There's also one detail that's fairly puzzling in this new narrative that Kharkiv was the real prize and Kherson just a fixing operation, which is that it seems agreed Ukraine lost about 5000-6000 KIA in the this alleged Kherson fixing operation.

That seems incredibly high for a fixing operation.

But again, to really evaluate things militarily we'd actually need to know KIA, wounded and material losses on both sides (and quality of those losses, such as the KIA in Kherson being the experienced elite, NATO trained units that can do offensives), and we don't know losses on both sides.

Thousands of Ukrainian KIA might be worth the territorial gains if somehow Kharkiv region is some critical strategic thing and the offensive continues from there ... or then simply there are more KIA Russians in these operations.

The war still remains mainly of attrition at this phase, and we'd need to actually know losses to evaluate what's happening militarily.

However, the grid attacks seem more significant to me and we'll see the fallout of this in the weeks and months to come. I honestly don't see how Ukraine could maintain their grid under conditions of continuous attacks and I honestly don't see how Ukraine can deal with simply not having grid based electricity over larger areas.

However, the Ukraine-Russia situation is very different; pushing back Russia to its borders would not result in a situation such as Isreal and Mauritania where the persisting state of war could be said to be symbolic and there is no real threat. Russia would still be a considerable threat to Ukraine and could re-invade at any moment, the war would not be "over" and Ukraine would not have "won". — boethius

Putin's failure to invade Ukraine will probably lead to his death and/or replacement by someone else at the helm of Russia. Regime change, IOW. Perhaps the new Russian regime will be less Nazi than the current one.

Putin's failure to invade Ukraine will probably lead to his death and/or replacement by someone else at the helm of Russia. — Olivier5

Again, this has been claimed since basically day 2 of the invasion.

Sure, maybe, but as simply a propaganda statement to keep social media spirits high ... I don't think they could be any higher at any point of this conflict; however, the conflict clearly is not won or lost on social media.

Social networks are not reality, so fucking what? The point is that a better Russia could emerge from this war, IFF Russian forces lose the war. Of course, in theory a worse Russia could also emerge from it, eg if a leader even more nationalist than Putin gets to replace Putin.

Bottom line: the future is wide open, Ukraine can win and Russia can change. Enough with your pessimism.

I suppose the regime isn't ready to unleash Stalinist purges on its supporters. — SophistiCat

Yes, an official breakdown would be politically expensive.

Still, they could 'suicide' one or two of them, like they did to so many oligarchs. But then, Putin would be left with only the official reports, and he knows they lie.

Russian milbloggers must serve a purpose, otherwise they'd be dead.

So what? The point is that a better Russia could emerge from this war, IFF Russian forces lose the war. — Olivier5

Sure, yeah, that's possible.

Of course, in theory a worse Russia could also emerge from it, eg if a leader even more nationalist than Putin get to replace Putin. — Olivier5

Also possible.

Bottom line is: the future is wide open, Ukraine can win and Russia can change. — Olivier5

I don't disagree.

We've been discussing these recent military developments, but there is still all the political and economic part in which many things are possible too.

many things are possible — boethius

Exactly. And such is often neglected by people who think "inside the box".

Exactly. And such is often neglected by people who think "inside the box". — Olivier5

Agree, but the point of geopolitical analysis is to try to tease out what is more or less likely to happen, rather than be satisfied with the observation that many things are possible.

The situation, however, is very unstable. — boethius

In the scheme of things, I'm guessing this won't change much with someone like Putin (or worse) at the helm.
The history, measures taken domestically (and foreign for that matter), rolling into Ukraine, ...

Misc reports, not much new I suppose ...

^{RAND (Jul 11, 2016): The Russian "Firehose of Falsehood" Propaganda Model
CSIS (Jul 20, 2020): Russia Ramps up Global Elections Interference: Lessons for the United States
Reuters (Mar 16, 2021): Putin likely directed 2020 U.S. election meddling, U.S. intelligence finds
Wilson Center (Mar 4, 2022): The Limits of Putin’s Propaganda
Defense One (Mar 11, 2022): Putin’s Propaganda Machine Is What America’s Far-Right Wants (seemed +speculative at first)
National Post (May 13, 2022): Wesley Wark: Russian Victory Day was a powerful propaganda tool for Putin}

Meddling, subversion attempts, etc, happens all over, sometimes in response to each other.
Systematically suppressing other voices domestically is another ball game.

Something is wrong! :snicker:

the point of geopolitical analysis is to try to tease out what is more or less likely to happen — boethius

Sure. All I am saying is don't insult the future. Meaning, when you try and tease what could happen, do not assume that the future will necessarily repeat the past. Expect some surprises.

This is a broader issue than the war in Ukraine but the Ukrainian resistance, as a whole, has been one big surprise.

This is still going on since my last post, after I predicted it the conflict would end on Victory Day.

Someone discussed Russia's options. Russia has pulled out troops from some areas. Why not simply pull out completely, admitting defeat or whatever the need may be? It will save lives, and that can't be bad.

Here's the idea:

German Chancellor Olaf Scholz has urged Russian President Vladimir Putin to find a diplomatic solution for the conflict in Ukraine based on a cease-fire and the complete withdrawal of Russian troops, the chancellor’s office said on September 13 after the two leaders spoke by phone.

https://www.rferl.org/a/scholz-putin-ukraine-ceasefire-russian-withdrawal/32032075.html

Russia should offer an ceasefire and peace treaty. Ukraine ceases all military action, leaves the east alone and Crimea to boot, and gets to rebuild its shattered nation.

Russia could launch another 'special operation' if the ceasefire is broken, but this time I don't think Ukraine will have the will to get into a war again just when it is rebuilding. Russia gets to get on with its life or death or whatever it was doing before 2014.

Covert operations are always an option like for the US. But you knew that.

Hopefully Putin gets a day older each day until he doesn't.

His replacement may be worse. He could step down. In any case withdrawing troops and staying in power maybe a good may be an attractive alternative. Someone should explain that to him. Why could't they hack the Ukranian elections instead?

I'm struggling to see where this idea comes from that Russia is losing, and I'm starting to get the impression this forum's ability for reason is buckling under a constant barrage of media propaganda.

I can't blame anyone for that, because the propaganda has been relentless.

Still, I'd like to know what factual circumstances give rise to this idea.

There is a little bit more clarity concerning the relative strength of both sides and the Kremlin's objectives following the events on the front in both Kharkov and Kherson over past week.

It would appear that Russia - having abandoned the Kharkiv region without a fight - has no intention of conquering/holding any territory whose population is not predominantly supportive of Russia and also capable of deploying its own troops to defend that territory.

Although, the Ukrainians were successful in reclaiming a large swathe of territory in the Kharkov region - last week - the weight of evidence suggests that the Russians had largely already withdrawn and repositioned their defensive lines behind the Oskil River on the Lugansk border.

A much larger Ukrainian Offensive operation was attempted in Kherson region - last week - but there the Russian and allied forces were prepared to fight and for now have successfully repelled Ukraine advances. Since then, a series of minor further Ukrainian Offensive operations have yielded little if any gains and the war has resumed its normal pattern of the last 2 months: where Russian allied artillery relentlessly pounds fortified Ukrainian positions near Donbas and Donetsk with the occasional minor Russian advances.

The Ukrainian capture of territory in Kharkhov led to jubilant claims throughout western media and Kiev. And in Russia, Putin and his leadership attracted widespread criticism. Senior Ex-military officers and opposition parties began calling for an escalation from this timid Special Military Operation to an all out declaration of war and full mobilisation of the country. However, following a series of high-level meetings in Moscow, where it seems various escalations were considered - including declaring Ukraine a Terrorist State - in the end it has been decided to continue with the Special Military Operation - with some minor tweaking of the rules of engagement but without any declaration or further military mobilisation.

With due respect for the fog of war - if we assume the above synopsis largely depicts events as they actually are - then it would seem that the Kremlin is prepared to play the long game in the Ukraine - or at least to the end of the coming northern winter. Putin's calculus maybe that the economic trade war is working to its favour and that European unity against Russia may begin to crumble, over the coming winter, as pressure on fuel prices, gas shortages and food continues to mount.

On balance, it seems highly unlikely that the Ukraine will recapture its lost territory or that Russia is able or willing to conquer all or most of the Ukraine. In boxing parlance, we are looting at a split decision. And at some point, a settlement will need to be negotiated and signed by NATO, Russia, Ukraine and its neighbours.

I think it's funny the West likes to pretend they don't do exactly the same. There's a long history of this: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_electoral_intervention

It would appear that Russia - having abandoned the Kharkiv region without a fight - has no intention of conquering/holding any territory whose population is not predominantly supportive of Russia and also capable of deploying its own troops to defend that territory.

Although, the Ukrainians were successful in reclaiming a large swathe of territory in the Kharkov region - last week - the weight of evidence suggests that the Russians had largely already withdrawn and repositioned their defensive lines behind the Oskil River on the Lugansk border. — yebiga

sources?

With due respect for the fog of war - if we assume the above synopsis largely depicts events as they actually are - then it would seem that the Kremlin is prepared to play the long game in the Ukraine - or at least to the end of the coming northern winter. Putin's calculus maybe that the economic trade war is working to its favour and that European unity against Russia may begin to crumble, over the coming winter, as pressure on fuel prices, gas shortages and food continues to mount. — yebiga

@ssu Also let's talk about this. I have found the decisions to impose sanctions incredibly callous in regard of our own populations, especially when we consider the effects on the poor with regard to their energy bills, combined with the ongoing inflation caused by supply chain issues now further excarbated by those sanctions.

It started with some export restrictions on gas and later diesel.

In the first few weeks of the war we had sanctions on the foreign reserves of Russia with the potential of inflicting a banking crisis in Russia. That didn't happen.

Subsequently, we had further sanctions intended to affect Russian exports.

March: IAE says: Russian exports will crater.

April report: Russia sees output fall by 17%

May report: Russia sees revenues increase

Thank God we're going into the summer and the effects are relatively small but Russia is making a killing.

August report: Russian exports have increased from the March low as well as Russian revenues.

September report: IAE says: Russian exports will crater with new embargo package from EU.

Only donkeys try the same thing twice and expect different results. Meanwhile, bakeries and small businesses are applying for bankruptcy because they cannot afford the increased energy bills. There are 690,000 households in the Netherlands threatened to go into poverty due to the increased costs of living and rising energy prices. That's almost 9%. And once you're in poverty you're pretty much fucked in a system that only concerns itself with what rights you have instead of what you need to get out of poverty.

In the final analysis, this is not our war but we're sacrificing entire families by pushing them into poverty - that includes all the missed opportunities as a result of a lower socio-economic position in society. We're destroying the future of thousands of children in the Netherlands and I doubt it is much different in other European countries.

I think the energy sanctions have been a mistake and should never have been imposed.

Isreal did not continuously declare "we will not negotiate!" throughout all these conflicts with neighbours. — boethius

Yet Israel never agreed on to stop a military engagement before reaching it's military objectives.

Usually there was a push from especially the Superpowers to cease the military actions. Both in the Six Day war and in Yom Kippur basically the Arab powers were defeated on the battlefield. That is a simple fact. Also was in the case of the Suez crisis with Egypt. Then Operation Musketeer was totally successful reaching it's primary objectives (and I assume Operation Kadesh too), the failure was political, which saved Nasser's ass.

So, it's when people say Ukraine does not need to negotiate and can "win" militarily, which is when I point out that without diplomacy "winning" means conquering and defeating your enemy; otherwise, the war just continues forever. — boethius

I'm not sure what your point is. Ukrainian have tried to negotiate with the Russians and understand that even a ceasefire needs negotiations. Remember the negotiations in Turkey. So I'm confused just what is your point here.

I'm not sure what your point is. — ssu

I swore I wouldn't get into this nonsense again, but this one is so simply answered, and could well summarise half the thread in one sentence.

Here's a model negotiation...

"You do/stop X and we'll Y"

So with Ukraine to Russia it would be...

"You stop invading us and we'll Y".

What's the Y you'd be willing to advocate? Because apparently it's not ceding territory and it's not ceding any autonomy and you've just admitted that Ukraine are no threat to Russia. As @Benkei says, the sanctions are somewhat toothless. International condemnation seems irrelevant...

This is what @boethius and others mean by recognising that Ukraine cannot 'win'. They can't reach a point where they don't have to come up with a Y.

The whole argument we've been making here is to try and preempt what this Y is going to have to be as early as possible to avoid the destruction of war.

The counterargument has been that Ukraine ought resist all attempts to limit it's territory or autonomy at all costs (the 'existential fight' we keep hearing about).

But if it's not to cede territory, not to cede autonomy, nor can it threaten Russia itself...

...then what Y can it offer in negotiations?

Sources: Not Mainstream Media
Various Pro-Ukraine and Pro-Russian Telegram Channels
Military Summary Channel - telegram
The Duran
Scot Ritter
moonofalabama
southfront
zerohedge

what Y can it offer in negotiations? — Isaac

None that I can think of, which is perhaps why they aren't negotiating, in actual fact.

I'm struggling to see where this idea comes from that Russia is losing, — Tzeentch

Your confusion is easily solved: it comes from them losing ground on the battlefield.

This BBC article pushes some of the same facts, but much of it is still speculative due to the paucity of legitimate military sources.

From them losing ground on the battlefield. — Olivier5

Looking at a map of Ukraine now, why is this significant?

Why look at a map? It is significant because it means that the Russians can be beaten. If they can be repelled in Karkhiv, they can be chased from other regions as well.

Why look at a map? — Olivier5

Because it puts things into perspective.

The Ukrainian forces took back some territory, but large parts of Ukraine remain in Russian hands. Further, it shows the offensive halted at the first natural line of defense it encountered - the Oskil river. Why would that be?

It is significant because it means that the Russians can be beaten. — Olivier5

The aforementioned implies the Russians weren't beaten, but their forward troops retreated to the first line of defense.


Anyway, back to your point.

You're implying that because Ukraine has shown the Russians can be beaten (lets put it in military terms - "is capable of offensive operations") Russia is losing the war. Seems like a jump to conclusions to me.

Allow me to be a bit more cynical and posit a theory of my own:

The failed Kherson offensive signaled that Ukraine was, as many had feared, no longer capable of conducting offensive operations - which would mean they had all but lost the war.

This risked to undermine support, especially abroad, at a crucial time. Likely a months-long operational pause is coming during winter, and Ukraine will need this time to rebuild and repair. To do that it needs foreign aid and a lot of it.

Meanwhile, European countries' Ukraine policies are under pressure due to growing energy insecurity. Their support for a war which many fear will be lost cannot be maintained indefinitely.

They needed something they could write off as a victory, and to convince their populations that they would not be sitting in the cold for nothing.

So after the failed Kherson offensive they chose to stage an offensive over dead ground - the Russians would not be defending it so victory was essentially guaranteed.

Then they just needed to let the propaganda machine inflate this to a victory of epic proportions - that notion probably won't be challenged before the onset of winter. Hopefully for the Ukrainians that will safeguard foreign support and buy them time to recover.

Admittedly a bit cynical. I could be totally wrong. But this is my genuine impression.

That all would make sense... if it weren't for the fact that people within Russia risk prison for speaking out about how Russia is losing and the fact that they leave precious hardware behind when they retreat in a situation where they have to grab chips from home appliances in order to keep up with the hardware advantage of Ukraine.

While the offensive seems to take more casualties than Ukraine is being official about, this is more in line with traditional warfare. Keep the war propaganda up to keep the morale up. It's part of how war is conducted and it would be foolish to do anything else.

The problem I see is that the tribalistic nature of the discussion around all of this makes people either deem the offensive a pure failure or pure success. But it just is what it is, Russia is being forced back, faster than they expected and it is a noticable defeat on Russias part, otherwise there wouldn't be that much hardware left behind and negative words in Russian state media. But it's also not a complete success for Ukraine as they've suffered a lot of losses.

In the end, the balance hangs on if the losses were enough to make a huge difference. If Russia has problems pushing back the line and win back territory, then there's a new line bunkered down over the winter, or Ukraine chooses to use the winter as a way to push Russia before they have time bunkering down. Taking advantage of the chaos this has caused.