So nothing then. Got it.

How has it been for you to live "under one empire"? Because me and Christopher haven't been living under it, but our countries seem to be willing to join now on side. For me the happiness of Finlandization is all too clear as I've grown up during the Cold War so I remember it. — ssu

How did I get embroiled in this conversation? I've created three posts in all, one of which is a simple inquiry over the removal of my first post. Lol

@ssu attempted to mention @Christoffer but got the wrong username. I wouldn't get involved in this discussion if I were you!

The bitter truth may simple be that Russia can't lose. But it must not win either. — neomac

Oh they can lose alright. Just watch...

that proposal is unlikely to be accepted — jorndoe

It's not a serious proposal, just a Russian wet dream, including as it does that the baltic states ought to get out of NATO. Why would they ever do that?

what kind of likely loss do you have in mind?

This video provides really great context to one of the big global issues that has been discussed during this war (especially in non-Western countries I'd say the major justification of non-Western countries not joining sanctions, which, in my opinion, were / are the real geopolitical stakes in this crisis).



A lot of the myths debunked in this video I never even heard any contradictory opinion about, and I've studied WWII a lot (far less than a historian of WWII, but more than the average person).

Why would they ever do that? — Olivier5

I realise this will come as a surprise to someone who think civilian casualties are just like extras in a film, but some people actually care about peace and are willing to take pragmatic steps to maintain it.

Such as not being part of a military alliance your massive, very militaristic neighbour considers a threat.

some people actually care about peace and are willing to take pragmatic steps to maintain it.

Such as not being part of a military alliance your massive, very militaristic neighbour considers a threat. — Isaac

One could argue that Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia are more secure inside NATO than outside of it. That'd be why they joined in the first place, no? If you care so much for their lives, don't throw them under the bus.

One could argue that Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia are more secure inside NATO than outside of it. — Olivier5

Go on then.

The argument was already provided: if the baltic states joined NATO, it is most probably because they felt safer inside it than outside it.

This is a simple argument, based on the notion that Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians are rational people. You should have been able to understand it.

↪Isaac The argument was already provided: if the baltic states joined NATO, it is most probably because they felt safer inside it than outside it. — Olivier5

That's not the issue you're even discussing. Obviously the people joining likely felt safer to join and that's why they therefore joined (the alternative being bribery).

However, the baltic states are small, do not occupy so critical strategic locations (such as compared to Georgia) and have few ethnic Russians (mainly due to them having been concentrated in Kaliningrad), but mainly they are just small and not a big strategic threat. Russia never expressed that the Baltics in NATO was a major security risk that they would need to react to (only forward missile bases, that for a while was respected, and even, at least nominally, there are no forward offensive missile bases, just defence against Iran, supposedly), made any threats about invading the Baltics if they joined NATO, and did not invade.

However, in the case of Georgia and Ukraine it was made very clear by the Russians that they would view joining NATO as an intolerable security threat, that they would do something to prevent it happening, and in both cases kept to their word on that.

Of course, you can argue that the best thing for Ukrainians, even considering Russia threats and clear intention to carry them through (especially after doing exactly that in Georgia), would still be join NATO and have NATO come and defend Ukrainian borders and extend the nuclear umbrella the eastern border and tip of Crimea.

Maybe true.

The problem is that NATO didn't let Ukraine join.

Say I want the bank to give me 10 billion Euros.

The problem is the bank doesn't give it to me, not my desire to have the 10 billion which can remain constant nor the arguments I can make that getting the 10 billion would be good for me, and my simply restating my desire for 10 billion Euros, and the reasons getting that 10 billion Euros would be good for me, is not an effective strategy to deal with the problem. Effective strategy would be realising despite my desire for 10 billion Euros of the banks money, the banks power to give it to me if it wanted, and my justifications of why such a thing happening would be good for me, that the bank is very unlikely to give me 10 billion Euros just because I ask for it and think I should have it, and to come up with an entirely different life plan.

Now, no one disputes Ukraine wanted to be in NATO and that NATO had the power to let Ukraine join (even now it could fly over some papers and have Ukraine in Nato tomorrow), and no one disputes that Ukraine joining NATO would be good for Ukraine.

The problem is NATO didn't think that would be good for NATO (otherwise it would have done it years ago).

NATO is the friend you don't want to have: not by your side when you need them, offering mainly moral support that is (over time) demoralising, and offering indirect no-skin-in-the-game material support insofar as you serve their purposes (of course, time will tell if as much talk, money, and energy will be spent by the West rebuilding Ukraine).

That's not the issue you're even discussing. — boethius

I'm afraid it is the issue we are discussing. Read the thread.

Also, last week I pointed out that the escalation in weapons systems is calibrated to ensure Ukraine loses (and so Russia has no reason to use nuclear weapons), each weapon system is hyped as "the thing" that will defeat Russia, each weapon system fails to do so, and then the cycle is repeated with the next weapon system.

And, after HIMARS have both made a "decisive" difference (like the shoulder mounted rockets, drones, artillery, body armour, air defence, and all the rest before) ... but has also not produced victory and anything resembling winning important battles.

Literally a few days after HIMARS was announced as basically the greatest success that has occurred in the history of warfare ... F16's ... right on cue.

what kind of likely loss do you have in mind? — neomac

Progressive build up of Ukrainian NATO weaponry in the battlefield, resulting in progressive attrition of Russian fire power, as the HIMARS are achieving right now. As more HIMARS and precise long range artillery such as the French Caesar or the German PzH 2000 make it to Ukraine, as they certainly will, the Russian front will break at some point.

I'm afraid it is the issue we are discussing. Read the thread. — Olivier5

No where does @Isaac claim:

The argument was already provided: if the baltic states joined NATO, it is most probably because they felt safer inside it than outside it. — Olivier5

You were responding to:

I realise this will come as a surprise to someone who think civilian casualties are just like extras in a film, but some people actually care about peace and are willing to take pragmatic steps to maintain it.

Such as not being part of a military alliance your massive, very militaristic neighbour considers a threat. — Isaac

Which has nothing at all to do about anyone's feelings.

@Isaac's satement here is in no way contradicted nor has any problem accommodating people's feelings. Whether the Baltic state's feel safer or not, has no direct bearing on whether they are actually safer.

For example, NATO eastward expansion (which Baltic states have participated in) is a big, if not "the" big reason for the current war, which plenty of experts predicted would happen (including the US's own cold-war top analysts's and policy makers), and the current war is a major threat to Baltic security. Things can be argued both ways ... but people can feel safe independent of whatever the facts are.

And again, no one here is disputing that Ukraine (as defined as a majority or just the ruling elite) would "feel safer" in NATO. Feelings don't matter in this context. See my bank example above.

For example, NATO eastward expansion (which Baltic states have participated in) is a big, if not "the" big reason for the current war, which plenty of experts predicted would happen (including the US's own cold-war top analysts's and policy makers), and the current war is a major threat to Baltic security. Things can be argued both ways ... but people can feel safe independent of whatever the facts are. — boethius

If Russia feels threatened by NATO expansion (it doesn't matter if they are justified), NATO expansion is the culprit. If Eastern European countries feel threatened by Russia and therefore join NATO as deterrent against direct aggression (it doesn't matter if they are justified), NATO expansion is still the culprit. Why is that always NATO expansion is the culprit that can not be excused/justified based on perception/reality analysis of moral or geopolitical reasons?

FYI, originally, the discussion is about a peace proposal made by a certain David T. Pyne in the columns of the National Interest. It include amongst its many provisions favorable to Moscow, item # 14: "no more NATO members along Russia's borders".

I understood this to mean the removal of NATO membership for those NATO members already bordering Russia, i e. the Baltic States.

( It could also mean something else I guess: no ADDITIONAL NATO members, but those Russia neighbours already part of the alliance can remain in it )

So I wondered why the Baltic States should get out of NATO:

It's not a serious proposal, just a Russian wet dream, including as it does that the baltic states ought to get out of NATO. Why would they ever do that? — Olivier5

That's when Isaac chipped in with:

some people actually care about peace and are willing to take pragmatic steps to maintain it. — Isaac

So he was clearly talking about the Baltic States walking out of NATO to appease Moscow.

If Eastern European countries feel threatened by Russia and therefore join NATO as deterrent against direct aggression (it doesn't matter if they are justified), NATO expansion is still the culprit. — neomac

Again, the basic issue: Eastern European countries do not necessarily have the option to "feel threatened by Russia and therefore join NATO". Some do and some (such as Ukraine) don't, since NATO doesn't let them in ... they are unable to simply "therefore join NATO".

Of the countries that were allowed to join by the grace of NATO, it can of course be debated whether it actually increases security or not. True, NATO is a powerful ally, but if joining NATO destabilises your entire region, your security maybe severely undermined even sans-WWIII (and increasing the odds of WWIII isn't exactly "good" for security).

Why is that always NATO expansion is the culprit that can not be excused/justified based on perception/reality analysis of moral or geopolitical reasons? — neomac

Again, if the argument is that Ukraine feels threatened by Russia and therefore wants to join NATO since 2008 ... I see zero problems with such a argument.

The problem is NATO didn't let Ukraine join.

If your point is that hypothetically Ukraine would have liked to join NATO, and would like to still, and hypothetically this would be good for Ukraine, I don't have a problem with such assertions. Sure hypothetically it may have triggered WWIII or then hypothetically it would have avoided the war and been great for Ukraine.

These hypotheticals did not happen though. NATO is definitely the culprit in pretending the "might" do it, which is purely provocative and without actually doing it provides essentially zero additional security to Ukraine.

I understood this to mean the removal of NATO membership for those NATO members already bordering Russia, i e. the Baltic States. — Olivier5

Well, that seems of the two options you thought of, the wrong one.

As you point out yourself it could also mean no additional members, which makes far more sense for someone to propose, especially as the current members that border Russia (excluding Kaliningrad).

Removing existing members from NATO is obviously far more extreme, impractical, and unrealistic, and so maybe give the author the benefit of the doubt and assume a less extreme interpretation unless it is clearly clarified that indeed they are meaning the extreme interpretation.

So he was clearly talking about the Baltic States walking out of NATO to appease Moscow. — Olivier5

This is not at all clear.

Almost difficult to argue at all, since first you would need to argue that @Isaac has the same understanding of "no more" as you did (which is far from obvious) and also by "some people are willing to take pragmatic steps for peace" he is endorsing this extreme "kick existing NATO members out of NATO", rather than just an expression of principle ... which is in direct contradiction to your interpretations of "no more" as it's clearly in no way pragmatic to kick existing NATO members states out of NATO.

Well, that seems of the two options you thought of, the wrong one. — boethius

Hey, it's not my fault if they can't even write their propaganda in legible English.

you would need to argue that Isaac has the same understanding of "no more" as you did ( — boethius

Be serious now. He was responding to my post where I clearly wondered about why the Baltic States should exit NATO.

Be serious now. He was responding to my post where I clearly wondered about why the Baltic States should exit NATO. — Olivier5

Sure, but responding to a post does not somehow imply you take the opposite position to everything in said post.

@Isaac's fundamental position (same as mine) is the war should be ended by a negotiated peace by the parties involved, which would obviously mean a compromise.

Of course, what compromise is achievable and reasonable compared to further war can be debated.

Likewise, if the Baltic states increased their real security by joining NATO can be debated, and likewise just as it is legitimate to discuss a country trying to join NATO (and discuss if NATO would let them join), it is equally legitimate to discuss if existing NATO be good or bad for a country. Alliances and international organisations are not one way streets, as Brexit demonstrates.

Now, I would argue that the Baltic states would not, for now at least, even consider existing NATO and there would be no practical way to kick them out of NATO even if other members wanted them gone, which seems unlikely as well, and I'd also argue Brexit was a mistake. Nevertheless, such changes to international relations are hardly unthinkable and happen regularly throughout history, and certainly legitimate to debate.

However, what I was responding to was the idea that Baltic states feelings of security has any relevance in any of these topics. Obviously they most likely did feel more secure after joining. Certainly Ukraine would have felt more secure if they were let in.

You wondered why anyone would follow or agree to the recommendations of a peace plan. The answer is obvious. To secure peace.

If you personally think the recommended actions will not secure peace then you need to a) provide an argument as to why, and b) dial down this stupid faux incredulity that other people might have a different opinion to you.

If your best argument for (a) is "the people of that country wanted it and they're not going to be wrong are they", then we can leave it there. You're clearly not interested in any serious discussion, that's been made clear, job done.

If your counter argument is that leaving a defensive alliance is much more significant response than not joining one, then perhaps it might have made sense to actually write that in response rather than this obsequious garbage about the government automatically being right because they're the government.

In the latter case, as @boethius has said...

the war should be ended by a negotiated peace by the parties involved, which would obviously mean a compromise.

Of course, what compromise is achievable and reasonable compared to further war can be debated. — boethius

But I don't really expect a serious debate about that from you, my main point was to counter this absurd notion that we'd be surprised people might be willing to compromise to achieve peace. We're not all like you (think god).

If Russia feels threatened by NATO expansion (it doesn't matter if they are justified) — neomac

Matter to whom, for what?

If we're talking about what those countries ought to have done, then whether they are right about their safety matters, does it not?

So how does whether Russia are right about their fears matter to the countries we're talking about? If they invade because of false fears, how is that any different to invading because of justified fears? Do they use lighter bombs in the latter case?

my main point was to counter this absurd notion that we'd be surprised people might be willing to compromise to achieve peace. — Isaac

That's what I understood from your statement, a general point about pragmatism and compromise. We're in agreement there.

But I don't really expect a serious debate about that from you, — Isaac

I have no serious peace proposals at the moment as I honestly do not see either side compromising right now, which is what happens when a war goes beyond the initial stages and both sides have sacrificed too much to compromise; very predictable situation.

Before, and at the start of the war, I argued for the compromise of neutral Ukraine, independence of the Donbas, recognition of Crimea and restarting the water there. Of course, this was what Russia was proposing so many said it would be "giving into" Russia, but these points were basically already negotiated in the Minsk agreements, so hardly unreasonable.

Of course, as you point out, more Russia pays a price in blood and insofar as there's no fear of failure, demands only go up as they can be achieved by military means.

So, for the moment the only analysis I see has relevant is refuting statements I disagree with as well as explaining the situation: NATO is bleeding the Russians and calibrating the arms supply to do that without actually risking a Russian loss: hence one weapon system at a time, to observe it's effect and seeing what supply level doesn't really change anything, before moving on to the next weapons system.

If you actually wanted Ukraine to win, you'd supply all the weapon systems as early as possible ... not after critical defeats in Kherson, Mariupol and Donbas.

However, the grain deal is maybe a sign both sides are tiring out and want to reach a deal.

NATO membership has already been ruled out, and the critical terms would essentially be over land.

It's possible Russia makes an offer Ukraine accepts, but seems to me unlikely. So a peace deal would be essentially on Russia's terms and more Ukrainian capitulation. If Ukraine can simply no longer sustain the fight, this is possible. But we really have no way of really knowing the military situation on the ground.

Of course, Europe could go and make serious offers on sanctions, Nord Stream 2, resolution of all legal issues related to the war, and so on to compensate Russia going back to the three initial points.

Maybe this is possible.

There's plenty of serious things to debate in terms of acceptable compromise on all sides.

However, if fighting the Russians is a moral imperative, then compromise would be immoral, so I see this topic as entirely relevant to the matter at hand, as that's how it has been framed in the West: Russia is evil, Putin is Hitler, Zelensky is Churchill, democracy as such is at stake, etc.

I don't see how we get to compromise before wading through these issues, which @Olivier5 and company are representing.

Sure, but responding to a post does not somehow imply you take the opposite position to everything in said post. — boethius

Normally, it implies you respond to the post, not to something else.

But I don't really expect a serious debate about that from you, — Isaac


I have no serious peace proposals at the moment — boethius

I've just realised what a impression that last post gave, quoting you in the middle of my response to @Olivier5. I meant that I didn't expect any serious response from him, not you!

Having said that, your response was interesting, so not entirely a failure.

Normally, it implies you respond to the post, not to something else. — Olivier5

Responding to a post in no way means taking every possible opposing position.

As @Isaac has himself clarified, regardless of your interpretation of the author cited, and regardless of what the author is really meaning, @Isaac agrees with the authors goal of exploring and trying to reach a compromise (which his very much an ideation process, until something is found that "works").

Which is the only inference that is warranted from @Isaac's statement, that he approves of people trying to find peace through pragmatic compromise rather than more bloodshed.

However, if fighting the Russians is a moral imperative, then compromise would be immoral, so I see this topic as entirely relevant to the matter at hand, as that's how it has been framed in the West: Russia is evil, Putin is Hitler, Zelensky is Churchill, democracy as such is at stake, etc. — boethius

Yes, exactly, but the 'if' question is as yet unanswered.

We have two competing theories. Are people morally outraged and so only able to contemplate a military defeat of Russia, even after a long drawn out war...

or...

Do those in control of the rhetoric want a long drawn out war and so find it convenient to stoke the narrative of a moral imperative to punish Russia.

I'm inclined toward the latter, simply because that group has both the power and the incentive to do this so, holding the view that they could, but just aren't, seems implausible.

Hence what's at stake might be more like how that power can be limited?

I meant that I didn't expect any serious response for him, not you! — Isaac

Ah ok, thanks for clarifying.

It did cross my mind as a possibility, but then it seemed fruitful anyways to contemplate this criticism as I have a deep respect for your point of view and it was an invitation for some soul searching.

It is valid rebuke that I haven't been talking about compromise lately, and maybe with the grain deal it's a good moment to refocus on that. That this deal was possible I think is grounds for at least hope peace can be achieved in the short term.

It's possible all parties are now in a "it has to stop somehow" attitude.

Especially with Johnson and Draghi resignations, and total collapse of Sri Lanka, the West maybe starting to enter "serious reality" mode.

Likewise, Russia certainly has all sorts of problems relating the war and sanctions, can certainly sell to its people military victory at this point in time, so there maybe strong desire for peace on that side as well.

So, perhaps the conditions are ripe, but I think what is clear is that "open source diplomacy" has been ended as an experiment, so the situation is difficult to analyse.

What cards each side has is easy to point out, but it's difficult to guess what sort of recipe might be accepted by all parties. However, if there's serious intention to find peace, it is certainly doable by the global diplomatic community, and I hope their voices are starting to be louder in the offices of power; even if only for raw self-serving career preservation at this point.