And what about this claim?

Putin made quite easily same kind of mistakes like Hitler after the victories against Poland and France. — ssu

And this claim...

Similarly Putin's earlier victories and the West's mute response made him confident the Ukrainians wouldn't be much of a match and he could pull off the invasion that he started on the 24th of February this year. — ssu

And this claim...

Russia modeled it's attack from the most successful military operation that the Soviet Union did post-WW2: Operation Danube.

The objective was to capture Kyiv ... — ssu

______


And what about your implied claim that Russia was aiming for a full-scale invasion of Ukraine?

The number of troops the Russians have deployed indicate they never intended to invade all of Ukraine. — Tzeentch

If the Ukrainians would not have defended at all, just why would you think Putin would have stopped? What Putin has said about the "artificiality" of the sovereignty of Ukraine shows clearly what he thinks about Ukraine. — ssu

Oh, and when I stated that it was a highly questionable assumption that Russia intended to hold all the territory that it occupied at one point or another, you replied characterstically with:

LOL! :rofl: — ssu

So lets hear you substantiate the claim that Russia intended to hold all territory it occupied as well.

I see you mentioned me, but same applies to you as to boethius: I don't read your posts, I don't care what you think, so don't jump up and down trying to catch my attention after I already told you to fuck off - it's undignified.

And while we're on the topic of historical throwbacks.

When Nazi-Germany invaded Ukraine in June of 1941, they deployed roughly 800,000 - 1,000,000 troops, fighting against an extremely weak and disorganised Soviet military.

To anyone familiar with military doctrine and strategy, this should be no surprise. Invading and occupying a country isn't just about defeating troops, but also about supply lines and holding the ground that is taken. That requires troops, and a big country like Ukraine would require a lot of troops to fully invade and occupy.

Russia only deployed a fraction of what would be necessary to accomplish this. Mearsheimer makes this point ( The causes and consequences of the Ukraine war, he addresses it during the lecture and answers a specific question about it during the Q&A at 1:55:00 ) . To me that implies a full invasion and occupation was not their objective.

What I was referring as proof was against the argument from Tzeentch that:

Everybody and their dog knew it wasn't going to be a repeat of 2014, and that the Ukrainians would be prepared. — Tzeentch — ssu

So dodging the substantive question again, then?

Notwithstanding the fact that nothing in the article you cited comes close to refuting @Tzeentch's point. People assessing Russia's full invasion capacity to outmatch Ukraine is not even close to refuting the idea that everyone knew it wouldn't be a repeat of 2014.

I don't read your posts — SophistiCat

Your reply is a performative contradiction.

don't care what you think, so don't jump up and down trying to catch my attention — SophistiCat

If tagging someone constitutes "jump[ing] up and down trying to catch [someone's] attention", then why are you tagging me when you "don't care" what I think? Seems a little undignified...

Yesterday there was a lengthy interview with Scott Ritter, a former USMC intelligence officer, who I gather is a fairly controversial figure.

Still, he had some interesting things to say and gave the impression of being both knowledgable and relatively unbiased.



Starts getting into the Ukraine war and the Kherson offensive at 18:30.

Also interested to know what the forum thinks of this man. Has he been brought up before?

@boethius , @Tzeentch - if you're going to be snarky try and put some substance in it.

@Isaac @SophistiCat - neither of you needs to have a contest about who wants to talk to the other person the least. Walk away from each other if you can't be constructive.

@Olivier5 - you posted just an insult to Tzeetch. If you can't keep a post reasonably civil, don't post it at all.

Fair enough.

Notwithstanding the fact that nothing in the article you cited comes close to refuting Tzeentch's point. — Isaac

Really???

So @Tzeentch says:

Everybody and their dog knew it wasn't going to be a repeat of 2014, and that the Ukrainians would be prepared. — Tzeentch

And then I note that the US was offering to evacuate Zelenskyi and I gave example of how Western think tanks thought that the capital Kyiv would fall in hours and the best option of Ukraine would be to fight with an insurgency? Sorry, but if you would know anything about military issues, advising to fight with an insurgency means that you cannot directly stop any military attack otherwise.

And then you say that doesn't refute the idea that everybody thought Ukraine was prepared and could stage a fight as it has done. :roll:

That's simply laughable. Insane.

And what about your implied claim that Russia was aiming for a full-scale invasion of Kiev? — Tzeentch

Please now, Tzeentch, try yourself to back up your words and say that the battle for Kyiv wasn't a push to try to take the capital. The taking of Antonov Airport and the drive towards Kyiv.

I'm waiting with popcorn for this thing.

For sanity's sake, here are two videos to watch:

Just what is wrong with Meersheimer's idea explained by Alexander Stubb:



And an interview done just as the invasion had started in February, a sober interview with Stephen Kotkin. Even if done in the start of March, it still is worthwile to listen to:

I see you mentioned me, but same applies to you as to boethius: I don't read your posts, I don't care what you think, so don't jump up and down trying to catch my attention after I already told you to fuck off - it's undignified. — SophistiCat

I think I should take some example from you. :up:

There are no winners in war. The survivors get to count their dead. — unenlightened

The survivors also tend write the history. It'd be interesting to read a history of war written by those who did not survive. I don't think it would dwell so much on the glory.

And what about your implied claim that Russia was aiming for a full-scale invasion of Kiev? — Tzeentch

Please now, Tzeentch, try yourself to back up your words and say that the battle for Kyiv wasn't a push to try to take the capital. — ssu

I meant to write 'full-scale invasion of Ukraine' there, but I also find it plausible that the Russians did not intend to take and hold Kiev, even if they could have. I've already presented arguments why I believe that.

In summary:

- The Ukraine's centre of gravity is not in Kiev, because this war isn't conducted from Kiev. It's foreign support that is keeping this war going. Capturing Kiev would be symbolic, but not decisive.

- With the limited amount of troops Russia has deployed, it is unlikely they intended to spend the time and effort it would require to capture Kiev, when they had areas of strategic significance to occupy in the south.

- It is in Russia's primary interest that Ukraine continues to fight this war themselves. The capture of Kiev and it's C&C facilities could bring a western intervention closer.

- My view is that the drive on Kiev was a show of force and Russia's last attempt at finishing the conflict quickly. By showing they were not bluffing, they could conceivably have made the West back off and forced a renegotiation of Ukraine's position. If this were to fail, which it did, it could double as a diversionary attack to allow Russian forces to occupy the south with less resistance.

And then you say that doesn't refute the idea that everybody thought Ukraine was prepared and could stage a fight as it has done. :roll:

That's simply laughable. Insane. — ssu

LOL! :rofl: — ssu

Much of the things we are discussing here are speculatory, and not factual. Multiple perspectives are possible, and finding one perspective more convincing than others does not mean that the other perspectives are completely without merit. Time will tell, and it's entirely possible that when they open the archives that all of us were wrong.

But if you're so convinced you're right and find perspectives that conflict with yours "laughable" and "insane", then why are you here? If an echo chamber is what you're looking for you can just turn on the tv.

That was true once, but nowadays we don't need to wait years or decades for court historians to write their politically correct histories. We can get news and analysis just as events are progressing. We can get a survivor's account of Russian occupation days after it's been lifted. There is no glory there. And the dead - they talk as well, perhaps louder even than the living, because they have no reason to suppress or distort.

We can get news and analysis just as events are progressing. We can get a survivor's account of Russian occupation days after it's been lifted. — SophistiCat

The duration of elapsed time between the events and the narrative created around them doesn't magically make bias disappear.

Neither you nor I are in the war, even those in it don't have an eagle eye view of the whole theatre.

Everything we hear is a filtered narrative. Without exception. The idea that the news, or literally any other source, provides us with some unbiased 'window on reality' is absurd.

I see you mentioned me, but same applies to you as to boethius: I don't read your posts, I don't care what you think, so don't jump up and down trying to catch my attention after I already told you to fuck off - it's undignified.
— SophistiCat
I think I should take some example from you. :up: — ssu

Likewise... :-)

Speaking of tags, I'm not tagging any of you because I want you all to ignore my posts, even though I am talking about you. This is called 'dehumanising' and it makes the slaughter much easier to stomach.

Living up to your name? :wink:

Talking about historical precedents to the current war, and for all the mentions of WW2, there is also a possible parallel to be made with WW1, -- in accelerated fashion. Many milbloggers and experts have made the comparison, because of the importance of artillery warfare, the trenches etc. So there was a first dynamic phase during which the Germans made much progress and threatened Paris; then the first wave was repelled and a long static phase of trench warfare followed; ending with a more dynamic phase again, when the allies kicked back against an exhausted German front and breached it. The threat of total collapse of the front, combined with civil unrest in Germany forced the Kaiser and co. to capitulate.

I also find it plausible that the Russians did not intend to take and hold Kiev — Tzeentch

Seems that you aren't a von Clausewitz fan.

- The Ukraine's centre of gravity is not in Kiev, because this war isn't conducted from Kiev. It's foreign support that is keeping this war going. Capturing Kiev would be symbolic, but not decisive. — Tzeentch

Hmm...so Capturing the Western border was the objective then? Or what?

- It is in Russia's primary interest that Ukraine continues to fight this war themselves. The capture of Kiev and it's C&C facilities could bring a western intervention closer. — Tzeentch

How? The US won't start WW3 because of Ukraine. That's already established. And what do you mean "by themselves"? The Russian army has had to save many times the Donetsk and Luhansk rebels before when the war was limited to the Donbas.

My view is that the drive on Kiev was a show of force and Russia's last attempt at finishing the conflict quickly. By showing they were not bluffing, they could conceivably have made the West back off and forced a renegotiation of Ukraine's position. If this were to fail, which it did, it could double as a diversionary attack to allow Russian forces to occupy the south with less resistance. — Tzeentch

I wonder why you find it so hard to agree that a) Russians did try to take the Capital and b) once the defense was far more stiffer than anticipated, they understood that some Stalingrad/Grozny -type slow methodical overtaking of the capital was immensely costly and likely counterproductive, so they opted to withdraw understanding their limited resources. This withdrawal was easy as Ukrainians wouldn't follow them over to Belarus (and basically start a war with the country).

That simply sounds far more logical than showing something to the West with an attack that somehow isn't anticipated to work...or just be a fake.

Iconic Russian singer Alla Pugacheva, 73, a variety superstar for decades in the USSR and Russia, has denounced the conflict in Ukraine on Instagram, citing the death of soldiers "for illusory purposes".

Reacting to the announcement, on Friday, of the placement of her husband, the actor Maxim Galkin, who had openly criticized the military campaign in Ukraine, on the infamous list of "foreign agents", Alla Pugacheva wrote that her husband, currently abroad, wishes in Russia "freedom of expression and an end to the death of our boys for illusory objectives which make our country a pariah and weigh on the lives of our citizens ".

Seems that you aren't a von Clausewitz fan. — ssu

Why not? 'Centre of gravity' (Schwerpunkt) is a Clausewitzian term. ;)

It is in Russia's primary interest that Ukraine continues to fight this war themselves. The capture of Kiev and it's C&C facilities could bring a western intervention closer. — Tzeentch

How? The US won't start WW3 because of Ukraine. — ssu

They probably won't start WW3, but the United States is deeply invested in Ukraine, starting with the Bush administration fourteen years ago in 2008, and possibly earlier.

A total defeat of Ukraine would be a major blow to the United States, both in terms of investments lost and reputation. That's something they cannot afford in a time where US hegemony is being overtly challenged.

If under current conditions a total defeat of Ukraine is threatened, the United States won't let that happen quietly, even if it means risking escalation.

Putin isn't the only one capable of brinkmanship.

I wonder why you find it so hard to agree that a) Russians did try to take the Capital — ssu

Because I remain unconvinced that they made a serious effort to do so, and the attack was likely a probe, followed by a diversionary attack or feint.

b) once the defense was far more stiffer than anticipated, they understood that some Stalingrad/Grozny -type slow methodical overtaking of the capital was immensely costly and likely counterproductive, so they opted to withdraw understanding their limited resources. — ssu

I think those things played a role in their decision-making process. Your particular take on it seems to be that the Russians ran into unanticipated resistance.

Again, I keep pointing to the limited troops the Russians have deployed, making it in my view unlikely that their war aims were to take the capital and take and hold a lot of territory in the south. They simply didn't have the manpower to make that happen.

At the onset of war, it was roughly 200,000 Russian troops versus roughly 250,000 Ukrainian troops. Most contemporary military doctrine prescribes at least a 3:1 numerical advantage when on the offensive, and preferably even a 5:1 advantage. The Russians didn't even have a numerical advantage, they were outnumbered!

Sure, they may have believed their troops were qualitatively superior, but no qualitative edge can bridge such a gap. These things were all on the table before the invasion began, so the Russians knew what they were in for.

Was the Ukrainian resistance stiffer than they had anticipated? Maybe. But we need to have a sense of proportion. We don't know the Russian war aims, so we have nothing to compare their current situation with, other than estimating what their war aims might've been, based on the few things we do know.

If one's opinion is that the Russians expected to take Kiev in a few hours and Ukraine in an equally rapid amount of time, they'd obviously not be doing well.

If however one's opinion is that the Russians aimed for a limited war - something which I believe is supported by the available evidence I have discussed - it paints a different picture.

Well, US intelligence (with the UK close behind) had warned (at least) since Oct 2021 about Russian moves and danger. The EU and Ukraine kind of fumbled some, except for the general training/mobilization since the 2014 Crimea grab, which, I'm guessing, made a difference. I suppose, since the decision to start warring rests with the attacker-invader, there's only so much peace-mongers can do. I've no doubt that there'd be some fumbling again in a similar situation, and that many would effectively argue toward that.

The Guardian (Feb 11, 2022): US warns of ‘distinct possibility’ Russia will invade Ukraine within days
The New Yorker (May 9, 2022): How Ukrainians Saved Their Capital
Washington Post (Aug 16, 2022): Road to war: U.S. struggled to convince allies, and Zelensky, of risk of invasion
↑ paywalled, ↓ summarizes
The Brussels Times (Aug 19, 2022): US warned of Russian invasion for months but EU dithered

The Ukrainians had information, though, from there to thinking it would happen, and to further proactively implement a strong defensive posture, is another step (also easily construed as provocation by Putin for that matter). Seems doubtful that Putin would sacrifice military resources like that in an outright fake Kyiv takeover; history tells a different story. What would that say about Putin anyway? Belarus and Transnistria are standing by. A few states have now taken measures, less fumbling, which Putin and team may or may not have anticipated.

One factor pointing toward the status of taking Kyiv being a central goal at the beginning of the invasion is how the failure to do so has greatly diminished the utility of Belarus in the conflict.

One imagines that the situation in that country would be very different if it was now the favored access path to a Kiev ruled by a puppet government.

I wonder why you find it so hard to agree that a) Russians did try to take the Capital
— ssu

Because I remain unconvinced that they made a serious effort to do so, and the attack was likely a probe, followed by a diversionary attack or feint. — Tzeentch

Are we to believe then, that if the Russian 'probe' had succeeded all the way to Kiev, it would have been a failure of the Russian strategy?

It's a bit pointless to speculate over something as unlikely as the Russians being able to take Kiev free of cost. Who is to say what they would have done in that case?

Maybe they would not have taken the city, despite getting it "for free", for the reasons I've already explained. Maybe they would have taken the city, but abandoned it later. Or perhaps they would have taken and held the city for as long as they could, even though it's a massive commitment to occupy a city like Kiev. I find the first two options a lot more likely than the third.

But this is just speculation over a very unlikely hypothetical scenario, about an event that has already taken place.

I have not been following all the interchanges here, but I am curious where the taking of Kiev 'free of cost' idea refers to. Who spoke the quote marks, "for free."?

Are we to believe then, that if the Russian 'probe' had succeeded all the way to Kiev, it would have been a failure of the Russian strategy? — Olivier5

A probing attack or a feint are non-committal attacks.

A probe is meant to gauge the degree of enemy resistance in a certain area. A feint is meant to provoke an overreaction.

Had the Russians been able to take Kiev with such an attack, it would imply the Ukrainians let them walk into Kiev basically unopposed.

Honestly, that hypothetical scenario isn't really worth considering.