And you seem to assume that the Russian side never makes any mistake, and that "everything is going according to plan". — Olivier5

I don't see anyone claiming this.

Rather, a good military plan includes what to do if certain missions fail.

Certainly plan A was Kiev accept the offered peace terms at the start of the war, obviously that plan failed.

However, there was clearly a plan B which was take the key Southern regions and liberate Donbas by force, do some denazification and so on.

In the current situation, certainly plan A is defend both Kherson and the Kharkiv region, but plan B is that if defending lines in Kharkiv fails to withdraw.

In chess the "not-best-moves" are categorised into inefficiencies, mistakes and blunders.

The ant-Russian propaganda presents the smallest of Russian setbacks as catastrophical blunders, and when it's explained that's obviously not the case then the retort is "you think the Russians don't make mistakes!"

Fact of the matter is, in purely military terms, Russians have no blundered. Being stuck in Crimea would have been a blunder, a rescue of Mariupol.

The offensive to Kiev obviously had pros and cons. Certainly involved many inefficiencies and mistakes ... but so too the Ukrainians.

When you send soldiers to war some of them are going to fuck up and die, it's just a fact. There's no evidence that Russians do more of this than the Ukrainians. To make a strategic appraisal we need to know if one side is fucking-up and dying more than the other.

And this key information we simply don't have. If the Russians killed a lot more soldiers and destroyed more vehicles, and of higher quality, than the Ukrainians in the Northern operations, then it is successful engagements of attrition, in addition to distracting Ukrainian forces from the South, it they had way higher losses then maybe it was still worth it as a fixing operation (or maybe not).

Likewise with the sanctions; could be a major blunder if the Russian economy collapses as has been predicted since the first week of the war ... but that hasn't happened yet.

I don't see anyone claiming this. — boethius

It's subconscious, I think.

It's subconscious, I think. — Olivier5

If you're battling other people's subconscious, shouldn't you do that subconsciously and in silence?

I trying to help, by teasing out unconscious, unexamined assumptions, thus allowing us to examine them -- a time-honored philosophical tradition.

A wise lad once said, "Why do you see the speck in your brother's eye, but fail to see the beam of wood in your own?"

It's not a time honoured tradition to not address what your interlocutors actually say.

If you want to honour this tradition you're talking about, you should first address what's actually said and then carry on your project of speculating what unexamined assumptions there maybe.

For instance, in the Socratic method (indeed, time honoured) the way to do that is: asking questions.

Otherwise, just paraphrasing erroneously people is called: disrespectful and a waste of time.

For example, to take the text in question (and not risk erroneously paraphrasing you myself):

↪Tzeentch And you seem to assume that the Russian side never makes any mistake, and that "everything is going according to plan". So the reason you are "struggling to see where this idea comes from that Russia is losing" is simply that you assume that whatever happens is a desirable outcome for the Russians. — Olivier5

Nowhere does seem to assume never makes mistakes; the point was it that the idea of a significant Ukrainian victory (as plastered everywhere in the Western media at present) is questionable.

And those are just the facts (so far).

Kherson offensive had very little impact (so far at least).

Around Kharkiv, Russians simply withdrew (avoiding getting trapped or overrun, which could have easily happened had they not retreated, and would have been far worse).

The conclusion of the recent offensives (so far) is nothing really changed in the strategic situation and it appears a high cost in lives for Ukrainians to achieve a largely propaganda victory (which they certainly need to motivate more Western aid ... but wars are not won by propaganda alone, or Ukraine would rule the entire world by now).

In addition, Russia has demonstrated it can disable half the Ukrainian power grid.

This all could be a good setup for a diplomatic resolution, which the Europeans could easily force (if they weren't bitches ... but I think that boat has sailed a long time ago).

Don't change the subject all the time. I'm trying to help you understand something, and it's hard enough.

The reason you are "struggling to see where this idea comes from that Russia is losing" is simply that you subconsciously assume that whatever happens is a desirable outcome for the Russians. Rid yourself of this assumption, and you may start to read the message on the wall. But if every time something happens, you jump to the interpretation that the Russians must have wanted this to happen all along, you will never be able to understand how Russia is losing.

To caricature your position a little bit, if the Ukrainians ever end up besieging Moscow, you will conclude that the Russian leadership have them Ukrainian hordes exactly where they want them to be!

The reason you are "struggling to see where this idea comes from that Russia is losing" is simply that you subconsciously assume that whatever happens is a desirable outcome for the Russians. — Olivier5

I don't think this characterizes my position very well. But already said about this what needed to be said (and thank you for that ).

Okay. It should thus be easy for you to point out a military event or offensive or situation that did not go according to Russian plans. What would that be?

If they wanted to invade and occupy all of Ukraine, the troops they'd need to deploy to keep it under control would have to be several times what they've deployed now. — Tzeentch

How much troops did they need to annex Crimea? And the way Russia could interfere in Ukrainian politics before makes it easy to underestimate Ukrainian resolve.

Putin made quite easily same kind of mistakes like Hitler after the victories against Poland and France.

What you're implying is that all territory Russia at one point or another controlled they also meant to hold.

I think that's a highly questionable assumption. — Tzeentch

LOL! :rofl:

Oh boy, these arm-chair pro-Russians....

The reason you are "struggling to see where this idea comes from that Russia is losing" is simply that you subconsciously assume that whatever happens is a desirable outcome for the Russians. Rid yourself of this assumption, and you may start to read the message on the wall. — Olivier5

:up: :100:

In February, Putin met with Xi in Beijing. Now, Xi will meet Putin somewhere in Central Asia just a month before Xi is poised to cement his place as the most powerful Chinese leader since Mao Zedong. — magritte

Follow-up on that:

We understand your questions and concern about this. During today's meeting, we will of course explain our position, we will explain in detail our position on this issue, although we have talked about this before. — Putin to Xi

Putin in Samarkand is not a happy boy. China has "questions and concerns." So does India:

I know your stance on the conflict in Ukraine and the concerns you constantly express. We’ll do everything to end this as soon as possible. — Putin to Modi

Modi said that "today’s era is not one for war." Xi did not even mention Ukraine in his statement after the talks. I suppose that's as far as he is prepared to go in his support for Russia: not chastising it in public.

Didn't read any of that.


On a different topic:

Sure, demonstrate your fanatical devotion to your preferred propaganda by proudly explaining your closed mindedness on a debate forum.

How much troops did they need to annex Crimea? And the way Russia could interfere in Ukrainian politics before makes it easy to underestimate Ukrainian resolve. — ssu

Putin made quite easily same kind of mistakes like Hitler after the victories against Poland and France. — ssu

Seems like there's two wild, unsubstantiated claims in here:

1. Russia modelled their invasion of Ukraine on the previous conflict in Crimea.
2. Russia's invasion of Ukraine can from a military-strategic viewpoint be compared to Hitler's invasion of Poland and France.

The podium is all yours friend. Show the world you've got more than clowning, 'pro-Russian' accusations (which are beyond sad, by the way) and parroting western propaganda.

I won't argue those bullet points as theses, but several observations occur to me.

In 2014, Russia succeeded in getting a large number of the 'the self-identified Russian' population to support the changes. There are no similar groups in play during this Special Operation. The attempts to set up a similar scheme in Kherson has collapsed. The conscription methods in Donetsk and Luhansk have the population hiding their males to protect them from the war. So whatever strategic/tactical similarities may exist between the present operation and the first invasion, the previous element of local support is not there in newly attacked territories.

The WW2 comparison most apt for the present situation in the Kherson oblast is the Battle of the Bulge. The Germans were kicking butt until their supply lines were cut and they could not retreat across a big river.

Russia modeled it's attack from the most successful military operation that the Soviet Union did post-WW2: Operation Danube.

The objective was to capture Kyiv and replace the existing administration and take basically the part of "Novorossiya" into Russia. That the Donetsk and Luhansk Republics were planned to be annexed into Russia is quite evident (starting from the Freudian slip of the intelligence chief, just to give one example). Hence it was basically a strategic strike.

Which then failed the first day.

2. Russia's invasion of Ukraine can from a military-strategic viewpoint be compared to Hitler's invasion of Poland and France — Tzeentch

When you don't get it, you really don't get it.

The success of Hitler in Poland and France made not only him, but his generals to believe that the Soviet Union could be beaten in 100 days. Hubris kicked in. If France fell so easily, why wouldn't the Soviet Union too, which couldn't even annex puny Finland?

Similarly Putin's earlier victories and the West's mute response made him confident the Ukrainians wouldn't be much of a match and he could pull off the invasion that he started on the 24th of February this year. That since 2014 when the war started, the Ukrainians basically wouldn't have done anything.

What the hell you are talking about above, I don't know.

There are no winners in war. The survivors get to count their dead.

Russia modeled it's attack from the most successful military operation that the Soviet Union did post-WW2: Operation Danube. — ssu

First it was Crimea, now it is Czechoslovakia.

Invading a diplomatically isolated, unprepared Soviet republic and invading a western-backed, militarily prepared Ukraine? The two couldn't be further apart.

You're now claiming the Russians modelled their invasion of Ukraine after their invasion of Czechoslovakia - a conflict that took place over 50 years ago? Lets see some proof then. Or anything that resembles a reasoned argument.

Similarly Putin's earlier victories and the West's mute response made him confident the Ukrainians wouldn't be much of a match and he could pull off the invasion that he started on the 24th of February this year. That since 2014 when the war started, the Ukrainians basically wouldn't have done anything. — ssu

Mhm. Except that there was an eight year period between the invasion of Crimea in 2014 and the invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

The conditions surrounding the invasion of Crimea were completely different from the invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Furthermore, the element of surprise the Russians had in 2014 was not present in 2022. The United States has been preparing Ukraine since at least January 2021, and probably earlier.

Everybody and their dog knew it wasn't going to be a repeat of 2014, and that the Ukrainians would be prepared.

So getting back to your earlier response, what your claim boils down to is that Russia's troop deployments aren't a product of meticulous planning as is standard in modern militaries (argued also by experts such as Mearsheimer), but it's because they're a bunch of dummies who underestimated their opponent.


So, let's take stock:

1. The invasion of Ukraine was modelled after the invasion of Crimea? Czechoslovakia? Conflicts that couldn't be more different in nature. Wild claim. Zero substantiation. Lets see some proof then if you want to argue wild!

2. Putin is Hitler in 1941, except everything is completely different. Supposedly the invasion of Crimea eight years prior gave him all the confidence he needed to wing an invasion of a western-backed Ukraine.


You expect me to take your "they're a bunch of dummies" argument seriously, when everything from common sense to military doctrine and expert opinion points towards the Russians having made a carefully weighed decision?

That the Russians did not have enough troops deployed in and around Ukraine for a full invasion was already known in the West before the start of the invasion, with Ukrainian officials going on record stating they were not expecting a full-scale invasion, but were fearing for a more localized conflict.


All I'm seeing from you and is knee-jerk reactions whenever your flimsy ideas of how this war is going are challenged. Accusations of partisanship and "subconscious biases" - have either of you ever looked in a mirror?

All I'm seeing from you and ↪Olivier5 is knee-jerk reactions whenever your flimsy ideas of how this war is going are challenged. Accusations of partisanship and "subconscious biases" - have either of you ever looked in a mirror? — Tzeentch

Oh I am clearly pro-Ukraine, I haven't been shy about it. Whose side are you on?

Whose side are you on? — Olivier5

No one's. I'm not a part of this conflict.

You're now claiming the Russians modelled their invasion of Ukraine after their invasion of Czechoslovakia - a conflict that took place over 50 years ago? Lets see some proof then. Or anything that resembles a reasoned argument. — Tzeentch

Learn what a strategic strike means in military terminology first.

The similarity with the occupation of Czechoslovakia and Crimea should be evident: Both were military operations where the opponent didn't fight back. Both achieved strategic surprise. Both events we even don't call wars, they were so successful. When you can achieve your objectives without even a shot fired, the military operation has really achieves it's goals. The tanks just appeared on the streets of Prague, just like the Russia paratroops appeared in Crimea, whom the Western media even didn't call out to be Russian, so totally dumbfounded was back then the Western media. The totally insane lie that these would be "Crimean volunteers" got the media confused and it fell into bothsidesing. The pro-Russian propaganda had a field day.

Invading a diplomatically isolated, unprepared Soviet republic and invading a western-backed, militarily prepared Ukraine? — Tzeentch

This just shows how ignorant you are.

Czechoslovakia wasn't a Soviet Republic (like Ukraine was during the Soviet Union). And Ukraine in 2014 was totally unprepared for any military attack. There were no shots fired when Russia took over Crimea. The military was able to respond to the Donbas insurgency only far later. Ukraine was militarily prepared by the West.

(Russian troops and Ukrainian troops confined to their barracks in Crimea in 2014)

Everybody and their dog knew it wasn't going to be a repeat of 2014, and that the Ukrainians would be prepared. — Tzeentch

Perhaps not as an easy cake-walk as Crimea, but the view was that it was totally possible for the Russian military to take out Ukraine quickly. Your "and your dog" argument that everybody knew that Ukraine would be prepared is totally false, absolute bullshit.

Proof:

The US offered Zelenskyi to evacuate him. Why would they offer this, if they were certain that there would be a war fought for months? Before the attack the ability for Ukraine to defend itself from a Russian aggression was seen quite futile.

For example, the Atlantic Council openly questioned in December 2021 Ukraine's ability to defend itself in a conventional war and opted to go for an insurgency:

Deterrence can be achieved by denial or punishment of the aggressor. Unfortunately, it is highly unlikely Ukraine can deny Russian invasion forces at or near its border. Therefore, Ukraine’s best chance of deterring the Russians is to threaten to punish them once they cross the border.

Ukraine can raise the cost to Russia by preparing for a long war complete with significant guerrilla activity behind Russian lines. Russian leaders are acutely aware of the price Afghan guerrillas extracted for the occupation of their country. Preparation for this kind of war requires recruiting and training personnel as well as establishing weapons caches quickly. Such efforts are already underway and will likely intensify in the weeks ahead.

See Guerrilla tactics offer Ukraine’s best deterrent against Putin’s invasion force

Something like fighting a conventional war was obviously out of the question to the author above.

This is what the CSIS think tank thought of the chances of Ukraine in November of 2021, just months before the attack happened:

Russian military forces—including elements of the 41st Combined Field Army and 144th Guards Motorized Rifle Division (see Figure 4)—would likely outmatch Ukrainian conventional forces and overrun Kiev in a matter of hours if they invaded.

See CSIS report: Moscows continuing Ukrainian buildup

A well-respected think tank estimating that the capital will fall in hours showed just how little the West believed in Ukraine. The West had just experienced the fall of Afghanistan. The Russian military machine looked smart: modernized and capable.

You expect me to take your "they're a bunch of dummies" argument seriously — Tzeentch

Because you are inventing your own fabricated narrative that you then answer and not that what people actually say, I guess I shouldn't take you seriously either.

I made it clear to you more than once that you are not worth my time.

No one's. I'm not a part of this conflict. — Tzeentch

Does that mean you are indifferent to the outcome of the war?

This is brilliant. So your 'proof' that Russia intended to take Ukraine is that some analysts thought that Russia could beat Ukraine in a full invasion. The same analysts you now want to claim were wrong? So the analysts who you want to claim got it wrong are the ones you want us to believe got it right?

And talking of...

inventing your own fabricated narrative that you then answer — ssu

...any intention of actually answering the very simple question I asked? Or just going to stick with fabricating your own narrative and answering that?

I made it clear to you more than once that you are not worth my time. — SophistiCat

No-one's seriously falling for that. Of course @boethius's comments are well worth your time, that's why you've just chosen to spend your time painting them as being beneath response. If they really were beneath response you'd just not respond. You respond because there's merit to them which you'd rather weren't seen as meritorious, that's the whole point of the 'your arguments aren't even worth responding to' tactic. It's verbatim from the playbook. If arguing against ideas you don't like isn't your scene then just don't, but let's not insult anyone's intelligence by pretending this is anything other than rhetoric.

Learn what a strategic strike means in military terminology first. — ssu

Strategic strike isn't a military term used to denominate ground invasions.

I won't hold it against anyone that they're not experts on military terminology, but don't try to fake expertise.

The similarity with the occupation of Czechoslovakia and Crimea should be evident: Both were military operations where the opponent didn't fight back. Both achieved strategic surprise. Both events we even don't call wars, they were so successful. When you can achieve your objectives without even a shot fired, the military operation has really achieves it's goals. The tanks just appeared on the streets of Prague, just like the Russia paratroops appeared in Crimea, whom the Western media even didn't call out to be Russian, so totally dumbfounded was back then the Western media. The totally insane lie that these would be "Crimean volunteers" got the media confused and it fell into bothsidesing. — ssu

Czechoslovakia wasn't a Soviet Republic (like Ukraine was during the Soviet Union). And Ukraine in 2014 was totally unprepared for any military attack. There were no shots fired when Russia took over Crimea. The military was able to respond to the Donbas insurgency only far later. Ukraine was militarily prepared by the West. — ssu

And what does any of this have to do with the invasion of Ukraine?

I am talking about the troops deployed in the invasion of Ukraine. You replied by asking questions about the Crimea invasion, implying they're in any way comparable - they are not.

Now you went from comparing the invasion of Ukraine to Crimea, to comparing Crimea to Czechoslovakia. Your goalposts move quickly.

Proof:

The US offered Zelenskyi to evacuate him. Why would they offer this, if they were certain that there would be a war fought for months? Before the attack the ability for Ukraine to defend itself from a Russian aggression was seen quite futile. — ssu

How is that proof of anything? Zelensky is an obvious target for assassination regardless of what course the war took.

Why would they offer this, if they were certain that there would be a war fought for months? — ssu

There was no certainty at the onset of war. War is a terribly unpredictable thing that has a way of defying all expectations. So why would anyone assume the Russians were singularly expecting an easy repeat of Crimea? Taking into account worst-case scenarios in the monumental decision to invade Ukraine seems no more than common sense, and it's a standard of military planning.

Something like fighting a conventional war was obviously out of the question to the author above. — ssu

The author, T.X. Hammes, doesn't make that claim at all. You're making stuff up.

Secondly, he's speaking on his own behalf - not on behalf of the US government or the Atlantic Council. He simply wrote an article. And I don't find the article to be without merit. However, it doesn't claim or prove what you believe it does.

This is what the CSIS think tank thought of the chances of Ukraine in November of 2021, just months before the attack happened: — ssu

This is not what the CSIS thought - at the bottom of the page it reads:

"Commentary is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s)."

I suggest you get your quotes and attributions right.


Further, here's CNN reporting two Ukrainian officials (foreign minister Dmytro Kuleba and Ukrainian ambassador Sergiy Korsunsky) on January 26th 2022 going on record saying Russia does not have a sufficient amount of troops for a full invasion of Ukraine: CNN: Ukrainian Foreign Minister says current Russian troop numbers insufficient for full invasion

Official statements by the Ukrainian government, one month before the invasion.

At this point everyone knew the invasion was coming - the only question was when. Obviously there was plenty of reason for uncertainty. I still see zero evidence of the idea that Russia went in expecting an easy victory.

Does that mean you are indifferent to the outcome of the war? — Olivier5

I don't see it as my role to be a cheerleader for either side.

As of yet, I am not able to see the full implications of either outcome, so I reserve judgement. I just sit and watch, and try to understand.

I was answering to @Tzeentch, not you.

Are you refuting that Russia didn't try to attempt a strategic strike? That's brilliant!

So your 'proof' that Russia intended to take Ukraine is that some analysts thought that Russia could beat Ukraine in a full invasion. — Isaac

No. What I was referring as proof was against the argument from @Tzeentch that:

Everybody and their dog knew it wasn't going to be a repeat of 2014, and that the Ukrainians would be prepared. — Tzeentch

And what does any of this have to do with the invasion of Ukraine? — Tzeentch

Are you so absolutely clueless that you don't understand that this war started in 2014? That just for some time, it was called a frozen conflict, yet Russian forces where all the time involved in the Donbas?

But now you are asking what does the occupation of Crimea have to do with this war now? :snicker:

You're going to substantiate your claims, or will you hide behind snarky comments to hide the fact you're backpeddling?

You're going to substantiate your claims, or will you hide behind snarky comments to hide you're backpeddling? — Tzeentch

What backpedaling?

I have consistently said that Russia attempted first a strategic strike, It's objectives that can be seen is to get basically the part of Ukraine called Novorossiya after it already has annexed Crimea. I've consistently said that even if NATO enlargement is ONE reason for the attack in Ukraine, it is wrong to denounce EVERY OTHER reason clearly stated by Putin for this invasion. And simply that when a country annexes parts of another and declares them part of itself, simply the actions of a third party (NATO and it's expansion) don't explain everything. Likely without NATO expansion, Russia would have regained a lot more of it's territory it lost when the Soviet Union collapsed. The imperialism of the Putin regime should be obvious to anybody.

It is you who are asking what does the annexation of Crimea have to do with the war in Ukraine now. So I try to answer that.