Obviously, the best way to avoid that is to avoid war in the first place. — boethius

Once the war started, Ukraine made lot's of strategic and tactical choices to maximise suffering of it's own people, essentially holding them hostage in war zones for the purpose of garnering international public sympathy.

The worst of such offences is handing out arms to civilians, which makes them legitimate military targets.

A weapon in the hands of a civilian during a war is a false sense of security that will get them killed and hyperdrive gang violence.

The NATO policy of pouring arms into Ukraine, as I mentioned months ago, will undermine European security for decades to come. These weapons are already in Europe. The two traditional barriers to sophisticated weapons coming to Europe: they're being hard to get and so super expensive (therefore only affordable by groups Western intelligence likely knows about, and most well financed groups are mafia's of one form or another that aren't so interested in causing random mayhem) and then the actual transport to Europe giving opportunities of interception, do not exist with these weapons: they are cheap, available to all sorts of random groups that can come into existence literally today and completely dedicated to random mayhem (especially if Ukraine doesn't "win" and the West is obviously to blame for that), with the weapons already in Europe and require little smuggling expertise or expense to transport them anywhere on the continent (maybe why UK has been more enthusiastic for war).

Furthermore, lowering both the cost and the costs and risk of transport, lowers the barrier to completely "rational" organised crime. It makes no sense to spend millions in both capital outlay, transportation, and "levelized cost of crime" considering the risk of capture, on a robbery, assassination, or gang violence of which the benefits are lower.

Lower the costs and risks of acquiring and transporting the weapons and this significantly widens the scope of profitable crime.

To make matters worse, security systems and protocols of yesterday were thought out and designed for the threats of yesterday.

It is only a matter of time before a civilian aircraft is downed by a stinger missile, as well as unbelievably violent robberies take place with advanced weaponry.

There is no doubt as to the extreme lethality and effectiveness of the sophisticated weapons delivered to Ukraine. NATO flooding the black market with its most sophisticated shoulder operated weapons is complete insanity.

When you actually do military service you realise quickly that an automatic assault riffle, as destructive as it is and capable of civilian massacres that we regularly see ... is basically a prop compared to the other weapons systems involved in a modern military engagement.

There seems to be a genuine incapacity to understand the realist position I and others have defended here as well as presented by John Mearsheimer. — boethius

Your position is very remote from any realism. You have entertained fantasies about nuking Ukraine. You have argued here that rooting for and supporting the Ukrainians was more morally disgusting than bombing the Ukrainians. This evidently implies an anti-Ukrainian and pro-Russian bias. It also shows that realism has little to do with your motivations, because a realist would never bother with such skewed moralism and fantasy of Armageddon, aware as he would be that it won't come across to his audience.

You and your walls of equivocating text are supporting the Russian war effort, even if you won't admit it openly.

What a cheap retort to what is an argued position. It must be wonderful to be so convinced about your own position you can dismiss others without trying to understand them and instead impute bad faith.

Your position is very remote from any realism. — Olivier5

Realism has nothing to do with:

You have argued here that rooting for and supporting the Ukrainians was more morally disgusting than bombing the Ukrainians. — Olivier5

Which I have not argued. I asked: what about the US bombing the Iraqi's (and plenty others) with exactly analogous or then very similar justifications.

However, given the Russian's perception of self-defence (at least as much as the US vis-a-vis Iraq -- and it's simply legitimate to say Russia is genuinely more at risk from Ukraine than US was at risk from Iraq), there is at least this moral component on the Russian's side.

NATO pursuing a policy that essentially maximises destruction in Ukraine, short of nuclear weapons, is not "supporting Ukraine" but rather doing everything to possible to destroy Ukraine. Which, US diplomats and military mouth pieces don't really hesitate to say that's the policy, as that's the policy which also maximises harm to the Russians.

Imagine I am your commanding officer, and I ask you to defend a position to the death. I cannot possibly say this is justified in supporting your own self-defence. Obviously, the only possible justification is fighting to the death holding one position will help the defence of others. US representatives regularly say the justification for "supporting" Ukraine is not that they'll win, or that the outcome is somehow better for Ukraine, but that it is beneficial to avoiding other parties, including themselves, from need to fight the Russians later. A highly debatable presupposition to begin with, but clearly the argument put forward.

It also shows that realism has little to do with your motivations, because a realist would never bother with such skewed moralism, aware as he would be that it won't convince anyone. — Olivier5

I just explained at length the realistic option to protect Ukraine by "supporting Ukraine" which is to form a formal military alliance inside or outside NATO and send boots on the ground to do, or be prepared to do, actual fighting to protect Ukraine.

I made clear that if there was some "Cuban missile" style standoff where some grand bargain is reached or Russia "bluffs" we're continuously told about are actually successfully called (rather than Russia doing exactly what the West claims Russia is bluffing about), hats off to high-stakes statecraft ... if it works.

It is the in between, neither strong nor conciliatory that I have issue with. "So, because you are lukewarm—neither hot nor cold—I am about to spit you out of my mouth." I remember hearing somewhere ... a long time ago.

You have argued here that rooting for and supporting the Ukrainians was more morally disgusting than bombing the Ukrainians.
— Olivier5

Which I have not argued. — boethius

You did, right here:

So what is the MOST disgusting of the two: to aggress your neighbour in such a war, or to cheerlead the victims trying to defend themselves?
— Olivier5

Cheerleading others to fight for your own virtue-signalling on social media is far more disgusting.

Actually fighting a war, at least there's skin in the game."Courage of your convictions" as they say in French. — boethius

----

I just explained at length the realistic option to protect Ukraine by "supporting Ukraine" which is to form a formal military alliance inside or outside NATO and send boots on the ground to do, or be prepared to do, actual fighting to protect Ukraine. — boethius

This is not a realist option, rather it's a recipe for WW3. Yet another proof that your position has very little to do with realism.

This is not a realist option, rather it's a recipe for WW3. Yet another proof that your position has very little to do with realism. — Olivier5

It is realistic, it's exactly what the Cuban Missile crisis was, which no one really criticises US decisions about.

And, I explain that Ukraine in NATO could be compensated to Russians so they don't even consider WWIII. And, considering the high stakes, everyone would accept pretty much anything given to Russia in such a context, as obviously peace is preferable to war.

You could go in with a "statecraft" plan, even tell it to the Russians over the crisis hotline, see if they signal they agree with the steps about to be taken (or maybe reconsider if they don't).

Anyways, the only thing not realistic in the strategy to protect Ukraine by protecting Ukraine ... is US does not have the statecraft capacity for high-stakes diplomacy, as corrupt plans require the purge of all dissenting voices internally (leaving corrupt and/or morons running things), and the US does not care about Ukraine even if they did have such statecraft capacity left.

Ukraine is tit-for tat for the US disastrous invasion and retreat from Afghanistan. US mouth pieces even kept on saying that before and immediately following the war: "we can give Russia their Afghanistan! We can give Russia their Afghanistan" ... just like the USA gave the USA the USA's Afghanistan ... Russia has become somehow to blame for everything American does to itself.

Take "meddling in elections": even if 200 000 USD on facebook adds was significant somehow and, even assuming it was somehow state sanctioned trolling, why does regulation allow Facebook selling political adds to foreign entities to begin with?

Follow the money.

It is realistic, it's exactly what the Cuban Missile crisis was, which no one really criticises US decisions about. — boethius

What are you talking about? Sending NATO troops and planes and warships into this war would literally be WW3. What do you think Putin will do when NATO troops get close to Moscow?

How many realists want to die in a nuclear holocaust?

Hypothetically of course, what might motivate Putin and team to take over Ukraine (over a short- or longer-term)?

Strategic (militarily and other):
The geographic strategic advantages of Ukraine being part of Russia should be fairly obvious.
Has come up in the thread here and there.
(Crimea, connecting Russia and Transnistria, etc.)
A Russian Ukraine would extend Russia further into Europe, bordering Hungary and Slovakia, ..., influence, missile ranges, whatever.

Economic:
By now, most should know that Ukrainian agriculture is big on the world stage.
High-tech and minerals are also big.
(By the way, according to rumors, the last Antonov An-225 Mriya was destroyed during the invasion, would'a :heart:'d seeing/flying one.)
What would subsuming Ukraine mean for Russian economy?
^{(I have little overview on this stuff, heck, GMOs, droughts, climate change could be factors for all I know)}

Political:
Taking over Ukraine (in part or whole) would be a victory for Putin (or could be construed as such), one that could secure his future.
Losing face over the invasion could be bad for him and team, right down to lethal.
That's domestic; foreign is much more wishy-washy, at least I've come to expect little.

A disadvantage could be Ukrainian resistance (now terrorists) and Russo-haters; hard to tell how such like would figure in Putin's concerns.
Another disadvantage could be international responses and distrust.

With Ukraine, Russia is a genuine Great Power.

Without Ukraine, Russia isn't a Great Power, but just a regional power.

Russian soldiers refusing to fight undermine Moscow's offensive
By Denis Kataev and Eric Biegala, Radio France
Published on Tuesday, August 16, 2022 at 8:57 am

There are a few hundred of them, maybe thousands. Russian "refuseniks" who refuse to fight any longer and are imprisoned, even tortured according to the father of one of them. Some would also be sent back into combat.

Recently, the Russian army seems to be struggling in Ukraine: its advances in the Donbass are particularly slow and costly in terms of men and equipment. And obviously it is struggling to recruit fighters, especially since desertions and refusals to fight seem to be multiplying.

"I will solve the problem by my own efforts, I will talk to these soldiers who are responsible. He is my son. I will not leave without him": for several weeks now, Maxime*, in his fifties, has been wandering between the disparate units of the Russian army engaged in Ukraine, in the region of Luhansk where his son Youri*, 26 years old, has disappeared. He did not die in combat, nor was he wounded, he simply refused to continue the offensive started by Moscow on February 24. Since then, he has not been heard from again.

Yuri was an active soldier, a lieutenant assigned to a unit based on the island of Sakhalin in the Pacific, in the Russian Far East. In April, his unit found itself engaged in Ukraine, in the battle of Izium, south of Kharkiv. Izium is a neuralgic point which commands the communication axes towards the Donbass. The battle is hard, the Ukrainians defend themselves with great effort, the Russians finally take Izium, at the price of heavy losses. In June the young lieutenant decides to throw in the towel and refuses to fight any longer. He was immediately arrested, along with other Russian soldiers from his unit who were just as resistant, and incarcerated in Bryanka, a prison in the Luhansk region.

He still managed to reach his father on the phone, who said: "He told me about torture, he said they were tortured. I had already understood this from talking to the parents of other soldiers. According to Yuri, the rebels are regularly beaten and tied up on the floor. There are even mock executions. "Many of those who have been there have told me that they could never have imagined such a thing, that their own country could treat them in this way", Maxime tells us.

The objectors were kept in detention for some time, then transferred: "They were exfiltrated to unknown destinations... Why? I think it's clear, so that they can't say anything about what happened in the prisons. They are not sent back to the units where they used to serve, but to special units, to the areas of the front where the army is suffering the most losses. I think they don't want them to get out alive."

Some Russian units seem to have been condemned as a whole, such as the infamous 64th Motorized Rifle Guards Brigade, probably responsible for the abuses against civilians in Boutcha during the Battle of Kiev. The unit, although decorated by Vladimir Putin, was immediately reintroduced into the battle in Ukraine after its evacuation from the outskirts of Kiev. Its losses have been so great in the Ukrainian Donbass that some are now talking about its probable dissolution.

The losses, in men as well as in equipment, are obviously sufficient for the Russian General Staff to have decided to completely recompose certain units, combining sections with no experience with other more seasoned ones. Yuri, Maxim's son, probably found himself forcibly re-enlisted in one of these units: "He was taken to the prison in Perevalsk, where the men of the Wagner group said they needed him because he was a specialist - Yuri is a sniper - he couldn't refuse, so he went back" to the battle. Maxime traveled all the way to Ukraine, to the province of Luhansk, to try to find his son, who was undoubtedly reengaged in the fighting against his will.

How many are these refractory members of the Russian army? At least several hundred, perhaps even several thousand. In June and July, two units present in the Ukrainian Donbass, the 205th Cossack Motorized Rifle Brigade and the 11th Airborne Assault Brigade, about a thousand men each, reported a total of more than 378 soldiers, non-commissioned officers, and officers who refused to continue fighting in Ukraine.

*First names have been changed

https://www.radiofrance.fr/franceinter/guerre-en-ukraine-les-refuzniks-de-l-armee-russe-plombent-l-offensive-de-moscou-3992522

Bits and pieces from Newsweek:

Gorbachev Feels His Life's Work Being Destroyed by Putin, Close Friend Says (Jul 23, 2022)

At 91 and at poor health, he's probably not going to get killed for his words. Then again...you never know.

Putin Says U.S. Using Ukrainians as 'Cannon Fodder', Trying to Prolong War (Aug 16, 2022)

Yet, Putin could end the war whenever. Blames the entire "west" while bombing Ukrainians. Is his propaganda/diversion working?

Gorbachev Feels His Life's Work Being Destroyed by Putin, Close Friend Says (Jul 23, 2022)

At 91 and at poor health, he's probably not going to get killed for his words. Then again...you never know. — jorndoe

Bit ironic when your life's work was actually the dissolution of the Soviet Empire. Think about it, the Soviet Empire was basically the continuation of the Russian Empire, and they got Russia to be against it's own empire.

Yet, Putin could end the war whenever. Blames the entire "west" while bombing Ukrainians. Is his propaganda/diversion working? — jorndoe

To those that think everything bad that happens is because of the actions of the US, yes. They take it all in without any problem.

A big article in WoPo about US prewar intel: As Russia prepared to invade Ukraine, U.S. struggled to convince Zelensky, allies of threat (If you run into a paywall, try opening in incognito/private window, or turn off Javascript, or use something like the Reader View in Firefox.)

This account, in previously unreported detail, shines new light on the uphill climb to restore U.S. credibility, the attempt to balance secrecy around intelligence with the need to persuade others of its truth, and the challenge of determining how the world’s most powerful military alliance would help a less-than-perfect democracy on Russia’s border defy an attack without NATO firing a shot.

The first in a series of articles examining the road to war and the military campaign in Ukraine, it is drawn from in-depth interviews with more than three dozen senior U.S., Ukrainian, European and NATO officials about a global crisis whose end is yet to be determined. Some spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive intelligence and internal deliberations.

Even the FSB personnel don't seem happy to go to Ukraine:

Employees of the Federal Security Service of Russia massively refuse to go to war in Ukraine. They do not agree even for a salary increase of 6-8 times and additional benefits.

The Telegram channel “We Can Explain” authors shared the relevant information, citing a source in the FSB.

The Russian Federation is trying to form new special service units in the temporarily occupied territories of the Kherson, Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia regions. Military counterintelligence officers are needed and at all levels: from assistants to the commandant on duty to operatives and middle managers.

Very few people want to go to Ukraine, so the FSB is trying to put pressure on employees under whom the “chair wobbles.” If a person is on the verge of being fired or “warned about incomplete service compliance,” then he is offered to go to war. Calling and former secret service employees who lost their jobs on discrediting grounds.

However, the efforts lead to almost nothing. The source said that people are refusing, even though they are offered a lot of money: “Of the 200 people who were called, only three said they would think. And this despite the promises of huge payments and benefits.”

FSB officers are promised to be paid from 450,000 to 600,000 rubles per month if they agree to a “business trip.” This is 6-8 times more than the salary under the contract.

Similar news and that some Russian troops don't want to serve in Ukraine (see here) or some officers have been even officers have been prosecuted for sending conscripts to the Ukraine war (see Russia Prosecutes 12 Officers Over Conscript Deployments to Ukraine) just point to one obvious issue: low morale among the Russians fighting troops in this war.

Commanders are in a pickle: officially they are not at war, and so peacetime laws apply. Which means that they can't force anyone to fight. Any contract serviceman can quit at any time and for any reason. At most, they can be prosecuted for insubordination, which is not a very serious charge.

Then again, laws-schmoes. At first, commanders were pressuring soldiers to stay, threatening all manner of (fictitious) legal consequences. Then they began detaining refuseniks in unofficial prisons, beating and starving them into submission. Or they just refuse to accept their resignations. According to some soldiers from the infamous 64th infantry brigade, some 700 of their ranks are trying, mostly unsuccessfully, to quit. Even those whose contracts have expired often cannot leave. Those few who manage to obtain a leave of absence and go back to Russia promise to come back, but of course, none do. It's like Catch-22, but even more absurd and tragic.

Commanders are in a pickle: officially they are not at war, and so peacetime laws apply. Which means that they can't force anyone to fight. Any contract serviceman can quit at any time and for any reason. At most, they can be prosecuted for insubordination, which is not a very serious charge. — SophistiCat

When you start a large conventional war and don't call it even war, you have this. Putin had the balls to put the Russian Armed Forces to make an all out attack on Ukraine, but he hadn't the balls to put the Russian society into war mode. You reap what you sow.

Meanwhile, NATO is flexing it's muscles.

The 22nd Marine Expeditionary unit with it's Marine force and Airwing (on USS Kearsarge) practiced with the Finnish Navy and it's coastal forces and the exercise just ended this week. What is notable, that either the 22nd MEU or the Finnish Navy didn't know about this exercise in May of this year. So now NATO is basically having ad hoc exercises, not those agreed basically years earlier. The Finnish commander of the Coastal Brigade commented that the ad hoc exercise was the best military exercise in his 33 year military career. Tells something about it.

(What is interesting that American marines and their Finnish counterparts are training in mixed units:)


Just few weeks before in Estonia, on the other side of Gulf of Finland, Exercise Hedgehog was conducted and was the largest military exercises in Estonia since 1991 with 15 000 personnel (in a country with 7500 active personnel). An interesting video about it:



And likely you could go down until the Black Sea with similar NATO exercises taking place.

Yet the actual war seems to have to an artillery duel equivalent of WW2 / WW1 era, that both sides simply cannot continue. This war has dragged on for quite a while:

.

Even the FSB personnel don't seem happy to go to Ukraine — ssu

Speaking of FSB, here is the next installment of WoPo's investigative articles on pre-war intelligence: FSB errors played crucial role in Russia's failed war plans in Ukraine

An agency whose domain includes internal security in Russia as well as espionage in the former Soviet states, the FSB has spent decades spying on Ukraine, attempting to co-opt its institutions, paying off officials and working to impede any perceived drift toward the West. No aspect of the FSB’s intelligence mission outside Russia was more important than burrowing into all levels of Ukrainian society.

And yet, the agency failed to incapacitate Ukraine’s government, foment any semblance of a pro-Russian groundswell or interrupt President Volodymyr Zelensky’s hold on power. Its analysts either did not fathom how forcefully Ukraine would respond, Ukrainian and Western officials said, or did understand but couldn’t or wouldn’t convey such sober assessments to Russian President Vladimir Putin.

What are you talking about? Sending NATO troops and planes and warships into this war would literally be WW3. What do you think Putin will do when NATO troops get close to Moscow? — Olivier5

It would not be "literally WWIII"; I spend some effort to explain how a "tough" standoff could result in a diplomatic solution.

Maybe actually read what I wrote.

However, let's assume this premise is true, then it follows that arming Ukraine "enough" to actually push back the Russians may likewise start WWIII anyways ... so, can't have that, just enough arms to Ukraine to cause damages to Russia but not enough that they escalate to tactical nuclear weapons.

Which is exactly what we see.

However, the truth is that the principle of "can't send NATO troops" or "can't send too many arms", to avoid WWIII, is simply used as a manipulation tool to calibrate the arms and intelligence support to maintain the war by propping up Ukraine, but not nearly enough support for Ukraine to have a chance of winning.

When you start a large conventional war and don't call it even war, you have this. Putin had the balls to put the Russian Armed Forces to make an all out attack on Ukraine, but he hadn't the balls to put the Russian society into war mode. You reap what you sow. — ssu

Obviously they would make it an "official war" if they wanted to, and they've talked about doing so.

However, paying people to fight is a lot more stable politically and they have increased revenue from fossil fuels sales, so can easily pay.

Similar news and that some Russian troops don't want to serve in Ukraine (see here) or some officers have been even officers have been prosecuted for sending conscripts to the Ukraine war (see Russia Prosecutes 12 Officers Over Conscript Deployments to Ukraine) just point to one obvious issue: low morale among the Russians fighting troops in this war. — ssu

Again, we don't really have any statistically relevant data on Russian troops morale ... and low-morale in armies is pretty common and often goes up and down, total collapse being a pretty big outlier.

Moreover, is Ukrainian morale any better?

For such observations, even if true, to be useful, we'd need to compare both sides. If Russia has lost some number of armoured vehicles, the context of Ukrainian losses are needed to make sense of such a figure.

At least, in terms of evaluating the current military situation. If morale is equally bad on both sides, though neither likely to collapse, then perhaps no difference at all really will result anyways.

If the goal is to damage the Russian military regardless of damages to Ukraine in the process, then the context of Ukrainian losses

Smart-looking but dead. Shoulda been putin.

Employ a drone attack. — Changeling

Yes, please elaborate on your military and geo-political analysis that killing Putin with a drone attack is both feasible and a good idea.

Or, go to reddit to circle jerk virtue signalling fantasies.

Speaking of FSB, here is the next installment of WoPo's investigative articles on pre-war intelligence: FSB errors played crucial role in Russia's failed war plans in Ukraine — SophistiCat

As I've repeated many times throughout this thread, we really have zero credible information on the Kremlin's or FSB internal dialogues and aims.

However, it's already been discussed here at length this idea of a Russian intelligence failure. They secure the South and clearly had a plan B to the first plan and methods of attacks (level everything with artillery), successfully prepare for and withstand sanctions, this does not really demonstrate a failed war plan.

I'd be willing to believe a quick Ukrainian capitulation was viewed as more probable (and maybe it was more probable, the current situation being realistically less likely than the counter-factual; as simply because something happens doesn't mean it was the likely outcome), but the Russian's clearly had a plan B.

There's an incredible amount of myth making on the part of Western media about Putin, or the Kremlin, or the FSB, or the Russian generals internal debates and monologues, but we really have basically zero information. We do not really know what they even really trying to achieve.

For example, part of this mythology of "miscalculation" is that Putin didn't expect the West to steal Russia's money held in Western banks. Certainly sounds had having some 350 billion dollars stolen from state assets.

However, maybe demonstrating to the developing world that their assets aren't safe in Western banks is exactly what Putin wanted, and is worth spending 350 billion dollars to undermine confidence in Western institutions.

Indeed, a critical component of resisting Western sanctions over the long haul is getting the non-Western world to implement alternative payment systems with Russia, and seeing 350 billion dollars get stolen without any due process of any kind is a big motivating factor.

What Western mainstream journalists / propagandists consistently forget in their analysis / propaganda is that the rest of the world is far closer to Putin politically than it is to the Western "ideals" (which the West hardly represents anyways). Most powerful people in nearly every country would be more concerned about their own assets and state assets being stolen by the West, for genuine philosophical "differences" or then pretextual bullshit, than they are of Ukrainian sovereignty.

As I've repeated many times throughout this thread — boethius

I really don't know why you bother

I really don't know why you bother — SophistiCat

You bother to posit some factoid as "real truth", or such is the implication, completely ignoring the issue has already been discussed.

I bother to point out your factoid is based on nothing; the whole "someone close to the Kremlin" or "anonymous CIA officials", or "FSB told me so" etc. are a confidence level of information of precisely zero.

What we learn from de-classified intelligence is that things are completely fucked up and almost nothing could have been deduced from public information at the time. What people in the FSB really thought, Putin thought, what they think now; we really don't know.

Reddit believing as a collective whole they can psychoanalyse all these people ... not a substitute for real knowledge.

And you're bothered that I bother to point it out?

As for updating my analysis of the situation:

It seems Russia is slowly taking all of the Donbas region, and the much talked about Ukrainian counter offensive against Kershon did not move the Russian lines much at all.

We've seen some "high value" targets been damaged or destroyed, such as the bridge to Kershon and then the recent ammo depots in Crimea, but these have very little affect on the actual war.

Main purpose of these attacks seems mostly for media diversion purposes, as Russia steadily takes ground in the Donbas.

Once again, the new "shiny" weapons system "finally getting to Ukraine", the HIMARS, had little effect on the actual military situation.

As I mentioned some weeks ago, taking Kershon is essentially a litmus test for the offensive manoeuvre potential of the much hyped "million man army" in combination with the legendary HIMARS.

Without offensive manoeuvre potential, Ukraine can only steadily lose territory.

As @Olivier5 keeps reminding us, no one wants WWIII, so it seems this situation where Ukraine can only lose territory at immense loss of life and cost will continue.

My guess is the Russian plan is to take all of the Donbas, declare their current objectives "achieved", switch to a defensive posture, and then it will be extremely difficult for Western media to keep up the narrative that Russia is somehow losing / has lost.

As far as the map goes, it's extremely slow but Ukraine has not been able to actually hold any fixed lines, so in the current dynamic is only a question of time.

At that point, Europeans maybe too tired of the war and the media narrative will switch to Ukraine needing to accept defeat and compromise with Russia. Or, could just be shelling back and forth for years as a new normal.

You're on mute.

↪boethius You're on mute. — SophistiCat

Ok, great, but how are we talking if I'm on mute?

Yes, this came first apparent when Putin's own intelligence service raided the FSB headquarters responsible for Ukraine after the war had started. Likely they had told simply what Putin wanted to hear (a trap in that intelligence services can fall into).

I think we'll know the details later even better, but likely the intelligence service painted a rosy picture of this invasion just going so well as the occupation (and annexation) of Crimea. We have to remember that the most successful military operations that the Soviet Union and Russia have pulled off were so successful that they aren't called wars: The occupation of Czechoslovakia 1968 and the occupation of Crimea 2014. Hence the Russia have this urge for these armour attacks going straight to the Capital and simply eliminate the enemy leadership.

Americans call the tactic a "Thunder Run", which the US did successfully during the invasion of Iraq. When the US noticed that the Iraqis weren't putting much a fight, they just rolled the tanks right inside Baghdad into the city center. With a defender that would be willing and capable to fight, this would be a horrible strategy. And so it was in the battle of Kyiv (and earlier in the First Chechen war).

Interesting to look at the American experience in Baghdad to what now happened in Ukraine:


And how the same tactic didn't work near Kyiv. Here a large armoured column is attacked, it stops (basically bunching up dangerously together) and then it retreats:

↪SophistiCat Yes, this came first apparent when Putin's own intelligence service raided the FSB headquarters responsible for Ukraine after the war had started. Likely they had told simply what Putin wanted to hear (a trap in that intelligence services can fall into). — ssu

Again, wild speculations by Western media.

The raid could be that someone sold information to the Americans (they did "know about" the invasion), or were anyways spied on, or then not but how to know without an investigation?

Or, throwing shade on the FSB perhaps suits the Kremlin as a scapegoat for a bloody war that FSB told them was likely, but that's what the Kremlin wants.

Or then simple intelligence failures having nothing to do with a supposed assessment of Ukraine likelihood of fighting.

There can be a long list of reasons on the jump to conclusions mat.

I think we'll know the details later even better, but likely the intelligence service painted a rosy picture of this invasion just going so well as the occupation (and annexation) of Crimea. We have to remember that the most successful military operations that the Soviet Union and Russia have pulled off were so successful that they aren't called wars: The occupation of Czechoslovakia 1968 and the occupation of Crimea 2014. Hence the Russia have this urge for these armour attacks going straight to the Capital and simply eliminate the enemy leadership. — ssu

Certainly that is the preferred outcome, but we have no knowledge of how likely they thought this outcome would be, but we can be pretty sure they did not think it 100% as otherwise they would have only gone for the capital and not bothered taking Kershon (and the critical waterway to Crimea) and surrounding Mariupol, all in a few days.

A bloody war, with extreme sanctions and nearly total cut with the West may suit Russian and Chinese leadership interests, or then at the least an acceptable outcome and clearly preferred over the pre-2022 status quo.

Obviously just rolling into the capital and the war over in a couple of days, is preference number one for any military (as you point out for the US in Iraq). However, there is zero indications that the invasion was premised on such an eventuality and plenty of indications the Kremlin was committed to intense warfare if need be.

It also simply doesn't seem plausible that the Kremlin would assume taking Kiev in a day or two a slam dunk, as the Ukrainians are already supported by NATO powers and the CIA is advising at various levels, Ukraine has been fighting since 2014, political class as well as many regular people has been very radicalised to want a war with Russia, and therefore there maybe both intelligence and military surprises.

The war is always mythologized as Ukraine "standing alone" against a larger power. But that is obviously untrue, US and NATO made many commitments to Ukraine, already supplying arms and training and intelligence, so there's zero reason to assume the scenario presented itself to the Russians as simply a smaller country totally alone and should be foregone conclusion to just "knock out" with a column of tanks to the capital (which was not their strategy, they also took critical strategic positions in the South).

Obviously they would make it an "official war" if they wanted to, and they've talked about doing so. — boethius

But they have not. And that's the important issue here.

Again, we don't really have any statistically relevant data on Russian troops morale ... and low-morale in armies is pretty common and often goes up and down, total collapse being a pretty big outlier.

Moreover, is Ukrainian morale any better? — boethius

With the information we have, we can at least quite confidently say that Russian morale isn't high and Ukrainian moral isn't on the verge of collapse.

Even if it is anecdotal and perhaps some reporting is biased, there's enough to understand that there are moral (and other) problems in the Russian side. That doesn't mean that all Russian units have low moral. And when it comes to Ukrainians, Russia would be eager to show of large groups of surrendering Ukrainians. We did see videos of these when Mariupol fell.


And naturally we can say that Ukrainian morale is better. They have been attacked, it's pretty simply for them. It's the Russians that can have the debate about if this war was a good idea. Many young people have voted on the issue by leaving Russia. Something that is an indicator that not everyone agrees with Putin.

Again, wild speculations by Western media. — boethius

I'm not so sure about that. We do know something about how Russia works. Don't think it's all speculation. Starting with the US knowing that Russia would invade, there are things that are known. What Putin thinks inside his head we naturally have no idea.

But they have not. And that's the important issue here. — ssu

I'm not saying they haven't, I'm just pointing out that there's no reason to assume it's some miscalculation or mistake. There's negative consequences to conscripting people into an offensive war, especially with the economic pressure of the sanctions.

Furthermore, it's part of the Kremlin's narrative to the domestic audience that they are not trying to "conquer" Ukraine, just dealing with neo-Nazis and protecting ethnic Russians.

With the information we have, we can at least quite confidently say that Russian morale isn't high and Ukrainian moral isn't on the verge of collapse. — ssu

Sure, but there's nothing to indicate Russian morale is on the verge of collapse or affecting the war outcome in any significant way. Battle is still raging and Russia is still taking new territory. Russians are obviously presented with a very different version of the war as well, with major recent victories.

Even if it is anecdotal and perhaps some reporting is biased, there's enough to understand that there are moral (and other) problems in the Russian side. — ssu

There have been reports of Ukrainian units refusing to fight, even posting videos saying so, as well as recent interviews with foreign fighters talking of major corruption, weapons disappearing, pointless suicide missions, etc.

But anecdotes really don't say much about the current war situation.

For sure there will be units with low morale in any military nearly anytime, even in peace time. But there's so far no evidence of Russian morale affecting battle outcomes in any significant way.

I'm not so sure about that. We do know something about how Russia works. Don't think it's all speculation. Starting with the US knowing that Russia would invade, there are things that are known. What Putin thinks inside his head we naturally have no idea. — ssu

But that's what speculation is, saying "we know something about how Russia works" and therefore such and such events must be explained by what we already "know".

Evidence, hard evidence, is required to actually know something about anything, and even moreso when it comes to spooks who are constantly trying to deceive each other and certainly us.

I have so far encountered no evidence that Putin, the Kremlin, the FSB, believe the current state of sanctions and the war is a bad thing compared to the pre-2022 status quo (the basis of comparison). Certainly things can always be better, but it seems to me Putin and the Kremlin and FSB committed to this schism with the West by preparing for it for 8 years.

Why that's relevant is that decisions and diplomacy depend on a model of the counter-parties decision making. If the West assumes "sanctions are bad" and Putin and the Kremlin are squirming under them ... when they aren't, even exactly what they want (as kicking the West out unilaterally would not be an easy sell domestically), then it produces bad strategy. Or, likewise, if the West assumes the war is a net-negative (a miscalculation) for the Kremlin but they see it as a net positive, again results in bad strategy.

Of course, could be a giant miscalculation and they are in a panic, sweating bullets, sanctions about to destabilise the entire economy as army morale collapses, and wanting to find a way to end the war, save face and all that. I've just encountered no actual evidence for any of that.

It is speculative what is the current mental state of Russian decision makers. Nothing wrong with speculation of course, but it is dangerous to assume speculations are facts simply because they are convenient to believe, leads to terrible decision making.

Also have to take freedom/presence of press/observers into account.