Cheers. Dyspeptic? I prefer bemused. Nice writing by SJG.

Dyspeptic? I prefer bemused. — Tom Storm

Sorry, I just really like the word "dyspeptic." It feels good to say it. Also, when I use it, I imagine you scowling.

Taking the concept of reality out of the equation for a moment, I believe we can assert with confidence that there exists variation in the way things are organized in the universe; meaning that we can be certain that there exist things different and separate from themselves and our bodies - the distribution of whatever it is that makes that which we call the universe is not isotropic. Even if this variation is real or not, it exists (no matter what real means, there is variation); it is undeniable, even from the human perspective, since the fact that there are things different from me implies that I am different from them - none of the schools of philosophy can exist without variation/difference/variety. In fact, any kind of organizing process, if that makes any sense, is unable to exist without variation - for how can there be any kind of organization in an absolutely isotropic quality/entity/substance? Now, to me, it seems this variation is ubiquitous across all levels of organization that pertain to the sciences, math, and logic, and I would say there is nothing more real than that, but again, it might not even be.

there is nothing more real than — Daniel

... chocolate?

Of course, our own experience/interpretation can be compared and perhaps found wanting by others but it's real, no? — Amity

Yes. Fictions, or interpretations, may consist of 'truth-telling lies' which (can) indicate realities.

That's a clever, intriguing paper. Thanks. So where I above supposed that there may be two differing but agreed descriptions, the paper argues that there may be disagreement between what each observer deduces that the other observer sees; but Aaronson suggests this relies on the contradiction of a measurement not measured. — Banno

Yes, that's right.

I've read through an explanation of Wigner's friend twice and can't figure it out how it applies beyond just plain old "quantum weirdness." — T Clark

Plain old "quantum weirdness" is when a system is in a superposition of state 0 and state 1.

Wigner-grade "quantum weirdness" is when Wigner's friend in the lab is in a superposition of having measured state 0 and having measured state 1. From the friend's point-of-view, the wave function has collapsed whereas from Wigner's point-of-view, it has not.

Yes, that's right. — Andrew M

Hmm. So was some sort of consensus reached as to which view was correct?

Hmm. So was some sort of consensus reached as to which view was correct? — Banno

No. Renner addresses criticisms, including Aaronson's which is the "agent's brain" sentence below. Assumptions Q, S and C are what Aaronson describes in his post as "(briefly, QM works, measurements have definite outcomes, and the “transitivity of knowledge”)".

We have thus seen various proposals for how one could resolve the FR paradox. Some of them amount to giving up some of the most basic assumptions that underlie physical reasoning (like disallowing the use of standard logic, or postulating that future actions on an agent’s brain can invalidate conclusions drawn by the agent in the past). The others basically correspond to rejecting one of the explicit assumptions, Q, C, or S. — Testing quantum theory with thought experiments - Nuriya Nurgalieva and Renato Renner (section 6)

Ah, well. Another "watch this space"...

Thanks.

Sorry, I just really like the word "dyspeptic." — T Clark

Me too!

Of course, our own experience/interpretation can be compared and perhaps found wanting by others but it's real, no?
— Amity
Yes. Fictions, or interpretations, may consist of 'truth-telling lies' which (can) indicate realities. — 180 Proof

Interesting. Never heard this term before: 'truth-telling lies'. In a text, they would constitute substantive content (material) but also the subjective thoughts/ideas (mental/spiritual ) of the author.
Readers bring their own realities to the table. All real, no?

Where else might we find 'truth-telling lies'? A stretching of the truth or reality.
I found 'paltering': the devious art of lying by telling the truth is not just for politicians; we all do it.

Lying can and does clearly serve a devious social purpose. It can help someone paint a better picture than the truth, or help a politician dodge an uncomfortable question. "It's unethical and it makes our democracy worse. But it's how human cognition works," says Rogers. — BBC Future

Knowing what is 'real' and how to challenge the misuse of facts...developing critical thinking...having the courage to stand up against the lying and the manipulative...we could all do more...to progress rather than regress. Education right from the get-go; telling stories and discussing them. Pretty much what we do here.

I’ll define “reality” as the state of being real. — T Clark

A circular definition, not particularly helpful.

Expanded here:

The state of being actual or real.
A real entity, event or other fact.
The entirety of all that is real.
An individual observer's own subjective perception of that which is real. — WordHippo

The latter would include hallucinations and delusions as previously discussed.

[...] It's important to recognise the distinction between different kinds of reality and their consequences. For health reasons, if nothing else. — Amity

I’ll define “reality” as the state of being real — T Clark

What else could it be, oui mon ami?

But if you would understand a real idea, with what woudl you contrast it? What is an unreal idea - one from the sixties? If you would understand a real sensation, then you would also understand an unreal sensation... but what would that be? In asking such questions one comes to see that the notion of "real" is misapplied to sensations and ideas. Whole volumes of bad philosophy are removed by such considerations. — Banno

'What is an unreal idea'?
That got me wondering if the opposite of 'real' is 'unreal'. Should it be nonreal, irreal...?
Sticking with 'unreal', there's a long list but I've cut it down to three:

1. Opposite of that which is material, tangible, or physical
2. Opposite of essential, innate or inherent to something
3. Opposite of existing independently of the mind — WordHippo

clicking on the links:
1. immaterial, mental, spiritual, intangible
2. extrinsic, acquired, artificial, learned
3. nonempirical, theoretical, subjective, faith-driven

Next up, what is an 'idea':

Noun
(philosophy) An abstract archetype of a given thing, compared to which real-life examples are seen as imperfect approximations; pure essence, as opposed to actual examples.
(obsolete) The conception of someone or something as representing a perfect example; an ideal.
(obsolete) The form or shape of something; a quintessential aspect or characteristic.
An image of an object that is formed in the mind or recalled by the memory.
More generally, any result of mental activity; a thought, a notion; a way of thinking.
A conception in the mind of something to be done; a plan for doing something, an intention.
A vague or fanciful notion; a feeling or hunch; an impression.
(music) A musical theme or melodic subject.
— WordHippo

An 'unreal idea', then, is what?
1. a mental image of an object
2. an acquired way of thinking
3. a subjective result of mental activity

To be contrasted with a 'real idea'. What is that again?

• A genuine abstract archetype.
• An existing mental image.
• A physical vague notion
• An objective mental conception of a plan

Pick and mix. Compare and contrast. But we're missing context. Have we any examples?
Any ideas come to mind? Real or unreal? :chin:

In asking such questions one comes to see that the notion of "real" is misapplied to sensations and ideas. Whole volumes of bad philosophy are removed by such considerations. — Banno

I haven't covered sensations but, given the above, how is the notion of 'real' misapplied to ideas?
Whole volumes of philosophy, bad or otherwise...could be removed and we would still be non the wiser.
Which philosophers are more 'real' than others?

Of course, all of the definitions above come from a non-philosophical site.
Are they more or less helpful than something from the SEP or similar?
Enter 'idea' and you get 1965 hits. Talking of which...

What is an unreal idea - one from the sixties? — Banno

In "This ball is red," "... is red" is a function not an object..... — Srap Tasmaner

Ok. “...is red” functions as a predicate in a proposition, then. The function of a predicate is to describe the subject to which it belongs, such that “this ball” has at least one certain identifying condition.

.....the characteristic function of the set of all red things. — Srap Tasmaner

Yeah, but we’re only concerned with “this ball....”. The statement says so. Rather simplistic to say the least, but if I hold out my hand with a ball in it, and tell you in no uncertain terms this ball is red, the last thing you’re going to do is consider the set of all red things, just as I did not upon determining something certain about the ball. And you, all you’re going to do is say, yeah, ok, I see that (iff the ball appears red to you), or, yeah, ok, I’ll take your word for it (iff the ball does not appear red to you).

But you’re trying to show me something, and you’ve done that well enough for me understand what you’re saying. I must say though, it’s far too complicated and quite an unnecessary elaboration of simple human constructs to be of any beneficial use. Or, as a question of mere interest, of what benefit could it be?

I mean....Santa Claus does refer, and without any annoyance I should think, if the sticker on the gift-wrapped present says “from: Santa”. And if considered from the standard subject/copula/predicate logical propositional format, any conception contained in a predicate, and is thereby the object of it, must refer to its subject.

So I wonder....what’s the point in deviating from the standard? What profit is there in it, over and above what’s already there?

To say something is observable is to privilege empiricism and to make assumptions about the observer and what is being observed. How does one rule out idealism, for instance? — Tom Storm

Sorry I took so long to come back to this. Such an articulate/coherent thought you present here. Your question is a good one.

To say something is observable I don't believe privileges empiricism because if it did then we would not be able to observe "belief" in action. Yet we observe belief (personal truths of others/reality according to them) all the time.

You can observe a person behave in accordance with their values even if you have no empirical evidence that their values exist/should exist. For example, you can observe a person go to a church, mosque or other religious institution and pray to their God. You can understand through their actions that they must really believe in such an entity - otherwise they wouldnt pray, despite the fact that you yourself may not believe in such a god. You have no empirical/objective proof outside the fact that that person is an object with a phenomenon associated with it which you are observing.

One can argue that that is or isn't "empirical" evidence or subject to "observation". That choice is yours to make.

How does one rule out idealism you say? My answer to that is why would you want to rule out idealism? Idealism stands as a goal, a noble one at that. Idealism stands for a world which can be better than it is now. It stands for evolution, for progress and for improvement. Without a sense of idealism, without a hope for the ideal, we are left broken, defeated and feeling worthless. We are depressed, disenchanted and dangerously close to suicidal ideation instead of the ideation of a better life.

We must inspire good ideals in others to prevent them from succumbing to depression and suicide. If we value their life that is. Which we should. :)

Santa Claus does refer, and without any annoyance I should think, if the sticker on the gift-wrapped present says “from: Santa”. And if considered from the standard subject/copula/predicate logical propositional format, any conception contained in a predicate, and is thereby the object of it, must refer to its subject. — Mww

Santa Claus is a real fictional character, but not a real person. When the tag on the present is signed "from: Santa" that's supposed to mean it's from the person Santa Claus; no one thinks they're getting a present from a fictional character. Since there is no person Santa Claus, signing a tag that way is pretending that there is such a person.

That's what I mean when I say "reference": an expression that picks out one of the objects in the world. Santa is not one of the objects in the world, so the expression "Santa Claus" does not refer. We pretend it does.

The sense in which a predicate "refers to" its subject, to what it's predicated of, is a matter of syntax not semantics. It's the "of" in "red is true of this ball." Not the same as the expression "this ball" referring, semantically, to some particular object.

Taking the concept of reality out of the equation for a moment, I believe we can assert with confidence that there exists variation in the way things are organized in the universe; meaning that we can be certain that there exist things different and separate from themselves and our bodies - the distribution of whatever it is that makes that which we call the universe is not isotropic. Even if this variation is real or not, it exists (no matter what real means, there is variation); it is undeniable, even from the human perspective, since the fact that there are things different from me implies that I am different from them - none of the schools of philosophy can exist without variation/difference/variety. In fact, any kind of organizing process, if that makes any sense, is unable to exist without variation - for how can there be any kind of organization in an absolutely isotropic quality/entity/substance? Now, to me, it seems this variation is ubiquitous across all levels of organization that pertain to the sciences, math, and logic, and I would say there is nothing more real than that, but again, it might not even be. — Daniel

As you say in your first line, you've taken the concept of reality out of the equation, which changes everything. As I see it, your interesting description of the world we live in is just a different way of looking at thermodynamics. You need stuff moving from areas of relatively high to areas of relatively low concentration for anything to happen. That's physics. The idea of reality is ontology, metaphysics. As I understand it, metaphysics is not something that can be verified empirically. But that's a long song I've sung many times here on the forum.

The idea of reality is ontology, metaphysics. As I understand it, metaphysics is not something that can be verified empirically. But that's a long song I've sung many times here on the forum. — T Clark

Wait. What is metaphysics?

jk T Clark.

Wigner-grade "quantum weirdness" is when Wigner's friend in the lab is in a superposition of having measured state 0 and having measured state 1. From the friend's point-of-view, the wave function has collapsed whereas from Wigner's point-of-view, it has not. — Andrew M

Thanks for the response. I've always thought of this kind of paradox as a game physicists play, not really signifying anything substantive. But I'll admit to being relatively naive when it comes to quantum mechanics, so let's not get into that discussion here.

jk — Manuel

You are forgiven.

A circular definition, not particularly helpful. — Amity

I started out discussing what "real" means. Then, in the passage you quoted, I indicated that "reality" is the noun form of "real." No circularity at all.

oui mon ami — Agent Smith

As I noted previously, I find this affectation annoying.

Disagree.

Santa Claus is a real fictional character..... — Srap Tasmaner

Yep. Keyword....real. All I was going for all along.

When the tag on the present is signed "from: Santa" that's supposed to mean it's from the person — Srap Tasmaner

Technically, all it’s supposed to do is explain how the present didn’t get there all by itself. It answers the question, “who is this from?” before it needs to be asked. The reasons for using an imaginary character, if only to circumvent the asking...... that’s another topic, and sorta beside the point anyway.

That's what I mean when I say "reference": an expression that picks out one of the objects in the world. Santa is not one of the objects in the world, so the expression "Santa Claus" does not refer. We pretend it does. — Srap Tasmaner

That’s fine. I, on the other hand, find nothing wrong with using mere conceptions to refer, and with them, I don’t have to pretend. The onus is on me, nonetheless, to insure the conception I use doesn’t freak out whoever I’m talking to.

Wonderful faculty....imagination. Always in use, seldom given its due respect.

find nothing wrong with using mere conceptions to refer — Mww

Wonderful faculty....imagination. Always in use, seldom given its due respect. — Mww

For some cases, the issue is direction of fit. It is one thing to imagine a way of proving Fermat's last theorem, and then spend years actualizing that proof, and another to have written out some mathematics you mistakenly imagine is a proof of Fermat's last theorem. Fermat himself seems to have imagined a proof, which he did not write down, but if he had he would probably have recognized that it was not a proof after all.

We must inspire good ideals in others to prevent them from succumbing to depression and suicide. If we value their life that is. Which we should. :) — Benj96

:up:

How does one rule out idealism you say? My answer to that is why would you want to rule out idealism? Idealism stands as a goal, a noble one at that. — Benj96

Sorry, I was referring to philosophical idealism (all that exists is consciousness and materialism is just mind when viewed from a particular perspective) as per Schopenhauer, Berkeley, Hegel, Schelling, and these days Kastrup and Hoffman)

Sorry, I was referring to philosophical idealism (all that exists is consciousness and materialism is just mind when viewed from a particular perspective) as per Schopenhauer, Berkeley, Hegel, Schelling, and these days Kastrup and Hoffman — Tom Storm

Ah okay. Understood. Well in that case I believe idealism and pragmatism (what is realistic) operate in contention with one another. You cannot have idealism without realism they are opposites. Mutually dependent..
Does that clarify my position a bit better? If not speak your mind and we are free to discuss it further :)

It is one thing to imagine a way of proving Fermat's last theorem, and then spend years actualizing that proof..... — Srap Tasmaner

OK. Standard rational methodology: hypothesis, reason, conclusion.

.......another to have written out some mathematics you mistakenly imagine is a proof of Fermat's last theorem. — Srap Tasmaner

Non-standard rational methodology. Or, which is the same thing, standard irrational methodology. Imagining a way to prove, which presupposes a method, is very far from imagining a proof, which doesn’t.

The norm in humans is the standard, which makes the proper direction of fit go one way. If the conclusion contradicts established criteria, as in the case of pure mathematics, or fails to conform to observations of Nature, in the case of the empirical sciences, the hypothesis is falsely premised. Back to square one, change the premises in the hypothesis....carry on.

But you’re right. There are two ways of doing things. One adheres to the rules, which may be sufficient for an end, whatever that may be, the other is the exception to those rules, which is sufficient only for acquaintance with the difficulty, or downright impossibility, for that end. Being aware of the exceptions should serve to inform as to what not to do.

You can wedge direction of fit in there somehow, if you wish. I don’t see what good it does; we already do all direction of fit says anyway.

Disclaimer: I’m up on this modern linguistic jazz just as much as I’m up on set theory, so I have a self-prescribed out.

I've no idea.