). Double whammy.

Nagel seems to be saying that the buck must stop somwehere - the justification has to have a finality to it - and he recommends to look inside rather than outside logic/reason, that is to say he finds circularity less problematic than auto-contradiction. He seems not to have realized that both fallacies are committed at the same time - we can't choose the lesser of two evils in this case because it's bundleware/a package deal.

Wayfarer

↪Agent Smith

To be fair to Thomas Nagel, I only quoted one paragraph.

Tom Storm

↪Wayfarer

Nice. Thank you.

Agent Smith

To be fair to Thomas Nagel, I only quoted one paragraph. — Wayfarer

A most interesting paragraph mon ami, a most interesting paragraph. Au revoir.

unenlightened

One cannot embed all one's reasoning in a psychological theory, including the reasonings that have led to that psychological theory. The epistemological buck must stop somewhere. — Thomas Nagel, Evolutionary Naturalism and the Fear of Religion

Physically, the buck stops with the world. Senses evolve to indicate threats and opportunities. They have survival value to the extent that they do that rather than entertain with celestial visions and music. They have value, that is, to the extent that they tell the truth about the world more often than not.

Language extends the senses. The scout reports that the buffalo are in the next valley, and the hunters set out. Language also has survival value to the extent that it tells the truth more often than not.

Reason has survival value to the extent that it helps conserve truth in language.

I am not dead, therefore I can trust my senses, my friends, and my reasoning (more often than not). Reason passes the harsh test of keeping us alive. You can stake your life on it, and do, every day.

SophistiCat

↪unenlightened

No, I think Nagel is right in this instance. You cannot pull yourself out of the abyss of skepticism by your bootstraps using reasoning and empirical evidence if the very reliability of reasoning and observation are in question. It is good that evolutionary science can give a plausible account for the reliability of our cognitive faculties, but that cannot be your source of confidence in them. You have to "help yourself to a little something" (Plantinga's expression) to even start.

But so does everyone, no matter their beliefs. Theists aren't better grounded just because they help themselves to imaginative origin stories and rationalizations of why the good Lord would not allow a malicious demon to systematically deceive them.

Wayfarer

I’m inclined to place reason amongst the ‘meta-cognitive faculties’. Apart from its obvious instrumental utility - counting, and so on - the advent of language, reason, and self-consciousness signifies a new plateau of awareness that was is not available to other creatures (nor to our early simian ancestors). One of the straightforward manifestations of reason is asking why: why did that animal drop dead for no visible cause? A human will puzzle over that, and perhaps examine the corpse for insight, while a hyena will simply help itself to the remains. Surely that kind of awareness would have manifested very early in human ancestry, reaching another plateau with Greek philosophy. 'Wisdom begins in wonder', as Socrates said.

unenlightened

You cannot pull yourself out of the abyss of skepticism by your bootstraps using reasoning and empirical evidence if the very reliability of reasoning and observation are in question. — SophistiCat

Then you are dead.

SophistiCat

↪unenlightened

Doesn't follow. Nothing follows if you can't take the reliability of your cognitive faculties for granted. The argument is so corrosive that it undermines everything, including itself.

Tom Storm

↪SophistiCat

It is good that evolutionary science can give a plausible account for the reliability of our cognitive faculties, but that cannot be your source of confidence in them. You have to "help yourself to a little something" (Plantinga's expression) to even start.

But so does everyone, no matter their beliefs. Theists aren't better grounded just because they help themselves to imaginative origin stories and rationalizations of why the good Lord would not allow a malicious demon to systematically deceive them. — SophistiCat

:up: Yep, we still can't get from 'reason is divine' to any particular divinity or even any particular malicious demon. I guess our primary source of confidence in the logical absolutes are that they continue to demonstrate their usefulness and without them... chaos. What more do we need? :wink:

unenlightened

Doesn't follow. Nothing follows if you can't take the reliability of your cognitive faculties for granted. The argument is so corrosive that it undermines everything, including itself. — SophistiCat

You can think whatever you please, but I find it is preferable to order one's thoughts to align with the world. Satisfying conditions of certainty come low on the list. What follows will follow, regardless of arguments. So I will continue to take my faculties for granted, except when they prove to have been at fault, which, alas, is often enough.

SophistiCat

↪Tom Storm

Our primary source of confidence in our senses and our reason is that we don't have a choice. You either take them as given or you are lost.

So I will continue to take my faculties for granted, except when they prove to have been at fault, which, alas, is often enough. — unenlightened

Yes.

Wayfarer

What more do we need? — Tom Storm

Philosophy aspires to something more than utility.

Response to Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism

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