You specifically asked me about descriptions, right? — Terrapin Station

I asked you what you call a statement that describes an objective fact and what you call a statement that doesn't describe an objective fact. As an example, I offered the fact that there are two balls in a bag and the propositions "there are two balls in the bag" and "there are three balls in the bag".

I asked you what you call a statement that describes an objective fact and what you call a statement that doesn't describe an objective fact. As an example, I offered the fact that there are two balls in a bag and the propositions "there are two balls in the bag" and "there are three balls in the bag". — Michael

Right and I answered that.

I agree with that. The flux out there is the facts. — Terrapin Station

A fact to me had to be more concrete, immobile to be useful. It is a movement that had been conceptualized as from. A photograph.

What's out there, on the other hand, is just a mass of stuff (whatever it may be) that is constantly in flux. One can say that in total it is a fact as the Universe of Everything. This would translate to the Dao or God or whatever Absolute that one embraces.

Right and I answered that. — Terrapin Station

No you didn't. You told me what you call statements that are judged to describe a fact and that the proposition is just pixels on a screen. But I want to know is what you call a statement that actually describes the objective fact that there are two balls in the bag.

A fact to me had to be more concrete, immobile to be useful. — Rich

I wouldn't say there is anything immobile. And I'd say everything is concrete, in the sense of material. There's a flux out there, and a flux in here. Everything in in flux. And it's all material, in particular relations, undergoing particular processes.

But I want to know is what you call a statement that actually describes the objective fact that there are two balls in the bag. — Michael

And I told you that "accurately," as in mind-independently or objectively, as opposed to subjectively judged, when it comes to whether propositions describe anything, correctly or incorrectly, is a nonsensical idea in my view.

And I told you that "accurately," as in mind-independently or objectively, as opposed to subjectively judged, when it comes to whether propositions describe anything, correctly or incorrectly, is a nonsensical idea in my view. — Terrapin Station

So these objective facts are fundamentally ineffable?

You could say they're "objectively ineffable." But we're subjects. We describe things subjectively. The idea of an objective description, in a literal sense, is a category error.

It's like wondering why your bathtub isn't breathing.

You could say they're "objectively ineffable." But we're subjects. We describe things subjectively. The idea of an objective description, in a literal sense, is a category error. — Terrapin Station

So how do you conceive of these objective facts? What sort of things do you imagine them to be, particularly when nobody is around?

I wouldn't say there is anything immobile. And I'd say everything is concrete, in the sense of material. There's a flux out there, and a flux in here. Everything in in flux. And it's all material, in particular relations, undergoing particular processes. — Terrapin Station

If we agree all is in flux, then the fact must also necessarily be in flux, creating as far as I can tell a unique meaning to the term fact. It's OK, as long as everyone understands your meaning.

I'm terms of materiality, this term itself is rather malleable as the nature of stuff is not clear. Ultimately the nature of facts is directly dependent upon how one views this stuff and how the mind manifests this stuff as perception. So different ontologies will lead to disagreement as to the nature of facts.

I don't really have any idea what you're asking there. Are you asking for something like a blueprint of how concept-creation works?

I don't really have any idea what you're asking there. Are you asking for something like a blueprint of how concept-creation works? — Terrapin Station

An example of an objective fact would be a good start.

So different ontologies will lead to disagreement as to the nature of facts. — Rich

I agree with that, but I don't agree with this:

Ultimately the nature of facts is directly dependent upon how one views this stuff — Rich

I think that puts too much emphasis on us, which I think is an all-too-common error in philosophy.

An example of an objective fact would be a good start. — Michael

Oh. That's easy. There's a blue bucket in my bathroom, for example.

Oh. That's easy. There's a blue bucket in my bathroom, for example. — Terrapin Station

Right. Then if there being a blue bucket in your bathroom is an objective fact then "there is a blue bucket in your bathroom" actually describes an objective fact and "there isn't a blue bucket in your bathroom" doesn't.

"there is a blue bucket in your bathroom" actually describes an objective fact and "there isn't a blue bucket in your bathroom" doesn't. — Michael

Not in the sense of mind-independently or objectively, as opposed to per one's judgement, because there is no such thing as a mind-independent or objective correct/incorrect description.

I think that puts too much emphasis on us, which I think is an all-too-common error in philosophy. — Terrapin Station

A former English teacher of mine also insisted that an author's writing were completely distinct from the author. I argued back that it is impossible to separate the creator from the creation. They are entangled forever. Whatever we conceived creates a permanent entanglement. There is no way to disengage.

Not in the sense of mind-independently or objectively, as opposed to per one's judgement, because there is no such thing as a mind-independent or objective correct/incorrect description. — Terrapin Station

You seem to be misunderstanding the issue. It's not a case that we agree on what the objective fact is but disagree on which words describe that fact. It's that we disagree on what the objective fact is.

For example, if one person were to say "it's wet" and another person were to say "it's dry", it's not that what the first person means by "it's wet" is what the second person means by "it's dry", as if they have some mirrored language, and are simply disagreeing on which words describe the objective fact that the ball is covered in water. They have the same language. They agree on which words describe which facts. They just disagree about whether or not the ball is covered in water.

For example, if one person were to say "it's wet" and another person were to say "it's dry", it's not that what the first person means by "it's wet" is what the second person means by "it's dry", as if they have some mirrored language, and are simply disagreeing on which words describe the objective fact that ball is covered in water. They have the same language. They agree on which words describe which facts. They just disagree about whether or not the ball is covered in water. — Michael

In a thought experiment where we're positing that we know they have just the same meanings in mind, etc, then yes, sure, they disagree on whether or not the ball is covered in water, which means that they are making different judgments about how the proposition relates to the world.

A former English teacher of mine also insisted that an author's writing were completely distinct from the author. I argued back that it is impossible to separate the creator from the creation. — Rich

I agree with you there. I just don't think that the world is our creation.

I agree with you there. I just don't think that the world is our creation. — Terrapin Station

I clearly don't believe that we create the world (universe) but I do believe we are all involved (entangled) in a continuous co-creation (more Bergson).

In a thought experiment where we're positing that we know they have just the same meanings in mind, etc, then yes, sure, they disagree on whether or not the ball is covered in water, which means that they are making different judgments about how the proposition relates to the world. — Terrapin Station

And those judgements can be wrong. If, as a matter of convention, we accept that the proposition "X" refers to a particular state of affairs obtaining and that the proposition "not X" refers to that state of affairs not obtaining then if that state of affairs obtains then "X" is true and "not X" is false, even if we judge otherwise. Because as you've said, the facts are independent of us.

Again, we're not just disagreeing over which words describe the agreed-upon fact. We're disagreeing over the fact.

And those judgements can be wrong. — Michael

Only in other persons' judgment. They can't be wrong objectively or mind-independently, because there is no objective meaning, no objective reference, etc.

If, as a matter of convention, we accept that the proposition "X" refers to a particular state of affairs obtaining and that the proposition "not X" refers to that state of affairs not obtaining then if that state of affairs obtains then "X" is true and "not X" is false, , even if were were to judge otherwise. Because as you've said, the facts are independent of us.

The only way it makes any sense for "X" to refer to a particular state of affairs is for us, subjectively (and individually), to decide for "X" to refer to a particular state of affairs, and what it is for "X" to refer to a particular state of affairs is for us to think about "X" and the state of affairs in a particular way. "X" only refers in the exact way that each individual thinks about it (even if in a thought experiment, we assume they all think the "same").

Outside of us thinking about it that way, "X" doesn't mean anything and "X" doesn't refer to anything.

So while the state of affairs obtains or not independently of us (assuming it's something independent of us of course), "X" referring to anything doesn't obtain independently of us. That's a category error. So "X" can't be true or false mind-independently.

Only in other persons' judgment. They can't be wrong objectively or mind-independently, because there is no objective meaning, no objective reference, etc. — Terrapin Station

That misses the point, as I've explained. We're not disagreeing over how to describe an agreed-upon fact. We're disagreeing over the fact.

The only way it makes any sense for "X" to refer to a particular state of affairs is for us, subjectively (and individually), to decide for "X" to refer to a particular state of affairs, and what it is for "X" to refer to a particular state of affairs is for us to think about "X" and the state of affairs in a particular way. "X" only refers in the exact way that each individual thinks about it (even if in a thought experiment, we assume they all think the "same").

Outside of us thinking about it that way, "X" doesn't mean anything and "X" doesn't refer to anything.

So while the state of affairs obtains or not independently of us (assuming it's something independent of us of course), "X" referring to anything doesn't obtain independently of us. That's a category error. So "X" can't be true or false mind-independently. — Terrapin Station

And if we subjectively agree that "X" refers to a particular state of affairs, and if that state of affairs doesn't obtain, than "X" doesn't describe a fact, even if we judge that it does. Again, the above shows that you're missing the point. We're disagreeing over which states of affairs obtain, not over which words refer to the states of affairs that do obtain.

That misses the point, as I've explained. We're not disagreeing over how describe an agreed-upon fact. We're disagreeing over the fact. — Michael

You can't literally "think the fact." The fact is the state of affairs in the world.

So I'm not talking about disagreeing on how to describe the fact either. I didn't say anything that at all suggests that. What would be disagreed upon is the relation between the "identical" description in both cases and the world. People are making judgments about that relation. The world itself can't make judgments about that relation, because the world, sans minds, has no meaning, no reference, etc. There's no way in the world sans minds to set up any sort of "matching" (or not matching) relation between something like a text mark, "X" and some other fact(s).

And if we subjectively agree that "X" refers to a particular state of affairs, and if that state of affairs doesn't obtain, than "X" is false, even if we judge it to be true.

No. That makes no sense, because the only way that could possibly work would be for X to mean something, to refer to something, independently of how we think about it. But that's not how it works. Meaning and reference are how we think about it, and there's nothing else to it.

And of course it can be and often is disregarded.

Not that that depends on truth being relative. One can disregard something if truth isn't relative, too. People can disregard all sorts of things if they like.

If only the fact that people can disregard things had any particular significance.

You're probably also disregarding that it's an objective fact that truth is relative. But whether a statement about that fact is true or false is subjective of course. — Terrapin Station

I'm not sure that I follow all of this. I think you're missing the point in saying that "people can disregard all sorts of things if they like." My point was that, by the cognitive relativist's own lights, his interlocutor can not only disregard the relativist's claim that "all truth is subjective/relative," but also the relativist's response that the truth that "all truth is relative" is true only for him (and other relativists, presumably).

No. That makes no sense, because the only way that could possibly work would be for X to mean something, to refer to something, independently of how we think about it. But that's not how it works. Meaning and reference is how we think about it, and there's nothing else to it. — Terrapin Station

It makes perfect sense. If we agree that "it is raining" refers to a state of affairs where water falls from the clouds, and if water isn't falling from the clouds, then "it is raining" is false, even if we believe that water is falling from the clouds.

The very fact that you're trying to argue that you're right and that I'm wrong shows that you understand the logic of this.

As a realist, facts in no way depend on there being humans or persons. If no life existed, the world would still be overflowing with facts. — Terrapin Station

There are those of us who don't agree, at least not in any absolute way. Facts are human. Stories we tell ourselves.

When you say you are a realist, do you mean you find that a useful approach to understanding and living in the world, or are you claiming some sort of privileged perspective?

There are those of us who don't agree, at least not in any absolute way. Facts are human. Stories we tell ourselves.

When you say you are a realist, do you mean you find that a useful approach to understanding and living in the world, or are you claiming some sort of privileged perspective? — T Clark

A universe in continuous creation and flux can be imagined as a continuously rotating kaleidoscope. This would be the one and only fact, as far as I can ascertain, using Terrapin Station's definition and ontological perspective. The Stuff or the Universe is The Fact.