I don't think we refute such relativism, but instead we make it part of a set of agreed practices. What I think of as good moral practice happens within well-founded institutions, robust but flexible, with a strong justice system. That's because I'm a virtue man, and virtues require a sound polis or political structure.
Your list of abhorrent practices is interesting. What exactly is wrong with cannibalism? Why would moral rectitude rest on prohibitions rather than on maxims of good and bad behavior?

The poster child for abhorrent practices is Nazi Germany, although the same wind has blown all throughout history. Nazi practices were based on beliefs; do you think they and similar beliefs are irrefutable? (Without attempting to hang too much on the hook of irrefutability - that's why I think most argument is of limited value, and that it take an especially strong argument to make people change.) I think they must be refutable. If not, then the Holocaust becomes "reasonable," Either that or it is not susceptible or resolvable within reason. Of course Kan'ts imperative comes in here: if it's ok for us to kill them, it must be ok for them to kill us.

If by cannibalism you mean just the act of eating, then it's not so easy to argue against it categorically. If instead you include everything cannibalism entails, then it's an easier problem, not least because cannibalism usually entails victims.

Prohibition v. maxims of good and bad behavior: These are not two sides of the same coin. The negative by itself does not adequately define the goal, just hazards along the way. For this reason I think both are salutary.

In a previous post I laid out an impressionistic list of basic human values I think could form the basis of a legitimate relativistic moral code.

[1] Provide a secure place for children
[2] Support families
[3] Protect weaker people from stronger ones
[4] Provide for the well-being of members of the group
[5] Promote the stability of the group
[6] Protect members of the group from hazards from outside — T Clark

Hows about one of you who have identified yourself as absolutist do something similar from an absolute point of view.

The poster child for abhorrent practices is Nazi Germany, although the same wind has blown all throughout history. Nazi practices were based on beliefs; do you think they and similar beliefs are irrefutable? (Without attempting to hang too much on the hook of irrefutability - that's why I think most argument is of limited value, and that it take an especially strong argument to make people change.) I think they must be refutable. If not, then the Holocaust becomes "reasonable," Either that or it is not susceptible or resolvable within reason. Of course Kan'ts imperative comes in here: if it's ok for us to kill them, it must be ok for them to kill us. — tim wood

You can't refute any moral claims because moral claims are not true or false. They're ways that people feel. They're endorsements or rejections of behavior based on "feeling" ultimately.

"Just in case x is not refutable, then x is reasonable" is completely arbitrary. Whether something is reasonable is a matter of whether someone feels that conclusions follow from premises given by the way.

And re Kant's categorical imperative, that's simply a way that Kant felt about how interpersonal conduct should proceed. (And of course many other people feel the same way about it, but that's all it is.)

In a previous post I laid out an impressionistic list of basic human values I think could form the basis of a legitimate relativistic moral code. — T Clark

How would moral codes be "legitimate" or "illegitimate" in your view?

I am getting a little tired of this misrepresentation of the relativist position. Here's a definition I used in a previous post on this thread - "the doctrine that knowledge, truth, and morality exist in relation to culture, society, or historical context, and are not absolute."

In relation to culture, society, or historical context - not my opinion. To oversimplify - society defines and enforces moral values.

Point taken. But a question: if nothing of these is absolute, then what grounds them? One answer: their absolute presuppositions - their unarticulated, unexplicated fundamental axioms. These are both absolute and not absolute (but never relative). Absolute in that they are both cornerstone and keystone of any belief system, not absolute in that they evolve as cultures and systems evolve.

It's my view that if a culture holds a particular belief, then mainly its citizens who hold those views, and hold them personally.

Look at the way you guys are arguing over the definition of "relativism," and compare that to your behavior when it comes to math. Suppose you were having this argument over dinner and then split the check. It might take a few tries, but you would agree on an answer within minutes, after arguing for hours about the definition of a single word. — Srap Tasmaner

Yes, we could split the bill with few issues. We could just as easily agree that it was morally or ethically wrong when Tim Wood snuck off without paying. Absolutism vs. relativism doesn't really change much on a day to day basis. — T Clark

I think you're right about that last point, and that's worth looking at closer.

I think you're wrong about the other bit. It's just as easy to imagine one of you excusing him and one of you not, for all sorts of different reasons. But it's inconceivable that you would have different "points of view" about the math.

How would moral codes be "legitimate" or "illegitimate" in your view? — Terrapin Station

Maybe "legitimate" is not the right word. Maybe "reasonable" is better. Reasonable in that basic principles are 1) clearly stated and 2) justified based on testable hypotheses about human nature. A (vague) mechanism by which those principles can be turned into a moral code (the action of society and culture) is then proposed.

I think you're wrong about the other bit. It's just as easy to imagine one of you excusing him and one of you not, for all sorts of different reasons. But it's inconceivable that you would different "points of view" about the math. — Srap Tasmaner

Have you ever split up a bill before? "I think we should just split the bill three ways." "No way, I only had one drink but Bill had three and I had a hamburger and fries but Al had the lobster and an appetizer." "I only want to leave a 10% tip." "Separate checks please."

That of course is not an argument about the math, it's an argument about "what's fair."

That of course is not an argument about the math, it's an argument about "what's fair." — Srap Tasmaner

Agreed. But there aren't all that many questions that are just about the math. Math questions are easily answered without conflict not because they are special, but because they are, at this level, trivial. They are matters of fact like the capital of France or the number of ounces in a pound. We used to argue about that type of thing all the time. Now, with iPhones, calculators, and Google, we can't do it anymore.

Math questions are easily answered without conflict not because they are special, but because they are, at this level, trivial. They are matters of fact like the capital of France or the number of ounces in a pound. We used to argue about that type of thing all the time. Now, with iPhones, calculators, and Google, we can't do it anymore. — T Clark

That's an interesting view. I still think you're wrong, but now I'm intrigued by this idea of math as fact.

Why do I think you're wrong? Well, you got the capital of France readily, but what's the capital of Israel? For almost any fact you can think of, there's probably someone out there who denies it.

I'm really glad you brought this up though, because I think I have an idea now why math is different. What counts as a fact, what we assert as true, is intimately related to what counts as evidence for it, and people can predictably disagree about evidence and its interpretation, and some of those debates are just unresolvable.

But think about math. The connection between a mathematical fact and the evidence for it is really quite different from everything else.

That is true, but I'm sure there are plenty of disagreements in the area of 'higher mathematics' - philosophy of number, and so on. The point about math itself, however, is that numbers are the same for anyone who can count; it's not up to you or anyone whether two plus two is four.

On that note, when Galileo said that 'the book of nature is written in mathematics', he was plainly trying to bring the same mathematical rigour to the study of nature. That is why he is a seminal figure in modern science. Rather less appreciated is the fact that this grew out of his interpretation of Plato, for whom 'dianoia' - knowledge of mathematics and geometry - had higher intrinsic value that either opinion or sensory knowledge, because it's objects were ideal and invariant. And that Platonist influence in turn grew out of the rediscovery of Plato by the Renaissance humanists, such as Ficino, who translated Plato's works into Latin.

Subsequently, when we talk in terms of 'scientific knowledge', we almost invariably refer to something mathematically quantifiable. After all virtually the whole of physics is now mathematical physics. But in so doing, the original philosophy behind Galileo's method, and indeed Galileo's broader philosophical assumptions, are generally forgotten. For us, it's simply 'scientific truth' which is as near as we're going to get to truth in the general sense.

I'm really glad you brought this up though, because I think I have an idea now why math is different. What counts as a fact, what we assert as true, is intimately related to what counts as evidence for it, and people can predictably disagree about evidence and its interpretation, and some of those debates are just unresolvable.

But think about math. The connection between a mathematical fact and the evidence for it is really quite different from everything else. — Srap Tasmaner

I disagree. As I said, at the level we are discussing, i.e. restaurant bills and similar situations, math is just arithmetic. It's trivial. The capital of Israel is complicated in the same way that me paying for your lobster when all I had was a hamburger is complicated. When human judgment gets involved, nothing is easy. This web site provides dozens, hundreds, of examples of that. We'll argue about anything.

Let's consider the trivial notion that 1+1=2. It is five symbols strung together that is inherently meaningless. It has as much truth as covfefee. It is when one attempts to ascribes meaning to it that relativism floods in.

But we can even go further. There are people who cannot do arithmetic (learn the symbolic sequence) and for them there is disagreement with all those who can.

at the level we are discussing, i.e. restaurant bills and similar situations, math is just arithmetic. It's trivial. The capital of Israel is complicated in the same way that me paying for your lobster when all I had was a hamburger is complicated. When human judgment gets involved, nothing is easy. This web site provides dozens, hundreds, of examples of that. We'll argue about anything. — T Clark

I'm going to keep saying, "except math." @Terrapin Station might assert that truth is whatever he says it is, in both the general and specific senses, but even Terrapin is not going to assert that 2 + 2 = 5, or, more importantly, something like "To me, 2 + 2 = 5, even if for you 2 + 2 = 4." Nobody ever says anything like that. Math is out of reach of all sorts of controversy, both in fact and in principle.

Let's consider the trivial notion that 1+1=2. It is five symbols strung together that is inherently meaningless. It has as much truth as covfefee. It is when one attempts to ascribes meaning to it that relativism floods in. — Rich

Do you have an example in mind of an alternative interpretation of "1 + 1 = 2"? Have you had experience with someone claiming "1 + 1 = 2" means something different from what you think it means? Relativism floods in a whole lot of places, but I really don't see it flooding in here. What does this math relativism you speak of look like?

It is true, though, that I'm rapidly running out of room here as I back into this corner. There are controversies that relate to the "higher mathematics" that Terrapin has doubts about, and there are controversies about the foundations of mathematics. There are philosophical differences about what I guess we'll have to call the "interpretation of mathematical symbolism." But these are really quite different from issues like what the capital of Israel is, whether I said I'd arrive at 7 or 8, whether Oswald acted alone, etc. And the goal is almost never some sort of relativism--it's usually still the nature of the one mathematics that's at stake. (We're getting farther afield here, which I suppose is my fault, but not to worry, because we're nearing the edge of my "expertise" too.)

It is also true that I cheated a little in my last post. The evidence most people actually rely on for the basic facts of arithmetic is either "That's what I learned in school," or "That's what the calculator/computer says." But if you consider the possibility of debate, which is what we're interested in here, there is always an effective decision procedure to determine whether a mathematical statement is true or false. That's true for mathematics bottom to top. What counts as a proof changes as you move from bottom to top and back, but the core remains the same: an effective decision procedure. So I had this in mind as the ultimate backstop for arguments over mathematics, whether or not it's actually accessible to the people who happen to be having the argument. So there's evidence and there's evidence.

So to get back to splitting the check and such: only an effective decision procedure, even if it's just a calculation on your phone, can settle mathematical arguments--no effective procedure, no truth--but an effective decision procedure is always available to settle any such dispute. (Until Fermat's Last Theorem was proven, no one knew whether it was true. Now we do.) There's no room to debate what to count as evidence, or how to interpret the evidence, and so forth. I guess people sort of know that, though maybe not explicitly, so they just don't argue about math the way they argue about other questions of fact. There's no point. There is also no room for "my math" and "your math," "math as I see it" and "math as you see it," etc.

For the purpose of this thread, it might be worthwhile to characterize other fields of argument by how they differ from mathematics.

PS: Should have said this too: Note that mathematicians have never argued about whether Fermat's Last Theorem is true. They might argue about whether it was likely to be true, whether it was likely we would ever have a proof, what approach might work, and so on, but there was universal acceptance for the method of deciding whether it was true: show us the proof. What other field has that kind of unanimity?

if nothing of these is absolute, then what grounds them? One answer: their absolute presuppositions - their unarticulated, unexplicated fundamental axioms — tim wood

This is an interesting point to reach. R G Collingwood's view of metaphysics (thanks to a poster on the old forum for ever pointing me in that direction some years ago now) was that it involved asking a series of questions of any philosopher. Whenever their work answers a question, you ask a deeper question of their work. Finally you reach some sort of bedrock: the answer that provokes no questions. These answers for him are that philosopher's metaphysics: their absolute presuppositions, rooted in their historical situation and their personal outlook. Oddly enough Collingwood held such a relativist view and yet remained a practising Anglican.

Nazi practices were based on beliefs; do you think they and similar beliefs are irrefutable? (Without attempting to hang too much on the hook of irrefutability - that's why I think most argument is of limited value, and that it take an especially strong argument to make people change.) I think they must be refutable. If not, then the Holocaust becomes "reasonable," — tim wood

Nazi practices were purportedly based on certain beliefs. It seems to me always open (a) to question rationally whether certain beliefs really do underpin the relevant practices; and (b) to burrow into the core of a belief rather than take it at face value.

Eugenics, for instance, was a shared belief among Nazi and some Western intellectuals at a certain time, and I have seen it alleged that we have returned to it in a different form, in genetically manipulating offspring. There are excellent reasoned arguments for it, even though we might find it repugnant.

I don't think, for instance, you can 'refute' the idea that one 'race' or 'people' is inferior to another. You can critically undermine the terms, and demonstrate that what might be left of the idea lacks evidence in its favour. Then you can commit - the existential moment - to anti-racism, as lots of people do. But that's not going to amount to a 'refutation' that would be likely to prevail against a broad sincerely-held belief.

2) justified based on testable hypotheses about human nature. — T Clark

That doesn't sound like relativism to me, and it sounds like you believe that oughts can be derived from is's.

even Terrapin is not going to assert that 2 + 2 = 5, or, more importantly, something like "To me, 2 + 2 = 5, even if for you 2 + 2 = 4." — Srap Tasmaner

I wouldn't normally say that, but I'd agree with the idea of it.

It's not though. If I say, "'All truth is relative' is true," as a relativist, and as a truth-value subjectivist, I'm not saying that "'All truth is relative' is true" is anything but relatively, subjectively true to me--I'm reporting my judgment about that proposition to you. Certainly other people can and do assign "false" to that statement instead. And assigning "true" and "false" to it are nothing other than judgments that we make as individuals. I'd not be claiming that the "is true" part of "'All truth is relative' is true" is something other than a judgment that an individual makes.

Often what's happening there is that the truth-value non-relativist is reading their non-relativistic framework into the statement; they're not parsing it under whatever the relativist's notion of truth is. — Terrapin Station

I would point out that the truth value of the cognitive relativist's claim that their statement "all truth is relative" is only relatively or subjectively true for them would likewise be only relatively or subjectively true for them, and thus can be disregarded at will by the non-relativist (or other cognitive relativists, for that matter). Little, if anything, a cognitive relativist says can carry probative force.

I would point out that the truth value of the cognitive relativist's claim that their statement "all truth is relative" is only relatively or subjectively true for them would likewise be only relatively or subjectively true for them, — Arkady

Of course.

thus can be disregarded at will by the non-relativist (or other cognitive relativists, for that matter). — Arkady

And of course it can be and often is disregarded.

Not that that depends on truth being relative. One can disregard something if truth isn't relative, too. People can disregard all sorts of things if they like.

If only the fact that people can disregard things had any particular significance.

You're probably also disregarding that it's an objective fact that truth is relative. But whether a statement about that fact is true or false is subjective of course.

Do you have an example in mind of an alternative interpretation of "1 + 1 = 2"? — Srap Tasmaner

1+1=2 is essentially 5 arbitrary symbols strung together that we are taught in elementary school to accept by rote. Inherently it has as much meaning as any string of symbols. Without further meaning one can just stare at it with bewilderment​. It is when one starts applying meaning to it, e.g. one apple and another apple is two apples that we begin to inject relativism. Exactly what makes two apples? You would have to start defining an apple and then all heck breaks loose in the same way that trying to define relativism creates problems.

1+1=2 is essentially 5 arbitrary symbols strung together that we are taught in elementary school to accept by rote. Inherently it has as much meaning as any string of symbols. Without further meaning one can just stare at it with bewilderment​. It is when one starts applying meaning to it, e.g. one apple and another apple is two apples that we begin to inject relativism. Exactly what makes two apples? You would have to start defining an apple and then all heck breaks loose. — Rich

Yeah, to even get at the concept of a unit that can be counted you need to learn to conceptualize things in a particular way. So it's basically noting a supposed uniformity a la "if you play the game of conceptualizing things this way, then you conceptualize things this way."

For the purpose of this thread, it might be worthwhile to characterize other fields of argument by how they differ from mathematics. — Srap Tasmaner

I don't think we will resolve our differences on this matter. Whatever I say will just be a repeat of something I said before, so I'm going to leave this dead horse alone for now. That doesn't mean I won't be willing to continue at a later time.

Thanks for slugging it out with me. I'll get the check!

I don't think, for instance, you can 'refute' the idea that one 'race' or 'people' is inferior to another. You can critically undermine the terms, and demonstrate that what might be left of the idea lacks evidence in its favour. Then you can commit - the existential moment - to anti-racism, as lots of people do. But that's not going to amount to a 'refutation' that would be likely to prevail against a broad sincerely-held belief. — mcdoodle

Isn't that true of any except the simplest idea, perhaps something as definite as mathematics as Srap Tasmaner has been writing.

Thanks for slugging it out with me. I'll get the check! — Srap Tasmaner

No, no, I insist.

Thanks for slugging it out with me. I'll get the check! — Srap Tasmaner
No, no, I insist. — T Clark

More evidence - we'll argue about anything.

1+1=2 is essentially 5 arbitrary symbols strung together that we are taught in elementary school to accept by rote. Inherently it has as much meaning as any string of symbols. Without further meaning one can just stare at it with bewilderment​. It is when one starts applying meaning to it, e.g. one apple and another apple is two apples that we begin to inject relativism. — Rich

Of course, symbols like "1" and "2" and "+" aren't inherently meaningful, but I would say they acquire meaning for us when we are taught how to use them to do math, not when we apply them.

I also agree that application can be messy, but that takes the math end as settled, as given. The poster child for this is the sorites and friends.

[Bonus apple math trivia: apples are sized not by diameter or weight or something, but by how many will fit in a standard box, so 120's are smaller than 90's.]

No, no, I insist. — T Clark

I used to love going out to dinner with my Dad and his brothers, because when the check came, there was what I called "the dance of the 20's," as they each started tossing 20-dollar bills out and picking up each other's and tossing them back.

the fact that people can disregard things — Terrapin Station

Perhaps that is a good definition of "relativism." Or is that what you were saying.