Hmm ... Russia(ns) + Africa(ns)?

How Putin prepared for sanctions with tonnes of African gold
^{— Tom Collins · The Telegraph · Mar 3, 2022}

Will Russia’s Ukraine Invasion Impact the Central African Republic?
^{— Nosmot Gbadamosi · Foreign Policy · Apr 6, 2022}

Analysis: The curious case of Russia in Central African Republic
^{— Bram Posthumus · Al Jazeera · May 20, 2022}

Russia is plundering gold in Sudan to boost Putin’s war effort in Ukraine
^{— CNN · Jul 29, 2022}

Leader of Central African Republic tells Putin he intends to attend Russia-Africa summit
^{— TASS · Nov 11, 2022}

Vladimir Putin Stashes Billions In Central Africa In Preparation To Flee Moscow In Case Of Emergency 'Evacuation' | Via MSN
^{— Haley Gunn · RadarOnline · Nov 15, 2022}

For that last article, it seems unlikely (to me) that Putin et al think they'd be left alone in Africa.
News and a bit of fake news? Don't know.
Makes for a cool story, though.

I say just take the wretched bombs out already, aggressively, throughout, whether it takes lots or more or special or expensive tech or not.
They've been wreaking destruction for a long time and it's apparently spilling over.
It's not like shooting them down is going to kill anyone, at least that's very unlikely, rather the opposite.
Yep, keep heads cool, NATO shouldn't just retaliate. — jorndoe

Retaliate against whom, anyway? There's an assumption these were fired by Russia but latest news is this is unlikely given the trajectory. We need to wait to understand what happened. If it wasn't the Russians though... that's going to complicate matters. But I'd rather not speculate at this point.

Now this explosion in Poland. Right before winter.

Cool heads must prevail. — Manuel

And cooler heads seem to have prevailed.

Things people say and forget:

A sign of a "winning" army would be taking Kherson
— boethius

taking Kherson would be a turning point.
— boethius

Losing Kherson would be both bad militarily (likely thousands, if not tens of thousands, stuck and captured troops) as well as intensely embarrassing.
— boethius — Olivier5

First, do you see thousands, if not tens of thousands, of stuck or captured Russian troops?

This was the scenario under discussion at the time. Ukraine had launched an offensive with this aim of taking Kherson by force and encircling Russian troops in and around Kherson.

That would have been "intensely embarrassing".

But that didn't happen. Russia left Kherson, which I have since described as "embarrassing" (compared to the "intensely embarrassing" worse scenario of being routed and encircled).

So yes, a sign of a "winning" army is that Ukraine's offensive operation succeeded. It did not. The goal of that operation was to take Kherson by force, which Ukrainian forces were unable to do (they did not launch their operation and "win").

Russian forces withdrawing from Kherson is embarrassing, but this was not Russian lines collapsing, being routed, thousands of troops surrounded and captured, break down of command and control and the whole operation in disarray, people demanding Putin's head for getting their boyz stuck in Kherson etc. (that was the scenario under discussion then, which is not the current scenario.)

What has occurred is not some catastrophe for Russia, but one step in a war of attrition. Ukraine has been attritting Russian held territory but at significant cost of men and material (at least people seem to agree on the point Ukrainian losses have been much higher in these recent offensives).

So, to evaluate the current stage of the war we'd need to know exact losses on each side, which we don't.

The second thing we'd need to know is the West's appetite to pour in more arms. This we also don't know.

Russia's plan was clearly to get to winter and see the effect of the gas situation, and Ukraine's plan was large scale brilliant operational success, routing the Russians and taking large amounts of territory with sustainable losses.

Both sides have accomplished some of their strategy. Ukraine has made advances and maybe losses are sustainable if the West replaces everything, while Russia has gotten to winter by simply withdrawing from weak points.

I think it's useful for us and people following this thread to note that international relations are not legal relations, which has already been discussed by is worth repeating.

There is no guarantees in any international agreement as there is no world court and world police system that enforces agreements. — boethius

Yes, absolutely. All the more pertinent when set against this talk of 'requirements' which must apparently be in place for a negotiation to be possible. As far as I can see there are no requirements at all. As you say, a party might enter a negotiation for all sorts of reasons and a second party might agree to those terms (or merely appear to agree) for a completely different set of reasons.

There's literally nothing stopping two countries coming to any kind of agreement they each consider to be in their immediate best interest. The idea that some kind of ideological hurdle regarding the definition of statehood prevents a party from making an agreement is frankly silly.

It is relevant to any deal because the annexations make the terms of any compromise to be about how much territory Russia is willing to cede to Ukraine to stop the war. — Paine

But why would Russia need to negotiate to stop the war? It doesn't make any sense. If Russia could have staked a claim to those territories merely by negotiation, then it would have done so. IT has no leverage at all other than war, that's why it went to war. A negotiation is an exchange of promises, with each party feeling that their promises are worth the assurances they get in return.

So in your scenario, Ukraine are 'winning', Russia want to stop the war because they're 'losing'. So Russia's promise would be what? "We'll stop shelling you if you let us keep Donbas"? That's not going to work, because in your scenario, Russia were going to stop shelling Ukraine soon anyway. What are Russia going to offer in this scenario which might make Ukraine inclined to give up Donbas?

Alternatively, Russia are 'winning', they can now claim "We'll stop shelling you if you let us keep Donbas" and Ukraine might well accept that offer (maybe with a counter offer like "OK, but only if you pay for repair in Kiev"). But to make this offer, Russia don't need to say anything at all about Ukraine's legitimacy as a nation. It's irrelevant. The deal is about which government makes laws where and what each government is going to tell their armies to do.

The Ukrainian state was not accepted as a legitimate governance of any of the territory up to the western borders. Having gone this far resisting the Russians, it would be ridiculous for the Ukrainians to let this condition continue. — Paine

It's ridiculous to save thousands of lives?

That is why any possible agreement has to start with recognizing a Ukraine that is something more than a tool of foreign powers. A place where Russia does not have the right to remodel the government to its liking. — Paine

That doesn't follow at all. An agreement merely has to declare a promise not to attack said region. It doesn't have to say anything about its legitimate right to be there.

It's not like shooting them down is going to kill anyone — jorndoe

Shooting them down literally did kill someone (two someone's). That's the entire point.

The Soviet Union couldn't continue the arms race and actually did collapse partly because of it (even if Americans tend to overemphasize this). Soviet Union was spending twice the percentage of GDP than the US was and it was failing to keep up in the technological race. You are correct in that the two Superpowers never trusted each other, but agreements could be found simply when there wasn't any other sustainable option. — ssu

You are just underlining my point that agreements are carried out in international relations not because of any sort of guarantee or legal system that would enforce those agreements, but because you think the other party's interest is to carry out the agreement, even without any or minimal trust.

For example, both the US and Soviet Union recognised it was not in their own self interest to have a nuclear war by accident, and that tens of thousands of nuclear weapons on each side was creating this risk.

So, even without any trust, both sides were able to "trust enough" that the other party saw it was in their own interest to abide by various nuclear control and proliferation treatise.

To tip the balance of the "assumption scales" both sides allowed fly over inspections of their territory.

US and Soviets had also deterrence means that Ukraine doesn't have though. — neomac

This is just foolish. At no point did either side threaten the other with a first strike nuclear launch if they broke or pulled out of any agreement.

The basis of diplomatic resolutions between the Soviet Union and the US was that each side saw it was in their best interest to avoid a large scale nuclear war, and each side was able to believe the other side believed that too, so some agreements could be reached. However, nothing kept each side in these agreements other than their own interest.

And this basic situation in international relations doesn't really change except in the direction of the more powerful party having zero consequences of breaking the agreement and the weaker party accepting the deal with zero belief the stronger party is forced somehow to abide by it, but because they have no other choice.

What matters is actual leverage in international relations.

For example, Japan had zero guarantee that the US wouldn't just arrest the emperor and execute him after accepting the conditional surrender, and largely Japan, being in the weak position at that point, had no choice. Nevertheless, executing the Emperor may create some endless Japanese insurgency, so even in totally losing the war the Japanese high command still had the leverage that their emperor (what they cared about in the surrender terms) was useful for an orderly transition, which presumably was in the US interest (seeing as the conflict with the Soviet Union is around the corner); which may seem like common sense now, but it is not some obvious thing as "holding the Emperor to account for Pearl Harbour and other war crimes" could be a good sell for the domestically, and you may calculate there will not be an insurgency (out with the old boss, in with the new, for the Japanese psychology). Point being, whatever the relative strength between parties in international agreements, there is no legal guarantee of any kind ever, but one must simply genuinely assume the other party intends to follow the agreement for their own reasons, has no choice, or then it is part of one's own intricate deceptive plan (as, likewise, neither the other party nor yourself need follow the agreement).

Now, if you have zero leverage then all you can do is make suggestions and argue what you want somehow also benefits the stronger party that has all the leverage.

If you do have leverage, then it would be this leverage that you'd be using to make clear it is in the best interest of the other party to follow the agreement.

But the idea that guarantees are needed to enter into an international agreement is just a high school level and completely ignorant understanding of international relations. There is never any guarantees. There's no guarantee anyone in normal life follows an agreement, only that there is a far stronger party that can be appealed to implementing or compensating the breach by force, aka. the state, but there is nothing that guarantees the state to intervene in your issue (due to not recognising an agreement it cares about, inefficiency, corruption or just not feeling like it).

Well Russia are saying it isn't them and Ukraine are saying it's a Russian conspiracy to even say it was Ukraine. So we're left with no good options.

If it was Russia (or people believe it was), then they've now attacked NATO, it's basically World War Three.

If it was Ukraine (but Ukraine deny it - rather than say "sorry, accident" - and continue to blame Russia), then Ukraine have deliberately fired into a NATO country to try and drag them into their war with Russia. Ukraine loses it's Golden Boy status and the arms supply, which was getting less and less secure in the long term dries up. Ukrainians have to fight an even longer, more drawn out war, or surrender.

If it was a third party, then terrorists have already got hold of some of the shitload of untraceable weapons now on the black market in Ukraine and are using them to provoke international conflict.

Either way...

The only thing to add to your analysis is that the US will choose the interpretation that fits their existing policy choice.

If they want to escalate with Russia they'll blame it squarely on Russia, claim they have the Radar proof, even if they have zero proof or even if they are sitting on proof it was Ukraine.

If they want to basically exit the war they'll blame it on Ukraine.

If they want to make the situation even more confusing for some reason, they'll blame it on terrorists.

If they want to keep the current situation, they'll just never blame anyone and it will stay "one of those things", maybe just say it was certainly an accident wherever the missiles came from.

What actually happened is of secondary importance in these sorts of small and ambiguous events, that can be spun in different directions and no one really knows for sure anything anyways (and if they do they can't prove it in a way that can't be denied).

the US will choose the interpretation that fits their existing policy choice. — boethius

Yes, this will be a litmus test for when the US plans to hang Ukraine out to dry like they did with Iraq, Libya and Afghanistan once they've milked the situation for all they think they can get out of it.

What's different this time is that I don't think anyone planned for the huge multiplier effect of social media. Governments and corporations only have to seed social media with the germ of idea now and it will, virtually free of charge, multiply and foment into two warring camps, one of which can then be declared 'misinformation', and voila - you have ready-made virtually fanatical support for whatever you wanted to do.

That's a weapon they've not had before.

So, even without any trust, both sides were able to "trust enough" that the other party saw it was in their own interest to abide by various nuclear control and proliferation treatise. — boethius

Basically both sides are simply forced to make agreements. And this is with this war in Ukraine too.

Negotiations will be successful if both sides, Putin and the Ukrainians, have no option to continue the war or continuing would be a very bad decision. Hence very likely the war will continue.

Yes, this will be a litmus test for when the US plans to hang Ukraine out to dry like they did with Iraq, Libya and Afghanistan once they've milked the situation for all they think they can get out of it. — Isaac

Again the typical anti-American view: Ukraine and the Ukrainians have no agency in this fight. After all, according to Isaac, why should Ukrainians even defend their country? Here's what I'm talking about. @Isaac's thinking is clearly showed in this quote from him months ago:

Option 1 - Long drawn out war, thousands dead, crippled by debt, economy run by the IMF, regime run by corrupt politicians in the pocket of lobbyists benefiting the corporations and immiserating the poor. Blue and yellow flag over the parliament.

Option 2 - Less long war, fewer dead, less crippled by debt, less in thrall to the IMF, regime run by corrupt politicians in the pocket of oligarchs benefiting the corporations and immiserating the poor. Blue, red and white flag over the parliament.

Option 2 has fewer dead. — Isaac

Hence to Isaac, it doesn't matter at all to Ukraine and the Ukrainians if they are in control of their own country or under Putin's de-nazification program. All the killings, the forced evictions, the fake referendums and the Russification measures in the occupied territories are totally meaningless for Isaac. Because all that doesn't matter to Isaac. Perhaps it doesn't matter because it's not done by the Americans (and then it would matter a lot to Isaac). Yet it does matter to Ukrainians and hence Isaac's comments should be left to their own level.

So yes, a sign of a "winning" army is that Ukraine's offensive operation succeeded. It did not. — boethius

LOL... It did succeed in recapturing Kherson. :-)

LOL... It did succeed in recapturing Kherson. :-) — Olivier5

Was I talking about that? Or was I talking about what I literally stated: routing the Russians and encircling them in and around Kherson.

Ukraine launches an offensive: if they were simply better and stronger than the Russians, then that offensive would have worked without the Russians being able to hold any lines.

The current scenario of the Russians withdrawing I literally describe as "embarrassing", but obviously not as bad as losing on the field, positions overrun and thousands or tens of thousands of troops encircled.

The current situation is not a clear sign of Ukraine being able to beat the Russians in the field wherever and whenever they want and on a obvious path to "victory". War is far from over and far from having any obvious outcome.

Basically both sides are simply forced to make agreements. And this is with this war in Ukraine too. — ssu

No. No one is forced to make agreements.

Even if a party can't possibly win, even then sometimes a party will not surrender and the other party does what they want by force without any agreement at any point about it.

Negotiations will be successful if both sides, Putin and the Ukrainians, have no option to continue the war or continuing would be a very bad decision. Hence very likely the war will continue. — ssu

In no way true. There is always the option to keep fighting, even in a hopeless military situation (see: Nazi's sending children to fight) and just having all your positions overrun and your high command captured and / or run away.

Certainly parties enter agreements because they think it's a good idea, but no one's ever forced to. The whole idea of an agreement is what you are doing willingly and are not forced to do. When police arrest someone we don't call that an "agreement".

Parties enter agreements for all sorts of reasons, that the results are "guaranteed" in some sense of certainty is never one of them. If a company "guarantees" something, they may still go bankrupt and be unable to actually fulfil their promise, if you go get that promise insured ahead of time for this exact scenario, the insurer may go bankrupt or fight it in court and win.

This whole idea of only entering an agreement if the results are guaranteed is not how any agreement works, and as we increase in the power of the parties involved, is less and less remotely possible to try to approximate. Whenever we think an agreement is somewhat certain, it's only because there's a third far more powerful party (the state) that we think will act on our behalf (that the agreement is actually an agreement with the state to enforce it somehow, and not something the state doesn't care about such as an informal promise, unprovable promise, or a promise of love or anything else the state doesn't concern itself with); however, nothing actually guarantees the state will do so, it is purely an inference of the state doing so in the past for similar things, but even then any number of things can go wrong in our quest for legal restitution (you may not have the money for a lawsuit, your lawyer maybe incompetent, the judge maybe corrupt; and what "should happen" is not what actually happens).

This is just foolish. At no point did either side threaten the other with a first strike nuclear launch if they broke or pulled out of any agreement.
The basis of diplomatic resolutions between the Soviet Union and the US was that each side saw it was in their best interest to avoid a large scale nuclear war, and each side was able to believe the other side believed that too, so some agreements could be reached. — boethius

You misunderstood my claim. I was referring precisely to the following condition: “each side saw it was in their best interest to avoid a large scale nuclear war”. The best interest of both US and Soviet Union was calculated by taking into account the deterrence means they both had (but Ukraine doesn’t have!), and this was pre-condition for the kind of agreements they could rationally pursue.

But the idea that guarantees are needed to enter into an international agreement is just a high school level and completely ignorant understanding of international relations. There is never any guarantees. — boethius

My impression is that you have no clue what you are talking about:

• International relations include a legal framework based on voluntary acceptance by acknowledged independent nations. Within this legal framework one can implement “security guarantees” (https://www.academia.edu/16541504/Legal_Notion_of_the_Terms_Security_Assurances_Security_Guarantees_and_Reassurances_in_International_Security_Law).
• The primary involved parties in the Ukrainian war are clearly interested in such “security guarantees”: Putin urges West to act quickly to offer security guarantees. (https://www.npr.org/2021/12/23/1067188698/putin-urges-west-to-act-quickly-to-offer-security-guarantees). And Ukraine showed interest in having one, given the consequences of the Budapest Memorandum about “security assurances” (https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/stvorennya-mehanizmu-bezpekovih-garantij-dlya-ukrayini-stane-76129).
• To the extent there is an international law and rational agents engage in it, there must be some reasonable application for it, independently from any arbitrarily high standard of reliability and compatibly with power balance/struggle concerns. The reason to me is obvious: the international legal framework increases transparency and trust, given the coordinated and codified procedures/roadmap to monitor and measure commitment and implied costs.

You misunderstood my claim. I was referring precisely to the following condition: “each side saw it was in their best interest to avoid a large scale nuclear war”. The best interest of both US and Soviet Union was calculated by taking into account the deterrence means they both had (but Ukraine doesn’t have!), and this was pre-condition for the kind of agreements they could rationally pursue. — neomac

First, the deterrence means was not a pre-condition of the agreement but what the agreement was about (we both have too much deterrence to our mutual detriment).

However, the US and the Soviet Union could have entered into agreements that one or both pull out of the very next day; the situation would have then just stayed the same as before the agreement, no immediate negative consequences to a party violating, certainly nothing "forcing" them to stay in the agreement.

That Ukraine has no nuclear deterrence just means that it needs to consider the fact that Russia does.

If you feel it's "unfair" that stronger parties have more influence over events than weaker parties, I don't know what to say other than welcome to the real world.

If you're complaint is just that any deal Russia signs they can more easily break than Ukraine and that's "unfair" to Ukraine because they are the weaker party and less able to do anything about breaches to the agreement, then to make the situation "fair" you'd need a more powerful party than Russia to keep them to their word. Which is exactly what Ukraine is arguing in that the US would need to guarantee the agreement.

But, ok, the question then comes up of what would actually make the US enforce the agreement? Especially if doing so risks nuclear confrontation with Russia they have zero rational reason to risk that for the perceived benefit of Ukraine (risking nuclear war doesn't necessarily benefit Ukraine in any net-present-value calculation of any plausible metric of human welfare, but let's assume it does for the sake of argument).

Answer is nothing. Russia's promises can be empty and the US promise of "making Russia" do something can be equally empty.

What Ukraine is discovering is simply the reasoning behind why weaker states generally try to deal with stronger states diplomatically (accepting a worse negotiating position and accepting the stronger state can anyways more easily break whatever agreement is reached than themselves) rather than pick a fight with a stronger state on the basis of nationalist jingoism.

Ukraine's position now is basically "we'll start acting rationally if the world is changed to suit our irrational desires".

Yeah, looks that way.

My impression is that you have no clue what you are talking about: — neomac

You literally cite exactly what I describe:

Key words:

voluntary acceptance — neomac

International agreements are all voluntary.

And so, a "guarantee" is likewise a voluntary thing ... and therefore not any sort of actual guarantee. These sorts of words in these sorts of agreements are purely ornamental. US can guarantee whatever it wants, doesn't mean it's going to do that.

Now, if your point is just that Ukraine would feel better if this sort of language is in the agreement and adding this language does place a bit of "prestige stakes" for the US, sure, but that hasn't been what's being discussed. The talk of guarantees has been some sort of actual guarantee, like US using nuclear weapons.

The primary involved parties in the Ukrainian war are clearly interested in such “security guarantees”: Putin urges West to act quickly to offer security guarantees. (https://www.npr.org/2021/12/23/1067188698/putin-urges-west-to-act-quickly-to-offer-security-guarantees). — neomac

Because Russia knows:

A. It will be just feel good language and not the US nuking Russia if for some reason the agreement isn't kept.

B. Any economic leverage as a substitute consequence would require the West first scaling back the economic leverage its applied so far, which is basically a maximum of what it can reasonably do.

B. The West offering security guarantees means that they are at the negotiating table and a deal can be worked out with who actually matters in the situation, because, first it's NATO, not Ukraine, that is the more important party to the conflict (Ukraine being a complete military dependency at this point, just under a logo of alleged freedom), and, second, the following statement:

To the extent there is an international law and rational agents engage in it, there must be some reasonable application for it, independently from any arbitrarily high standard of reliability and compatibly with power balance/struggle concerns. — neomac

Is completely false, unless you're just repeating what I stated and what you claim to have issue with.

International law is not "law" (in the sense of law within states) and "legal framework" is not a "legal system" (in the sense of legal system within states). Same language maybe used, but referencing completely different things.

Actual law references the state's apparatus to enforce said law. "International law" references:

voluntary acceptance — neomac

Or then a war if that doesn't happen and bygones can't be bygones about whatever the dispute is about.

The reason you have legal language in international agreements and arrangements is because if the states concerned intend to actually do whatever it is, they'll need to translate the agreement into actual domestic laws, and the wording being the same helps with that and was also a signal they'll actually do whatever it is.

If the party has zero intention to carry out the agreement, then it helps the deception to be all legal and shit.

obviously not as bad as losing on the field, positions overrun and thousands or tens of thousands of troops encircled. — boethius

Yes, they avoided total humiliation. Most importantly, they saved a lot of Russian and Ukrainian lives by deciding to withdraw from a position they were unable to hold. So they lived to fight another day, and Ukrainians could liberate Kherson at minimal cost.

I believe that the massive casualties among newly mobilized men incurred in the east over the past few weeks have taken a toll: all these wives protesting that their husbands are treated as cannon fodder and holding government to account can't be good politically... So it seems to me that the mobilisation reduced Russian appetite for wasteful death. That's a positive.

Yes, they avoided total humiliation. Most importantly, they saved a lot of Russian and Ukrainian lives by deciding to withdraw from a position they were unable to hold. So they lived to fight another day. — Olivier5

Then we agree, this is exactly what I describe: a "bad thing" but not some total disaster and strong signal Russia's military just can't compete with Ukrainian military and the current trajectory is towards total defeat in Ukraine.

I believe that the massive casualties among newly mobilized men incurred in the east over the past few weeks have taken a toll: all these wives protesting that their husbands are treated as cannon fodder and holding government to account... The mobilisation reduced Russian appetite for wasteful death. That's a positive. — Olivier5

In a war of attrition bad things are happening to both sides. There is no question bad things are happening to Russians; likewise, there is no question bad things are happening to Ukrainians.

In terms of projecting "who's winning" it's largely a question of how much badness each side can tolerate. Between the fog of war and disinformation and propaganda, unless a side start suffering clear "total humiliation", then it's just not really clear what the breaking point for each side is, and how close we are to each.

To say "Russia can't continue like this" is only meaningful if it comes with the argument "Ukraine can continue for longer" which is only meaningful if that comes with the argument "the West will cover the bill for however long that is".

but not some total disaster and strong signal Russia's military just can't compete with Ukrainian military — boethius

The signal is there alright: they were forced to withdraw from what their lord Putin sees as Russian territory. That signal was well received in Ukraine, given all the celebrations, and it was also received in Russia, I would think, though less well given all the complaints and arguments. The Russians are losing ground, period. You are welcome to convince yourself otherwise, but it's a fact.

Shooting them down literally did kill someone (two someone's). That's the entire point. — Isaac

Better stop shooting down missiles and kamikaze drones then

The signal is there alright: they were forced to withdraw from what their lord Putin sees as Russian territory. — Olivier5

The signal is not there.

The Russians are losing ground. — Olivier5

At what cost?

I've pointed out the obvious now several times: what actually matters is whether these territory gains are sustainable for the Ukrainians or not? because if they are not sustainable then they are not the first steps of defeating the Russians but, rather, exhausting force capability which can be easily counter-productive and the territory simply re-lost in Russian offensives.

The meaningful question is that after these offensives by Ukraine are they in a stronger position or not?

Are the losses worth the gains?

The next meaningful question, would be even assuming Ukraine has increased their relative strength ... is that "strong enough" to achieve their objectives through force?

Or ...

Gen. Mark A. Milley, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has made the case in internal meetings that the Ukrainians have achieved about as much as they could reasonably expect on the battlefield before winter sets in and so they should try to cement their gains at the bargaining table, according to officials informed about the discussions — New York Times

Which is another way of saying the losses aren't sustainable and so Ukraine should seek a diplomatic resolution to the war using the leverage they currently have (and, the implication being, won't get any better).

First, the deterrence means was not a pre-condition of the agreement but what the agreement was about (we both have too much deterrence to our mutual detriment). — boethius

Again that's not what I claimed. I didn't talk about the content of the agreement. Read carefully: The best interest of both US and Soviet Union was calculated by taking into account the deterrence means they both had (but Ukraine doesn’t have!), and this was pre-condition for the kind of agreements they could rationally pursue

That Ukraine has no nuclear deterrence just means that it needs to consider the fact that Russia does.

If you feel it's "unfair" that stronger parties have more influence over events than weaker parties, I don't know what to say other than welcome to the real world. — boethius

If the West is involved in this war there is a reason and if they want to weigh in about this agreement at the expense of Russia, Russia must deal with it, even if Russia thinks it's "unfair" to them.

But, ok, the question then comes up of what would actually make the US enforce the agreement? Especially if doing so risks nuclear confrontation with Russia they have zero rational reason to risk that for the perceived benefit of Ukraine (risking nuclear war doesn't necessarily benefit Ukraine in any net-present-value calculation of any plausible metric of human welfare, but let's assume it does for the sake of argument). — boethius

Ukraine's position now is basically "we'll start acting rationally if the world is changed to suit our irrational desires". — boethius

You are just reinforcing my impression that you have no clue what you are talking about. The Western involvement in the war in Ukraine is not for Ukraine, it's for the West. If a hegemonic power perceives a non-negligible threat to its hegemony, it will react accordingly. Russia is expressly framing this war as a struggle for the World Order at the expense of the Western/US hegemony. That's why Russia must now suffer the consequences.

International agreements are all voluntary. And so, a "guarantee" is likewise a voluntary thing ... and therefore not any sort of actual guarantee. These sorts of words in these sorts of agreements are purely ornamental. — boethius

What looks ornamental to me is your latest contributions to this thread. Money, law, language are based on voluntary accepted conventions. So what?

US can guarantee whatever it wants, doesn't mean it's going to do that. — boethius

So what? State powers (and even criminal organizations) ground their power not just in brute force but also in consensus and reputation relative to their competitors and among competitors&allies for their own selfish interest!

The talk of guarantees has been some sort of actual guarantee, like US using nuclear weapons. — boethius

Dude, it's not up to you to determine how these security guarantees are implemented. The security guarantees do not need to consist in the US swearing on their mother's head that they are going to nuclear bomb Putin's ass if he defects the agreement and act accordingly. It could simply require the forms and degree of military cooperation between Ukraine and its guarantors.

To the extent there is an international law and rational agents engage in it, there must be some reasonable application for it, independently from any arbitrarily high standard of reliability and compatibly with power balance/struggle concerns. — neomac

Is completely false, unless your just repeating what I stated and what you claim to have issue with. — boethius

You are claiming that "these sorts of agreements are purely ornamental". I claim that this claim of yours show "completely ignorant understanding of international relations". International law has its use (addressing coordination issues) and can help in increasing transparency and trust. For that reason, rational political agents are engaging in it.

International law is not "law" (in the sense of law within states) and "legal framework" is not a "legal system" (in the sense of legal system within states). Same language maybe used, but referencing completely different things. — boethius

I'm talking about https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_law
So if you have a problem with the standard usage of the term "international law", I don't care.

A sign of a "winning" army would be taking Kherson — boethius

The signal is not there. — boethius

Say the three wise monkeys... :-)

We are working calmly and in a very calm manner — Andrzej Duda · Nov 16, 2022

The best interest of both US and Soviet Union was calculated by taking into account the deterrence means they both had (but Ukraine doesn’t have!), and this was pre-condition for the kind of agreements they could rationally pursue — neomac

The precondition of any agreement is that the parties involved have some reason to pursue an agreement. Having nuclear weapons is not a "pre-condition" for entering that "kind of an agreement".

Lot's of non-nuclear powers have entered the same non-proliferation agreements ... without having nuclear weapons.

What you are saying is both meaningless and false.

The only "precondition" to negotiating any agreement is being able to communicate. Just declaring preconditions is just a way of saying you won't negotiate, or then because you think the other party will give you concessions for free for some reason.

If the West is involved in this war there is a reason and they want to weigh in about this agreement, Russia must deal with it, even if Russia thinks its "unfair" to them. — neomac

This is what Russia wants: Negotiate with the West, the counter-party with the actual leverage (the weapons, the money, the economic sanctions).

So what? State powers (and even criminal organizations) ground their power not just in brute force but also in consensus and reputation relative to their competitors, for their own selfish interest! — neomac

Thanks for agreeing that Ukraine will not and cannot get any sort of guarantee from the US, or anyone else, in the "sense of certainty". I go on to describe that adding such language does create prestige states, that make matter or not.

Dude, it's not up to you to determine how these security guarantees are implemented. The security guarantees do not need to consist in the US swearing on their mother's head that they are going to nuclear bomb Putin's ass if he defects the agreement and act accordingly. It could simply require the forms and degree of military cooperation between Ukraine and its guarantors. — neomac

Again, if Ukraine signs, their guarantors sign, and then the "guarantors" don't do what they guaranteed, or did it in a bad faith way that is not fit for purpose. Is this a guarantee?

There are two meanings to guarantee commonly used: certainty (I guarantee you the sun will rise tomorrow) and a promise that is in no way certain (satisfaction guaranteed!). Now, the talk of US nuking Russia or doing something else, if they don't abide by the agreement or reinvade or whatever, if meant as a guarantee in the second sense (a promise that maybe kept, maybe not, the word "guarantee" just being an expression of confidence by a party that could be trying to deceive you), I have no issue. However, if people want to be able to actually visualise how Ukraine could be certain the agreement would be followed, and what the guarantee is in this sense, then we definitely seem to agree that there is no such guarantee.

Now, if such wording is useful diplomatically and adds some prestige reasons as additional motivation for parties to ensure the agreement happens, sure, have at it, add the word guarantee and "guarantor" after every sentence.

You are claiming that "these sorts of agreements are purely ornamental". — neomac

No, I said the word "guarantee" is purely ornamental.

Saying "the parties will do A, B, C" is exactly the same as saying "the parties will guarantee A, B and C" except for the prestige points.

The agreement themselves are useful and meaningful (otherwise no one would ever make one), they are just not "guaranteed" in any sense of certainty (which you seem to agree with).

For example, the EU exists based on a giant pile of international agreements, premised on the idea of mutual benefit to the parties involved (that they want to be "in" and want to follow what's "agreed", overall), but, as the UK recently demonstrated, any party to these agreements can nope out of at anytime.

I'm talking about https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_law
So if you have a problem with the standard usage of the term "international law", I don't care. — neomac

I explained how a "guarantee" (in the sense of some certainty Russia won't break the agreement) is impossible to implement, and such a reason is not, and never is, a reason to enter an international agreement (or any agreement for that matter).

You then say I don't know what I'm talking about and cite "international law" as a "voluntary" thing.

I say ... yeah, that's what it is, all these international agreements are voluntary, and likewise any agreement between Ukraine and Russian and anyone else. I point out your citation of international law as:

International relations include a legal framework based on voluntary acceptance — neomac

Is exactly what I'm describing to explain why "guarantee" in such agreements would be ornamental and not representing something actually certain.

I point our your explanation is the same as mine (Ukraine will never get any sort of guarantee from anyone, other than ornamental) ... and then you complain that I'm not using your definition of international law as entirely voluntary?

Say the three wise monkeys... — Olivier5

You agree that this situation is not anywhere close to being as bad as an actual military defeat in Kherson, positions overrun, lines routed, soldiers surrounded ... so how is the current situation a "strong signal" of military might?

Military might would be doing those things far more embarrassing to Putin. Or is your argument that Ukraine could have taken Kherson by force at anytime but not-doing-so was a 5-D chess move?

Because unless your saying not-taking-Kherson due to the Ukrainian offensives and just letting the Russians leave with all their soldiers, all the civilians that wanted to, and most of their equipment was a 5D Ukrainian chess move, the only signal we have is that Kherson was becoming more trouble than it was worth for Russia, in addition to avoiding the risk of the damn collapsing, so they left.

Maybe this allows Russia to consolidate forces and advance elsewhere. True, they no longer have this bridge head on the West of the Dnieper but they can invade from Bellarus anytime anyways.

And, just as continuously hitting the bridges across the Dnieper was a major problem for Russia, it stands to reason Russia can do the same to Ukraine in further fighting East of the Dnieper.

So, if Russia consolidates and launches their own successful offensives, the current embarrassment will quickly be forgotten and it was clearly a "smart move".

Likewise, if the Russian withdrawal from West of the Dnieper allows Ukraine to free up significant forces previously guarding any breakout operation there and continue sustainable territorial gains, then the Russian retreat was simply delaying the inevitable.

If you really think based on this withdrawal from Kherson we can deduce the "war is over" or the Ukrainians are clearly "winning", you simply live in wishful thinking land.

At the moment, the inference from the actual information available would be that neither side can currently make any decisive and sustained gains, so Russia is attempting to attrit the Ukrainian electricity grid and Western appetite to continue financing the war and deal with high energy prices.

That we're hearing all this talk of a "peace deal" and Zelensky focused on this subject, could be some 5-D move or then could be that it's clear to the West that Ukraine cannot "win", energy situation isn't good for them, and they want to wind down the war (whether Zelensky wants to or not, as he has no leverage with his "guarantors").