So, one stumbling block seems to be the position you hold about notions of true and false. You've expressed concerns, and rightfully so, about the difficulties inherent to any attempts to sensibly attribute the terms "true" and "false" to language less belief as a result of true and false being strictly linguistic notions. See if I can ease this difficulty...

Notions/concepts of "tree" are existentially dependent upon language. What we pick out with those notions/concepts is not. Trees are not existentially dependent upon language. Much the same holds good for the notions of "true" and "false" as they pertain to language less thought and belief...

There can be no question that all notions/concepts of "true" and "false" are linguistic, if by that I mean that those notions are existentially dependent upon language use. However, and this is key, what those notions pick out to the exclusion of all else is no more existentially dependent upon language than trees are. We use "trees" to pick out the things in my front yard. We use "true" and "false" to pick out things(belief in this case) that are consistent with and/or correspond to fact.

If there is a mouse behind the tree, then the fact consists of a mouse, a tree, and the spatial relationship between them from some frame of reference/vantage point. That fact is no more a sentence, string of letters, or marks on a screen than the tree, the mouse, or the spatiotemporal relationship is. If there is a creature, say a cat, that is capable of believing that that mouse went behind that tree, and the mouse is behind the tree, then that creature's belief is consistent with and/or corresponds to fact. The tree, the mouse, and the relationship between them are all meaningful to the cat as a result of the correlations drawn between them by the cat's biological machinery. They become meaningful by virtue of this process(drawing correlations).

That's a not too rough and ready outline/model of what meaningful language less thought and/or belief consists of and/or how it emerges onto the world stage. It's amenable to evolutionary progression as well as being commensurate with supervenience.

So what is reality — val p miranda

A fraught notion...

What I'm unsure about is the implication that concepts don't have to do with the brain's relationship, as you put it, to objects. I mean, sure, "mind" is probably a much better starting point, but you went with brain, so brain it is. Is that not more or less exactly where we expect to find concepts? — Srap Tasmaner

I'm speaking about linguistic concepts, but you seem to be suggesting a broader sense (thoughts, ideas, etc, - I'm just guessing, since you didn't say). Concepts like true and false, and what we mean by true and false, develop in social contexts, not in isolation. The relationship between language and the mind/brain is something we don't fully understand. We obviously have our intuitions and opinions, but that's as far as it goes. I would say, as per the context of this thread, that true and false are necessarily not part of the conceptual framework of non-linguistic animals.

But then are we going to say that societies have concepts but individuals, even individual members of societies, don't? That sounds terribly odd. So if the social demands to be brought in, how exactly? And is the social, shall we say, aspect entirely linguistic? — Srap Tasmaner

I wouldn't say, "societies have concepts but individuals, even individual members of societies, don't?" - I would say individuals learn to use linguistic concepts in social contexts, so individuals have linguistic concepts only in so far as they acquire them socially. This gets back to the private language argument.

Well, this was part of my question, whether experiments were relevant to your position, or whether you understood concepts to be inherently linguistic phenomena in some sense. So are you saying that this is an empirical question after all? — Srap Tasmaner

I'm saying that there maybe some experiment that shows what part of the brain lights up while using linguistic concepts, as opposed to what happens when being shown objects apart from a linguistic context. These kinds of experiments aren't going to answer the question of what we mean by concepts like true and false. So, in the context of what I'm referring to, some experiment, at least as far as I understand, isn't going to answer a question of meaning and use. Of course it depends on what you're looking for.

Notions/concepts of "tree" are existentially dependent upon language. What we pick out with those notions/concepts is not. Trees are not existentially dependent upon language. Much the same holds good for the notions of "true" and "false"... — creativesoul

I would word it slightly different, the concept tree, includes the notion of something existentially separate from language. Whereas the notion of true and false seems dependent on linguistic content in an important sense. In other words, I can imagine a dog seeing a tree apart from language, but not a dog observing true and false apart from the application of these concepts within our linguistic framework. This can be a bit confusing, because when we talk about true and false, we often refer to objects (i.e., facts) that we observe, although not always (referring to facts as abstract objects).

There is definitely much more to say, and I'm sure we're not going to see eye to eye on some of this.

Sorry I didn't respond to all of your posts. I have a difficult time sitting for hours responding. So, I tend to take long breaks (sometime hours, days, weeks at a time). I find that social media can be a bit taxing, and in some ways unhealthy.

We seem to agree that "snow is white" is a sentence — Banno

Yes if we agree to clarify that the string without quotes is what we're calling a sentence, while the string with quotes is a name facilitating talk about the smaller string (the calling it a sentence).

and that snow is white is a fact, — Banno

Yes if we agree to clarify that the string itself is not what we're calling a fact, at least, it is not the fact which, as a sentence, it represents. That would be as silly as confusing the name "Fido" with the dog which, as a name, it represents. The string is a sentence, representing or corresponding to the fact.

yet you seem to need to slip something else in between the bolded bit and the white snow. I don't. — Banno

If the bolded bit is the bolded string, and slipping something else in between that and the white snow is choosing to distinguish the two, I enthusiastically plead guilty.

Well, I'm going to just stipulate that names are not facts. The person Luke is not a fact, but that Luke posts on the forum is.

And I don't think I will be alone in doing this. — Banno

Your link is not entirely supportive of your claims:

As we pointed out above, one view about facts is that to be a fact is to be a true proposition. On another, incompatible view, facts are what make true propositions true, or more generally, account for their truth. The search for what accounts for the truth of propositions is, as we have seen, actually one main rationale for the introduction of facts...

As we have emphasized, one of the main rationale for introducing facts has been to account for the truth of true propositions. The idea is that whenever a proposition is true, its truth is to be explained in terms of the existence and / or non-existence of some facts...

Our definition of truthmaking fails to capture the explanatory character of the notion people have usually in mind when they talk about truthmaking. If something makes a given proposition true, it is usually assumed, then the existence of that thing explains the truth of the proposition. Now it should be clear that truthmaking as we have defined it is not explanatory in this sense...

Representation, as we have defined it, is also quite remote from what people usually have in mind when they speak of propositions representing facts: propositions which cannot be true represent (in our sense) any fact whatsoever, and if the proposition that Socrates exists represents (in our sense) the fact that Socrates exists, then it also represents (in our sense) the fact that [Socrates] exists (granted that these two facts exist at the same worlds).

Despite the fact that truthmaking as defined above does not to capture the usual concept of making true, we shall not deal with the latter concept here. And we shall not deal either with the usual notion of representation. — SEP article on Facts

I have appealed to dictionary definitions and ordinary language use. This article mentions my use, but it also states that they are using terms which are contrary to the "usual concept" of truthmaking and the "usual notion" of representation. Wittgenstein teaches us to look to common usage for meaning, so I don't think I'm alone in my use of the term "fact" either.

It is worthy of notice that the sentence “I smell the scent of violets” has the same content as the sentence “It is true that I smell the scent of violets.” So it seems, then, that nothing is added to the thought by my ascribing to it the property of truth. (Frege, 1918)
— link — Pie

Saying "it is true" in this case is indeed redundant. But this is a simplistic example; actually a commonplace. Like "It is true for you what it is true for you".

Truth, however, is a complex and multifaceted concept and term. That's why it reigns in philosophy since ever!

From my point of view, there's no such a thing as an absolute, objective truth. The closest to that is a commonly accepted, agreed upon truth. Most people believe --i.e. it is a common truth among them-- that moon landing is a fact, true. However, there are some people who don't, but instead believe in conspiracy theories about the subject. But, based on facts and proofs in general, as well as on reason and cohesion, we can safely say that moon landing is a fat, i.e. true.

This "process" is maybe more clear in court cases, where different "truths" --both genuine and false, supported or not by facts and argumentation-- are presented, in favor and against the accused, It is the prevailing one that, according to the jury or just the judge, determines in a court whether the accused is innocent or guilty. And sometimes, it cannot be obtained.

P.S. As for Pilate's jesting question "What is truth?", it referred to Jesus claiming that he was "witness to the truth", which is not plausible. So, Pilate's reaction was quite plausible. Anyway, I don't think we can ever be certain that such an event --like many others-- actually happened or whether has it been misrepresented or not, for known reasons.
Besides, if Jesus was as wise as he has been portrayed, I doubt if he had said such a thing, and if so, we don't know how it meant. I believe it's most probably a fabrication by John, like many other.

I would word it slightly different, the concept tree, includes the notion of something existentially separate from language. Whereas the notion of true and false seems dependent on linguistic content in an important sense. In other words, I can imagine a dog seeing a tree apart from language, but not a dog observing true and false apart from the application of these concepts within our linguistic framework. This can be a bit confusing, because when we talk about true and false, we often refer to objects (i.e., facts) that we observe, although not always (referring to facts as abstract objects).

There is definitely much more to say, and I'm sure we're not going to see eye to eye on some of this.

Sorry I didn't respond to all of your posts. I have a difficult time sitting for hours responding. So, I tend to take long breaks (sometime hours, days, weeks at a time). I find that social media can be a bit taxing, and in some ways unhealthy. — Sam26

For sure. I'm with you on that last bit. As it pertains to the rest...

What I offered in the previous couple of posts was where I thought our views were a bit different. Upon rereading, I also realized that I did not properly quantify my examples. What I mean is that the example given was about how true and false belief, and thus truth(and meaning) can exist without language. But that example(language less thought and belief) does not touch upon any of the cases where the notions of "true" and "false" are used to talk about things that are not independent of language. Those cases far exceed in sheer number alone the language less ones, in both the literature and common practice.

Be well until next time!

:up:

Your link is not entirely supportive of your claims: — Luke

Yeah, it is. I am not alone in rejecting the notion that a fact is what makes a true proposition true. Rather it would be better to say that facts just are true propositions.

The resulting view is thus extremely strong. — Facts as propositions

This, incidentally, looks to be much the same disagreement as I have with

I'm a bit surprised to see you entertaining the notion of concepts. In. Wittgensteinian terms they are rather fraught. For some folk they consist in private mental furniture, so that they end up saying things like that my concept cannot be the same as yours, and so on; stuff with which neither of us would agree. But if a concept is instead conceived of as a public item, then is it anything more or less than the use to which a term is put?

I am not alone in rejecting the notion that a fact is what makes a true proposition true — Banno

I never said that you were; I said that I wasn’t alone in my view either.

And what are facts? The notion of a fact as some sort of ontological entity was first stated explicitly in the second half of the nineteenth century. The Correspondence Theory does permit facts to be mind-dependent entities. McTaggart, and perhaps Kant, held such Correspondence Theories. The Correspondence theories of Russell, Wittgenstein and Austin all consider facts to be mind-independent. But regardless of their mind-dependence or mind-independence, the theory must provide answers to questions of the following sort. “Canada is north of the U.S.” can’t be a fact. A true proposition can’t be a fact if it also states a fact…

These questions illustrate the difficulty in counting facts and distinguishing them. The difficulty is well recognized by advocates of the Correspondence Theory, but critics complain that characterizations of facts too often circle back ultimately to saying facts are whatever true propositions must correspond to in order to be true. Davidson has criticized the notion of fact, arguing that “if true statements correspond to anything, they all correspond to the same thing” (in “True to the Facts”, Davidson [1984]). Davidson also has argued that facts really are the true statements themselves; facts are not named by them, as the Correspondence Theory mistakenly supposes.

Defenders of the Correspondence Theory have responded to these criticisms in a variety of ways. Sense can be made of the term “correspondence”, some say, because speaking of propositions corresponding to facts is merely making the general claim that summarizes the remark that

(i) The sentence, “Snow is white”, means that snow is white, and (ii) snow actually is white,

and so on for all the other propositions. Therefore, the Correspondence theory must contain a theory of “means that” but otherwise is not at fault. Other defenders of the Correspondence Theory attack Davidson’s identification of facts with true propositions. Snow is a constituent of the fact that snow is white, but snow is not a constituent of a linguistic entity, so facts and true statements are different kinds of entities — IEP article on Truth

.

Therefore, I am not alone in rejecting your “stipulation”.

Davidson also has argued that facts really are the true statements themselves; facts are not named by them, as the Correspondence Theory mistakenly supposes. — IEP article on Truth

That bit.

Snow is a constituent of the fact that snow is white, but snow is not a constituent of a linguistic entity, so facts and true statements are different kinds of entities — IEP article on Truth

A shame that the Children's Encyclopaedia of Philosophy does not provide adequate references. That might be an argument worth addressing if it were filled out. What is it for snow to be a constituent of the fact that snow is white? Facts have parts?

I'm a bit surprised to see you entertaining the notion of concepts. In. Wittgensteinian terms they are rather fraught. For some folk they consist in private mental furniture, so that they end up saying things like that my concept cannot be the same as yours, and so on; stuff with which neither of us would agree. But if a concept is instead conceived of as a public item, then is it anything more or less than the use to which a term is put? — Banno

I don't believe my views expressed with Creative leads to this conclusion. What in particular leads you to think this? I think you've expressed this before, but I think it's a misinterpretation of what I'm saying.

Ok, that's fine. I'm just encouraging caution. Happy to have someone else field Creative's odd confusion.

We could all use some caution in our views, especially since we're at the edge of what we can claim to know. Moreover, it's very difficult to know at times where Wittgenstein went wrong, since much of his philosophy is novel and prone to misinterpretation. Not all of my views align with his, and I'm sure not all of yours do either.

What is it for snow to be a constituent of the fact that snow is white? Facts have parts? — Banno

As I already pointed out in the SEP article:

On another, incompatible view, facts are what make true propositions true, or more generally, account for their truth.

[and]

If something makes a given proposition true, it is usually assumed, then the existence of that thing explains the truth of the proposition. — Luke

In case you missed it again, facts are what make propositions true, and - it is usually assumed - the existence of a thing is what makes a proposition true. Therefore, the existence of a thing is, or can be, a fact.

That's a really odd post.

Here's the point at issue:

• on the one hand we have the view that facts and true propositions are distinct, but related in that facts are what make true propositions true.
• on the other hand we have the view that a fact just is a true proposition.

I take the latter, you the former, views. I ask what it is for snow to be a constituent of the fact that snow is white, and you reply by repeating that facts make propositions true.

Not seeing a point here.

I would say, as per the context of this thread, that true and false are necessarily not part of the conceptual framework of non-linguistic animals. — Sam26

I get that. True and False are concepts we might naturally think of as applying to linguistic artifacts, so in that sense at least they're "linguistic concepts".

True is funny though.

If I ask someone whether they thought what you said was clever, I'm expressing an interest in what you said and how you said it, among other things. If I ask someone whether they thought what you said was true -- I might be investigating your character, or I might be very interested in the state of the world suggested by what you said. (Are the barbarians really within the walls?) Not so much in your phrasing or diction or use of periphrasis.

So even as it seems to apply to linguistic artifacts, True is a somewhat odd duck. Not alone, though. Many such usages come to mind, especially 'modal' adjectives like ”probable", "likely", "impossible", and so on.

Anyhow, I don't have any particular agenda here. Was just curious what you were thinking.

So even as it seems to apply to linguistic artifacts, True is a somewhat odd duck. Not alone, though. Many such usages come to mind, especially 'modal' adjectives like ” probable", " likely", "impossible", and so on. — Srap Tasmaner

That's why we should look at the meanings of these concepts in terms of use (social linguistic constructs), and in terms of Wittgenstein's family resemblance idea. It gives us a much better picture of what meaning amounts to.

I’ll try once again. According to the SEP article on Facts:

Facts are what make a proposition true or account for the truth of a proposition.

The existence of a thing can account for the truth of a proposition.

Therefore, the existence of a thing can be a fact.

According to the SEP article on Facts:

Facts are what make a proposition true or account for the truth of a proposition. — Luke

Well, no. Rather according to the SEP article, one view is that facts are what make a proposition true.

There are other views, also addressed in the article.

And yes, the existence of a thing can be a fact. But this is not dependent on which of the competing views one choses.

So if true propositions are facts, then "The Queen exists" is a fact.

But your contention, the one with which I disagreed, was that an individual can be a fact. The Queen is not a fact.

Trivial stuff.

What an odd response.

After I give examples with the intent of showing the difference between being interested in someone's words, on the one hand, and what they're talking about, on the other, you suggest it will all be clearer to me if I focus on how people use words.

No need to turn this into another Wittgenstein thread, though...

Here's the point at issue:
on the one hand we have the view that facts and true propositions are distinct, but related in that facts are what make true propositions true.
on the other hand we have the view that a fact just is a true proposition.

I take the latter, you the former, views. — Banno

Just so that I can understand how this "view" works, can you explain how you would distinguish between a proposition which is a fact, and a proposition which is a falsity. Please don't say something like the proposition "p" is true iff p, or I'll accuse you of being dishonest again. That's because '"p" is true iff p', is a statement which relates the proposition referred to by "p" to the fact referred to with p, which is what you just rejected.

But your contention, the one with which I disagreed, was that an individual can be a fact. The Queen is not a fact. — Banno

Actually, I asked you why an individual cannot be a fact. You didn’t answer this question and instead responded by stipulating that names are not facts. My initial contention with which you disagreed was that a river is a fact. I’m not sure what you mean by “an individual” or why you say the Queen cannot be a fact. Is a river an individual? If the existence of a river makes a proposition true or accounts for the truth of a proposition, then it is a fact - at least, according to one view of facts.

Well, no. Rather according to the SEP article, one view is that facts are what make a proposition true. — Banno

Your original contention was that a river cannot be a fact. You did not qualify that this is only according to your own view. If you now acknowledge that the existence of a river can make a proposition true according to one view, then you were wrong to say that a river cannot be a fact.

The only thing odd, is that you didn't see the connection between my reply and your response.

My initial contention with which you disagreed was that a river is a fact. — Luke

Ok, a river is not a fact. That a river exists might be.

In much the same way that a name is not a sentence. Or an individual is not a state of affairs.

That has little, if anything, to do with whether facts are true propositions.

At first I thought you might have been making a subtle point, Now I am thinking you have made a trivial error.

Facts, philosophers like to say, are opposed to theories and to values (cf. Rundle 1993) and are to be distinguished from things, in particular from complex objects, complexes and wholes, and from relations. — SEP: Facts

See the bit in bold? Are you claiming it is wrong?

Ok, a river is not a fact. That a river exists might be. — Banno

So non-existent rivers are not facts? I might agree with you there.

If the existence of a river accounts for the truth of a proposition (e.g. “this river contains many fish”), then it is a fact.

Just as the existence of snow accounts for the truth of “snow is white”.

See the bit in bold? Are you claiming it is wrong? — Banno

No, but I don’t agree with everything that “philosophers like to say”. And, as I have already pointed out, the article gives a passing mention to some opposing views. Your claim that existing things are not facts - on any view - remains wrong.