However correct, your argument is far from being conclusive for 2 strong reasons: — neomac

I never said it was conclusive. I literally state in my argument that "never say never" there's just no actual evidence now that Finland and Sweden in NATO matters.

If you assume Finland will never actually invade Russia, host nuclear missiles, or host a NATO invasion force, then Finland in NATO is easily a net positive for the Kremlin and it just as easily plays as a security threat for Russia (thousands of kilometres of border with NATO) as it does in the West ... without actually being a threat requiring any investment to deal with than what is already there.

Things can change, but the blow to Russian national pride hurts now in this world, not in possible future world. — neomac

People do plan ahead you know. In these recent offensives there are material and troops costs to Ukraine and territory gained and large propaganda value. If the costs in material and troops are high enough, then the propaganda value is tolerable.

The "negative" press also served as justification for Russian partial mobilisation. Of course, that has a political cost but will have a military benefit.

We'll see how things play out. My assumption is Russia's basic plan is to see what affect the winter has on both Ukraine and the EU in terms of appetite for more war; the severity of the winter will also be a major factor.

Propaganda is not for free, it has its material and human costs and its unintended consequences. So I wouldn’t bet much on Russian masterminding Western propaganda at this scale of confrontation on a world stage. — neomac

What's with this obsession with any explanation of Russia actions other than "irrational" means the idea is some mastermind genius level ploy.

And if your only argument is propaganda has unintended propaganda ... all we hear from Ukraine is propaganda, what they want us to see, only negative things about Russia and very little transparency about their own losses, logistics problems, capability limitations, and so on.

You don't need to be a "mastermind" to know that when your opponent is running their mouth and talking shit and making promises they can't keep, that if you know the situation will reveres itself that there's no reason to talk back. It is even more embarrassing later for the party talking shite, and a confidence builder to your own crew to just say nothing, if of course things do indeed reverse later.

Honestly, I feel a lot of people say they've gone to basic "school of the street", but that sort of scholarship often seems to be lacking in these kinds of conversations.

The more Russians are mobilized to the war or flee from Russia and sactions+economic recession bite, the more Putin’s last word risks to fade away (inside and outside his circle), if military performance on the battle field proves to be as poor as it was so far. — neomac

Sure, we'll see what happens. A lot of people who leave in a panic return, a lot of people keep working at a distance, and a lot of services can be done at distance nowadays.

I'm honestly not convinced about these economic factors being all that significant. Russia state gets most of its revenue from fossil fuels, not taxing a tech based economic base.

Your speculation has some merits, — neomac

It's not speculation, it's literally what was happening during the summer as Russia took key towns and made gains, even Western media was forced to describe this as "winning".

Now Ukraine has taken ground, it's euphoric Ukraine is "winning", but if the tides turn again, may take time, but reluctantly Western media can't deny facts on the ground indefinitely.

but in so far as it’s a broad and one-sided prospect of possible future scenarios not only it has little chance to weigh in the decision process of Western governments, but it should not weigh even in the decision process of ordinary people, precisely because the lesson for anti-Western forces (Russian and beyond) would be that broadly assessed possible future threats (no matter how likely) would be enough to persuade Western general public to recoil and question their governments’ decisions. — neomac

I'm not sure what you thought I was arguing, but my point was simply that all the negative press today can turn positive tomorrow if gains start to reverse. That a lot hinges on whether recent Ukrainian gains are sustainable or not. If Ukrainians gains aren't sustainable then they burn out, the front stabilises as a consequence.

As a general principle, however, definitely decisions should be based on what's likely to happen in the future. I fail to understand how that wouldn't apply here. I drink water because it's likely to keep me alive (in the future), and I avoid falling off high structures as it's likely to get me killed (in the future), even putting aside exceptions, the basic decision making process is what's likely to happen in the future.

Putin and China are questioning the West-backed world order. The West must respond to that threat with determination. That’s why Putin unilateral aggression must fail in a way however that is instrumental to the West-backed world order. If this war is not just between Russia and Ukraine, then it’s not even just between the US and Russia, it’s between whoever wants to weigh in in establishing the new world order, either by backing the US or by backing Russia. — neomac

We agree that with the premise that Putin and China are questioning the West-backed world order.

However, it is of course up to debate what the West "must do".

In my view, the US / NATO actions (even if Russia retreats) are already a disaster for their geopolitical position.

The US, and the West in general, post-WWII, were (in my opinion) a very much soft power based imperialism centred around "peace keeping".

Brokering a deal with the Russias would have maintained that soft-power privileged position and the soft-power leverage over Russia in gas revenues, and the prosperity of America's "partners".

Everything Western media points to as "bad for Russia" and "good for NATO" is extremely simplistic view of things.

Geopolitically, my view of things, is this action by Russia is rearguard action for China's rise as a economic and geopolitical equal to the US (obviously with different strengths and weaknesses), and in such a scenario having Europe as a relevant and going concern with economic ties (aka. leverage) to Russia is a major difference to the current situation.

The US, at the end of the day, is not a conquering based Empire and its military is therefore nearly by definition not the basis of US imperialism.

US power was based on maintaining the global economic framework, and fracturing the global economic system (in my view) is a blow to American power that is foolish to underestimate.

As I stated in my last reply to you, NATO expansion in general is an issue to Russia. How could it not be? It is essentially an anti-Russian alliance. — Tzeentch

It's amazing how people can fail to grasp this basic fact.

Another smoking accident has happened, this time on the Kerch bridge.

Personally I think the notion of human rights is a good starting point. — Isaac

OK let’s do a step forward and ask: where do you think human rights are better supported: in Western countries (e.g. the US, the UK, Germany, France) or in the countries hostile to the West (Russia, China, North Corea, Iran)?
I think Western countries have institutions that support human rights within their territory (certainly for their citizens) better than in countries hostile to the West, no matter how imperfect and corrupt. And for that reason I personally would prefer to live in the US, the UK, Germany and France, than in Russia, China, North Corea and Iran, even if I were to be materially richer in the last non-Western countries, then I would be by living in some Western country. Therefore I’m open to share the standard of life I’m experiencing in the West with those people who are open to share this standard of life cooperatively.

The intention is not to 'prove' it. — Isaac

All the worse. If you set challenges to others (“as compassionate outsiders, our concern should solely be for the well-being of the people there”) which look grounded on unrealistic expectations about how we human individually or collectively can act, your challenges doesn’t sound that compelling.

States ought to be concerned with the welfare of all humans the interact with, as should anyone. I think nationalism is a cancer on human societies. — Isaac

It’s irrelevant what you think States ought to be, a realist view is about how States actually act in the geopolitical arena. I also think that Russian ought to respect international law and withdraw from Ukraine all together and the US or NATO didn’t do anything illegal from an international law point of view to support Ukraine (and certainly nothing as criminal as Russian aggression and annexation of Ukrainian territory), but then you can claim that according to a realist point of view Russia perceived NATO expansion as a threat to national security and therefore they would have reacted accordingly no matter the costs. And again, according to a realist point of view, no States can act compassionately in the way you prescribe as “concern should solely be for the well-being of the people there”. Additionally, while I can see how enforcing a certain international legal order can be within the means of great powers, I hardly see how great powers can enforce people to be “solely concerned for the well-being of the people there” as compassionate outsiders.

Yes. But it doesn't matter which. No-one is contemplating leaving Donbas as no-man's land. — Isaac

Yes it does. Because depending on the context there are political elites one can trust more or less for being up to the task.

in favour of negotiations — Isaac

That'd be great.

talks, diplomacy, more transparency, more bona fides signs

I doubt negotiations would be accompanied by a cease-fire, though. Doing so would give whatever parties room to replenish, settle, impose, prepare, etc, instead of bona fides peace. We've seen/heard plenty bullshit already. Diplomacy would likely have to be in parallel.

What the Ukrainians want has come up a few times - for the invaders to quit the bombing killing ruinage and leave. What Putin wants isn't quite clear - a demilitarized zone has been mentioned, shams, removal of Ukrainian culture and self-determination have been observed, down to elementary school (in some ways by the same playbook as the "Uyghur [cultural] genocide").

Would a neutral Ukraine be acceptable? As it stands, I'm guessing not acceptable to Putin. Otherwise I'm guessing yes.

^{• On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians (Vladimir Putin; Jul 12, 2021)
• Moscow's ethno-cultural war (Vladimir Rozanskij; Apr 12, 2022)
• Putin Aims to Triumph in Battle for ‘Cultural Supremacy’ (Bloomberg; Sep 6, 2022)
• Putin Is Trying to Turn Ukraine Into a Culture War (Lionel Beehner, Thomas Sherlock; Sep 9, 2022)}

Misc recent briefs ...

^{• Zelenskyy on 'impossible' talks with Putin (Oct 4, 2022)
• Ukraine regains control over Russian occupied areas (Oct 7, 2022)}

Another smoking accident has happened, this time on the Kerch bridge. — Paine

They pulled the "terrorist" card out. :D Not surprising I guess, though a bit of pretense goes into that.

Just so we're clear, I don't pretend to have conclusive arguments. Observers like us are probably only seeing half the picture, and the best we can do is make educated guesses. — Tzeentch

We can still discuss why your argument is not conclusive based on educated guesses. Hence my comment.

As I stated in my last reply to you, NATO expansion in general is an issue to Russia. How could it not be? It is essentially an anti-Russian alliance. — Tzeentch

Then there is no way to downplay the importance of having Sweden and Finland in NATO as Putin tried to do. And again, NATO's mission was essentially an anti-Russian alliance, but this alliance's objectives can be revised or replaced according to the current security global challenges (https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2022/06/29/national/japan-nato-china/).

Crimea only becomes a problem as a result of NATO expansion. With a neutral Ukraine, there is no threat of Crimea being cut off, since they'd have to be crazy to try it. — Tzeentch

As much as Sweden and Finland only become a problem as a result of NATO expansion.

In other words, if Russian (or anti-NATO) propaganda states that NATO expansion at the expense of Russian sphere of influence is an issue, then also Sweden and Finland entering NATO is an issue for Russian (or anti-NATO) propaganda.
If Russian (or anti-NATO) propaganda states that “denazifying” Ukraine means regime change and this is not what is happening, then this is an issue for Russian (or anti-NATO) propaganda.
If Russian (or anti-NATO) propaganda states that “neutral” Ukraine means Ukraine not in NATO, then increasing the likelihood for Ukraine to enter NATO is an issue for Russian (or anti-NATO) propaganda.
If Russian (or anti-NATO) propaganda states that Russia is just a special operation that will last days not months, but duration and Russian mobilization contradict this, then this is a problem for Russian (or anti-NATO) propaganda.
If Russian (or anti-NATO) propaganda states that Russia is the second strongest military in the world, but it performs as poorly as they did up to now, then this a problem for the Russian (or anti-NATO) propaganda.

The more you nuance or rephrase the Russians' stated reasons and objectives to match what Russians could actually achieve so far, the more overblown the Russian (or anti-NATO) propaganda sounds.

Then there is no way to downplay the importance of having Sweden and Finland in NATO as Putin tried to do. — neomac

The Scandinavian countries have been part of mutual defense agreements for over a decade, so what exactly do you believe has changed that would make this so significant?

As much as Sweden and Finland only become a problem as a result of NATO expansion. — neomac

What I tried to make clear to you is that the poor position of Russia in the Baltic Sea is a fact with or without Sweden and Finland, and as such, whether they're part of NATO or not isn't a major factor in anything.

Likely the Russians have been downplaying it because it was in the line of expectations.

The more you nuance or rephrase the Russians' stated reasons and objectives to match what Russians could actually achieve so far, the more overblown the Russian (or anti-NATO) propaganda sounds. — neomac

I don't know what else you'd expect from propaganda. My advice would be, don't watch it, whether it's Russian or western propaganda.

I never said it was conclusive. I literally state in my argument that "never say never" there's just no actual evidence now that Finland and Sweden in NATO matters. — boethius

I never said you said it was conclusive. As long as you keep reasoning with one-sided hypothetical future scenarios I expose my counter-arguments. What kind of actual evidence are you looking for? How come you ask me for actual evidence when you content yourself to hypothesize future scenarios? How come you say "never say never" and one line later you write "If you assume Finland will never actually invade Russia" ? Finally, the way I see it: the problem is not Finland expanding in Russia, but Russia expanding in Baltic sea.

The "negative" press also served as justification for Russian partial mobilisation. Of course, that has a political cost but will have a military benefit. — boethius

"negative" press is shitty justification then: a "special operation" shouldn't have required such a mobilization, and how calling Russian general idiots or claiming "Moscow should consider the use of low-intensity nuclear weapons in Ukraine given the recent setbacks it has suffered on the battlefield", can justify throwing in there more Russian soldiers in the battlefield is hardly understandable.

I'm not sure what you thought I was arguing, but my point was simply that all the negative press today can turn positive tomorrow if gains start to reverse. That a lot hinges on whether recent Ukrainian gains are sustainable or not. If Ukrainians gains aren't sustainable then they burn out, the front stabilises as a consequence.
As a general principle, however, definitely decisions should be based on what's likely to happen in the future. I fail to understand how that wouldn't apply here. I drink water because it's likely to keep me alive (in the future), and I avoid falling off high structures as it's likely to get me killed (in the future), even putting aside exceptions, the basic decision making process is what's likely to happen in the future. — boethius

OK then take your time to quantify the "likelihood" of all your ifs in your previous couple of comments.

The US, and the West in general, post-WWII, were (in my opinion) a very much soft power based imperialism centred around "peace keeping".
Brokering a deal with the Russias would have maintained that soft-power privileged position and the soft-power leverage over Russia in gas revenues, and the prosperity of America's "partners". — boethius

All right. Now that the toy is broken, what would be the best course of action by the West according to your possible future scenarios? What is their likelihood? What are your actual evidences to support them?

An adviser to Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskiy posted a message on Twitter saying the explosion which damaged Russia*s road-and-rail bridge to Crimea was just “the beginning”.

“Everything illegal must be destroyed, everything that is stolen must be returned to Ukraine, everything occupied by Russia must be expelled,” Mykhailo Podolyak wrote.

He told Reuters he believed the blast had been arranged by Russia, although he did not say how he knew.

“This is a concrete manifestation of the conflict between the FSB (intelligence service) and (private military companies) on the one hand and the Ministry of Defence/General Staff of the Russian Federation on the other,” he said.

https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2022/oct/08/russia-ukraine-war-live-news-fire-engulfs-part-of-kerch-bridge-between-crimea-and-russia#top-of-blog

Any other offers on who done the bridge? It does look like, and is claimed to be, a truck bomb. In which case it is most probably be Crimean resistance or some Russian faction. Can we expect more?

Zelenskiy is a fucking legend and will be found in the annals of history as one; poutine is just another shitheel tyrant destined to be flayed in the underworld.

The Russian army has announced on its Telegram account (where else?) that it has replaced the commander of the SMO. It can mean only one thing: that the previous top commander (whose name was not made public) was found fearsomely efficient.

The new commander in Ukraine is Army General Sergei Surovikin. At 55, is a veteran of the civil war in Tajikistan in the 1990s, the second Chechen war in the 2000s and the Russian intervention in Syria launched in 2015. Until now, he led the group of "Southern" forces in Ukraine, according to a Russian ministry report from July.

The latter ruling was later controversially revised, but this was no common-law holiday camp. — Baden

Thanks for the correction, Baden.

The fact that you don't know this speak volumes about your biases. — Isaac

Learn what prior to means. And then correct your own biases.

Another smoking accident has happened, this time on the Kerch bridge. — Paine

The rail line is extremely important to Russian logistics. Russian supplies depend on rail. Seems that it is quite repairable.

What kind of actual evidence are you looking for? — neomac

Again with switching the burden of proof. The claim, mentioned many times here on this forum and for months in Western media, is that Finland and Sweden joining NATO is some major strategic blow to Russia. If people want to support this claim, they should have evidence for it.

How come you ask me for actual evidence when you content yourself to hypothesize future scenarios? — neomac

I've posted lot's of evidence in the course of this discussion to support the claims I've been making. However, if someone makes an unsupported claim then it is quite usual to ask the evidence for it.

How come you say "never say never" — neomac

Obviously because something no one expects may happen in the future, maybe Finnish politics radically changes and becomes convinced invading Russia is necessary or there is some calamity and a general free-for-all.

one line later you write "If you assume Finland will never actually invade Russia" — neomac

Because people maybe assuming that. It both may describe what people in the Kremlin and NATO for that matter actually think, but it's also simply another way to express risk.

For example: assuming this water is not poison then it may satiate my thirst. Now, if there's evidence the water is poison then what follows would be weighing the probabilities and consequences. If there's no evidence the water is poison then it is simply a true statement but nothing really to evaluate risk on; sure, it "could be poison" even if I have zero reason to believe that, but I'm assuming it's not and so I drink. Likewise, if the Kremlin is assuming that Finland in NATO doesn't change the security situation (as Finland is a stable country unlikely to invade Russia or change it's current defence policies much anyways) then it may explain that the Kremlin has taken little action over it.

"negative" press is shitty justification then: a "special operation" shouldn't have required such a mobilization, and how calling Russian general idiots or claiming — neomac

Why would Russia mobilise if press was fantastic?

and how calling Russian general idiots or claiming "Moscow should consider the use of low-intensity nuclear weapons in Ukraine given the recent setbacks it has suffered on the battlefield", can justify throwing in there more Russian soldiers in the battlefield is hardly understandable. — neomac

Obviously they are doing so and obviously they are justifying doing so due to the recent setbacks resulting in bad press people can see.

I'm describing a factual chain of events.

OK then take your time to quantify the "likelihood" of all your ifs in your previous couple of comments. — neomac

Again, the burden of proof is on people, here and elsewhere, claiming that these recent Ukrainian offensives resulting in positive press coverage in the West and usually focusing on the key word "humiliation" to describe Russia, is something that matters.

When a claim is made without supporting evidence, outlining the alternatives is a good way to try to either solicit the evidence (why they think their proposal is more likely) or then highlight that the proposal has no supporting evidence at all.

Furthermore, in these sorts of events it does not follow that we can assume each possibility is equally likely. When it comes to nation states, they are fairly resilient to collapse (actually rarely happens) and do not have a tendency to spontaneously collapse, in particular due to bad foreign press. So there's a fairly high burden of proof if you want to argue that things are different than usual, and bad Western press and social media really may bring down the Russian state somehow.

So, what I find likely is that the negative press at the moment does not matter much, the war is not waged on social media, and if the Ukrainian offensive is not sustainable then successful Russian offensives later will once again swing the mood-pendulum in another direction. Of course, the war maybe far from over even then.

All right. Now that the toy is broken, what would be the best course of action by the West according to your possible future scenarios? What is their likelihood? What are your actual evidences to support them? — neomac

For myself, I cafe little for nation states, my view of nationalism is that it is an ersatz sense of identity for the lost and bewildered, frightened and alone.

Indeed, the bigger the country one feels apart of the more lonely you can be as the larger a void can be filled.

However, let us say you wanted to preserve Western preeminence, which is what I understand your "what would be the best course of action by the West":

A few basic facts are required to understand first.

To start, the entire premise that buying Russian gas is financing "Russia's war machine" is a simplistic view of things. The foundational assumption of "liberalism" is that economic exchange reduces the reasons for and intensity of war; and assumption that seems to have been demonstrated in the war being intimately connected to the Nord Stream pipelines, and severe sanctions causing a complete diplomatic schism leading to global economic schism.

So, in starting to wage economic war (reason to prevent Germany from approving Nord Stream 2 being US can sell EU gas now with fracking and LNG), rebuking economic exchange as a foundation of peace (at least between the major nations that can defend their interests to some extent in the system), we are in fact witnessing, I would argue, the cannibalisation of the values and premises the Western way of doing things is based on.

Russia has options: it can sell to China. However, it is the West that talked itself into a rhetorical corner by making parallels to WWII and a "fight on the beaches and so on" and "never surrender" in that it's simply not remotely that kind of conflict ideologically, politically, economically or militarily.

In military terms, we can't go and "defeat the Hitler/Putin" even if the entire West thought it was justified due to nuclear weapons, and Russia is not actually presenting any serious risk of invading "the West" anyways and whatever Russians believe on average or Putin represents it is not some ideology that like Naziism that challenges our own mental comforts in the West.

Economically, Russian commodities being sold to Europe is called "added value" being created in Europe, where you want to be in the value chain and essentially guaranteeing European economic dominance over Russia. Again, the US has some donors that gain short term by destroying European prosperity both in terms of war profiteering and capital gains but also in severely undermining European policies that are less destructive / profitable.

Which is the key thing to understand, that "the West" is not some monolithic entity, and US and European interests can differ and this way of ensuring US dominance in Europe is a bad thing for the whole Western enterprise. There are different political structures with different interests.

So, what should the US do? Realise its ecocidal corrupt mania is destroying the planet and placing us all in danger, including Ukrainians (far more than Russia currently is; it's unclear to me why a project that has the known consequences of potentially destroying civilisation as a whole gets a "free pass" on the genocidal mania spectrum).

What should Europe do? Ukraine of course can fight the Russians if they want, it is Ukrainian business at the end of the day. There is simply zero European interest served by pouring arms into the situation, or letting arms traverse European territory, nor any European interest served by creating this schism and antagonism with Russia.

European policies should be the same as with respect to US bombing some random place: nobody cares.

Of course, morally, neither the US nor Russia "should" extort smaller countries by force, but they both do, and after decades of the US justifying everything it does as "in our national interest! National security!" it's not suddenly a change of heart and on some purely altruistic mission in supplying arms to Ukraine.

The Churchillian propaganda overwhelmed European political discourse, but it was not in European interest to simply believe on face value. It "sounds good" to "standup to a bully" ... but if you aren't actually about to go standup to the bully and put troops in Ukraine and match your rhetoric with actions, then it is propaganda having those unintended consequences that you mention.

Now, that does not mean abandon Ukrainians (even though I think that's entirely morally acceptable: you get yourself into a war ... defending your "agency", well, go ahead and use that agency to get yourself our, go "win the war"; I do not see how it's my business as a non-Ukrainian and where I live having no interest in a war with Russia: and, to be clear, "support" without the "fighting with" part is not an alliance, the West is not "allied" with Ukraine, why Zelensky had to say "de facto" alliance in making a "rapid application" to NATO only to then be immediately humiliated by a "yeah, no" with love, from NATO).

Even if morally acceptable to stop sending arms and support to Ukraine (there is no moral principle that obliges arms shipments, and it's a truly tours-de-force of US propaganda, in service of the arms industry, to make that now some sort of moral imperative), it is not necessarily politically expedient.

What would be politically expedient is making peace with the Russians by forcing a compromise. Europe has significant leverage with both Ukraine (both negative leverage in both stop arms shipments, but block and interdict arms shipments from the US, as well as positive leverage like EU membership) and of course leverage with Russia (sanctions, stop arms shipments to Ukraine and so on). It's also in the interests of actual Ukrainians compared to more total war because it plays well on Tictoc.

For any politician who is not a complete coward, peace is not so difficult to achieve. Of course, social media will bitch about it, but then life goes on.

The Scandinavian countries have been part of mutual defense agreements for over a decade, so what exactly do you believe has changed that would make this so significant? — Tzeentch

Do you refer to them being EU members or what?

The rail line is extremely important to Russian logistics. Russian supplies depend on rail. — ssu

The whole point of the land bridge to Crimea was that there's not a single point of failure in logistics to Crimea that the actual bridge represented.

The Crimea bridge can also be repaired.

Perhaps more significantly, this invites retaliation against critical civilian infrastructure in Ukraine.

It's possible Russia simply lacks the capacity to destroy Ukrainian bridges of the Dnieper, for example, but if it has the capacity but has chosen not to do so, then tit-fot-tat is pretty usual justification for more violence. Basic point being Ukrainian forces in South-East Ukraine are more bridge dependent than is Russia, which is now directly connected.

The Scandinavian countries have been part of mutual defense agreements for over a decade, so what exactly do you believe has changed that would make this so significant? — Tzeentch

If you're referring to the Scandinavian defence union, then not really.

Do you refer to them being EU members or what? — ssu

I was wondering, too.

It took Putin's moves for Denmark, Norway, and Sweden to come together in Aug 2022 (and Sweden to partially abandon their traditional neutrality).

Apart from the usual competitiveness, the Nordics/Scandinavia have been/are fairly close - borders, culturally, neighborly, whatever - aligning defense measures closer was a result of Putin looming on the horizon.

it would stand to reason that what Russia has on the entire front, rear area and reserves is several orders of magnitude greater and Ukraine is doomed in any sort of war of attrition. — boethius

Yep. It should be no contest. But then Russian incompetence, as all the credible analysis says…

They have a lot of systemic and institutional weaknesses that had been masked because they had not operated on this scale in a really visible way, at least not for quite a while. You’d have to go back to their invasion of Georgia, in 2008, to find something approaching the scale that they’re operating at now. And that one didn’t go well.

They were showing the same kind of problems back then: this disunity of command; logistical weaknesses; poorly trained, poorly motivated, poorly led troops; very poor quality of officer corps; very poor quality of campaign design and ability to plan. They also have very poor integration within and among the armed services, including the synchronization of air and ground operations.

They made misjudgments, but also just institutionally they don’t have the capacity. What we can now see is that they simply do not have the institutional capacity to support offensive operations deep into enemy territory and aren’t able to give units supply and combat support of all kinds: artillery support, air support, air-defense support. With an already weak logistics base, it was an enormous mistake for them to chop their main offensive into four major axes that were widely geographically dispersed. They don’t have enough trucks. They don’t really have expeditionary logistics.

They were driving trucks into Ukraine that were breaking down because they were old, because there had been slipshod maintenance or no maintenance done on these vehicles and they were being operated by troops that didn’t know how to operate and maintain them. That’s why so many of these vehicles were breaking down and being left by the side of the road. That tells you all kinds of things.

It seems like one of the priorities for their modernization project was the air-defense systems, and also their precision-guided munitions—both aircraft-borne and surface-to-surface missiles—and ballistic missiles. But those all failed. You have Turkish-made U.A.V.s flying over the Russian air-defense systems and zapping them from the air—that’s not supposed to be happening. So I don’t really buy it.

Even the quality of the things that did get modernized seems like smoke and mirrors. I find it hard to swallow that they’ve been spending fifty billion, sixty billion, seventy billion dollars a year on modernizing these forces, and, after almost fifteen years of that, they didn’t get around to modernizing their T-72 tank fleet or retiring it. I think the most logical conclusion is that a large portion of that budget was evaporated in corruption.

A bad army was ordered to do something stupid. They were sending armored units just ambling down the road with no infantry screen, no reconnaissance, no air cover. And then the Ukrainians just picked them off with anti-tank weapons. It’s not surprising. The Russians took some of their supposedly élite airborne units and then had them assault toward an airfield.

They were supposed to open up the airfield so they could fly in more ground forces quickly, but their secure communications system failed on the first day. This is why they’ve been dependent on Ukrainian cell-phone towers ever since.

It looks like their officers have been promoted based on patronage as opposed to military ability. We know a lot of the names, including the guy [General Aleksandr Dvornikov] who’s been named the over-all commander now. In Syria, it looked to me like their focus was not really on effective military operations but, rather, on trying to acquire assets—trying to acquire property and revenues for themselves from the Syrian regime or from other actors—and, secondly, on using Syria as a test bed for weapons systems. But they were not terribly impressive in their planning or decision-making in Syria.

What we’ve seen in action is a military machine on the Russian side that could not pull off a confrontation with any nato power. So escalating into a confrontation with nato would be suicidal for them. And I have to believe that they’re not suicidal. Imagine if that invasion force had stumbled into Poland instead. The casualties that we’re seeing now are high enough, but the entire invasion force would’ve been wiped out.

https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/is-the-russian-military-a-paper-tiger

if Russian (or anti-NATO) propaganda states that NATO expansion at the expense of Russian sphere of influence is an issue, then also Sweden and Finland entering NATO is an issue for Russian (or anti-NATO) propaganda — neomac

And, vice versa, if Russia was to take over Ukraine (the anti-NATO thing), then Russia equally becomes an issue for Moldova Poland Romania Hungary Slovakia (and, by extension, Europe). The nuclear rattling making it more so.

This would then suggest a neutral Ukraine. Un/acceptable? Ask the Ukrainians (first and foremost).

The Scandinavian countries have been part of mutual defense agreements for over a decade, so what exactly do you believe has changed that would make this so significant? — Tzeentch

Russia will have to deal with a larger NATO alliance, once again at the doorstep of Russian territory. More militarised and committed to serve NATO’s agenda in Europe and in the Artic region, at least. And a more hostile NATO agenda, since east Europe and Scandinavian countries are more likely to fear Russian expansionism and revanchism than western European countries. And if this happens Ukraine could be next. That’s even more likely without Donbas and Crimea because only Crimea and Donbas were significant to Russian security concerns right?

And anyone with a post-kindergarten level of understanding Russian/Soviet actions understands that it will happen. Not perhaps with the ferocity as during the war, but still in a way that anyone clear headed would call it a war. The first the Russians will deny is the existence of a war or insurgency, if they can. I guess you have absolutely no idea how long the Lithuans fought against the Soviet invader after WW2, well into the 1950's. Or that the last "Forest Brother" were killed in 1970's in Estonia. — ssu

One doesn't even have to be an insurgent to end up in one of FSB's or DNR/LNR many torture basements. Ever since the Russian 2014 coup the grim expression na podval (into the basement) has entered the common lexicon in Ukraine. The Russians are looking for anyone who has a military or law enforcement experience, or who might give up such contacts. You can get in trouble for social media posts or pictures found on your phone - or for the lack thereof, which can raise suspicions. For a "nationalistic" tattoo, such as Ukraine's national emblem. Or simply because a neighbor or colleague denounced you.

Arctic soldiers relocated to the Kherson farms:

Russia’s Reindeer Brigade Is Fighting For Its Survival In Southern Ukraine (Forbes; Oct 7, 2022)
^{(alternatively via msn)}

No one's marching on Moscow, so that gives a bit of freedom. Armed authorities in Moscow are for something else.^{(2019, 2020, 2021, 2022)}

As an aside, neo-Stalinism came up elsewhere. Not just Russia, and has parallels elsewhere. Seems to be creeping out. :/

On a cynical note:

“The organizing principle of any society, Mr. Garrison, is for war.”
^{— Mr X in JFK (1991), wikiquote, youtube, imdb}

… with which I tend to disagree, from experience, though it can be an organizing principle at times.

Timothy Snyder published an essay How does the Russo-Ukrainian War end? He argues that Putin is very unlikely to make true on his vague nuclear threats, and that in any case that is not what we should be focusing on. He also argues that "Putin will need no excuse to pull out from Ukraine, since he will be doing so for his own political survival."

For myself, I cafe little for nation states, my view of nationalism is that it is an ersatz sense of identity for the lost and bewildered, frightened and alone. — boethius

It’s hard to follow the logic of your reasoning. First you start with “let us say you wanted to preserve Western preeminence” as if the sake of your argument is to see how to achieve that goal more effectively than simply by supplying weapons to Ukraine, but then you conclude with “making peace with the Russians” for Europeans (to grant economic prosperity independently from the US?) and “realise its ecocidal corrupt mania” for America (namely, giving up on their hegemonic role?), neither of which ensures Western preeminence.
Indeed the series of discrediting remarks against the West (in relation to starting an economic war against Russia, to support but not ally with Ukraine, overstating the Russian threat, Western political cowardice, more total war on tictoc) that you repleted your argument with seem aiming at questioning the desirability of pursuing Western preeminence more than finding a way to preserve it.
So your point is that the West should give up on its idea of World Order, Europe should only pursue economic prosperity by making peace with Russia, and the US should give up on its hegemonic role? And then we will more likely have peace? Is that it?

So your point is that the West should give up on its idea of World Order, Europe should only pursue economic prosperity by making peace with Russia, and the US should give up on its hegemonic role? And then we will more likely have peace? Is that it? — neomac

Excellently summarised. Just prepare for the dismissive waffle that will follow. :grin:

The article is helpful in showing how the misfortune of war will play out in Russian society. A countervailing perspective from the game of Risk underway in many minds:

During an internal struggle for power in Russia, Putin and other Russians will have other things on their minds, and the war will give way to those more pressing concerns. Sometimes you change the subject, and sometimes the subject changes you.

Ukraine is only one front - in a much larger struggle between the US Empire and an emerging multi-polar world order; one where China and Russia have begun to challenge US supremacy. However, the country that most challenges US hegemony is China - not Russia. China's industrial capacity exceeds that of both the USA and the EU combined. It is a rhetorical question whether or not China's objective is to supplant and eclipse US power, because the fact is that it is what the US believes and it is a belief that most explains US geo-political behaviour. And for an emergent China, Russia represents critical resources essential to ascent on the global stage.

Russia's inclusion in this power calculus is both surprising and illuminating. Conventional wisdom - post the USSR - had largely come to assess Russia as a mid-level regional economic power that enjoyed an elevated global significance largely by virtue of its legacy nuclear arsenal. Senator John McCain - one time Presidential Candidate - went so far as to describe Russia as a "Gas Station masquerading as a country." Something of this thinking underpinning McCain's derision must have featured prominently in the minds of EU leaders when they began to enthusiastically proclaim a series of dramatic trade sanctions against Russia.

A free trade alliance between China and Russia is the necessary foundation for any Eurasian economic zone capable of challenging Western hegemony. The partnership of Russia's unlimited resources combined with China's population and industrial capacity possesses an irresistible gravitational pull on the entirety of the Asia and the Middle East. The SCO, and Silk Road investment projects are already expanding and attracting interest from India, Iran, Turkey and the all the Stans. These countries represent over half of the worlds population.

For the West - It is this perspective that makes it necessary to balkanise Russia. As Secretary of State during the Obama Administration, Hillary Clinton bemoaned that it was unfair that Russia possessed so much access to natural resources. In the short term, the Ukraine war is a financial windfall for the MIC, a fillip of relevance for NATO, it consolidates power of the EU in Brussels and it advances the agenda of the WEF.

So what happens in the Ukraine is important but is only one part of a much larger game. What we know about Putin and the war is filtered by our media thru this lens.

Our Western political leaders are in the habit of elevating one foreign leader after another as the latest reincarnation of Hitler. In just the last 2 decades we've had five of these Doctor Evil types: Saddam, Gaddafi, Kim Jong-un, Trump and now Putin. Popular Western Culture can accept criticism of its imperial colonial past but is not so comfortable discussing and arguably blind to its current geo-political excesses.

Is the Western World really still a force for good?

Ever since 9/11, hysteria, outrage, anger, fear and hate have all become normalised. It's more than a little unsettling just to review a sampling of the headlines and vocabulary used to cover news over the last 2 decades: Patriot Act, war on terror, rendition, Al Queda, ISIS, Rendition, GITMO, Waterboarding, Coalition of the willing, Axis of Evil, Snowden, Assange, GFC, Moral hazard, Quantitive Easing, Novichok, Wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria,
millions of refugees, Russia Gate, Not my President, Stolen Elections, Impeachments , Insurrections...

And if that were not enough, there is the threat of extinction from greenhouse gases and climate catastrophe. All the while, there are an increasing number of media reports of key personnel in the administrations of both Russia and the USA threatening each other with Nuclear war.

So what happens in the Ukraine is important but is only one part of a much larger game. What we know about Putin and the war is filtered by our media thru this lens. — yebiga

If that is the case, your observations cannot be supported as evidence by appeal to any resource.

And if that were not enough, there is the threat of extinction from greenhouse gases and climate catastrophe. — yebiga

This being so, why does it matter whether you are camp West or camp Eurasia? Cheering for a team is a natural human reaction, but why not evaluate the whole of global politics through an ecological lens?

Our Western political leaders are in the habit of elevating one foreign leader after another as the latest reincarnation of Hitler. — yebiga

This is what cheering for your team looks like.

But factually, both sides make the same comparisons. So the criticism applies equally. The habit is shared.

On May 2nd, in an interview on the Ukrainian president, the Russian Foreign Minister said: “Zelensky is a Jew? Hitler also had Jewish origins. The greatest antisemites are precisely the Jews.”

https://jewishunpacked.com/can-ukraine-have-a-nazi-problem-with-a-jewish-president/