No seriously. What facts underpin what reads as assumptions on what the apparently monolithic Russian entity wants? Something that Russian society and the apparatchick is so thoroughly convinced of that surely these telltale signs have been there since the fall of the Soviet Union.

There's so many assumptions in your post that it is fiction.

most of times your line is slavishly following your masters' propaganda. — Olivier5

What propaganda?

Can you cite a single sentence of mine that is "propaganda" and not either plausible facts and premises or then reasoned argument from those plausible facts and premises.

For example, I stated a Ukrainian offensive or counter-offensive would not be possible with only small arms such as shoulder launched missiles, and these recent offensives utilised many armoured vehicles. A plausible assertion that proved true.

Another example, I've asserted there is no end to the war other than a negotiated peace that will require compromise, as there's no way Ukraine can defeat Russia and force a Russian surrender (Ukraine could win every battle in Ukraine and that is still not winning a war with Russia). No alternative to this view has even been presented.

I've even elaborated how NATO could have, before the war or even during the war, sent in ground troops and created a Cuban missile crisis style standoff and then negotiate a rapid resolution to the conflict (again, would require compromise), and made clear I would support NATO making such a move (if it worked) as that would have prevented the war and could have, and still could, end the war rapidly at any moment preventing further child suffering, death and trauma (my "constituency" in this fight).

That NATO has not provided Ukraine sufficient armament and training to defeat Russia in Ukraine, much less in Russia itself, is just obvious fact, with each weapons system drip-fed and provided only when previous weapons systems prove insufficient (after thousands of Ukrainian KIA and casualties demonstrate that empirically).

One can argue that the US should do this policy to "fight them there rather than here!" but that's obviously not a policy with Ukrainian interest in mind, but is to use Ukrainians to bleed the Russians.

As for the geopolitical realm of things: Russia has not collapsed, has not been abandoned by key allies, and economic hardship from the sanctions are changing governments in Europe and not Russia. These are facts.

Since my position is to support a diplomatic resolution of the war, and I've explained how this is done (minimum understanding of the Russian perspective in order to negotiate in the first place and then minimum compromise to reach a deal), I am not so interested in "just war arguments" (it could be Ukrainian cause is just ... just that they can't defeat Russia so it's relevant in terms of resolving the conflict now). However, I've also made clear I'm willing to debate who has just cause or then "more just cause", and I've asked questions that would start such a debate: such as how many Nazi's would be too many Nazi's (in order to evaluate that Ukraine does not reach this threshold of Naziness) and also a political theory in which US invading Iraq on pretext of bioweapons that weren't there was not-a-war-crime but Russia invading Ukraine and actually finding military bio-labs is a war-crime (or then make clear both are war crimes and doesn't matter if Iraq actually had WMD's or Ukraine actually has bio-weapons labs or not); i.e. is there a theory that US has just cause in its various wars but Russia does not have just cause for the exact same reasons? Of course, neither has just cause is also an acceptable position, but proponents to a moral theory about Russia should demonstrate how it applies to other cases, is the main point.

You're position basically boils down to the idea that pointing out Ukraine cannot defeat Russia (a critical factor in evaluating what to do; only a force destined to win need no diplomacy, such as the Russian defeat of the Nazi's the first time), but if you cannot force a capitulation then the options are diplomatic resolution or then no-end to the conflict ... or being eventually defeated yourself.

Of course, if the only practical option to end the war is diplomacy, and compromise will be needed for that, then every day Ukrainians fight on to support an uncompromising position is lives lost for nothing, for they are, under such conditions, not actually fighting to anywhere but merely "for Western values" -- aka. a symbolic gesture -- as Zelensky himself notes.

I thought this comment I read in a interview recently was very pertinent to @Olivier5's absurdity, he's talking about Paul Mason, but the point is the same...

Paul Mason’s position is that if you say anything in public, particularly if you’re an academic, that aligns with what he calls Russian talking points or Kremlin talking points, then you must be silenced.

Some of this came out last week in leaked emails, where he’s allegedly talking about de-platforming people. He doesn't quite have the intellectual faculties to understand the implication of that. Virtually any criticism of Western foreign policy or mainstream media coverage is going to align in some way with Kremlin talking points.

He's basically saying you can no longer be critical of your own government. — Justin Schlosberg, professor of journalism at the University of Birbeck, and former Chair of the Media Reform Coalition

I am not 100% certain of much. Let's not pretend that things are impossible to tell in the specific case of Ukraine... There's more info on Ukraine than on many other issues.

And yes, Ukrainians in majority think that it is worthwhile to chase the Russians from Ukraine. You are welcome to disagree, but our opinion is not really important here. We're not fighting this war. — Olivier5

Our opinions seem to be "important" to the point where they're relevant to their thread. Most discussions don't change the world but we still have them so this is a strange dismissal. We can also dismiss individual Ukrainian opinions because they don't get to decide and we can dismiss all their opinions as not really important because in the grand scheme of things this doesn't even register on the scale of the history of the universe. Doing this, we can make every opinion unimportant.

Either it's interesting to discuss the morality surrounding this war or it isn't. If it is, then my opinion on that matter is as important as yours. So I'd still would appreciate you to engage the earlier question. When is it no longer worth it to fight? (If you're familiar with the just war theory, this is an explicit consideration - does the war ultimately result in a better outcome than not fighting?)

Don’t be a dope. Every analysis of Putin tells the same story.

Vladimir Putin has compared himself to the 18th-century Russian tsar Peter the Great, drawing a parallel between what he portrayed as their twin historic quests to win back Russian lands.

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/10/putin-compares-himself-to-peter-the-great-in-quest-to-take-back-russian-lands

Aha, so even if that's accurate then you claim that Putin is Russia? Seems a bit of a stretch.

What a dull and confused reply. Nothing to see here. :yawn:

I’m talking about Russian identity. Every country has one. Putin could be just taping into national mythology for cynical advantage. But more worryingly, he seems to rather believe it himself, as his biographers remark.

Maybe you just haven’t bothered to read up on the subject?

Vladimir Putin has long insisted Ukraine is part of the country he rules.

Kiev is the mother of Russian cities,' he wrote in March 2014. 'Ancient Rus is our common source and we cannot live without each other.' A few days later, Russia completed the annexation of Crimea

'Ukraine is not just a neighbouring country for us,' he told the Russian people in a national broadcast. 'It is an inalienable part of our own history, culture and spiritual space.'

He [Putin] repeatedly denied Ukraine’s right to independent existence … In doing so, he revealed the structures of an imperial ideology with a chronology and ambition that goes far beyond post-Soviet nostalgia to the mediaeval era.

What Putin’s address reveals is the desire to plot Russian and Ukrainian history through the lens of imperialism. He is attempting to establish a direct line from shared ancient origins to a first and second Russian empire: one under the Romanov Tsars (1721-1917) and the second as part of the USSR.

https://www.ox.ac.uk/news/features/analysis-putins-imperial-ambitions-and-ukraines-300-year-road-statehood

Philip Short’s biography might be the place to start your education.

Strikingly, the occasions Short records when outsiders have witnessed Putin’s inscrutable mask fracture nearly all relate to these “lost” lands, countries whose independent existence was to him an impossible outrage.

https://www.theguardian.com/books/2022/jul/03/putin-his-life-and-times-philip-short-review-collapse-that-shaped-man-who-would-be-tsar

This is inconsistent with sending far too few troops to occupy Ukraine. It's also based on relatively recent speeches, so while certainly Putin may have changed his mind, I find the leap from there to Russian identity just that... a leap that finds no basis in facts.

I also love how the assumption is that when someone disagrees with you they are simply uninformed. I could say the same thing about you then. Haven't you read Mearsheimer and Kissinger? But of course I've read some of these exposés since @ssu is a proponent of them as well. I'm simply not convinced by them.

Every analysis of Putin tells the same story. — apokrisis

In what world does you coming up with a handful of sources become 'every analysis'?

I also love how the assumption is that when someone disagrees with you they are simply uninformed. — Benkei

We live in a terrifying new world where one side has 'the facts' and the other 'disinformation' simply by fiat, and that such fiat happens to align with the interests of some of the most powerful actors in the global economy is apparently a coincidence.

This is inconsistent with sending far too few troops to occupy Ukraine. — Benkei

Or instead, the FSB’s expensive network of political stooges were meant to ensure a swift and easy win. But - irony - corruption saw the money going into other pockets, Just as did the funds meant to keep the army’s tanks and trucks in serviceable shape.

Events have shown just how many miscalculations were involved in Putin’s “rational, well planned, limited aims” debacle.

But you can write your own history of the world.

In what world does you coming up with a handful of sources become 'every analysis'? — Isaac

Hyperbole seems the appropriate response for this low grade thread. :blush:

↪boethius What a dull and confused reply. Nothing to see here. :yawn: — apokrisis

I get it, the rest of Western social media is just repeating whatever Ukrainian "officials" say unquestioningly, asking zero questions that might be critical of NATO or Ukrainian government policies, and taking some unimportant ground around Kharkiv is supposed to be some cathartic moment that means full victory and the war essentially over already, Russian lines disintegrating as we speak, Putin about to be assassinated etc.

It's a comfortable propaganda bubble for Zelenskyites to live in and it's necessary to guard this delusional state to simply repeat the propaganda here and believe that doing so makes it more credible, being posted to a "philosophy" debate forum and all ... rather than actually debate on a debate forum.

Or instead, the FSB’s expensive network of political stooges were meant to ensure a swift and easy win. — apokrisis

You do realise this is a Zelensky and co. complaint, that Russia took over Kherson and South-West Ukraine with hardly any resistance due to Ukrainian traitors taking bribes.

You are imagining you are talking to some unsophisticated soul. I’ve no illusions about how the world really works. I’ve seen how it works up close. I’ve written about it professionally.

Hyperbole seems the appropriate response for this low grade thread. :blush: — apokrisis

Hyperbole is absolutely the worst possible response in the world, there's literally no worse response, you couldn't think of a worse response if you tried. It's worse than murder.

You are imagining you are talking to some unsophisticated soul. — apokrisis

This is definitely how I imagine things to be. Yes, we agree on this description of the situation.

I’ve no illusions about how the world really works. I’ve seen how it works up close. I’ve written about it professionally. — apokrisis

Please, prey tell. How does the world really work?

For those interested in debating the actual situation in Ukraine.

Russia has just announced a partial mobilisation, calling up 300 000 reserves as reported by the BBC:

Mobilisation essentially means assembling and preparing troops for active service.

According to Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu, this will apply to just 1% of the country's total mobilisation resource.

Russia's estimated to have around 2 million reservists. These are people who have done their military service - it's compulsory in Russia.

The 300,000 reservists being called at this point are soldiers with military experience - although it is not clear what that means and who that refers to.

Shoigu did say that students won't be called up. — What does Putin mean by partial mobilisation?

Of course, Ukraine has been in total war, banning military age males leaving the country, and forcibly conscripting.

Why mobilise now and not before I think has a bunch of explanations. First, had Russia mobilised before the war then Ukraine would have mobilised and this was not necessarily an advantage to start the war. Why not mobilise after can be explained either because the Kremlin believed a negotiated settlement was possible or then for political and economic consequences of mobilisation outweighed the benefits. Definitely, mobilising during the first phase of the sanctions could have been economically disastrous.

Additionally, Russia has been holding off annexing new territories. Again, this could be explained due to a desire to negotiate or then for purely tactical reasons of either first wanting to conquer the territories concerned or then fearing a Ukrainian offensive during the annexation process. The timing now can be interpreted as either retaliation for the recent offensive or then simply it is now safe to conduct the votes if the offensives have stalled and it will take time for Ukraine to organise a new one.

Whatever the reasons, annexing the territories is the pathway of mobilisation to then defend Russian territory.

It is repeated on reddit a lot that Russian reservists and conscripts will be super low quality soldiers. This is debatable (especially in quality comparisons of Ukrainian reservists and conscripts), but likely calling up reservists allows more rotations of the professional army corp for offensive manoeuvres.

Of course, how this plays out politically, economically and militarily is not certain, but mobilisation is certainly a military advantage and the question would be to what extent along with the political and economic costs.

:razz:

This is definitely how I imagine things to be. — boethius

:yawn:

Two responses ... two emoticons.

If you're trying to express how deep and sophisticated your soul is ... I'm not sure this is the way to do it.

They probably won't start WW3, but the United States is deeply invested in Ukraine, starting with the Bush administration fourteen years ago in 2008, and possibly earlier.

A total defeat of Ukraine would be a major blow to the United States, both in terms of investments lost and reputation. That's something they cannot afford in a time where US hegemony is being overtly challenged. — Tzeentch

Well, a total defeat of Ukraine...which seems quite remote now, would only alarm more the eastern NATO members and put to existential threat a country like Moldova.

But still, losing Ukraine wouldn't start WW3.

I wonder why you find it so hard to agree that a) Russians did try to take the Capital — ssu

Because I remain unconvinced that they made a serious effort to do so, and the attack was likely a probe, followed by a diversionary attack or feint. — Tzeentch

That it wasn't a serious effort?

The size of the attack and the use of paratroops to seize a central airport doesn't logically sound as a diversionary attack or feint. It goes totally against, actually the thing you mentioned, the Schwerpunkt-tactic. And what then was then the effort that was called Kyiv convoy, a 64km long convoy stuck there to do what? It wasn't a feint or diversion as the attacking forces were quite the same as the attacking forces attacking Kharkiv, which also wasn't taken. There the 1st Guards Tank army, the most powerful formation of the Russian army failed to take Kharkiv (and it's commander was sacked). Was that also a feint/diversion?

I think you should give some credible arguments that this operation was a feint or just a diversion.

Your particular take on it seems to be that the Russians ran into unanticipated resistance. — Tzeentch

If I use the Occam's razor, that would be the answer. And I would add to that the fact that Russians ran also into unanticipated problems of their own: the armed forces were simply not ready for a giant war like this. There's simply too much anecdotal evidence of this, if we don't take listen to the general consensus that this operation didn't go well for Russia. Just like this brief encounter from the start of the war:



Where the Russians did succeed was in the south attacking from Crimea. I think these formations were from the South and had seen combat in Georgia/Chechnya, so they were also a bit better (and obviously the Ukrainians basically were defending the North and the East.

Had the Russians been able to take Kiev with such an attack, it would imply the Ukrainians let them walk into Kiev basically unopposed.

Honestly, that hypothetical scenario isn't really worth considering. — Tzeentch

As I quoted earlier a highly regarded Western think tank, they didn't believe that Ukraine could repel an attack towards Kyiv from the Russian armed forces just few months before it was tried. It's quite an apologist take to say that they really didn't try to take Kyiv.

As of typing, I can't be bothered to round up more. — jorndoe

This has been said over and over again, but facts don't win an argument. Yet I think it's important in this kind of thread that someone points out the facts. :up:

Looks like Russia is running out of options. And while in a more rational society this might be an impetus for negotiations, now there is a ramping up - on both sides.

They really should try to hold talks. Unless they topple Putin from the inside, it is not wise to cage a tiger with no way out. It's pretty reckless. imo.

The size of the attack and the use of paratroops to seize a central airport doesn't logically sound as a diversionary attack or feint. It goes totally against, actually the thing you mentioned, the Schwerpunkt-tactic. And what then was then the effort that was called Kyiv convoy, a 64km long convoy stuck there to do what? — ssu

For a diversion to work, it must be believable. To tie up large amounts of troops requires real fighting.

The difference is simply that in an actual offensive the orders are to try to push through and get to various objectives, whereas in a diversionary fixing operation the orders are to push until enemy resistance is encountered and then minimise casualties.

Definitely there will still be casualties with a large manoeuvre intended to tie-up whole armies and there will still be commanders trying to do things as efficiently as possible, which may involve taking an airport.

And, no disputing that the idea outcome is Ukraine simply capitulate and accept the offered peace terms.

The debate has been between the idea that the entire operation in the North was some sort of failed attempt to storm Kiev or the first phase of conquering all of Ukraine. I.e. the "facts" you seem to laud against the propaganda of just calling everything Russia does incompetent.

Incompetence would have been not even getting out of Crimea ... and even then not necessarily incompetence but because Ukraine did the logical thing and blowup the bridges and heavily defended the coast.

Where the Russians did succeed was in the south attacking from Crimea. I think these formations were from the South and had seen combat in Georgia/Chechnya, so they were also a bit better (and obviously the Ukrainians basically were defending the North and the East. — ssu

Aka. the operations in the North meant they were unable to defend the South, the obvious military objective of creating a land bridge to Crimea that military analysts pointed out the Kremlin would be very much wanting to accomplish.

You basically lay out in your own words the logic of feinting / diverting / fixing / distracting, whatever you want to call it, operation in the North.

Looks like Russia is running out of options. And while in a more rational society this might be an impetus for negotiations, now there is a ramping up - on both sides. — Manuel

Zelensky has made his position clear that any compromise is rejected (at least right now).

As for running out of options, the current situation is not a military bad one for Russia: they still hold Kherson and the whole land bridge back to Donbas and Russia.

Best report I've seen into actual conditions on the front is this Washington Post article:

A clear picture of Ukraine’s losses could not be independently assessed.

Denys, sitting upright on his hospital bed, said almost every member of his 120-person unit was injured, though only two were killed.

A 25-year-old soldier being treated for shrapnel wounds said that, within his unit of 100 soldiers, seven were killed and 20 injured. Ihor, the platoon commander, said 16 of the 32 men under his command were injured and one was killed. — Wounded Ukrainian soldiers reveal steep toll of Kherson offensive - Washington Post

The whole article is insightful, but the above first-hand casualty reports should be concerning to anyone who thinks Ukrainian victory is "in the bag".

And so, we are getting sham elections and a "partial" mobilization. So bad is the situation for Russia.



I assume that the sham elections will go as well as in Stalin's time, but the partial mobilization might be something more difficult. There simply should be an organization to mobilize the forces.

Looks like Russia is running out of options. And while in a more rational society this might be an impetus for negotiations, now there is a ramping up - on both sides. — Manuel

Now the mobilization shows clearly what kind of failure this war has been to Russia. It's something like the Russo-Japanese war. And I think can easily have similar consequences as that war had.

My worst fear is that if the now held areas are "acquired" to be part of Mother Russia, Putin will use tactical nukes to "Escalate to De-escalate" and then cow the West to urge Ukraine to stop the war immediately however badly it is going for Russia.

Using one or two tactical nukes against Ukrainian field units wouldn't be extremely useful, modern brigades and combat teams are simply quite spread on the battlefield. But the public scare would be phenomenal. Naturally Putin's Russia would be even more of an outcast and China would reject the use of nuclear weapons. But if Putin can sell the illusion that Russia is under threat, he could do it. Otherwise now it's just useful to make threats about the use.