Imagine as well that there is a sensible world, exactly like this one. — Bartricks

At what stage of its development? Are there animals or just plants? If animals already exist, and they have to compete for survival, they will evolve into sentience, very likely through stages of behaviour that are inimical to other life forms.

So, they have two desires: a desire to leave the sensible world to operate in its own manner, but also a desire to introduce sentient life into the sensible world. — Bartricks

Then, in order to get their wish, as omnipotent entities generally do, they would have to introduce a sensible life form that fits seamlessly into the sensible world.

If there are only plants and perhaps vegetarian insects, they could introduce a well designed sentient life form. It should be small enough to make a meal out of one strawberry and sleep in the hollow of a tree. It should have a long life-span and reproduce infrequently. It should be able to fly and its wings should be solar-powered and water-resistant. The body should be covered in fur just warm enough to keep it comfortable. It should be sociable as to disposition but self-sufficient as to capability.

And you are not omniscient, but you know that this sensible world is an incredibly dangerous place, full of all manner of dangers and just about every conceivable harm. — Bartricks

That's not my definition of a sensible world. Why would I want to leave it that way?

I mean, if the omnipotent, omniscient person ought not to introduce sentient life into the sensible world if they are not going to change the sensible world, then your inability to change the sensible world should also mean that you ought not to introduce sentient life into it. Agree? — Bartricks

Not really. What would be the point of omniscience and omnipotence if you refuse yourself permission to change a world that doesn't satisfy you?

You seem to have missed my point entirely.

Imagine that Mary has two offers of marriage - one from John and one from Tony. So, she can pledge lifelong fidelity to John and she can pledge lifelong fidelity to Tony. And she can do both. That is, nothing stops her promising to be faithful to John exclusively and promising to be faithful to Tony exlusively.

Clearly it would be wrong for her to do both. If she pledges lifelong fidelity to John, then she ought not to pledge lifelong fidelity to Tony too, and vice versa. One or the other, not both.

So far so good. Now imagine someone else - Jennifer. Jennifer is already married to Ralph. So she is now unable to change the fact she has pledged lifelong fidelity to Ralph. Does her inability to change the fact she has promised lifelong fidelity to Ralph mean that it is now morally permissible for her to pledge lifelong fidelity to someone else? No, obviously not. It'd be as wrong for Jennifer to do that as it would be for Mary to pledge lifelong fidelity to both John and Tony.

Similarly then, the omnipotent person has the ability to satisfy both of her desires - her desire for the world to keep operating in the way that it is, and her desire to create life and make it live in the sensible world. But it would be wrong for her to satisfy both desires. One or the other. Not both. That is, either keep the sensible world operating as it does, but do not introduce life into it. Or introduce life into it, but change its operations so that it doesn't harm people to live in it.

We, by contrast, do not have those two options, for we are powerless to change how the sensible world operates. We are not, however, powerless to refrain from introducing life into it. Thus, we should refrain from introducing new life into it. If it was wrong for the omnipotent person to introduce life into it without changing it, then our inability to change it implies that it is wrong for us to introduce life into it as well.

‘Capitalism,’ like ‘democracy,’ is a variated term. I do not see ‘capitalism’ as the root of all social problems myself. It is more or less, in my eyes, a repercussion of other social attitudes and changes due to the modern world.

Communications have changed everything, and are still changing everything.

Everything would be nothing. There would be no meaning, sense nor care.

Basically, it would be as everything is now … the only difference being we of limited capacities can ‘appreciate’ something we term ‘difference’ through what is likely ignorance clouded with an idea we term ‘knowledge’.

I obviously disagree because of the above. The assumption that some higher being has anything like our sense of morality is nonsense. If that is woven into the hypothetical then I do not see how it can fit just like a hypothetical such as this:

‘Imagine all apples are oranges. If you were an apple are you an orange or an apple being an orange?’

It is irrelevant nonsense. Contradictory and therefore closed off fro rational thought and sensible investigation.

Your hypothetical may work if you reduce the knowledge and abilities of the entity in the OP as such a being having SOME form of limitations.

I have no idea how anything you are saying connects with anything I have said.

Again then: the omnipotent person wants to keep the sensible world operating as it does. The omnipotent person also wants to create new life. It is wrong for them to satisfy both desires. If they satisfy desire A - the desire to keep the sensible world operating as it does - then they ought not to satisfy their other desire, B - the desire to create new life. One or the other, not both.

With this, note, a proponent of the problem of evil - that is, someone who thinks the problem of evil demonstrates God's non existence - must agree. For if they think the omnipotent person can satisfy both desires and be doing nothing wrong in doing so, then they do not think there is a problem of evil.

All proponents of the problem of evil must therefore agree that the omnipotent person would be immoral if they satisfied both desires. One or the other. Not both.

Now, unlike the omnipotent person, we are unable to change how the sensible world operates. But what that implies is that we ought to frustrate any desire we may have to procreate.

Again: if the omnipotent person elects not to change how the sensible world operates, then they ought to frustrate their desire to procreate. Similarly then, if we are unable to change how the sensible world operates, we ought to frustrate our desire to procreate.

Morally what ought they to do? Should they frustrate their desire to introduce sentient life into the sensible world? Or should they frustrate their desire to leave the sensible world alone and instead alter it so that it does not pose the risks to the welfare of the innocent life they plan on introducing into it? Or should they satisfy both desires? — Bartricks

I think if there was an omnipotent omniscient person that wished to protect their project - life, or sentient beings. I would imagine that they would act in the best practice of any parent - non interference until such a time that their creation unknowingly puts themselves in the gravest of mortal danger.

Then its wise for their parent - this omniscient being to step in/ intervene and provide some of that knowledge to help guide his /her creation away from their own demise.

In this way the benevolent omniscient being maintains as much free will as is possible for their sentient creations so they can explore and be curious and make their own decisions, all the while protecting them from total self annihilation whenever they choose to ignore their omniscient parent entirely to the point of pure delusion and self harm. For example like inventing nuclear weapons.

Constants from @Bartricks

You seem to have missed my point entirely. — Bartricks

I have no idea how anything you are saying connects with anything I have said. — Bartricks

Etc.

I think it's obvious who is doing the imagining here:

Imagine there is an omnipotent, omniscient person. — Bartricks

There is no dialogue here, all we have is 'The delusional commandments of bar tricks!'

So, your conclusion is basically in support of anti-natalism.

the sensible world — Bartricks

Sensible meaning a world in which there is no suffering or injustice? Or just orderly?

If you guys would take the time to understand his arguments instead of getting triggered, you would realize that many of his arguments make a lot of sense. Even if they are pretty intense.

That's not me protecting Barricks btw, I think he is arrogant and on an unexplainable, bizarre crusade to trigger as many TPF posters as possible with *surprisingly well-thought-out arguments.

* as compared to the vast majority of people who post on philosophy of religion, or on this site at all

*surprisingly well-thought-out arguments. — ToothyMaw

Offer your best example of such and demonstrate that you are not just easily impressed.

I will. Just give me like 20 minutes.

I will. Just give me like 20 minutes. — ToothyMaw

Take all the time you need!

Morally what ought they to do? Should they frustrate their desire to introduce sentient life into the sensible world? Or should they frustrate their desire to leave the sensible world alone and instead alter it so that it does not pose the risks to the welfare of the innocent life they plan on introducing into it? Or should they satisfy both desires? — Bartricks

Simple. Create a dude, ask him what he thinks about it. After all, that's the subject of the matter. I know people who love life and writhe at the idea of it ending or not existing. I know people who can't stand it and swear this is Hell who want to die. We all do. If it's good, go for more. If not, back to the drawing board. Nothing to lose sleep over.

Some people love a good life or death challenge. Others prefer peace and the stability that comes with predictability. You can't make everyone happy all the time so you know what they say, "one man's morality..."

This is probably my favorite.

Bartricks basically leverages the problem of evil into a syllogism demonstrating that since God would not suffer innocents to live in a dangerous world, we must not be innocent.

The only avenues of attack were to claim that God is unjust - humans don't get what they deserve - or that innocence can indeed be ascertained via reason. I have argued for at least the first.

I'm pretty certain 180 simultaneously craps his pants and has an aneurysm every time Bartricks posts an OP.

So, firstly, you accept the premise that 'evil' is a problem, 'outside' of the concept that it is a purely human concept and has no existence outside of sentient life. Evil is a labelled projection or manifestation of what most humans may judge certain human behaviours be categorised as. Killing for no reason or a reason which is not justified enough, is evil, killing in self-defence is not. Only other humans, given judicial authority, can judge on an incident-by-incident basis.

Secondly you accept the premise that god must exist based on a BS argument that if it did, it would not suffer innocents to live in a dangerous world.
Why is the premise that if god exists then it is the source and origin of ALL EVIL any less 'feasible?' and therefore god would allow innocents to suffer, as they do, so an existent god is fully responsible for all evil. Many theists turn atheist because they think if god exists then it allows evil. This is in fact more akin to the term 'the problem of evil.'

If you consider this 'syllogism' to have any value, then I do think you are easily impressed because it is based on two premises which have not been DEMONSTRATED as true.

Innocence, like evil is another human concept and again is purely based on human judgement on a case-by-case basis, often further informed by the outcome of previous cases or precedent/legal principle.

The only avenues of attack were to claim that God is unjust — ToothyMaw

Not true, you can also make the equally unprovable claim that god does not exist, therefore the question is moot.

I'm pretty certain 180 simultaneously craps his pants and has an aneurysm every time Bartricks posts an OP. — ToothyMaw

Imo, @180proof has a far more impressive knowledge of philosophy than bar tricks and is quite capable of defending his own positions.
I personally thought bartricks was female not male but perhaps I am wrong.

A being cannot be both omniscient and omnipotent. Being omnipotent means having free will to choose one's action at all times. Being omniscient means knowing what every future choice will be. Can't have both.

Well, unless you allow for a universe that bifurcates (multi-furcates?) at each choice. So, omnipotence OR omniscience OR the multiverse (if both).

Or maybe gods don't exist (my vote).

I do not see ‘capitalism’ as the root of all social problems myself. — I like sushi

Nor do I. It is merely the most recent dysfunction of civilization. (Organized/state religion and monarchy were two of the previous manifestations.) The last and fatal one, IMO, because it compels the afflicted society to propagate it - much as a virus replicates itself by taking over the reproductive function of the cell it's killing - and the only end-point is the death of the host. No vaccine is coming from outer space.

You seem to have missed my point entirely. — Bartricks

Yes, I did. What was it?

Similarly then, the omnipotent person has the ability to satisfy both of her desires - her desire for the world to keep operating in the way that it is, and her desire to create life and make it live in the sensible world. But it would be wrong for her to satisfy both desires. One or the other. Not both. — Bartricks

By what authority do you hold and omniscient, omnipotent being to the moral standard imposed by society on ordinary mortals? You attribute superpowers to a character on whom you then place arbitrary limitations. You posit 'a sensible world' without defining 'sensible'.
Why set up an insoluble conundrum?
I can thumb my nose at God without the complications.

Morally what ought they to do? — Bartricks

Morality is built around the needs and desire of a society, this is a one person society so he/she/it can do whatever he/she/it wants to do and it would always be morally acceptable.

And if he/she/it does like the results, he/she/it can redo or undo the problems he/she/it caused.

No problem to discuss here, moving on.

Your hypothetical may work if you reduce the knowledge and abilities of the entity in the OP as such a being having SOME form of limitations. — I like sushi

If by "omniscient" we mean a person that knows correctly how they are connected fundamentally to the rest of existence (the universe) then they are omnipotent through said existence (the universe). They are not omnipotent in human form as they cannot do inhuman things (humans are in one way defined by what they can and cannot physically achieve).

As an object their total power would not be available to them, however they could point to the universe saying "look.. I am it and it is me" through some core relationship (energy perhaps) and say "there is my absolute power" (the universe). However I am just a partiality of said power, here as an object (human).

In that sense knowing that the "whole" is ambivalent (both creative and destruction, both chaos and order). The omniscient person (knowing of all relationships between things) can thus also be ambivalent (not care) in reflection of the whole, or they can be malevolent or benevolent.

So what defines the difference between an omniscient person being benevolent or malevolent? It is in their choice to either keep their omniscience to themselves (the truth) or spread it far and wide to empower others to be able discern ignorance from truth.

In essence a good god wants others to know they are god also and serves them in telling so. (selflessness).

A bad god wants people to think of only themselves as God and everyone else should be subordinates to them. (selfishness).

In that way the truth can be kept to do evil or spread to do good.

Again then: the omnipotent person wants to keep the sensible world operating as it does. The omnipotent person also wants to create new life. It is wrong for them to satisfy both desires. — Bartricks

This the crux of the matter. You have not demonstrated that a new life cannot fit into an imaginary world as it operates. You have not demonstrated how the conflicting desires - if indeed they are in conflict - of a deity becomes a moral issue.

Yes, I did. What was it? — Vera Mont

See my careful explanation in my previous reply to you. It seems you missed the point of that one too.

By what authority do you hold and omniscient, omnipotent being to the moral standard imposed by society on ordinary mortals? You attribute superpowers to a character on whom you then place arbitrary limitations. You posit 'a sensible world' without defining 'sensible'.
Why set up an insoluble conundrum?
I can thumb my nose at God without the complications. — Vera Mont

Again, nothing you're saying has anything to do with anything I have said.

You're not addressing the question.

The omnipotent, omniscient person desires to leave the world to run in its own way.

They also desire to introduce life into the world.

Now, as any proponent of the problem of evil will agree, it would be quite wrong of them to satisfy both desires. That is, it would be quite wrong of them to introduce life into the world and then just let the world do its own thing.

If you think they'd be doing nothing wrong in satisfying both desires, then you simply do not think the problem of evil arises. But I am taking it for granted that it would be immoral, other things being equal, for an omnipotent, omniscient person to satisfy both desires.

Morally it would be fine for them to just leave the world to its own devices and frustrate their desire to introduce life into the world. Nothing wrong in doing that.

And most would accept that it would be morally permissible for them to radically alter the world so that it was a safe place into which to introduce life and to monitor the world's operations to make sure no one comes to any horrendous harms (thereby frustrating their desire to leave the world to run in its own way).

If that is correct, then my point is that our inability to change the world and make sure it does not visit horrendous harms on anyone we bring here implies that we ought to frustrate any desire we have to procreate.

That is, if the omnipotent, omniscient person decides to indulge their desire to let the world run in its own way, then the omnipotent, omniscient person ought to frustrate their desire to procreate. We are unable to affect how the world runs. Therefore we ought to frustrate our desire to procreate.

Again, nothing you're saying has anything to do with anything I have said. — Bartricks

Oh well, that happens sometimes.

Oh well, that happens sometimes. — Vera Mont

My favourite colour is the colour I like most.

Morally it would be fine for them to just leave the world to its own devices and frustrate their desire to introduce life into the world. Nothing wrong in doing that. — Bartricks

But if they don't introduce life (conscious/sentient beings) into the world what capacity would such an inanimate world have for it would not even be aware that it exists. A world without an observer would be devoid of both meaning and its consequence: "good" and "evil" (concepts held by sentient things).

The person is powerful and knowledgeable enough to introduce a robust form of life such as tardigrades with big brains that are invulnerable to the environment.

Morality is built around the needs and desire of a society, — Sir2u

No it isn't.

But anyway, that's an absurd 'metaethical' claim, whereas my question is a normative one. Rookie mistake.
Me: "which way to the city centre?"
You: "A city centre is a collection of trees"

But if they don't introduce life (conscious/sentient beings) into the world what capacity would such an inanimate world have for it would not even be aware that it exists. A word without an observer would be devoid of both meaning and its consequence: "good" and "evil" (concepts held by sentient things). — Benj96

I don't really see your point. There's an omnipotent, omniscient person. There's a sensible world. They - the omnipotent, omniscient person - like the world, They enjoy watching how things unfold in it. There's nothing wrong in that. There's nothing wrong, for instance, in enjoying how the flames of a fire dance about. But if you also enjoy seeing a person dance about, it would be wrong to throw a person into the fire and watch them dance about in it. Watch the dance of the flames, or watch the dance of a human, but don't combine them.