The Ukrainian forces took back some territory, but large parts of Ukraine remain in Russian hands. — Tzeentch

Larger still are the Ukrainian regions the Russians failed to invade.

Further, it shows the offensive halted at the first natural line of defense it encountered - the Oskil river. Why would that be?

Because the Russians blown up the bridges over the Oskil river while leaving, duh...

It is significant because it means that the Russians can be beaten.
— Olivier5

You're implying that because Ukraine has shown the Russians can be beaten (lets put it in military terms - "is capable of offensive operations") Russia is losing the war. Seems like a jump to conclusions to me. — Tzeentch

Nope. I simply said that if Russia can be beaten in this oblast, it can be beaten in other oblasts. Do you understand now?

Larger still are the Ukrainian regions the Russians failed to invade. — Olivier5

The number of troops the Russians have deployed indicate they never intended to invade all of Ukraine.

And that's sensible - modern armies have the experience of many failed wars in the Middle-East to know the risks of that.

Because the Russians blown up the bridges over the Oskil river while leaving, duh... — Olivier5

Blowing up bridges doesn't stop a modern army. Ukrainian vehicles have amphibious capability, and their engineer corps possesses over bridging equipment like AVLBs.

If your position is they had the Russians in a full on rout, why didn't they take advantage of their breakthrough?

I simply said that if Russia can be beaten in this oblast, it can be beaten in other oblast. — Olivier5

But not in Kherson, apparently.

Larger still are the Ukrainian regions the Russians failed to invade.
— Olivier5

The number of troops the Russians have deployed indicate they never intended to invade all of Ukraine. — Tzeentch

No, it does not. That is only your interpretation of it. The war goals of this "special operation" haven't been made public. My interpretation is that they expected a rapid Ukrainian surrender.

But not in Kherson, apparently. — Tzeentch

Too early to tell, but the Ukrainians have made progress there too, in blocking the logistics and regaining terrain.

That is only your interpretation of it. — Olivier5

Sure. All we have are interpretations. But it's supported by figures like Mearsheimer. Mearsheimer makes the same point - the number of deployed troops are far below what would be feasible for a full-scale invasion and occupation of Ukraine.

My interpretation is that they expected a rapid Ukrainian surrender. — Olivier5

I would change that slightly - I would say they gave the Ukrainians (but more specifically the West) a chance to back down when they threatened Kiev.

In my opinion, this was the last point where a neutral Ukraine was still an option. They showed their hand and made it clear they weren't bluffing.

That doesn't mean they expected it to lead to a surrender or a re-negotiation of Ukraine's position, but they must've thought it was a possibility. And they must've also had a plan B, that's no more than standard military practice.

The soldiers and officers all thought it would be a walk in the park. That's what they say in any case.

The plan B was evidently to take Kiev and install a puppet regime. Didn't happen either.

The plan B was evidently to take Kiev and install a puppet regime. Didn't happen either. — Olivier5

I don't think that's evident at all.

For one, with western backing it was obvious from the outset that taking Kiev would not end the conflict. Leadership of the war is not and never has been conducted from Kiev.

Secondly, taking Kiev (or any kind of full-scale invasion of Ukraine) would have made direct western military intervention a lot more likely - Russia is obviously trying to avoid this. Keeping the conflict small(-ish) makes the bar for western powers to intervene military high. It also would have discredited the Russian narrative.

I think plan B was to accept war with the West, occupy the strategic areas in the south, and take it from there. The south is crucial, because it is both the key to Russian strategic interests pertaining to Crimea and Transnistria, and cutting off Ukraine from the sea would greatly hamstring it in the long run.

For one, with western backing it was obvious from the outset that taking Kiev would not end the conflict. Leadership of the war is not and never has been conducted from Kiev. — Tzeentch

And yet, they tried to take Kiev and to kill Zelensky. Have you considered that what seems obvious to you may not seem so obvious to someone else? A dictator for instance may find it difficult to fathom that killing Zelensky would not stop the resistance. See what I mean? We are all prisoners of our world view. Putin's world view is hierarchical.

A dictator for instance may find it difficult to fathom that killing Zelensky would not stop the resistance. — Olivier5

I would turn that around, actually. Putin and his cronies aren't fools, nor is Zelensky, nor is the Pentagon or the EU leadership - they likely know a lot more than us.

It's up to us to make sense of their actions - not to dismiss these people as dummies for acting in ways we can't make sense of at first.

But take whatever approach you will. I will stick with the one I just expressed.

This guy has been consistently the best at analysing the frontline situation. Here he gives reasons for new concerns....

What's the Y you'd be willing to advocate? Because apparently it's not ceding territory and it's not ceding any autonomy and you've just admitted that Ukraine are no threat to Russia. — Isaac

The only way Russia is going to the negotiating table is when it cannot obtain it's objectives through military means. What is so difficult here to understand?

Just to take a historical example: Finland was able to negotiate a separate peace with the Soviet Union in 1944 after it repulsed the Soviet offensive in the summer of 1944 with having one defensive line (the Salpa-line) still far behind the front line. Other German allies couldn't do that, even if the switched sides like Romania.

What Ukraine can do is simply what it is doing right now, quite successfully.

The number of troops the Russians have deployed indicate they never intended to invade all of Ukraine. — Tzeentch

If the Ukrainians would not have defended at all, just why would you think Putin would have stopped? What Putin has said about the "artificiality" of the sovereignty of Ukraine shows clearly what he thinks about Ukraine.

If the Ukrainians would not have defended at all, ... — ssu

That's a rather big if.

... just why would you think Putin would have stopped? — ssu

The short answer is, occupying large countries with too few troops is asking for trouble. The Russians know this first hand.

If they wanted to invade and occupy all of Ukraine, the troops they'd need to deploy to keep it under control would have to be several times what they've deployed now.

So the why is: they don't want a repeat of another Afghanistan or Vietnam.

, meddling was/is in all kinds of places, not just "the West".

^{(I suppose we could start categorizing meddlery, like rationales-outcomes, material for a thread on its own, heck maybe a book, tedious. Say, do Transnistria and Donbas have "fingerprints" of sorts?)}

Draconic, domestic oppression-repression is taking things further, as is attempts to take over other nations.

Meddling creepy. People ought to (be left to) make up their own minds by maximum information+ethics and minimal imposition/bias. Takes just one meddler to complicate that.

In the final analysis, this is not our war but we're sacrificing entire families by pushing them into poverty - that includes all the missed opportunities as a result of a lower socio-economic position in society. We're destroying the future of thousands of children in the Netherlands and I doubt it is much different in other European countries. — Benkei

I've gotten the impression the EU has taken the opportunity to use the war in Ukraine to both excuse its desastrous economic policies and to push its energy ideology.

"Never waste a good crisis," seems to be the motto they go by.

As Mao said: "all is chaos under the heavens, the times are excellent".

While I do believe we need the EU to effectively combat the various global crises we're facing, they're still shitty neo-Keynesians for the most part, or worse, half-hearted proponents of MMT. Meaning their economic policies are utter shit. It's like looking at a person with one bucket trying to stop a leaking roof.

Any way, we're straying off topic. We tend to agree about the problems but diverge about their causes and therefor solutions. No need to rehash I think.

A dictator for instance may find it difficult to fathom that killing Zelensky would not stop the resistance.
— Olivier5

I would turn that around, actually. Putin and his cronies aren't fools, nor is Zelensky, nor is the Pentagon or the EU leadership - they likely know a lot more than us. — Tzeentch

I see that my previous response was deleted. Oh my...

This has nothing to see with being a fool, and everything to do with being human.

Putin is a human being, not a god. He makes mistakes, and rest assured that there are things he cannot understand. You should not assume that what seems obvious to you necessarily seems obvious to him.

They tried and failed to capture Kiev and to kill Zelensky. Explain these facts, if you think they weren't trying to install a puppet regime.

Indeed, excellent analysis, eg on why the dam was bombed.

Just to be clear, the bold, stocky guy seen at the beginning of each clip, is Valerii Zaluzhnyi, commander of the armed forces.


"Failures indicate that success was never intended."

Putin is a human being, not a god. He makes mistakes, and rest assured that there are things he cannot understand. You should not assume that what seems obvious to you necessarily seems obvious to him. — Olivier5

Of course. But there are dozens if not hundreds of people working in the Kremlin. Analists, advisors, a general staff etc.

They tried and failed to capture Kiev and to kill Zelensky. Explain these facts, ... — Olivier5

I already explained my view on Russia's initial drive on Kiev.

As for Zelensky - I don't see how an assassination post-invasion would have facilitated the installation of a puppet regime. The goal behind such a move is probably aimed at sowing general chaos in the command structure.

We are long past the stage where regime change would be an option.

I already explained my view on Russia's initial drive on Kiev. — Tzeentch

All you said was:

For one, with western backing it was obvious from the outset that taking Kiev would not end the conflict. Leadership of the war is not and never has been conducted from Kiev.

Secondly, taking Kiev (or any kind of full-scale invasion of Ukraine) would have made direct western military intervention a lot more likely - — Tzeentch

What was the purpose of sending -- and in effect sacrificing -- all these elites troops in the general direction of Kiev at the onset of the war,then? Their lives were spent in vain?

I would say they gave the Ukrainians (but more specifically the West) a chance to back down when they threatened Kiev. — Tzeentch

My view is that this initial drive was a last attempt by the Russians to end the conflict quickly, not necessarily by taking Kiev, but by showing they weren't bluffing and their threats of war were real.

This failed, but it also drew a lot of Ukrainian manpower to the north, reducing resistance in the south, which is where the areas are located that are strategically relevant to the Russians.

If they really wanted to take Kiev, I believe they could have. But it would have taken them a lot of time and manpower, and occupying capital cities isn't all that relevant in a conflict where foreign support is the centre of gravity, so there wasn't much of a point.

Not to mention, if Russia manages to destroy Ukraine's C&C (which is generally the goal of occupying a capital city), who is going to take over that role? The West - likely the United States. The centre of gravity would shift even further towards the foreign backers, drawing them in. Russia will likely try to avoid this.

Wierd.

I asked "what is Ukraine's negotiating position?"

You answered...

The only way Russia is going to the negotiating table is... — ssu

And...

What Ukraine can do is — ssu

I didn't ask what would bring Russia to the negotiating table. I didn't ask what Ukraine could do in general. I asked what negotiating position you'd be prepared to advocate.

Did you have trouble understanding the question? Or do I take your inability to answer it as an indication that your position is exactly as incoherent as it seems.

It's a simple question. Ukraine comes to the negotiating table... what do they offer?

So you think they are dumber than I think they are, because it made no sense to sacrifice the best Russian troops around Kiev just to make a diversion from the South, when the South was already occupied at the time...

As far as I know, Russian advances around Kiev began from the onset of the war, so I'm not sure what you're getting at.

Just to put things into perspective:

I'm struggling to see where this idea comes from that Russia is losing — Tzeentch

What you're implying is that all territory Russia at one point or another controlled they also meant to hold.

I think that's a highly questionable assumption.

And you seem to assume that the Russian side never makes any mistake, and that "everything is going according to plan". So the reason you are "struggling to see where this idea comes from that Russia is losing" is simply that you assume that whatever happens is a desirable outcome for the Russians.

The maps do not really put things in perspective.

There is a massive difference between the areas in the North previously occupied by the Russians and the areas in the South, in particular the Donbas, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia (which Kharkiv is not a part of).

The Southern Donbas to Kherson band is of obviously political and strategic importance: Donbas being the pro-Russian separatist region supported by Russia (and at least nominal cause of the whole war), Kherson controlling the canal that supplies water to Crimea and Zaporizhzhia is the region directly in front of Crimea (additional protection and connects to the other regions for supplies).

Russia conquers nearly all this additional territory in the South in about 3 days and then there is prolonged siege of the Azov battalion and other forces in Mariupol.

There is obvious political and strategic value of these regions, Russians conquer nearly all of what they currently have in a matter days, and still hold it and clearly are willing to defend it as we see in Kherson over last few days.

The Northern operation was very different. Russians simply went around towns and tried to surround Kiev.

Analysts kept on telling us it would take at least a million soldier army to occupy all of Ukraine, which the Russians didn't invade with ... well, they invaded with 200 000 soldiers and are now occupying 20% of Ukraine, so maybe the math checks out.

The operation in the North was quite obviously to achieve 3 things:

1. Ideally the capitulation of the Ukrainian regime (accepting the offered peace terms) with the pressure on the capital]\.
2. Failing that, fixing Ukrainian forces in the North to be unable to defend and/or launch counter-offensive in the South (before new fortifications, supply lines setup and towns passified, there is vulnerability to counter-attack).
3. Destroy industrial capacity and various targets around Kiev, which apparently is achieved.

Now, whether doing the above was a good strategy or not is one question, but there was obviously never any even remote attempt to storm Kiev or occupy all the Norther regions the Russians pass through.

How likely the Kremlin believed in Ukrainian capitulation I don't know, but obviously there was plan B which was take in the South the desired lands and strategic locations and destroy Azov Batallion (whether the Kremlin genuinely fears/ despises these neo-Nazi's is one question, but either way it is critical for the home audience to defeat Azov Batallion in particular).

In particular, now that all pro-Ukrainian propaganda is instantly declaring the Kherson operation a fixing attack ... it's just dumb to dismiss off-hand the Kiev offensive as not possibly a fixing attack but failed occupation of the North and storming of Kiev.

As for whether it was a good idea or not, Russian generals have several nightmare scenarios at the start of the war:

A. Being stopped coming out of Crimea and the entire Southern operation falling flat.
B. Even after the South operation succeeds, successful counter attack that (for example) creates a salient to Mariupol and breaks the siege (as well as just counter offensives generally speaking).

Had A or B occurred it would have been a massive embarrassment to the Russians.

Certainly some things have gone well and other things less well for the Russians, but they have not experienced anything like an actual military debacle. Propaganda needs to spin full tilt just to present Ukraine as "in the fight", so imagine if they had just shelled to rubble the bridges out of Crimea and the Russians never got out of there, or valiantly penetrated Russian lines and fought all the way to breaking the Siege of Mariupol.

Keep also in mind, that there is not only these purely strategic elements in the South described above, but that's where Azov battalion, of which defeating is absolutely essential to the entire de-Nazification enterprise. So, failure to take this region would have been completely disastrous in terms of international and domestic image (support for the war etc.).

So, considering the stakes in the South, it is entirely logical to commit forces to threaten the capital which then must be defended at all costs (liquidating Azov battalion maybe a priority for Russia, but keeping Kiev would be the priority for Kiev; so one priority for the other).

Of course, would have been even better for the Russians if Ukraine simply collapsed, accepted peace terms etc. but a military strategy does not take into account political resolution; that for politicians to do or not, military planners will assume there is no political resolution to the conflict in elaborating their plan -- if they are told not to try to take all of Ukraine, they will then simply plan for an eventual frozen never ending conflict a la North-South Korea.

Point is, whether the plan was the best, could have been better, should not have been launched in the first place etc. are all valid criticisms, but the criticism that the plan does not make sense or has already failed is simply not supportable.

Additionally, even for the Russians to withdraw at this time, it would still be less embarrassing than being stuck in Crimea or Azov Battalion being rescued.

Russians have (even if they withdraw now) demonstrated the massive amounts of man power, equipment and money required to deal with (200 000 of) them. From purely international relations perspective its not "so bad" if Ukraine has clearly paid a heavy price for the withdrawal (that no other rational party would want to pay). One cannot draw the conclusion that the Russians are push-overs, certainly neither the Ukrainians, but this doesn't necessarily encourage anyone to seek conflict with Russia anytime soon.

However, I very much doubt the Russians will withdraw and until Kherson West of the Dnieper is reconquered by Ukraine I have a hard time believing they have the offensive capabilities to seriously threaten Russian presence East of the Dnieper.

The regions the Russians are committed to holding have now dense and integrated fortifications, concrete shelters for tanks, bunker networks etc. electronic warfare setup, and is extremely hard to assault, as the recent offensive in Kherson demonstrate.

Russian tanks emerged from newly built cement fortifications to blast infantry with large-caliber artillery, the wounded Ukrainian soldiers said. The vehicles would then shrink back beneath the concrete shelters, shielded from mortar and rocket fire.

Counter-battery radar systems automatically detected and located Ukrainians who were targeting the Russians with projectiles, unleashing a barrage of artillery fire in response.

Russian hacking tools hijacked the drones of Ukrainian operators, who saw their aircraft drift away helplessly behind enemy lines. — Wounded Ukrainian soldiers reveal steep toll of Kherson offensive

Yes, offensive in Kharkiv (not part of Donbas ... no strategic importance to Crimea) did succeed, but none of the above was put in place.

The reason to tactically retreat from a region you are not intent of occupying long term (whatever the reason: political, terrain and/or man-power) is to save as many of your own troops as possible while inflicting significant casualties on the advancing army: artillery, mines, gunships, missiles and bombs in predetermined kill-zones.