Phenomenology can be good, but it often leans into the usual ghost story. Why is that bad ? The ghost story, in most of its forms, is obsolete -- has been shown to be wrong or incoherent. Because it's outlandish and daring, it's supposed to be sophisticated, but believers are quick to tell you that 'practically' they are just like everyone else. So it's a bad theory that serves no purpose, hackneyed poetry basically, 'describing ' the world by denying it ... insisting it cannot be described, does not exist, etc. — Pie

I compare any antiphenemenological stance to interplanetary civilizations; in a sense phenomenology is, to put it mildly, mundane, restricted to, let's just say, (a) special case(s). Mind you, I'm not disagreeing with ya.

Does this mean I don't have to read and try to understand Merleau-Ponty or Heidegger now? :razz: :cool: — Tom Storm

:wink: You never had to; so it just depends on whether you're interested in discovering the greater depths or not.

I'm glad you approve. It'll be good for your soul to return to your your Hegel, Heidegger and Derrida etc. :wink: : analytic philosophy is too anal, and if one keeps at it too long one disappears up one's own arse. — Janus

To be frank, I gave you the thumbs up to acknowledge what I perceived as your expression disinterest. I love literature and music and <everything else Romantics love> too, but when I do philosophy, it's because I feel like being fussy and careful with concepts, doing something like math, except concepts are more like living wood than cast iron. It's just not for me to argue for the glory of maintaining a respectable metaphysics. It's mostly not practical, and it' definitely a fussy or anal thing to do. But that makes it something like an art. I like when concepts fit together beautifully. Flower arrangement ? But that's Romantic.

To me the philosophers from both (once-)feuding families all fit together. Brandom and Sellars are great, both arguably 'fixing' Hegel, removing the mystic bluster, keeping the crucial insight into the sociality and autonomy of reason. I take early Derrida to be a Husserl scholar making quasi-Rylean points against the core of phenomenological version of the myth of the given, but from more of an historical angle, tracing the superstition back to Aristotle, for instance.

As to 'dissappearing up one's own arse,' avoiding this is one motive against theories of the private mind that would make up-our-own-arses the only safe hiding place from doubt. Some would build a little world up there, with exactly one citizen, speaking a language made just for him, within which concepts always conveniently mean just what he thinks they mean. Is this not a bunker metaphysics ? Not even the NSA can peek in. And the only things allowed in are those I can't be wrong about.

I compare any antiphenemenological stance to interplanetary civilizations; in a sense phenomenology is, to put it mildly, mundane, restricted to, let's just say, (a) special case(s). Mind you, I'm not disagreeing with ya. — Agent Smith

I think we're on the same page. A philosophy book should tell us about the/our world. It can do this be focusing on the 'how' of our seeing it, and phen. sometimes does this well (Heidegger's hammer is cool!). I'm mostly just griping that constructing the world from the inside out doesn't make much sense. Yet it's taken as the 'obvious' starting point. It's like 'well clearly Venusians run the world, but we don't know if it's through the CIA or the Girls Scouts of America.'

To me they all fit together. Brandom and Sellars are great, both arguably 'fixing' Hegel, removing the mystic bluster, keeping the crucial insight into the sociality and autonomy of reason. I take early Derrida to be a Husserl scholar making quasi-Rylean points against the core of phenomenological version of the myth of the given, but from more of an historical angle, tracing the superstition back to Aristotle, for instance. — Pie

That's interesting. What do you understand to be the "phenomenological version of the myth of the given"? And how do you see it relating back to Aristotle?

As to 'dissappearing up one's own arse,' avoiding this is one motive against theories of the private mind that would make up-our-own-arses the only safe hiding place from doubt. Some would build a little world up there, with exactly one citizen, speaking a language made just for him, within which concepts always conveniently mean just what he thinks they mean. Is this not a bunker metaphysics ? Not even the NSA can peek in. And the only things allowed in are those I can't be wrong about. — Pie

I don't see doubt as having anything to do with it. If you have no belief that it is possible to give a discursive account of "reality", as opposed to one's own experience, if you don't buy into the realism vs idealism or anti-realism debates, then what is there left to doubt?

I realize now that I misspoke regarding analytical philosophy causing one to disappear up one's own arse; this is not correct at all; it causes one to disappear up the public arse, a far nastier place to be. You don't have to, unless you feel insecure, justify your ideas to anyone. I don't expect there will ever be consensus when it comes to philosophical ideas, and it would be a horrible world indeed if there were.

I think we're on the same page. A philosophy book should tell us about the/our world. It can do this be focusing on the 'how' of our seeing it, and phen. sometimes does this well (Heidegger's hammer is cool!). I'm mostly just griping that constructing the world from the inside out doesn't make much sense. Yet it's taken as the 'obvious' starting point. It's like 'well clearly Venusians run the world, but we don't know if it's through the CIA or the Girls Scouts of America.' — Pie

Neil deGrasse Tyson (astrophysicist, science educator, author) said something to the effect that the universe isn't in any way obligated to make sense to humans - it (the universe) can, it looks as though, do whatever the hell it wants; humans and their silly standards, bah! :snicker:

@Jamal (mod), is this post ok?

Neil deGrasse Tyson (astrophysicist, science educator, author) said something to the effect that the universe isn't in any way obligated to make sense to humans - it (the universe) can, it looks as though, do whatever the hell it wants; to hell with humans and their silly standards! :snicker: — Agent Smith

I agree that we shouldn't be surprised if the world surprises us. We are even looking for surprises as we extend our knowledge, no? But our sense-making theories should make sense to us, no ?

Jamal (mod), is this post ok? — Agent Smith

Of course. Don't play dumb.

That's interesting. What do you understand to be the "phenomenological version of the myth of the given"? And how do you see it relating back to Aristotle? — Janus

Improvising: it's basically a version of the 'ghost story.' 'Pure' meanings glow for it, infinitely intimate, unsoiled by the particularity and historicity of (social, worldly) experience. Presence. I'll find a good Derrida quote on this. But here's an historical source. (This is what Derrida quotes in Of Grammatology. )

Spoken words are the symbols of mental experience and written words are the symbols of spoken words. Just as all men have not the same writing, so all men have not the same speech sounds, but the mental experiences, which these directly symbolize, are the same for all, as also are those things of which our experiences are the images. — Ari

http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/interpretation.1.1.html

In my opinion, this tempts us to think of a set of universal, pre-given, immaterial concepts... for which we only have to invent conventional phonemes/tags (which Saussure rejects as the nomenclature theory.) This helps set up the veil-of-ideas.

Here's some of Derrida's response to the quote above. Note that the critique of phonocentrism (putting the voice closes to meaning than writing) is driven by a critique of the ghost.

The feelings of the mind, expressing things naturally, constitute a sort of universal language which can then efface itself. It is the stage of transparence. Aristotle can sometimes omit it without risk. In every case, the voice is closest to the signified, whether it is determined strictly as sense ( thought or lived ) or more loosely as thing. All signifiers, and first and foremost the written signifier, are derivative with regard to what would wed the voice indissolubly to the mind or to the thought of the signified sense, indeed to the thing itself ( whether it is done in the Aristotelian manner that we have just indicated or in the manner of medieval theology, determining the res as a thing created from its eidos, from its sense thought in the logos or in the infinite understanding of God) . The written signifier is always technical and representative. It has no constitutive meaning. This derivation is the very origin of the notion of the "signifier." The notion of the sign always implies within itself the distinction between signifier and signified, even if, as Saussure argues, they are distinguished simply as the two faces of one and the same leaf. This notion remains therefore within the heritage of that logocentrism which is also a phonocentrism...

...absolute proximity of voice and being, of voice and the meaning of being, of voice and the ideality of meaning.We already have a foreboding that phonocentrism merges with...the meaning of being in general as presence, with all the subdeterminations which depend on this general form and which organize within it their system and their historical sequence (presence of the thing to the sight as eidos, presence as substance/ essence/ existence / ousia, temporal presence as point [stigme] of the now or of the moment [nun], the self-presence of the cogito... — Derrida

One way to think of presence is in terms of self-evidence, the given. The mystic says that God is right here. Or the person who is sure sure sure he knows what he's talking about, even if he's run out of words. His meaning is right there, glowing and present and perfect, independent of the network of other public concepts. Is Derrida not making a Hegelian point that everything is mediated, mediated, mediated, or a Brandomian point that awareness is linguistic ? For we who are not thermostats?

I realize now that I misspoke regarding analytical philosophy causing one to disappear up one's own arse; this is not correct at all; it causes one to disappear up the public arse, a far nastier place to be. — Janus

I think you are trying to have your cake and eat it too. If you are indeed a great poetic soul, too cool for anal discussions of epistemology, then...good for you, sir ! But I'd believe it more readily if you weren't wasting your time with an even greater triviality like indulging in hackneyed 'defenses' of The Poetic Soul, as if your the only one among your peers that's ever had a finger in.

You don't have to, unless you feel insecure, justify your ideas to anyone. — Janus

This is one of the most irrationalist assertions I've ever seen on a philosophy forum (if you mean the typical role of ideas in social life, Mr. Anti-Up-My-Arse ) or the tritest (if you mean that the checkout girl at Costco doesn't care about the books I've read.)

Of course. Don't play dumb. — Jamal

Copy that!

[reply="Banno;726332"

Solipsism is where you end up when you can't prove other minds.
— GLEN willows

Banno - No it isn't. Lack of proof other minds exist is not proof that they do not exist.

So then it's belief?

Improvising: it's basically a version of the 'ghost story.' 'Pure' meanings glow for it, infinitely intimate, unsoiled by the particularity and historicity of (social, worldly) experience. Presence. I'll find a good Derrida quote on this. But here's an historical source. (This is what Derrida quotes in Of Grammatology. ) — Pie

I don't know what you intend by "pure meanings". I don't find that notion in the phenomenological works I am most familiar with (mainly Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty and Michel Henry).

Just as all men have not the same writing, so all men have not the same speech sounds, but the mental experiences, which these directly symbolize, are the same for all, as also are those things of which our experiences are the images. — Ari

Of course I don't agree that the "mental experiences" are the same for all, although I would say there are enough commonalities to make mutual understanding possible. So, I'm not sure what you think we are arguing about.

In my opinion, this tempts us to think of a set of universal, pre-given, immaterial concepts... — Pie

It might tempt you to think of such things, but not me; the idea seems incoherent to me.

Here's some of Derrida's response to the quote above. Note that the critique of phonocentrism (putting the voice closes to meaning than writing) is driven by a critique of the ghost. — Pie

I don't find much clarity or insight in Derrida, I do find, ironically, a similar absolutizing tendency in his writing that he o critique. The idea that the voice has been privileged over the written word I have never found convincing, since the age of the oral tradition has long since passed. One advantage of dialogue, whether spoken or written, over books, is that the speaker can be questioned on the spot as to their meaning.

I don't see how that passage is a "critique of the ghost"; are you claiming that Derrida thought of it as such or merely that you have interpreted to fit into your current preoccupations?

His meaning is right there, glowing and present and perfect, independent of the network of other public concepts. Is Derrida not making a Hegelian point that everything is mediated, mediated, mediated, or a Brandomian point that awareness is linguistic ? For we who are not thermostats? — Pie

I really have no idea what you are talking about here. Of course I agree that not everything, not all, but much of our experience, is mediated. I certainly don't agree that awareness is linguistic: animals are aware and they don't have language. No idea what you mean by "thermostats".

I think you are trying to have your cake and eat it too. If you are indeed a great poetic soul, too cool for anal discussions of epistemology, then...good for you, sir ! But I'd believe it more readily if you weren't wasting your time with an even greater triviality like indulging in hackneyed 'defenses' of The Poetic Soul, as if your the only one among your peers that's ever had a finger in. — Pie

I haven't said or implied that I am a "great poetic soul", and I'm not indulging in defenses of it, hackneyed or otherwise. It seems you've totally misunderstood what I've been saying. To reiterate, I've been saying that I don't accept that there is no private experience, and I don't accept that the most important aspect of (my) life is justifying my ideas to others, or others justifying their ideas to me. To me this would be the realm of the machine people.

When it comes to philosophy, I value ideas insofar as they offer me inspiration and insight, not insofar as I think they are "correct" or "justified". I see a whole spectrum of ways to think about things some more insightful and inspiring than others, and more or less so to various people. And all I'm trying to convey is how I think about these things, and all I've got from you is strawman attacks and defensiveness.

.

This is one of the most irrationalist assertions I've ever seen on a philosophy forum (if you mean the typical role of ideas in social life, Mr. Anti-Up-My-Arse ) or the tritest (if you mean that the checkout girl at Costco doesn't care about the books I've read.) — Pie

Seems a bit presumptuous, the checkout girl at Costco might have read more books than you, for all you know. I don't seek to deny that ideas in the various practical fields such as politics and economics are argued over in the marketplace; I'm referring to purely "philosophical" ideas that don't have any practical consequences, such as whether there is a mind-independent external world, or whether or not there is a mental substance ( I don't think there is, but I don't care if others do, since it isn't something which can be established empirically). Anyway, it seems obvious to me you're becoming increasingly defensive, so perhaps it's best to leave it there.

What?

If you can't prove something, it's a belief, correct?

Mistaken reading sorry

If you can't prove something, it's a belief, correct? — GLEN willows

Do you think that things must be proved in order to be true?

Or are there things that are true yet unproven?

Neil deGrasse Tyson (astrophysicist, science educator, author) said something to the effect that the universe isn't in any way obligated to make sense to humans - it (the universe) can, it looks as though, do whatever the hell it wants; humans and their silly standards, bah! :snicker: — Agent Smith

This is why, we, as human beings are required to to shape or formulate our principles in such a way so as to make sense of the universe. The onus is on us to make sense of the universe, not on the universe to make sense to us. And that is also why our principles (mathematical axioms etc.) cannot be eternal unchanging objects, as in Platonism, because we shape them, as required, to make sense of the universe.

However, there is a definite problem which arises. The world is observed by us. to be bound by some principles of order. So the problem is in how can we understand the real existence of these principles (natural laws as some would say), which we infer from our observations of the world, to have real governance over the world. In other words, "the universe isn't in any way obligated to make sense to humans", as you say, but for some reason, in many ways it does make sense to us.

Of course we formulate our artificial laws of "order" in the universe to match the existing natural order within the universe, and that is why the universe makes sense to us, but what type of existence does this natural order actually have? If all things in the universe follow some sort of natural order, then the order must be prior to the things, as logic dictates that the follower is posterior to what is followed. That is what distinguishes the natural laws from the artificial laws, the former are prior to the things while the latter are posterior to the things.

Do you think that things must be proved in order to be true?

Or are there things that are true yet unproven? — Banno

I believe he’s saying that if you can’t prove that aliens exist then you don’t know that aliens exist, even if you believe that aliens exist and even if aliens exist. The same with there being other minds.

Examples?

And the key word you used was "believed." I'll accept any belief you have...of Sasquatches, chem-trails, etc but I'd require proof. Wouldn't you?

Do you think that things must be proved in order to be true?

Or are there things that are true yet unproven? — Banno

Things must be proven to be known to be true, which is all that is important when it comes to truth. What could it matter that something be true if it were not known, or knowable as such?

I believe he’s saying that if you can’t prove that aliens exist then you don’t know that aliens exist, even if you believe that aliens exist and even if aliens exist. The same with there being other minds. — Michael

But what he said was that, to borrow your example, if we have no evidence of aliens existing, then it follows that they do not exist.

Things must be proven to be known to be true, — Janus

"Justified", or "warranted", are the usual the terms used, rather than proven.

Here's my point again, just to be clear: Even if there is no proof of other minds, it does not follow that they do not exist.

"Justified", or "warranted", are the usual the terms used, rather than proven. — Banno

This does seem important. Do you have any particular views on Truthmaker Theory?

Even if there is no proof of other minds, it does not follow that they do not exist. — Banno

I would have thought that was self-evident to most folk. I think where people seem to get carried away is the notion that in some cases if X can't be proven (let's say God), we have no good reason to accept X (God). It seems to me easy to slip from this to X does not exist. Thoughts?

"Justified", or "warranted", are the usual the terms used, rather than proven.

Here's my point again, just to be clear: Even if there is no proof of other minds, it does not follow that they do not exist. — Banno

It seems to me that under the JTB definition of knowledge, even assuming that there are real criteria concerning what counts as justification, that we can know things, but we cannot be certain that we know them, unless what we know is proven. Is anything other than a tautology ever proven? Perhaps in mathematics?

That said, I agree with your point that absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.

Do you have any particular views on Truthmaker Theory? — Tom Storm

A minimalist view of truth is the only way to go. Hence, T-sentences set out pretty much all there is to the logic of truth.

Even if there is no proof of other minds, it does not follow that they do not exist.
— Banno

I would have thought that was self-evident to most folk. — Tom Storm

Yes, but idealism and antirealism cloud the picture for some folk.

What's at stake here is what we are to say about the truth value of statements when the evidence is lacking. What will we say about, to keep to @Michael's example, the truth value of the existence of aliens?

On the one side we might adopt the realist view that either there are aliens but we don't have evidence for their existence, and hence "there are aliens" is true; or there are no aliens, and "there are aliens" is false, but again we lack evidence. This is the realist view: that "there are aliens" is either true or false, but we don't know which.

On the other side is the view that since we do not know that "There are aliens" is true or false, it is neither. This view sets aside the classical logical principle that a statement is either true or it is false. It can do this coherently by introducing a paraconsistent logic, of which there are several variations. This is the antirealist view.

. I think where people seem to get carried away is the notion that in some cases if X can't be proven (let's say God), we have no good reason to accept X (God). — Tom Storm

That's an important point. There is a thread in philosophy that claims that what is not proven is not to be take seriously. It's not a thread that one can take seriously. If everything is to be proven, we end up with either an infinite regress or a curricular argument.

Good stuff, thanks.

It seems to me that under the JTB definition of knowledge, even assuming that there are real criteria concerning what counts as justification, that we can know things, but we cannot be certain that we know them, unless what we know is proven — Janus

If the criteria for knowing something is proof, we have a problem.

If everything that is known has a proof, then for each statement that is known, there is some other statement that implies it. Problem is, any statement implies a true statement.

Look at the truth table for implication:


We know that q is true. So we are looking only at the first and third lines of the truth table, where "p" has the value "T". Now look at the value of "q" in those two cases. It does not matter if q is true or false, p→q is true.

If we know that some statement is true, the any statement, true or false, implies it.

Intuitively, what this is saying is that if we know the some statement is true, then the truth or falsehood of any other statement is irrelevant. If we know that Sydney is in Australia, then whether the cat is on the mat or not makes no difference.

Hence, every true statement is proven by every statement, true or false.

And this is why JTB speaks of justified true belief, and not proven true belief. Proof is too strong.

(I suspect that part of the reason non-analytic philosophers disparage analytic philosophy as anal is that they don't like the way it buggers their pet theories.)

I think Davidson's approach has great merit. Truth is such a basic notion that it is absurd to attempt an analyse of it... After all, such an analysis must itself be either true or false...

The Stanford Biographical article has something to say about his view of the realism/antirealism discussion.

...Davidson does not merely reject the specific premises that underlie the realist and anti-realist positions, but views the very dispute between them as essentially misconceived. — SEP:Donald Davidson

That said, I agree with your point that absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. — Janus

Would it not be more accurate to say that absence of proof is not proof of absence?
(Or, absence of evidence is not proof of absence, for that matter?)