Oh, and here's the most interesting part from the joint Amnesty, Human Rights Watch report...

Ukraine’s security services repeatedly denied the violations the two organizations documented. They have also sought to deflect criticism by repeatedly claiming, falsely, that reports of enforced disappearances were disinformation spread by Russian propaganda

.

Blaming the reporting of their abuses on Russian disinformation... Well...

And for the removal of doubt about the scale. This one from the OHCHR report...

The torture, ill-treatment and other violations described by detainees involved in the simultaneous release [an exchange of prisoners between both sides] are of a systematic nature and may amount to war crimes.

, so this move?

so, your proposed "solution" to your question is to cease the foreign aid to Ukraine and see what happens

As an aside, related to the so-called de-Nazification thing:
Ukraine crisis: 'Thousands of Russians' fighting in east
Reported Aug 28, 2014, a few months after the Crimea grab. Putinian insurgency.

Now there's a...mixed crowd of some 20,000 fighters (allegedly, I'm guessing less):
International Legion of Territorial Defense of Ukraine
That's gotta' be...something to deal with.

Anyway, if, for a moment, we disregard self-governance/sovereignty, then it seems most/everyone's good with a neutral Ukraine. Actually no, Putin and Peskov have mentioned demilitarized. At what point can the Ukrainians feel safe, retain (at least non-military) self-governance/sovereignty, pursue international affiliations, get on with life? At the moment, with what's come out and happened, I don't see the Putinian cosa nostra holding back in a way that matters, no bona fides signs for that matter.

Just in ...

It's all doom and gloom on Russian state TV right now
But criticism of Vladimir Putin remains absolutely off limits — Francis Scarr · Oct 6, 2022

^{Kremlin Spokesman Says No Mobilization Despite Ukrainian Counteroffensive Success (Sep 13, 2022)
Putin mobilizes 300,000 troops for war in Ukraine and warns he’s not bluffing with nuclear threat (Sep 21, 2022)}

You believe this is evidence? — Tzeentch

Your argument is so under water that all I can hear is the bubbling.

Your argument is so under water that all I can hear is the bubbling. — apokrisis

It's honestly bizarre your insistence on Russian military incompetence.

What I find most interesting about the incompetence narrative is that's it's needed to support the idea there should not be any negotiation strategy (unlike every other example provided of a smaller country fighting larger ones: most Finland and Isreal ... the list maybe small for a reason that's worth reflecting on).

However, although debating specific battles maybe fruitful, as has already pointed out deception is involved in warfare.

A better consideration for such a debate I think is simply the progress of the war to date:



Does not look to me like the advance of an incompetent military.

Nor recent losses some sort of total disaster.

Furthermore, what the Russian military has done was predicted as a "good move" before the war, which I posted citations from 6 months ago:

Zelensky is now seen as a hero the world over and quite probably in Ukraine as well. Good job Vlad!
— Olivier5

If you bother to read the context, the article predicts Russia is unlikely to undertake a full scale invasion - and if so, super limited incursions such as only in Dombas - and in that context the Russian buildup or then very limited incursions is to undermine Zelenskyy.

However, what the article gets right is:

The operation to establish a land bridge from Rostov to Crimea is likely the most attractive to Putin in this respect. It solves a real problem for him by giving him control of the Dnepr-Crimea canal ,which he badly needs to get fresh water to occupied Crimea. It would do fearful damage to the Ukrainian economy by disrupting key transportation routes from eastern Ukraine to the west. He could halt operations upon obtaining an important gain, such as seizing the canal and the area around it or after taking the strategic city of Mariupol just beyond the boundary of occupied Donbas.
— PUTIN’S MILITARY OPTIONS

Likewise, article also gets right:
Likely Ukrainian Initial Responses to Full-Scale Invasion

"The Ukrainian military will almost certainly fight against such an invasion, for which it is now preparing.19 Whatever doubts and reservations military personnel might have about their leaders or their prospects, the appearance of enemy mechanized columns driving into one’s country tends to concentrate thought and galvanize initial resistance. It collapses complexities and creates binary choices. Military officers and personnel are conditioned to choose to fight in such circumstances, and usually do, at least at first. There is no reason to think the Ukrainian military will perform differently in this case."
— PUTIN’S MILITARY OPTIONS

However, what the article gets wrong is that a full scale invasion for the purposes - not of occupation and dealing with insurgency in major cities - but for securing the land bridge and solve "a real problem", is one way to do it.

That being said, the article does go over the possibility of multiple parallel incursions, what it calls "Course of Actions subordinate to Course of Action I" (sub-COA's; COA I is the full scale invasion).

"But he might also execute several of these sub-COAs on their own to achieve independent objectives without intending to go all the way to full-scale invasion. We will consider the major sub-COAs here ordered by the likelihood we assess for each and laying out the separate objectives each might pursue beyond setting conditions for the full-scale invasion."
— PUTIN’S MILITARY OPTIONS

So, correct analysis after all, only fails to mention the Russians could choose to have so many of the parallel "sub-COA's" that it appears to be a full scale invasion, but it's not.

The reason for doing so is more-or-less presented in the article, in that Western reaction is likely to be fairly strong (at least sanction wise) and a limited incursion to test Ukrainian and Western resolve and then pulling back has a lot of drawbacks (but the article mistakingly concludes that's more likely than major incursions anyways).

As for Zelenskyy, what would major incursions cause?

"It would cause panic and crisis in Kyiv and drive Zelensky to plead for NATO help that would be unlikely to come"
— PUTIN’S MILITARY OPTIONS

Correct. — boethius

Now, you may say Zelensky did plead for NATO help and has gotten NATO help ... but this is debatable. What Zelensky was pleading for at that time was a no fly zone, which didn't come.

Rather, events seem very consistent with my drip feed hypothesis, that Ukraine gets just enough support from NATO to not lose outright but not enough to seriously threaten Russia's objectives or cause Russia to actually escalate to nuclear weapons.

Or as I usually put it:

Dude, the whole current war is precisely because NATO isn't Ukraine's friend ... or it would be in Ukraine right now shoulder to shoulder, protecting its "friend".

Saying NATO arms dealing with Ukraine is "friendship" is like saying your meth dealer dealing you meth is "friendship".

Maybe you need the meth, but big mistake thinking your meth dealer's your friend. That's how suicides happen. Public service announcement everyone. — boethius

Sure, your meth dealer doesn't "want you to die" but that's not exactly the same as caring about you.

What I find most interesting about the incompetence narrative is that's it's needed to support the idea there should not be any negotiation strategy — boethius

Who says that?

Everyone agrees about the surprising degree of Russian incompetence, but who says that is the reason not to negotiate. It would seem that all the reverses strengthen Ukraine’s negotiating position. The only issue is whether Putin has rational demands given his inchoate anti-West rants.

I like this calm summary for the reasons behind Russia’s systemic military incompetence….

Are you claiming the Russian army has been competent???

Who says that? — apokrisis

You are saying that, insofar as you've been supporting Ukraine's choices to fight while having zero diplomatic position.

More importantly, Zelensky is saying that most of the time, and recently in literally declaring he will "not negotiate" with Putin.

Everyone agree about the surprising degree of Russian incompetence, but who says that is the reason not to negotiate. — apokrisis

Everyone? You're literally debating right now the issue with 3 other interlocutors who disagree.

And, read the analysis the paper I cited (published December 2021):

Literally the first paragraph states:

A full-scale Russian invasion of unoccupied Ukraine would be by far the largest, boldest, and riskiest military operation Moscow has launched since the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan. It would be far more complex than the US wars against Iraq in 1991 or 2003. It would be a marked departure from the approaches Putin has relied on since 2015, and a major step-change in his willingness to use Russian conventional military power overtly. It would cost Russia enormous sums of money and likely many thousands of casualties and destroyed vehicles and aircraft. Even in victory, such an invasion would impose on Russian President Vladimir Putin the requirement to reconstruct Ukraine and then establish a new government and security forces there more suitable for his objectives.

So it's not a surprise Russia has suffered serious losses in such an ambitious undertaking as "Sub-COA 1c: Create a Land Bridge from Rostov to Crimea".

That is not a sign of military incompetence. The issue of whether it was politically wise, or the task is even doable are separate questions to that of military incompetence.

Looking at the anecdotal minutia is of literal analytical significance. Ukraine fronts have crumbled many times as well ... and currently Russia holds far more territory of Ukraine than vice-versa.

"Shit happens" and to evaluate any particular battle we need to know exact casualties and losses on each side. Simply taking territory is not "winning" if the costs are unsustainable, the offensives burn our and the tide turns the other way only with far less capability to defend than before the offensives.

Obviously, both sides want to both hide and deceive the other about losses.

What we can analyse is major strategic locations that we are sure both sides are equally committed to.

For example, we know Russia is committed to Kherson because it is a major city and bridge head over the Dnieper river, which is a major strategic advantage to have forcing Ukrainians to commit sizeable force to defend any offensive coming from there. To what extent there's an advantage of controlling both sides of the river I don't know, but if nothing else is a buffer Ukraine must deal with if it wants to create a bridge head of its own and retake the canal.

We know Russia is committed to the land bridge to Crimea.

And we know Russia is committed to holding Crimea itself.

Currently, only Kherson is being threatened, fighting not even at the city yet, and, notably, Russia can still lose West of the Dnieper and still maintain the canal (I assume; maybe there are complicating engineering details I haven't heard about).

So, Russia successfully accomplishing what Western analysts viewed as an ambitious plan of "Sub-COA 1c: Create a Land Bridge from Rostov to Crimea" is clearly competent military planning and execution.

In terms of air power, incompetence would be Ukraine currently having air superiority, supremacy or even comparable effectiveness (even within an order of magnitude).

Incompetence would have been a failure to even exit Crimea because Ukraine was competent and blew up the bridges and heavily defended any bridging attempts, or failed to successfully siege Mariupol, or failed to take Kherson.

If you read the analysis cited, what actual experts believed before the war was that an invasion would be costly, involving thousands KIA and significant armour and airframe losses.

Creating the comparison standard that Ukraine was some small essentially unarmed country in no way prepared for an invasion and should have fallen in a few days, is a Western media myth.

Ukraine is huge and distance itself is a significant strategic obstacle for full scale invasion, compared to a small country, and Ukraine has been fighting a war since 2014 and completed several steps of NATO partnership, arms and training and military and intelligence "advice".

Furthermore, NATO has needed to pour in billions of Euros of arms and economic aid in addition to essentially full US intelligence support (systems that are that are worth tens of billions if not hundreds of billions), simply to keep Ukraine "in the fight".

Once you pour in tens of billions of arms, intelligence and training, in addition to Ukraine being a large country with a smaller, but not tiny, population willing to fight, the Russian military performance is far from incompetent.

Of course, competence does not imply ultimate victory.

↪boethius Are you claiming the Russian army has been competent??? — RogueAI

As I've responded above to @apokrisis, Western media simply relaying anything "Ukrainian intelligence" says is not a basis of evaluating Russian military performance.

Russia has conquered, occupied, pacified, and defended strategically important territory for 7 months now while inflicting, by any count I've seen, several factors more casualties on Ukraine than suffering itself.

That's clearly military competence.

Large scale warfare is largely a statistical thing. In WWII tank survivability once in battle was measured in minutes and so quick were tanks destroyed that all sides downgraded the quality of their tank builds because they simply didn't last long enough for durability of most mechanical parts to matter.

Russia has definitely lost a lot of tanks, but so too Ukraine. However, we're now at a point in the war where Ukraine has lost all of its initial tank stock and is now nearing critical depletion of all the Soviet tanks NATO could scrounge up and send.

Which is why there's been a lot of talk in both the media, but more importantly Ukraine asking for tanks and US saying "no", of sending Western tanks to Ukraine. A recent US press briefing about the latest arms package, simply answers to this question about tanks that it would be so problematic to integrate Western tanks as to be counter productive.

However, my thesis from the start of the war has been Ukraine cannot mount successful offensives without armour (at the time heavy weapons were a no-no so the theory was Ukraine could "win" with only small arms and shoulder mounted missiles) has definitely proven true in these recent offensives, where Ukraine has used significant tank forces.

Of course, they're also losing tanks. If it's simply impossible to resupply those soviet tanks because they aren't being built anymore, then the war will return to slow moving fronts where Russia leverages its artillery, air power advantage and, seems now, drone advantage.

If the situation is simply Ukraine cannot possibly sustain these attacks to accomplish and hold any major strategic objective, then Russia's response of tactical retreat is a perfectly competent one.

Of course, losses still happen in a tactical retreat, just not as much as the force your tactically retreating from, which Western media and all sorts of indicators seem to say Ukraine losses are significant.

Also, notice that Ukraine advances are measured in square kilometres but Russian advances simply in kilometres, which obviously is a massive numerical difference in appearance.

Where the kilometres (for example to an objective) are significant is that you need to multiple your losses per kilometre by the amount of kilometres you need to go to reach all the key military objectives.

Ukraine has simply not gone all that far and the reported casualties are immense. It's of course possible that it's some kind of giant ruse, but I think that's unlikely because the reports of Hospitals filling up all the way to neighbouring countries would be difficult to fake and there's also no reason to believe advancing through artillery, missiles, rockets, mortars, mine fields, and air strikes could possibly be low-casualty for Ukraine (a successful fake casualty operation was the UK reporting high casualties in the wrong locations of German V2 strikes which would encourage more strikes wildly off target that did little damage, but these were special circumstances where Germany had little to no human intelligence on the ground and were relying on UK newspapers to correct their fire; so, does happen, but in this case seems unlikely reports of Ukrainian high casualties are part of a deceptive operation).

And, precisely because any rational analysis concludes the cost to Ukraine of trying to retake all the territory is simply unsustainable, that it must be assumed that Russia will somehow militarily, economically, politically collapse somehow in order to justify continued warfare without any realistic diplomatic position.

Russia has conquered, occupied, pacified, and defended strategically important territory for 7 months now while inflicting, by any count I've seen, several factors more casualties on Ukraine than suffering itself. — boethius

What is your source for this?

What is your source for this? — Paine

Pravda?

Russia officially becomes 113,000 square kilometers larger
See more at https://english.pravda.ru/news/russia/154246-russia_new_territories/

What is your source for this? — Paine

Ah yes, forgot to mention plausibly independent source, so not Ukrainian or Western Intelligence.

Starts by noting:

Nobody really knows how many combatants or civilians have died, and claims of casualties by government officials — who may sometimes be exaggerating or lowballing their figures for public relations reasons — are all but impossible to verify. — At 100 Days, Russia-Ukraine War by the Numbers, VOA

Or,

The number of soldiers dying is sensitive information and shapes the story of how the war is going for both sides, Gavin Crowden, of casualty-recording organisation Every Casualty Counts, says. — War in Ukraine: Can we say how many people have died?,BBC

But independent analysis often focuses on Zelensky's own admission:

Zelenskyy said this week that 60 to 100 Ukrainian soldiers are dying in combat every day, with about 500 more wounded. — At 100 Days, Russia-Ukraine War by the Numbers, VOA

Which seems just a base line, "everyday", kind of thing, without any fierce battles happening.

At one point he mentioned 200 dying.

Per month 60 KIA per day is 1800 per month, 100 per day is 3000, and 200 KIA per day would be 6000 per month. 500 wounded per day is 15 000 wounded per month.

If this range is indicative of the 7 months of the war, places Ukrainian KIA at 12 600 to 42 000 KIA, and 105 000 wounded.

Of course, Zelensky's comment could be a lie to inflate Ukrainian KIA and casualties, but it's difficult to find a justification for that. Honestly seemed a moment of candour, perhaps regret at the loss of life and frustration with NATO (which he expresses from time to time, and Western media simply ignores).

Considering the immense artillery and air power advantage Russia has is not really in question and fairly easy to confirm, these numbers are easy to believe and it's difficult to come up with a mechanism Russian casualties would be anywhere close. And that doesn't really seem in dispute. That was even the Western narrative for months, that Russian fires 10 times more artillery shells than Ukraine.

Again, "incompetence" is the only possible basis for believing that you fire 10x more shells, conduct hundreds of bombing sorties a day / night, but not only fail to match casualties but actually suffer more.

And usually that's not really proposed. The proposed major source of Russian KIA and casualties is the Northern offensive, which I fully believe was Russias highest losses. However, during the same time Russia completely encircled and destroyed or captured the garrison of Mariupol as well as significant troops that fell back to Mariupol. Ukraine conducted a lot of harassment and ambushes, but they had no operation like encircling an entire Russian army group and its fairly standard military theory that encirclement is easily an order of magnitude higher loss than retreat.

Retreat sounds bad, but it's far better to retreat than find yourself encircled and besieged.

And if you want something "Western Media", the Washington Post report on casualties in these recent offensives if not bleak, certainly doesn't give the impression Russian's are suffering more losses in these engagements:

A clear picture of Ukraine’s losses could not be independently assessed.

Denys, sitting upright on his hospital bed, said almost every member of his 120-person unit was injured, though only two were killed.

A 25-year-old soldier being treated for shrapnel wounds said that, within his unit of 100 soldiers, seven were killed and 20 injured. Ihor, the platoon commander, said 16 of the 32 men under his command were injured and one was killed.

[...]

“We lost five people for every one they did,” said Ihor, a 30-year-old platoon commander who injured his back when the tank he was riding in crashed into a ditch.

[..]

Russian tanks emerged from newly built cement fortifications to blast infantry with large-caliber artillery, the wounded Ukrainian soldiers said. The vehicles would then shrink back beneath the concrete shelters, shielded from mortar and rocket fire.

Counter-battery radar systems automatically detected and located Ukrainians who were targeting the Russians with projectiles, unleashing a barrage of artillery fire in response.

Russian hacking tools hijacked the drones of Ukrainian operators, who saw their aircraft drift away helplessly behind enemy lines. — Wounded Ukrainian soldiers reveal steep toll of Kherson offensive - Washington Post

Everyone? You're literally debating right now the issue with 3 other interlocutors who disagree. — boethius

I wasn’t talking about anonymous keyboard warriors of course. I meant credible public sources.

That is not a sign of military incompetence. The issue of whether it was politically wise, — boethius

The two ain’t exactly mutually exclusive. Indeed they are evidence that a kleptocracy now getting sentimental about lost imperial promise is a generally incompetent structural setting.

If you read the analysis cited, what actual experts believed before the war was that an invasion would be costly, involving thousands KIA and significant armour and airframe losses. — boethius

That is true. And it is also true that the degree of military incompetence was a surprise to these same analysts. Indeed a happy bonus from a hawkish US perspective as it created the chance to mire Russia in its own backyard Afghanistan.

Putin’s ineptitude looks to be delivering the US’s every defence policy wish. NATO expanded overnight. Russian oil gone. Putinism destined to die the death of a thousand cuts.

All they have to avoid now is nuclear escalation and the US finally wins biggly in a proxy war.

However, we're now at a point in the war where Ukraine has lost all of its initial tank stock and is now nearing critical depletion of all the Soviet tanks NATO could scrounge up and send. — boethius

But the Russian collapse is delivering more tanks and ammo to the Ukrainians in a few weeks than the west supplied in seven months. Of course the quality isn’t so great. But you know. Russian incompetence. :confused:

This was a feint, remember? Your story was there was no intended future use at all. Kyiv was a ruse to fix Ukrainian forces who might otherwise head for the Donbas. — apokrisis

I would like to reassert my previous point that arguments about the intentions of the Hostumel operation are not evidence for or against a 'feint'.

An argument for the 'feint' needs an identification of the forces who would have headed east if not held at Kiev. No such identification has been provided. My attempts to find sources on this point have yielded nothing so far.

The use of airborne forces does suggest it was part of a particular plan. On the other hand, the Russians have demonstrated so many bad tactical practices, easily confirmed by the ubiquitous explosions of tightly grouped armor vehicles, that arguing that another tactic is incomprehensively stupid is no guarantee that it was not attempted.

I don't know, linking to a source that says it does not know does not inculcate confidence.

I couldn’t follow your reasoning there.

A competent feint would be as convincing as possible while consuming as little men and material as possible.

Now if there were credible evidence that the Russians were happy to sacrifice the paratroops to a mock “airbridge” operation, then sure. We could start to take that more seriously. But detailed accounts of the assault give good reason for why the follow up landings of a heavier force had to be hastily cancelled, even while the transports were in the air.

What caps it for me is the ludicrous way Russia propaganda still had to pretend a successful airbridge operation took place. It seems that this brave and bold image of Russian competence was so important to morale that it had to be faked for domestic consumption.

Oh the ever compounding irony.

I figure future accounts will confirm your view. All airborne infantry missions are very risky. Many have failed.

Until that time when more has been revealed, Tzeentch's argument amounts to saying nobody could be that stupid to try it. And when that becomes the measure of what is conceivable or not, we are forced to compare that action with other actions and notice that a lot of those other tactics are stupid.

:up:

Putin's moves already prove why Ukraine wanted to join NATO - limiting free Kremlin movement/action.
EU relations/membership is another matter (though subject to Putin's rhetoric just the same).

Finding (ad hoc) fault at everyone is easy enough, and is a distraction, a diversion.

A self-determining Ukraine wasn't in Putin's cards.

Standard procedures are underway ... Sep 13, 2022; Sep 14, 2022

so this move?

so, your proposed "solution" to your question is to cease the foreign aid to Ukraine and see what happens — jorndoe

You already know it isn't. I am and always have been in favour of negotiations mediated by a third party with some meaningful power (the US, Europe, or UN). I think that such negotiations should consider the ceding of territory to Russia (on the grounds that I've previously explained - who has sovereignty over what is not a humanitarian consideration and so should be irrelevant to that third party, only the swiftest cessation of violence is a priority)

The fact that the West are financing this war in its entirety means that they can pull the plug any time. As such they can force Ukraine to the negotiating table. They have no such power over Russia, which is why it is so recklessly callous to turn down the rare offers Russia has made in that direction.

We are now in a worse situation than we were before when Russia first offered its four demands. Thousands more a dead, and instead of an independent Donbas, Russia are now annexing it, making it even harder to win back because Russia can leverage a set of weapons they couldn't before under the guise of a 'Special Operation'.

The same thing has happened here as happened with other cause célèbre in the recent past. Powerful interest groups have done what they always do - lobby as hard as they can to get their interests satisfied by policy. What none of them are equipped for is the power that social media gives them to achieve their goals. It's like pushing really hard on a door you expect to be jammed only to find it wide open. You tend to go barrelling through at a pace you didn't anticipate.

The arms industry lobby as hard has they can for a drip feed of weapons to a 'forever war' somewhere offshore, that's their ideal. They expect to have to fight hard for that against a media and a populace who are naturally resistant to such a horrific notion so they push their message through those channels as hard as they can - only nowadays, that message gets amplified by social media algorithms rather than suppressed, so a hard push becomes a tidal wave and here we are - they've got their 'forever war' to a truly horrific degree that I suspect even they didn't expect.

It's honestly bizarre your insistence on Russian military incompetence. — boethius

I believe this issue stems from something I've tried to address before.

It seems a lot of western military experts had a terribly inflated view of the Russian military prior to the invasion. Western academic sources were linked in this thread, claiming Ukraine would stand no chance and that Kiev would fall in a matter of hours.

Probably these sources also underestimated the extent of military aid that Ukraine has received from the United States, turning their military into a respectable force.


If one assumes the invasion would be a one-sided landslide and then sees the Russian military having to fight for every region they occupy, then one may easily chalk that up to Russian incompetence, instead of reconsidering their own conception of the balance of power.


Even as the actual situation began to unfold, western analysts in their analysis of Russian actions implicitly assumed that the Kremlin shared their inflated view of the Russian military. That's why they assume the Russians went into this war intending to invade all of Ukraine, conquering Kiev, etc.

What we know of the Russian force composition and their actions to date seems to imply the opposite. That the Russians aimed for a limited war with the south of Ukraine as its initial goal.

US support for Ukraine has been official US policy since at least January of 2021. Covert support has probably started around the invasion of Crimea. The Russians knew they were going up against a US trained, US armed force, yet they started the war outnumbered by roughly ~50,000 men. That speaks volumes. 200,000 men are not going to occupy all of Ukraine fighting outnumbered against a capable opponent, nor did they have the manpower to spare to occupy and hold Kiev while simultaneously securing strategic areas in the south.

Further, the fact that they managed to go on the offensive while outnumbered implies that they are not incompetent. To state as much would be a harsh insult to the Ukrainian military. After all, if the Russians are so incompetent then why weren't the Ukrainian forces able to defend against them when they had a numerical superiority on the battlefield?


These are simple, rational arguments based on contemporary military logic, in light of which much of the popular narratives can be dismissed outright.

These are simple, rational arguments based on contemporary military logic, in light of which much of the popular narratives can be dismissed outright. — Tzeentch

If the army had been so competent, why has Putin fired so many of his generals?

Far from bestowing glory on Russia’s military brass, the war in Ukraine is proving toxic for top commanders, with at least eight generals fired, reassigned or otherwise sidelined since the start of the invasion on Feb. 24.

After a long string of failures and few significant victories, the knives now seem to be out for Russian generals, amid criticism from prominent Russian military correspondents, state television propagandists and even members of the normally obedient parliament.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/10/07/russia-military-commanders-dismissed-war/

You've been mouthing off a little too much.

We'll continue our conversation as soon as you elaborate on your ideas about cruise missile SEAD strikes.

Take the stage, bud. We're all ears.

Interesting account of why Hostomel went so wrong. Imagine being a paratrooper and only discovering you are being dropped into a war zone as you are choppering in.

Stuck in a foxhole for three days on the edge of a runway as the second wave couldn’t land and no equipment arriving until ground forces showed up. Only survivor in his platoon.

However, there is also another big military difference in that Finland does not host any Russian naval bases, whereas Ukraine hosted one of Russia's most important ports.
There is a lot of pretty common sense reasons Russia would view Ukraine in NATO as a major threat to its security, which has no parallel with Finland. Of course, "never say never" but I seriously doubt anyone in Russia, Finland or the whole NATO seriously believes in any conflict between Finland and Russia, with or without Finland in NATO. — boethius

However correct, your argument is far from being conclusive for 2 strong reasons: 1. if Crimea was the issue, Russia could have clearly stated that the problem is not NATO expansion, but the control over Crimea. Talking generically about NATO expansion and Russophobia (think about Russian minorities in Baltic Regions), signals generic aspirations over territories and people Russia perceives as “theirs”, no matter what NATO countries have to say. 2. Finland and Sweden inside NATO and militarisation are relevant for the control of the Baltic Sea which is of unquestionable strategic importance (https://dgap.org/en/research/publications/russias-strategic-interests-and-actions-baltic-region). And evidently in line with Russian expansion trends (under Putin) to encircle Europe, given Russian militar and threatening presence in north Africa, in the Mediterranean Sea (bridged by the control over the Black Sea) and Baltic Sea (see Kaliningrad). Besides Russian aren’t certainly short on pretexts or motivations hostile to the West (see the wild resentment and grievances against the West exposed in their State TV).

For now. Things can change. Now, if you say this is one negative for now, then we agree. — boethius

Things can change, but the blow to Russian national pride hurts now in this world, not in possible future world.

So, if Russia is confident that Ukraine cannot sustain this offensive, then the greater the despair the greater the catharsis and euphoria when the tide is reversed. And such an observation is not "copium" but psychology 101 and hinges on the "if" statement. If Ukrainian gains are sustainable then the greater the despair the greater pressure to start use tactical nuclear weapons or justify some other policy shift. — boethius

Propaganda is not for free, it has its material and human costs and its unintended consequences. So I wouldn’t bet much on Russian masterminding Western propaganda at this scale of confrontation on a world stage. Besides since the bites of humiliation are entering national TV in Russia, we can no longer consider it just “Western” propaganda. The usage of nuclear weapons will be a further confirmation of Russian weakness because it will mean that Russia didn’t prove capable of defeating Ukraine backed by Westerners on conventional war grounds.

"last word" so to speak (only in Russia). — boethius

The more Russians are mobilized to the war or flee from Russia and sactions+economic recession bite, the more Putin’s last word risks to fade away (inside and outside his circle), if military performance on the battle field proves to be as poor as it was so far.

Most importantly, even the Western media is forced at some point to recognise Russia is "winning" if they clearly are. This was what was happening before these offensives. Ukraine was "resisting" heroically around Kiev and the withdraw from the North was a huge victory for Ukraine and Embarrassment for Russia, war crimes rinse repeat, but after some time even the Western media had to recognise that Russia was winning, especially after Ukraine retreat from major centres like Donetsk. — boethius

Your speculation has some merits, but in so far as it’s a broad and one-sided prospect of possible future scenarios not only it has little chance to weigh in the decision process of Western governments, but it should not weigh even in the decision process of ordinary people, precisely because the lesson for anti-Western forces (Russian and beyond) would be that broadly assessed possible future threats (no matter how likely) would be enough to persuade Western general public to recoil and question their governments’ decisions.

The argument that this war is finally the "kick in the arse" Europe needed to transition to renewables all along, is not a good argument, it simply establishes we have been led by traitors to European citizens and all of humanity and all life all this time. — boethius

Putin and China are questioning the West-backed world order. The West must respond to that threat with determination. That’s why Putin unilateral aggression must fail in a way however that is instrumental to the West-backed world order. If this war is not just between Russia and Ukraine, then it’s not even just between the US and Russia, it’s between whoever wants to weigh in in establishing the new world order, either by backing the US or by backing Russia.

Further, the difference between Sweden, Finland and Ukraine should be obvious. Sweden and Finland have no strategic relevance to Russia at all, while Ukraine is the most important region for Russia outside of Russia proper. — Tzeentch

Same response:

However correct, your argument is far from being conclusive for 2 strong reasons: 1. if Crimea was the issue, Russia could have clearly stated that the problem is not NATO expansion, but the control over Crimea. Talking generically about NATO expansion and Russophobia (think about Russian minorities in Baltic Regions), signals generic aspirations over territories and people Russia perceives as “theirs”, no matter what NATO countries have to say. 2. Finland and Sweden inside NATO and militarisation are relevant for the control of the Baltic Sea which is of unquestionable strategic importance (https://dgap.org/en/research/publications/russias-strategic-interests-and-actions-baltic-region). And evidently in line with Russian expansion trends (under Putin) to encircle Europe, given Russian militar and threatening presence in north Africa, in the Mediterranean Sea (bridged by the control over the Black Sea) and Baltic Sea (see Kaliningrad). Besides Russian aren’t certainly short on pretexts or motivations hostile to the West (see the wild resentment and grievances against the West exposed in their State TV). — neomac

However correct, your argument is far from being conclusive... — neomac

Just so we're clear, I don't pretend to have conclusive arguments. Observers like us are probably only seeing half the picture, and the best we can do is make educated guesses.

1. if Crimea was the issue, Russia could have clearly stated that the problem is not NATO expansion, but the control over Crimea. — neomac

Crimea only becomes a problem as a result of NATO expansion. With a neutral Ukraine, there is no threat of Crimea being cut off, since they'd have to be crazy to try it.

With Ukraine in NATO however, Ukraine becomes a potential pawn in a NATO-Russia power struggle.

As I stated in my last reply to you, NATO expansion in general is an issue to Russia. How could it not be? It is essentially an anti-Russian alliance.

2. Finland and Sweden inside NATO and militarisation are relevant for the control of the Baltic Sea which is of unquestionable strategic importance. — neomac

Strategically, economically and geopolitically, yes.

However the Russian position in the Baltic Sea is extremely fragile in case of war. The Gulf of Finland, and especially the Danish straits are too easily blocked, which is why any breakout into the Atlantic has historically been planned through the Norwegian Sea and the GIUK-gap. This is also why the main naval base of the Northern Fleet is located in Severomorsk (and not for example St. Petersburg or Kaliningrad).

In other words, in a military conflict with NATO, the Baltic Sea would play a secondary role. NATO's position there is simply too dominant.

I wasn’t talking about anonymous keyboard warriors of course. I meant credible public sources. — apokrisis

So by "everyone" you actually mean "not-everyone".

The two ain’t exactly mutually exclusive. Indeed they are evidence that a kleptocracy now getting sentimental about lost imperial promise is a generally incompetent structural setting. — apokrisis

The point was that successfully invading, occupying, pacifying 20%, and defending of Ukraine is not military incompetence. Even if Russian losses were greater, that would be expected in an offensive operation.

The domestic political and geopolitical wisdom and ultimate outcome is a different matter. However, Russia has not collapsed internally, has survived sanctions, and has maintained its "friendships" so I fail to see any incompetence on those levels either.

Of course, competence does not necessitate victory. Two competent attorney's can go head-to-head or two competent football teams or two competent mountain goats, and one side still may win and the other may lose.

That is true. And it is also true that the degree of military incompetence was a surprise to these same analysts. Indeed a happy bonus from a hawkish US perspective as it created the chance to mire Russia in its own backyard Afghanistan. — apokrisis

Can you cite any of these analysts claiming Russia military is incompetent?

From what I've read, Western analysts were surprised that Russia did not employ Western shock and awe tactics and blowup Ukrainian civilian infrastructure on day one, in particular the power and communications and keep those turned off, as that's what NATO would do, nor did Russia "take the gloves off" even after it was clear Ukraine would not capitulate.



Here's an interview of Michael Kofman, a pretty respected analyst of the Russian military.

He gives a slight edge to Ukraine on the long term war prospects, but that is contingent on continued Western support (economic, arms, intelligence etc.). Likewise, basic view of the current situation is exactly the same as mine, that what matters in these recent offensives is sustainability.

Putin’s ineptitude looks to be delivering the US’s every defence policy wish. NATO expanded overnight. — apokrisis

The expansion of NATO is a "wish" in order to sell more arms for the US arms industry.

More members has both pros and cons. Being a consensus driven organisation even a few dissenting members can cause serious problems (as a tool of US foreign policy).

The fact we're discussing NATO expansion ... when Finland Sweden aren't even in NATO yet, due to Turkey using it as leverage, underscores this point.

As for what Russia clearly actually cares about, Ukraine in NATO, even Zelensky has admitted NATO told him that would never happen, but there would be a public position that the door is open ... but the private position is never.

Russian oil gone. Putinism destined to die the death of a thousand cuts. — apokrisis

Russian oil is not gone, it's going to China and India and decrease in any flows has been mostly compensated by increased in increase in price.

All they have to avoid now is nuclear escalation and the US finally wins biggly in a proxy war. — apokrisis

For sure, in terms of relative power dynamic with their main geopolitical competitor (Europe) US has won, but this may turn out to be at the cost of helping other competitors such as China, if not also Russia in the long term as well.

European economic turmoil increases Russia's regional influence, not decrease it.

But the Russian collapse is delivering more tanks and ammo to the Ukrainians in a few weeks than the west supplied in seven months. Of course the quality isn’t so great. But you know. Russian incompetence. — apokrisis

Stop for a moment to reflect on what that would mean if it was even true.

If relatively small gains on a small and least defended regions of the front have resupplied Ukraine with more ammunition and tanks than it has gotten from the West in 7 months, it would stand to reason that what Russia has on the entire front, rear area and reserves is several orders of magnitude greater and Ukraine is doomed in any sort of war of attrition.

If Western zeal and support cannot match what Russia leaves behind no relatively small areas of the front, that is a not a "good thing" for Ukraine.