You can click on a posters name, then click on "comments" and get their most recent comments, scroll down and you can click more and then a number will appear in the URL of what comment to start at, which you can then change to jump around. — boethius

I see, thanks for the tip. Easy though it was, the clandestine game of "why don't you find out what I think by some trial of research", seemed ridiculous compared to "I don't think the Ukrainians should fight", or "I do think the Ukrainians should fight, but I haven't said as much yet". Either of which would have been more fluent.

But then the idea is clearly not fluency, the idea is to avoid having to address the salient points you've made by miring the conversation in some pedantic irrelevancy. We see it too often.

I'm not sure if Russia has the LNG capacity to export all its gas through all its non-EU pipelines and arctic LNG plants — boethius

It doesn't. Russia's existing LNG capacity is a minor fraction of its pipeline capacity. Since Russia doesn't have mature LNG technology of its own and its foreign partners have pulled out of expansion projects, it won't be able to ramp up its LNG exports much further.

It doesn't. Russia's existing LNG capacity is a minor fraction of its pipeline capacity. — SophistiCat

I'm aware of this, that's why I also mentioned the non-EU pipelines (mainly China but there's also some capacity to sell south ... of course so those nations can sell to the EU).

However, the main point was that oil generates 5 times the revenue than gas.

So it's simply not a big hit to reduce gas exports, in particular, as I mentioned, if the increase in price offsets the lower volume anyways.

Russia can also store gas while it builds further export capacity (also leave it in the ground and tap it later) ... maybe where their reserves come into play to just wait to sell later; resource doesn't disappear simply because you don't sell it today.

There is not logical necessity to export at maximum capacity and no inherent consequence to lowering exports.

All this to explain why Russia's energy export revenues are up.

I do agree there is some uncertainty as to the quality of Chinese and Indian capital equipment, but as long as it does function it's not some critical failure point.

The Western advanced engineering firms do have more efficient equipment, but efficiency isn't so critical in Russia's situation of producing energy.

Ukrainians should fight — boethius

I thought it was more that the Ukrainians will fight?
(not so much due to Zelenskyy, more that they're not inclined to hand the keys over to Russia)
Maybe that's just me.
I wouldn't mind them repelling the attacker-bomber, make the would-be land-grabber think twice, deter the invader. If they're going to fight? Heck yeah.

↪Tzeentch Taking care of the Russian threat for a generation is well worth the price.
— Olivier5

Seems pretty strong support for the war ... and that it's well worth the price of the dead so far. — boethius

Not really, because this comment was made in the context of a discussion with @Tzeentch about NATO and the EU, to whom it pertains.

This comment of mine did not pertain to the Ukrainians. It's not for me to say if their sacrifice is worth it. They alone can decide on whether or not they should fight, or vie for a truce.

So I am saying this: given that the Ukrainians have decided to fight rather than surrender, and given their relative success so far in doing so, whatever the EU and US spend in support of the Ukrainian side appears to me well worth the price the EU and US are paying, if it helps humbling the Kremlin's militaristic ambitions for a generation.

given that the Ukrainians have decided to fight rather than surrender, and given their relative success so far in doing so, whatever the EU and US spend in support of the Ukrainian side appears to me well worth the price the EU and US are paying, if it helps humbling the Kremlin's militaristic ambitions for a generation. — Olivier5

So because some Ukrainians have decided to fight, you think subjecting all Ukrainians to prolonged war and decades of financial destitution is a good idea?

You can't just hide behind some arbitrary number of other people's decisions. You're supporting a course of action which will seriously harm those who had absolutely no say in that decision. That some people have decided they want to fight doesn't absolve you of responsibility for defending your moral support for a course of action that entails massive harms on non-consenting, innocent bystanders... The others. The ones who didn't decide to fight.

Not really, because this comment was made in the context of a discussion with Tzeentch about NATO and the EU, to whom it pertains. — Olivier5

So NATO should support war with supplying arms ... but that's not a case for war?

Lot's of wars are considered by nearly all just wars, certainly most people here, there's no problem of principle, from the outset, arguing Ukraine's just war cause or NATO's just war cause.

The point of my comment was that you clearly genuinely believe your position, obviously our positions are very different (on at least some key points, not everything), debate and exchange of view ensues. What else would people expect from such a controversial and emotional topic as a war.

If Ukraine achieved a decisive battle field victory, or Russia did collapse and retreat begging for sanctions to be lifted, would you really be hedging your language now? Or would be be running internet victory laps.

Which, to be clear, I'm not criticising your passion for your cause. That part is noble. And, likewise, willing to submit your passion to scrutiny, which you do address and do reformulate your position (bad faith I only consider when criticism isn't even addressed), is likewise noble.

Of course, I still think you're wrong.

But, if you were right and there was some decisive Ukrainian victory or Russian regime collapse (which at the start I thought was a real possibility), for sure, in such a scenario I would be accepting my analysis was simply wrong.

However, @Isaac has made a more complete retort to the core moral issue, so I'll just repeat it again:

That some people have decided they want to fight doesn't absolve you of responsibility for defending your moral support for a course of action that entails massive harms on non-consenting, innocent bystanders... The others. The ones who didn't decide to fight. — Isaac

So NATO should support war with supplying arms ... but that's not a case for war? — boethius

It's a case for the US and EU to support the Ukrainian war effort, for as long as they need it.

If Ukraine achieved a decisive battle field victory, or Russia did collapse and retreat begging for sanctions to be lifted, would you really be hedging your language now? Or would be be running internet victory laps. — boethius

Of course I would plead for a rapid end to the sanctions, if Moscow gives adequate assurances that it will mend its ways.

I thought it was more that the Ukrainians will fight?
(not so much due to Zelenskyy, more that they're not inclined to hand the keys over to Russia)
Maybe that's just me.
I wouldn't mind them repelling the attacker-bomber, make the would-be land-grabber think twice, deter the invader. If they're going to fight? Heck yeah. — jorndoe

This seems to me clearly a pro-war position.

And, at the start of a conflict with Russia as a smaller nation, I would agree with fighting. I have trained for precisely this strategy.

The whole point of a conventional deterrent against a vastly more powerful force (and Russia's nuclear weapons makes them vastly more powerful), is to make a negotiated peace a better option for the aggressor than a costly and unpredictable fight.

Being willing to fight (even in a losing situation) is leverage in a negotiation.

However, if you demonstrate your willingness to fight ... and then don't negotiate, you not only lose your leverage the more you lose but you also motivate your opponent to demand more to compensate the costly fight.

What has happened in Ukraine is a missed opportunity for a negotiated peace early (or even before) the conflict.

This missed opportunity is I think very clearly due to a false sense of security provided by NATO (Zelensky seemed to genuinely believe he would get a NATO no-fly zone) while no NATO power did anything to explain to Zelensky the end-game if he refused to negotiate with Russia and accept some concessions (which, had it been explained that social media glory today is gone tomorrow, the weapons may not come forever and may not even be enough, the costs of trying to "win" by force may not be remotely worth it, and it's not at all clear how that's even remotely possible).

There is only one reason for that: US wanted this war to happen and to drag on as it has, and the EU leaders are basically puppets willing to harm their own people's interest, harm millions of Ukrainians, for US interests to reduce EU leverage to basically zero on the world stage, and have the EU submit as a bumbling and weak diplomatic side-kick and jester. The EU is basically the US' choir at this point.

It's a case for the US and EU to support the Ukrainian war effort, for as long as the need it — Olivier5

That's clearly pro war. Why call it something different?

Supporting NATO supporting the Ukrainian war effort ... is clearly supporting the Ukrainian war effort.

It's a case for the US and EU to support the Ukrainian war effort, for as long as the need it — Olivier5

New variant on "guns don't kill people...".

"I don't support war, I just support supporting war."

Mmmokay. But if the Ukrainians decide to vie for a truce, i'm fine with that.

However, Isaac has made a more complete retort to the core moral issue — boethius

You would do well to take your distance with lower IQ, hit-and-miss posters, such as Isaac. He is only misleading you, here as well as elsewhere. For you see, my argument with Tzeench for EU and US support the Ukrainian war effort was not a moral case at all. I am not saying that the Ukrainians have some sort of moral right to indefinite Western assistance -- such a moral position would be naïve in this particular instance.

Mine is a pragmatist, real politics-based position. I am saying that it makes perfect strategic sense for the US and EU to weaken expansionist Russia, if the Ukrainians are willing to fight. I trust you will agree to that, even if you may try, tactically here, to paint this proxy war approach in negative moral terms, and to wax some ethical veneer on your own cynicism.

Mine is a pragmatist, real politics-based position. — Olivier5

Again, supporting NATO supporting Ukraine's war effort, is supporting Ukraine's war effort.

Support is support, regardless of the justification and regardless of whether it's indefinite support or not.

If I support a political candidate, doesn't mean I'm committed to support indefinitely nor that if I reevaluate my support somehow that retroactively removes the support I provided in the past.

Your position is obviously support to Ukraine's war effort since starting on this thread.

Yes, please, explain your reasons for it, that's the purpose of discussing, and obviously many, many people in the West support Ukraine's war effort, so it's good for the purposes of discussion that someone represents that position.

Furthermore, realist, pragmatic and strategic decisions are still for the purposes of some moral objective.

None of these are amoral things, just analytical frameworks on how best to achieve moral objectives in the real, messy world where nothing is ideal and compromise is always necessary (simply limited resources forces us to compromise on what moral objectives are practical to pursue).

Realism, pragmatism and strategy are analytical tools to try to understand what the actual consequences of different actions are likely to be. Actual likely consequences are clearly relevant to decision making.

However, real consequences in a complex world, don't somehow make the moral objectives irrelevant, just bring to the for difficult decisions.

For example, in WWII, the allies broke Enigma and so could know when ships would be attacked, when and where.

Many ships were not warned or told to change course because it would risk statistically tipping off the Nazi's that enigma had been broken and they may do a full reset of all the code books, change wheels and so on.

Obviously the goal was to save lives, but a realistic, pragmatic, and strategic analysis concluded some lives needed to be knowingly sacrificed to optimise the covert information advantage over the longest possible time frame.

Someone could have spoken up for the fact it's the Germans that are morally responsible for the attacks and the deaths, they're duty is to save lives and so they must warn everyone they can, and if the German's change their codes and then kill more people it's their moral issue and doesn't matter.

The difference between such a naive fool and the mathematicians that worked out a formula of who to save and who let die, is simply the time frame under consideration. What achieves the goal (saving lives) in the short term may be counterproductive to the same goal over the long term.

A simplified distillation of Vlad's pizdets debacle on the home front (and implied prospects for his regime):

Maybe this long thread has covered the salient points raised in this video but I haven't read the last 150-200 posts, so someone tell me what this presentation gets wrong. Jives well with my (simplified) reckoning of Russia's accelerating insolvancy. :victory: :smirk:

The "Transnistrian war" was hardly a war: the scale and the forces involved were tiny compared to Donbas. There were, I think, a few old Soviet tanks that were rolled out at one point to intimidate the Moldovan forces - and that proved to be enough. There wasn't much will or ability to fight on the Moldovan side. — SophistiCat

Yes, but do note Transnistria is also tiny compared to the Donbas. Transnistria has a population of 347000 people, perhaps earlier half a million. The breakaway republics of Donetsk and Luhansk have 3,7 million people in them (even if many have left the region).

And, as you noted, Lukashenko is sitting on bayonets as it is; dragging his people into Russia's war against their will is the last thing he wants. — SophistiCat

Totally agree with you and this looks quite evident now.

So far, Kremlin has been accommodating, but one wonders: how long will Putin tolerate this wily, self-willed and treacherous vassal? Will he at some point decide that it would be so much more convenient to have a loyal silovik in charge? Of course, taking over a personalistic, top-down security and patronage system from a man who has been at the helm even longer than Putin would not be easy and smooth. But does Putin realize this? His delusional ideas of how easily he would take over Ukraine do not instill confidence in his judgement. — SophistiCat

I think Putin and Russian's understand that toppling Lukashenko can make things even worse. The last thing Russia would want is to handle political turmoil or at worse, an insurgency in Belarus. That basically Russia can use the territory of Belarus without fears that Ukraine attacking it is enough for now.

If Europe goes through with its divestment from Russian energy, then Russia's game doesn't look so good in the medium term. Oil and gas are not like gold: moving them takes a lot of specialized infrastructure that simply does not exist today and won't come into existence any time soon. And Asia's appetite for Russian energy isn't bottomless either: they'll take what they can if the discount is big enough, but they have other supplies as well. — SophistiCat

Your correct to talk about the medium term: Germany can build LNG ports, steer away from Russian gas, but not before it has to endure next winter. Creating new infrastructure simply takes time and if peace-time development speed is used (with all NIMBYs complaining to courts about the construction) it will take several years.

A real possibility is that today's globalization will morph to a world with competing economic axis: the West and Russia-China opposing each other.

Besides, energy isn't everything, and the rest of Russian economy looks pretty dismal. It will survive, but it needs more than mere survival in order to continue to support long and bloody wars of aggression. — SophistiCat

Russia won't collapse, it will survive, but it won't collapse. Iran and it's sanctions is a good example of this.

However, Ukraine's ability to continue to defend is also highly uncertain. We simply don't know the relative force capabilities on each side at the moment. Damage to Russia's army only matters if there's not equal or greater damage to Ukraine's army.

Every example of damage against the Russians, or then various problems, generally is safe to assume is as bad or worse for the Ukrainians. — boethius

Ukraine is economically absolutely devastated. But then it's fighting for it's survival. Economic hardships don't matter so much, when your facing even greater danger (which Ukrainians can see from the actions of Russians in the occupied territories).

Yet apart from a Crimea-like victorious sudden invasion (which didn't go through), Russia has not the manpower to occupy totally a country as large as Ukraine. Basically what it could do is to gain the area of "Novorossiya", which it is largely holding apart from Odessa and the Western coastline of Ukraine. The inability of Ukraine to contain Russia forces in the Crimean Peninsula has been one of Ukraine's failures in this war.

Maybe this long thread has covered the salient points raised in this video but I haven't read the last 150-200 posts, so someone tell me what this presentation gets wrong. — 180 Proof

Good question. I'll take a try.

When the documentary is saying "sanctions are working", first think what sanctions working would really mean?

Would Russia really stop the fighting and accept a peace favorable to Ukraine? I think not, yet "sanctions working" obviously would have to do that.

The last time sanctions did work was with South Africa: the country finally accepted to stop it's Apartheid-policies and give power to the black majority. Yet South Africa didn't view the West as an existential threat the way Iran, Venezuela and Cuba see the West and especially the US. North Korea basically is still at war with the US as there is only an armstice between the countries. Economic sanctions are just the new normal (or even the old normal) for them. South Africa was basically on the side of the US during the Cold War.

Yeah, Russians are now missing many things that earlier came from the West. They have now all kinds of problems and do feel the sanctions. Yet how will this work? Why would Putin submit when he sees the West as an existential threat to himself (and for Russia). As Russia is quite totalitarian and there are now far more political prisoners than in the end of the Soviet Union, it can endure these sanctions.

In fact just think what Ukraine is enduring now. More than every tenth Ukrainian is now a refugee. The GDP of Ukraine has fallen 45%. It basically cannot export it's produce. And it's losing a terrifying number of men daily and the death toll from this war (that started in 2014) will be very high. So wouldn't those kind of effects put Ukrainians into the negotiating table? No, because they see the war literally as an existential threat. And when people feel that they are facing an existential threat, ordinary issues like the standard of living doesn't matter.

Your position is obviously support to Ukraine's war effort since starting on this thread. — boethius

Fair enough. And what has been your position then, if not support to Russia's war effort?

Some say that NATO threatens Russia, like sovereignty or even existential.
Some say that NATO defends members together against Russia, constraining free rein.

Might not be an "exclusive or"; we can consider both. I'm guessing markedly more people are interested in Russia not rolling over others, than rolling over Russia. For that matter, I'm guessing markedly more people are interested in good relations, building trust, reliability, trade, than posturing and hostilities. Putin + team could be a different matter.

Ukraine sought membership, now canceled, ☢ threats stand out. Sweden and Finland seek membership, now under way, the defense thing above. Unfair if you will; at least Ukrainians haven't been left on their own.

Peace would mean the attacker stops attacking (a defender can't just declare peace :grin:), i.e. Putin's Russia.

What might Zelenskyy capitulating entail, jus post bellum? We can only guess, check history, Russia, ... Meanwhile the Ukrainians are fighting :fire: for their sovereignty and such; a capitulation would not end fighting, but tune it down, and render it "illegal". Surrendering to evil is a wretched pseudo-peace, we have examples where this is worse than resistance/war, or where fighting is just. (I'll abstain from a quote-spam, Plato, Tacitus, Burke, Mill, Niemöller, Wiesel.) Peace ☮ is the goal, not bad peace.

So, ehh anyway, NATO, a threat to and/or defense against Putin's Russia?

_{• Ukraine | Médecins Sans Frontières medical and humanitarian aid; • List of foreign aid to Ukraine during the Russo-Ukrainian War
• Antebellum South; • Auschwitz; • North Korea; • Uyghur; • Russia: Authorities launch witch-hunt to catch anyone sharing anti-war views
• World Development Report 2011 : Conflict, Security, and Development; • In the aftermath of Genocide: Guatemala’s failed reconciliation (worthwhile read)}


EDIT:
Should have mentioned that ...

Some say that NATO threatens Russia, like sovereignty or even existential. — jorndoe

... has been commented on quite a bit in the thread (re-repeats).

When the documentary is saying "sanctions are working", first think what sanctions working would really mean?

Would Russia really stop the fighting and accept a peace favorable to Ukraine? I think not, yet "sanctions working" obviously would have to do that. — ssu

If we are talking about sanctions as a tool to influence immediate decision-making, such as starting or escalating hostilities, then it is the threat of sanctions that sometimes works (and it does sometimes work). When deterrence fails, sanctions still have to be levied in order to maintain their future credibility, but they will almost never force a reversal. That is where we are now: sanctions, as you say, will not force Russia to stop its aggression and return the territory it has seized.

That said, success or failure can be hard to attribute for counterfactual events. You will know when sanctions fail. But, for example, if Putin did not order the attack when he did, would that be attributable to the threat of sanctions? How would we know? Even now we don't know for sure whether sanctions or the threat of further sanctions have deterred Russia from doing something it could have done (like deploying chemical weapons - not likely in any event, in my opinion, but just as an example).

Sanctions can have other effects than influencing decisions here and now. The most obvious effect of the present sanctions is in degrading Russia's war potential. That effect will be mostly delayed, but some of it is arguably felt even now. Russia has spent much of its high-precision munition stocks, and rebuilding will be challenging, partly due to sanctions. They are now reduced to lobbing dated anti-aircraft and anti-ship missiles at ground structures, which is far from optimal. They also have a shortage of drones, NVGs, navigation, communication and other high-tech equipment - same problem here.

Other sanctions seem like pointless virtue-signalling, punishing people and organizations that have no power to influence events. It could be that even those sanctions will have an indirect effect by provoking disaffection, social tensions, brain drain (that last one is very evident), and thus gradually weakening the regime. This is a highly uncertain territory though, as the effect can be, and likely is, precisely the opposite.

Sanctions can have other effects than influencing decisions here and now. The most obvious effect of the present sanctions is in degrading Russia's war potential. That effect will be mostly delayed, but some of it is arguably felt even now. Russia has spent much of its high-precision munition stocks, and rebuilding will be challenging, partly due to sanctions. They are now reduced to lobbing dated anti-aircraft and anti-ship missiles at ground structures, which is far from optimal. They also have a shortage of drones, NVGs, navigation, communication and other high-tech equipment - same problem here. — SophistiCat

This is true, but when there is a will, there will be a way. At least with time. Sanctions are a way to hinder the ability, but when you have the ability to make the needed components, even if inferior, then with time you will overcome the problems caused by sanctions and embargoes.

One of the best examples are the Iranian Grumman F-14 Tomcats, top-of-the-line fighters bought by the Shah of Iran just before the Islamic Revolution in the 1970's. After the revolution happened all supplies and parts to the fighters were stopped by the US. Yet not only did the Iranian F-14 fighters perform well in the Iran-Iraq war (with the only Tomcat aces being now Iranian pilots), but the aircraft are still after 40 years still flying.



When a country basically puts it entire army to attack a neighboring country, then obviously it's such a major "policy initiative" that simply the threat of sanctions will not change. Sanctions will be seen as a minor issue. Hence in fact sanctions and embargoes work when they are initiated by some action or policy that in importance is similar to international trade and/or international relations. Yet when one country commits to such an enormous task or feels that it's facing an existential risk, then sanctions are a side issue.

Putin has shown many times that he doesn't care about stock market prices, relations with the West and international trade relations etc. when he has initiated his wars.

Peter Zeihan putting the problem with the grain exports from Ukraine into context:



Higher World prices coming in the future...even if prices were rising before the war in Ukraine.

On Tuesday, a slew of videos posted on social media provided clues to what happened at the Saky naval aviation base on Crimea's southern coast. Witnesses began filming the events after what is believed to have been an initial explosion. A long column of black smoke rises diagonally into the azure blue sky as two huge near-simultaneous explosions occur at least one hundred meters apart. Two fireballs rise rapidly in a typical mushroom shape. This quasi-concomitance evokes the strikes of missiles fired in salvo.

However, the Saky base is about 210 km from the nearest area under Ukrainian control. Very few weapons in the Ukrainian arsenal allow strikes so far and above all so precise. The Ukrainian Neptune anti-ship missile can cover the distance and reach a land target, but kyiv has only a very small number of them, intended in principle to protect the coasts in the Odessa region from a landing. Furthermore, it is a subsonic missile, therefore vulnerable to Russian surface-to-air defenses.

What is obvious is the extent of the material damage. Many civilian buildings were badly damaged and dozens of cars parked several hundred meters from the airfield were burnt out. A brief video, filmed inside the airfield, shows an almost unrecognizable Su-24 fighter jet with its wings missing. In a satellite image taken a few hours before the explosions, thirty-seven fighter planes and six helicopters were visible on the tarmac.

Other videos broadcast from the beach, a few kilometers away, show holidaymakers flabbergasted by the violence of the explosions and hastily leaving the premises.

The incident would have caused the departure of very many summer visitors, until a long traffic jam was formed at the level of the Crimean bridge, in the direction of returns to Russia.

" It's only a beginning "

The Russian authorities immediately sought to minimize the scope of the event, speaking of "spontaneous detonation of ammunition" , and dismissing the hypothesis of a successful Ukrainian attack. “No trace of a Ukrainian missile has been found ,” repeat the officials. The death toll from the explosions was one dead and fifteen injured, according to the local health ministry. "It is reminiscent of the sinking of the cruiser Moskva , " said Russian political scientist Andrei Kolesnikov.Ukraine should by no means be shown as effective in the Russian narrative. Only the Russian military is capable of carrying out surgical strikes. Russian tourists must continue to believe that Crimea is untouchable and that Russian soldiers are infallible. The Moskva , flagship of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, sank on April 14 after being hit by two Ukrainian Neptune missiles, but Moscow has always maintained its version that an accidental fire was the cause of the sinking.

(Le Monde)

Other videos broadcast from the beach, a few kilometers away, show holidaymakers flabbergasted by the violence of the explosions and hastily leaving the premises. — Olivier5

‘We Need to Get Out of Here’: Fear Grips Annexed Crimea After Airbase Attack

By Anastasia Tenisheva and James Beardsworth, the Moscow Times
Updated: Aug. 10, 2022



https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/08/10/we-need-to-get-out-of-here-fear-grips-annexed-crimea-after-airbase-attack-a78541

Sometimes Ukrainians can score. Quite fitting that Russia first said it was an accident.

But how about the actual winners in this war: Qatar

And China, me guess... And Turkey.

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/aug/11/russia-oil-production-sanctions-limited-effect-ukraine-war

Limited effect on Russia. Europe on the other hand... There's a lot of Dutch families having trouble paying their bills due to the increased energy prices and there's a larger wave expected at the end of the year when the invoice for actual use is sent. Here we have a system where you pay an advance, which is calculated on historic use but also prices when the advance is set (eg. beginning of the year or contract if you have a longer term contract). So unless people have voluntarily raised the advance, they will have a hefty bill at the end of the year. The National Institute for Family Finance Information has already pointed out too little people are doing this and they expect a significant spike in defaults at the beginning of next year.

So if sanctions aren't really hurting Russia but are hurting the most vulnerable in our own societies, why continue with them?

So if sanctions aren't really hurting Russia but are hurting the most vulnerable in our own societies, why continue with them? — Benkei

I believe the logic is that the whole narrative of fighting a war without actually fighting it, only makes sense if there's at least the suffering part.

Look! We're suffering for the war effort! We're so committed!

Of course, the people making this policy don't suffer, and they clearly do not care about those that do. I think this is pretty obvious in the fact that whenever the subject of nuclear war comes up, White House et. al., are unhesitating in declaring we can't have that (therefore no no-fly zone, no "offensive weapons" etc.) but a total collapse of the Russian state would also be a likely nuclear war scenario: therefore, there was never any genuine belief sanctions would accomplish that.

It also seems to me improbable that there was any belief that the sanctions would "work", rather the goal is a new cold war theatre which requires a new iron curtain.

Fair enough. And what has been your position then, if not support to Russia's war effort? — Olivier5

I will go back and quote myself outlining again and again my position, but for now I will just summarise it again.

My first priority is to avoid death, suffering and trauma of children.

Obviously, the best way to avoid that is to avoid war in the first place.

There seems to be a genuine incapacity to understand the realist position I and others have defended here as well as presented by John Mearsheimer.

NATO playing "tough" could have avoided the war.

Almost no one criticises the American response to the Cuban missile crisis. But only because it worked. Had it resulted in nuclear exchange (even with the exact same political decisions, just things randomly got out of hand in such a tense standoff), people might have a lot of criticism.

What Mearsheimer point out is the simple truth that US / NATO is simply not willing to actually play tough, before, during or after the war, proven by the fact that it doesn't.

US and NATO declare some sort of Ukrainian pathway to join in 2008 ... so why didn't that happen?

Had they played tough, such as letting Ukraine in after 2008 in a midnight "super diplomacy" deal, or before 2014 ... or anytime after, maybe the war would have been averted.

Had US / NATO done some "tough" move, made a standoff, some deal is reached and Russia backs down. I would be totally for it. I am not criticising Ukraine in NATO if that averted war.

And, other things could be offered the Russians: Nord Stream 2, pulling back forward operating missile bases to "protect against Iran", no Ukrainian military forces on the Russian border, lifting all sanctions, Russian language protection, UN supervised vote of status of Dombas and Crimea etc. (not a requirement 2008-2014, when guarantees for Sevastopol and Russian minority rights would likely have been enough).

Nuclear war is not a foregone conclusion for the simple fact of letting Ukraine in. It's in anyways unlikely as Russia also doesn't want full scale nuclear war, and it's always possible to imagine some compensation to Russia that would convince them to not use tactical nukes in Ukraine, daring the US to respond with strategic nuclear strikes (again, unlikely because US also doesn't want nuclear exchange).

The reason this scenario isn't talked about is just that it's so obvious that US doesn't care about Ukraine enough to put in that kind of standoff and diplomatic energy. US and other NATO countries don't give a shit about Ukraine.

Which results in the terrible policy position of supporting Ukraine just enough to maximise Ukrainian suffering. This is not a morally or politically sound position.

And US at. al. don't even really hide it, they speak plainly that the goal is to "fight Russia in Ukraine so as not to fight them here," totally absurd (as Russia is not about to invade the US if "Ukraine falls") and basically admits to Ukrainians being cannon fodder in this strategy.

The reason to focus on the policy position of my own government and political blocks is that's the policy I'm morally responsible for as a citizen.

I'd also only get into some debate of the Russian moral and political justifications, if my pro-US interlocutors demonstrate how Russia's war in Ukraine is not as justified as the US war in Iraq and Afghanistan, torture programs, or violating sovereignty of other countries with both over and cover operations all the time without hesitation, in the name of "US interests".

And this is not whataboutism fallacy.

First, whataboutism is not a fallacy in the first place. It is a completely legitimate question to say "what about this other thing" to see how a position deals with it.

In a good faith debate a "what about this other thing" question is simply going through some other example to understand the principles of a position and how they operate, for better mutual understanding.

In a bad faith debate, "what about this other thing" is not a fallacy, just a waste of time or then deflecting from legitimate questions one has already received. For example, had I not answered your question of what my position, and simply said "what about the US!" then that would be bad faith and hypocritical, as I am demanding satisfaction of a question when I already in debt to perfectly legitimate one's myself.

In particular, whataboutism is bad faith when deflecting from internal criticism. For example, democrats defending obvious democrat corruption by saying "what about the Republicans". Republicans have nothing to do with democratic party integrity and the best way to fight Republican corruption is to provide a less corrupt example. The sub-text is alway "but we need to be corrupt to win!" ... but "win what?", well, obviously the fruits of corruption.

US proponents are in debt to the question of "what about Iraq," (as well as many other wars / covert actions) and in the US' own justifications of its action, Russia is justified by far according to those standards. Ukraine presents a far greater security threat to Russia than Iraq did the US. The whole there are bio labs that can't fall into enemy hands, seems far greater evidence of WMD's than US had concerning Iraq; if the Ukrainian biological WMD's don't exist ... well neither Iraq nuclear weapons or capacity to build them. Russian soldiers and officers have certainly done some torturing on their own initiative, but there is so far no evidence it is an institutional decision ... whereas US simply legalised torture and built large and sophisticated torture operations; I'm certainly willing to believe Russians do have institutional mandated torture programs, but that just brings them to parity.

Then there's the neo-Nazi question. Certainly not-invading Ukraine is appeasing these overtly Nazi organisations. The argument is they don't have enough influence in Ukraine to satisfy such an argument ... but what's the standard, how many Nazis is too many Nazis with too much power and influence.

Russia uses propaganda ... US uses propaganda.

That being said, if I the question was put to me after somehow responding to all these questions and demonstrating that Russia cannot easily justify its war effort according to the US' own standards set for itself, or then from simply a anti-Russian and anti-US position, certainly Russia could have done more to avoid war. There is a faction in Russia that wanted this war as much as the analogous faction in the US. These factions together pushed things towards war and not peace. They are morally culpable, but so too the less violent factions on both sides that did not oppose the process playing out in slow motion over several decades.

Why?

They were bribed not to intervene in the process in a way that might change the outcome.