My post prior to this one begins to address how true and false belief could exist in their entirety prior to the concepts of "true" and "false". I'm curious to get your take on that. — creativesoul

Part of the problem is in separating those concepts that have an ontology that is separate from language, and yet part of language; and, those concepts that have an ontology that are strictly linguistic, viz., concepts like true and false. So, concepts like belief, moon, tree, etc., have an ontology that involves extra-linguistic things, but other concepts are strictly linguistic. Part of the problem is placing strictly linguistic concepts in a non-linguistic environment. I think this would be an interesting study.

The mouse is in a particular state-of-mind, but it's not equivalent to our linguistic states, in particular, our beliefs as statements. So, the mouse is not believing that there is a mouse behind the tree, as you and I might believe. How could it do that without a linguistic framework to work with. It has no concept tree and mouse. If it did, well, maybe we could also infer the concepts true and false to the mouse also. You seem to be imposing linguistic concepts where there are none. — Sam26

That's the question, right?

How could a language less creature believe that a mouse is behind a tree if it has no linguistic concepts?

When I refer to beliefs (pre-linguistic beliefs in animals or humans), it's completely devoid of any conceptual framework for them, but not for us, as linguistic users. So, it seems that the tendency is to impose our conceptual framework onto them.

Indeed, it is. It is also quite common to conflate our reports of another creature's belief with the other creature's belief. I do not do that. Our report consists of propositional content. A language less creatures' belief cannot.

Part of the problem is in separating those concepts that have an ontology that is separate from language, and yet part of language; and, those concepts that have an ontology that are strictly linguistic, viz., concepts like true and false. So, concepts like belief, moon, tree, etc., have an ontology that involves extra-linguistic things, but other concepts are strictly linguistic. Part of the problem is placing strictly linguistic concepts in a non-linguistic environment. I think this would be an interesting study. — Sam26

Yes, yes, and yes...

That's much what I was getting at in the world before humans example...

:up: :cool:

meaning and reference — hypericin

Try this

https://fdocuments.in/document/goodman-likeness.html

When I refer to beliefs (pre-linguistic beliefs in animals or humans), it's completely devoid of any conceptual framework for them, but not for us, as linguistic users. So, it seems that the tendency is to impose our conceptual framework onto them. — Sam26

Some of my intuitions run the other way, but it's a messy area for sure. Research into the cognitive states of pre-linguistic children and animals is bound to be more difficult and less conclusive.

But I'm a little surprised to see you say, quite definitely, no concepts here, no conceptual framework whatsoever. It sounds like you take this to be true by definition and I wonder why. Is it all about language? Or about what enables language? What's the story here?

I'll give an example. Infants, I understand, have a sense of object permanence before they have a sense of object identity. If a toy is moved across their field of vision, passes behind a screen, and comes out as something else, that doesn't bother baby. If it doesn't come out at all, that does.

There's something in the ballpark of the conceptual going on there, I'd say, but what exactly, it's complicated.

But I'm a little surprised to see you say, quite definitely, no concepts here, no conceptual framework whatsoever. It sounds like you take this to be true by definition and I wonder why. Is it all about language? Or about what enables language? What's the story here? — Srap Tasmaner

First, I take it that concepts, are necessarily linguistic, unless you can demonstrate how they're not. Maybe you can have a wider definition of concept, such that it doesn't include language, but if you did that it would just be a matter of what kinds of concepts we're referring to in each of the arguments.

I'll give an example. Infants, I understand, have a sense of object permanence before they have a sense of object identity. If a toy is moved across their field of vision, passes behind a screen, and comes out as something else, that doesn't bother baby. If it doesn't come out at all, that does.

There's something in the ballpark of the conceptual going on there, I'd say, but what exactly, it's complicated. — Srap Tasmaner

How would this be about concepts, as opposed to their brain's relationship to a moving object?

Maybe you could have an experiment where you see how the brain lights up when using a concept like toy, as opposed to how the brain light up without a linguistic background. It's complicated for sure.

I take it that concepts, are necessarily linguistic, unless you can demonstrate how they're not. — Sam26

That's an interesting way to put it.

I'm not sure how to debate whether concepts are linguistic, but in the meantime I'm just curious why you would take such a strong position. Are concepts by definition linguistic? Or do you think they're just obviously linguistic?

Can you give me a thumbnail of your thinking here?

I am gong to leave this conversation. I don't see any progress being made. We seem to agree that "show is white" is a sentence and that snow is white a fact, yet you seem to need to slip something else in between the bolded bit and the white snow. I don't.

It's always, already interpreted.

In giving up the dualism of scheme and world, we do not give up the world, but reestablish unmediated touch with the tfamiliarobjects whose antics make our sentences and opinions true or false. — Davidson

Are you claiming that meaning is something like a social reality which is not localized in any one person's head? — hypericin

If he's not, I am.

I agree. But meaning then must be distinguished from interpretation, which is in the head.

I see four distinct components to a sentence:

1: The symbols themselves: The sounds or markings.
2: The meaning of the symbols: This is determined by language rules and context, and may be more or less ambiguous. This is not in the listener's or reader's head.
3: The interpretation: this is the mental schema the listener or reader conjures up, using the language rules and context as best they can, attempting to match the meaning.
4: The referent: The object in the world, the phenomena, or the abstract idea the sentence is referring to.

Another tack:

Sentences are just tools used to induce thoughts in others (or represent thoughts to ourselves, when thinking). It is the thoughts themselves which are true and false. A sentence is true if, when interpreted correctly, it induces true thoughts.

This is helpful because it removes the ambiguity of language which otherwise confounds the concept of truth, when truth or falsehood is applied to sentences themselves.

1: The symbols themselves: The sounds or markings.
2: The meaning of the symbols: This is determined by language rules and context, and may be more or less ambiguous. This is not in the listener's or reader's head.
3: The interpretation: this is the mental schema the listener or reader conjures up, using the language rules and context as best they can, attempting to match the meaning.
4: The referent: The object in the world, the phenomena, or the abstract idea the sentence is referring to. — hypericin

My correction:
1) The symbols themselves are not concept-independent, as if sounds or markings were not already interpretive meanings.
2)The meaning of symbols can’t be divorced from its interpretation by an individual in a given context.
3)Interpretation doesnt just compare itself to an extant set of rules for meaning. It is the only place where meaning actually arises.
4) We can’t speak of objects in the world outside of the objects that we form through our conceptual interpretations

That's a start, but language is a bit more complex than just that. We might go in any of a very many differing directions from there.

But there seems to be an inconsistency in that you agreed "meaning is something like a social reality" then recanted with "Sentences are just tools used to induce thoughts in others".

Which is it to be?

But there seems to be an inconsistency in that you agreed "meaning is something like a social reality" then recanted with "Sentences are just tools used to induce thoughts in others". — Banno

Not inconsistent, I didn't recant. Sentences, whose meanings are something like social realities, are tools used to induce thoughts in others.

My correction:
1) The symbols themselves are not concept-independent, as if sounds or markings were not already interpretive meanings.
2)The meaning of symbols can’t be divorced from its interpretation by an individual in a given context.
3)Interpretation doesnt just compare itself to an extant set of rules for meaning. It is the only place where meaning actually arises.
4) We can’t speak of objects in the world outside of the objects that we form through our conceptual interpretations — Joshs

1) Are you speaking of the difference between the physical markings and their interpretation as letters or phonemes? I agree, this should be distinguished.
2) No, it is absolutely divorced. You can see this by looking at an incompetent language user. A poor English user might understand "Water is wet" to mean water is slippery. This interpretation does not impact the meaning of the sentence, which remains water is wet
3) Languages users don't just compare, they have to actively construct an interpretation. As above, this construction is distinct from the meaning of the sentence.
4) But then, cf. the Twin Earth you cited to me.

Sentences, whose meanings are something like social realities, are tools used to induce thoughts in others. — hypericin

Meh. Looks like vacillation.

The two claims are not contradictory, so no.

SO meaning is both social and in the head.

No, meaning is social. It is stable whatever or whether we think of it.

Interpretation is what is in the head.

You've lost me. Or perhaps i wasn't with you to start with.

How would this be about concepts, as opposed to their brain's relationship to a moving object? — Sam26

I'm not quite sure what to say to this.

(Yes, I believe the original experiment was looking for rudimentary physics-related expectations among infants -- that something moving along that way will continue to do so, and it turns out as long as something does, even a different something, they appear to be satisfied.)

What I'm unsure about is the implication that concepts don't have to do with the brain's relationship, as you put it, to objects. I mean, sure, "mind" is probably a much better starting point, but you went with brain, so brain it is. Is that not more or less exactly where we expect to find concepts?

Maybe not, if you think the social is being given short shrift here. But then are we going to say that societies have concepts but individuals, even individual members of societies, don't? That sounds terribly odd. So if the social demands to be brought in, how exactly? And is the social, shall we say, aspect entirely linguistic?

Maybe you could have an experiment — Sam26

Well, this was part of my question, whether experiments were relevant to your position, or whether you understood concepts to be inherently linguistic phenomena in some sense. So are you saying that this is an empirical question after all?

Part of the problem is in separating those concepts that have an ontology that is separate from language, and yet part of language; and, those concepts that have an ontology that are strictly linguistic, viz., concepts like true and false. So, concepts like belief, moon, tree, etc., have an ontology that involves extra-linguistic things, but other concepts are strictly linguistic. Part of the problem is placing strictly linguistic concepts in a non-linguistic environment. I think this would be an interesting study. — Sam26

One example I like to use is the fire example. A language less creature, including but not limited to prelinguistic humans, can learn that touching fire causes pain without having a clue how to say, "touching fire causes pain", and without ever having an attitude towards that proposition such that they take it to be true. How can this be the case if believing that touching fire causes pain requires linguistic concepts?

Well, quite simply... it can't be if such belief requires linguistic concepts! Yet language less creature can and do learn and/or believe that touching fire causes pain. We can watch it happen. So, the only conclusion to draw here is that belief that touching fire causes pain does not require language or linguistic concepts. The difficulty in sensibly discussing and/or setting out language less belief is had in what the SEP characterized as...

the difficulty of usefully characterizing their mental lives without relying on the ascription of propositional attitudes...

...which I've recently found to be no problem at all. Although, I do reject the notion of 'mental lives' as a proper characterization of thought and belief. The belief emerges by virtue of the creature drawing correlations between the fire, the touching, and the subsequent pain they feel afterwards. There is nothing here that requires language, aside from our account of what happened. The fire, the touching, the subsequent pain, and the correlations drawn between those things(and others) are all existentially independent of language. That's what the belief consists of:The fire, the touching, the pain, and the correlations drawn between.

Belief that touching fire causes pain consists of the behaviour, the fire, the pain, and a creature capable of performing the behaviour as well as drawing the correlations between the aforementioned things. It is existentially dependent upon all of this. There is no need for language.

We can perform the same analysis with the belief that a mouse is behind the tree, as shown earlier in this thread as well as several others. The debate between Banno and myself also used that example in my opening statements about the content of belief.

There's no need for concepts here.

I'll give an example. Infants, I understand, have a sense of object permanence before they have a sense of object identity. If a toy is moved across their field of vision, passes behind a screen, and comes out as something else, that doesn't bother baby. If it doesn't come out at all, that does.

There's something in the ballpark of the conceptual going on there, I'd say, but what exactly, it's complicated. — Srap Tasmaner

A 'sense' of object permanence or an expectation(belief that something will come out the other side)?

I would go with the latter in that case. There is something similar to the conceptual going on there, but if the situation can be effectively/affectively exhausted without invoking the historically problematic notion of "concept" the better off we are.

This discussion of language less creatures' belief directly pertains to the topic of truth, because if it is the case that a language less creature is capable of forming, having, and/or holding true and/or false belief, then it only follows that either true belief does not require truth, or truth exists prior to language. We can take this even further and surmise that some language less creatures are capable of forming, having, and/or holding meaningful true belief. It follows that either meaning exists prior to language, or belief need not be meaningful to the believing creature. The latter is absurd.

When your thought, your view, your perception matches reality, you have the truth.

Truth is when your view or perception matches reality. So what is reality?