I clearly don't believe that we create the world (universe) but I do believe we are all involved (entangled) in a continuous co-creation (more Bergson). — Rich

Also Lao Tzu.

Yes. Such a conception is common in Eastern cultures. Also, Heraclitus shared this view as his Lagos in flux.

A universe in continuous creation and flux can be imagined as a continuously rotating kaleidoscope. This would be the one and only fact, as far as I can ascertain, using Terrapin Station's definition and ontological perspective. The Stuff or the Universe is The Fact. — Rich

Is this the way things are, or one of the ways things are.

Is this the way things are, or one of the ways things are. — T Clark

I would say it is a perspective.

The Dao that we speak of is not the Dao.

I would say it is a perspective.

The Dao that we speak of is not the Dao. — Rich

If you'd just given me the chance, I would have used the same quote.

:)

My point was that, by the cognitive relativist's own lights, his interlocutor can not only disregard the relativist's claim that "all truth is subjective/relative," but also the relativist's response that the truth that "all truth is relative" is true only for him (and other relativists, presumably) — Arkady

Who would say that an interlocutor can't disregard whatever?

If you're wanting to say "should," that requires an additional view: that one should or shouldn't believe (or also assign "true" to) something when truth value is objective/subjective.

Also, it's important to understand the distinction between whether something is true and whether it's a fact.

It makes perfect sense. If we agree that "it is raining" refers to a state of affairs where water falls from the clouds, and if water isn't falling from the clouds, then "it is raining" is false, even if we believe that water is falling from the clouds. — Michael

Let's try it this way. How would it work, exactly--basically in terms of the mechanics of it--that "it is raining" is true or false independently of what anyone thinks about it? You're got the proposition however you have it--are we talking about something printed? Some sound waves? And then what happens between the proposition and the facts in question?

Let's try it this way. How would it work, exactly--basically in terms of the mechanics of it--that "it is raining" is true or false independently of what anyone thinks about it? — Terrapin Station

The state of affairs we agree it refers to obtains independently of our opinion. As you've said, the facts that propositions are about are objective.

The state of affairs we agree it refers to obtains independently of our opinion. — Michael

I'm asking you how that works that the reference either obtains or it doesn't mind-independently, Explain it mechanically/physically.

That's the claim. I'm asking you how that works, mechanically/physically. — Terrapin Station

Which part? States of affairs obtaining independently of our opinion or us agreeing which words refer to which states of affairs?

I typed a mess the first time. I corrected it after that.

How words come to refer to states of affairs isn't the issue. The issue is whether or not the states of affairs obtain. You've accepted that facts are objective. So whether or not a particular state of affairs obtains is independent of our judgements. Which means that we can believe that a particular state of affairs obtains even if it doesn't.

How words come to refer to states of affairs isn't the issue. — Michael

That's why we're not understanding each other. That's exactly part of the issue on my view.

If words can't refer to something mind-independently, then we can't have reference obtaining or not mind-independently, and reference (and meaning, etc.) is necessary to assign "T" or "F"

States of affairs obtaining is talking about facts. There's no dispute about that.

The dispute is about propositions being true and false.

Facts and propositions are very different things. I explained that under my view at the start. If this whole thing is arising over confusion about this, that would be ridiculous.

If words can't refer to something mind-independently, then we can't have reference obtaining or not mind-independently, and reference (and meaning, etc.) is necessary to assign "T" or "F" — Terrapin Station

I'm not saying that words refer to things mind-independently. I'm saying that, as a matter of inter-subjective convention, we agree to refer to a particular state of affairs using a particular string of symbols.

However, as you say, the states of affairs themselves are objective; they either obtain or they don't, and (except in trivial cases), what we say and believe has no effect on this.

Therefore, we might agree to refer to state of affairs X using the symbol "X", and we might believe that this state of affairs obtains, but it's actually the case that this state of affairs doesn't obtain. So we have a situation where we judge a proposition to be true even though the state of affairs that it (as a matter of inter-subjective convention) refers to doesn't actually obtain.

Therefore, we might agree to refer to state of affairs X using the symbol "X", and we might believe that this state of affairs obtains, but it's actually the case that this state of affairs doesn't obtain. — Michael

There's no disagreement about that.

What there's disagreement about is whether "X" is true or false independent of us/our judgment. Whether X is true or false is a matter of a judgment about a proposition. That's what it "means" for something to be true or false. That's independent of whether the state of affairs in question obtains or not. And there's no way for "X" to be true or false ("X" would have to be a proposition, by the way, only propositions are true or false) independent of us, because there's no independent meaning, reference, etc. Again, this is independent of X as a state of affairs.

The state of affairs we agree it refers to obtains independently of our opinion. — Michael

The relativist position, at least the one I'm partial to, is not that truth or facts are dependent on our opinion. They're based on a consensus of observers.

The relativist position, at least the one I' partial to, is not that truth or facts are dependent on our opinion. It's based on a consensus of observers. — T Clark

That's different than my view. On my view, consensuses, norms, etc. can take a hike. ;-)

What there's disagreement about is whether "X" is true or false independent of us/our judgment. Whether X is true or false is a matter of a judgment about a proposition. That's what it "means" for something to be true or false. That's independent of whether the state of affairs in question obtains or not. And there's no way for "X" to be true or false ("X" would have to be a proposition, by the way, only propositions are true or false) independent of us, because there's no independent meaning, reference, etc. Again, this is independent of X as a state of affairs. — Terrapin Station

I'm not talking about "true" or "false". I'm talking about a proposition referring to a state of affairs that does or doesn't obtain. What do you call a proposition that refers to a state of affairs that actually obtains? What do you call a proposition that refers to a state of affairs that doesn't actually obtain?

What do you call a proposition that refers to a state of affairs that actually obtains? — Michael

Before I answer this again, I just want to make sure that you understand some basics of my view.

(1) Do you understand that I believe that propositions can only exist via an individual thinking the proposition?

Before I answer this again... — Terrapin Station

You haven't answered this. You've only explained what you mean by "true" and "false". I want to know what you call a proposition that refers to a state of affairs that obtains (and one that doesn't).

Okay, that's fine. I haven't answered that.

Do you understand that I believe that propositions can only exist via an individual thinking the proposition?

Okay, that's fine. I haven't answered that. — Terrapin Station

Then what do you call them?

Do you understand that I believe that propositions can only exist via an individual thinking the proposition?

Yes.

Thanks. I'm getting there. But I want to make sure you understand this one step at a time, because this is ridiculously laborious for something so simple, and I don't want to have to keep explaining it over and over..

Okay, and you understand that on my view, reference (and meaning) only obtains when an individual thinks about it in a specific way?

Okay, and you understand that on my view, reference (and meaning) only obtains when an individual thinks about them in a specific way? — Terrapin Station

Yes.

So what do you call a proposition that refers to a state of affairs that obtains?

Your remarks about predictions for the future, i didn't understand. There can't be facts about future anthropogenic global warming. I think most scientists think it's likely to be true, and that on the precautionary principle the best bet is to assume they're right. — mcdoodle

The predicted fact of what will occur if we don’t counteract in the case of global warming can be construed to be a more complex version of what will happen to the proverbial ostrich with its head placed in the ground if it doesn’t start running away from the attacking lion.

Addressing the issue of facticity, through one can come up with a number of possibilities of why the lion is charging toward the ostrich (maybe the lion simply intends to greet the ostrich with a friendly lick, etc.), when the lion and the ostrich are in touching distance only one possibility will unfold. This one actualized possibility will at that juncture become a fact. When we visually imagine the proverbial ostrich placing its head in the ground as a lion charges towards it from afar, we predict what the one future actuality will be. In other words, we predict what the future pertinent fact will be. That the lion will kill the ostrich is then a predicted fact (again, emphasis on predicted).

Addressing the issue of a relativity in which facts are changeable by beliefs and feelings, if the ostrich places its head in the sand, ceases to visually perceive the lion attacking, and then believes and feels that it is free from all future danger in regard to this lion due to what it believes to be the lion’s disappearance, does the charging lion actually/factually/objectively/truly/ontically disappear? [A strictly rhetorical question since we all know via a conflux of experience and reasoning that the lion does not factually disappear relative to the ostrich’s being at such a juncture.]

The same can then be applied to the issue of global warming (a more pressing, realistic, and complex scenario): do the facts of today which point to (and limit) what will occur in the future if we don’t counteract the danger (i.e., today’s facts by which we predict what the future facts will be given set of conditions Q) then ontically disappear were one to not believe that the stated facts of today are indeed factual?

Unlike the ostrich scenario, which concerns a single ostrich, the global warming scenario regards a populace that does not currently hold a unified stance (in this case, a global consensus) regarding the danger of global warming. So, to try to keep things simple via a different question, if person A believes in human caused global warming and person B believes that global warming is a hoax, will the future of this planet be different for the grandchildren of person A and person B … this at the same time? If (objective) reality (as compared to the intersubjective realities of cultures, etc.) is relative to beliefs and feelings, how does this resulting absurdity not obtain?

I hope this clarifies what I initially intended to express.

Okay. What it is, on my view, for a proposition to refer to a state of affairs (that obtains) is for an individual to think about propositions/meaning/reference in a particular way with respect to what they believe about the state of affairs. "What they believe" because since we're talking about a proposition and reference, it only makes sense to talk about it from that individual's perspective, because what propositions and reference/meaning and all that happen to be is that individual thinking about things a particular way.

Okay. What it is, on my view, for a proposition to refer to a state of affairs (that obtains) is for an individual to think about propositions/meaning/reference in a particular way with respect to what they believe about the state of affairs. "What they believe" because since we're talking about a proposition and reference, it only makes sense to talk about it from that individual's perspective, because what propositions and reference/meaning and all that happen to be is that individual thinking about things a particular way. — Terrapin Station

But things might be other than they think it to be. They might believe that a particular state of affairs obtains even if it doesn't. And if the proposition they choose to use to refer to that state of affairs is "it is raining", then the proposition "it is raining" is a true proposition (according to your definition of "true") that refers to a state of affairs that doesn't obtain.

So what do you call a proposition that refers to a state of affairs that actually obtains (or doesn't)?

But things might be other than they think it to be. They might believe that a particular state of affairs obtains even if it doesn't. — Michael

I agree with that part.

The problem with this part:

And if the proposition they choose to use to refer to that state of affairs is "it is raining", then the proposition "it is raining" is a true proposition (according to your definition of "true") that refers to a state of affairs that doesn't obtain.

Is that per my views that you just said that you understood above, propositions, reference and meaning don't even exist aside from an individual thinking about something in a particular way. So the proposition and how it relates or doesn't relate to the state of affairs are all about that individual's thoughts at the time in question.