It occurs to me I've never considered N to be anything but a philosophical (though not scientific) naturalist, especially emphasized in his "middle period" from Human, All Too Human to The Gay Science (and also later with On The Genealogy of Morals). — 180 Proof
(a) One can start with reading Freddy's (belated) prefaces to his books where the old philologist makes suggestions for how to read each work.↪180 Proof Do you think that there is a right way to read Nietzsche? — Moliere
I am wondering if this paper is accessible? As in, can people still interested read the paper? I have an account on there, and it was free for me, but I had to actually use the academia portal rather than being able to find it through public search engines. — Moliere
For your reading pleasure - as well as Tom Storm's: 11 page PDF. — Streetlight
Here’s a good argument in favor of making the distinction:
https://youtu.be/cU1LhcEh8Ms — Joshs
I'm having a gander at this. I thought maybe, given the breadth of postmodernism so far agreed to, and the other conversation, Nietzsche might be fruitful.
EDIT: I should be quick to point out that I'm not endorsing the reading of Nietzsche, but using Gemes thoughts to springboard into the OP. Through all this meandering, I am trying to bring it back around — Moliere
It occurs to me I've never considered N to be anything but a philosophical (though not scientific) naturalist, especially emphasized in his "middle period" from Human, All Too Human to The Gay Science (and also later with On The Genealogy of Morals). IME, N is neither an existentialist nor a (Jamesian) pragmatist nor a p0m0 'cultural relativist' (nor, if it still needs to be said, a proto-fascist).This paper may be helpful in highlighting those aspects of N's philosophy which are predominately naturalistic as well as referrng to other critical commentaries which corroborate this view.
Behold, I teach you the overman. The overman is the meaning of the earth. Let your will say: the overman shall be the meaning of the earth! I beseech you, my brothers, remain faithful to the earth, and do not believe those who speak to you of otherworldly hopes! Poison-mixers are they, whether they know it or not. Despisers of life are they, decaying and poisoned themselves, of whom the earth is weary: so let them go.
— TSZ, Zarathustra's Prologue — 180 Proof
I wrote a similar paper, available here in draft form:
“If we examine Heidegger's treatment of Nietzsche's Will to Power in 'The Word of Nietzsche:" God Is Dead"' , (located in The Question Concerning Technolog — Joshs
I am wondering if this paper is accessible? As in, can people still interested read the paper? I have an account on there, and it was free for me, but I had to actually use the academia portal rather than being able to find it through public search engines.
https://www.academia.edu/43664144/Heideggers_Nietzsche?source=swp_share — Moliere
the brain's pain-pleasure system is, to some extent, uniform with respect to what induces pain and pleasure. — Agent Smith
their antecedent causes differ from people to people, culture to culture, individual to individual — Agent Smith
Not true. In my experience, that word is always offensive, regardless of color, except when used among intimates – old / close friends & (birth) family.The N-word isn't offensive when it's black on black but it is when white on black. — Agent Smith
I'm about half-way through the readings at this point. I only get to this stuff when I have the energy after getting life done, so I move at snails pace. Plus I'm a slow reader, anymore. — Moliere
The N-word isn't offensive when it's black on black but it is when white on black.
— Agent Smith
Not true. In my experience, that word is always offensive, regardless of color, except when used among intimates – old / close friends & family-by-birth. — 180 Proof
postmodern idea on fragmented discourses would lead to
philosophy of science becoming the exclusive domain of
highly trained scientists concerned with conceptual issues
in their own discipline. A plurality of "finite metadiscourses"
about science would arise where scientists
reflect on their own discipline "without any great unifying
ambitions" (Parusnikova 1992:35).
At this stage of the debates on postmodernism, there is
still a lot of controversy about the exact definitions of
modernity and postmodernism. What is clear, however, is
that postmodernism presents us with a wide variety of
ideas that can be used in different combinations to
enlighten aspects of our reality. Thus, different sets of
ideas can be classified as being postmodern, and it is not
at all clear that all these ideas can be helpful in a specific
quest for a better understanding of our world. Sometimes
they are helpful and sometimes not. In typical
postmodern fashion one will have to cut and paste
amongst postmodern ideas; appropriate, transform or
transcend diverse ideas; construct them into a pastiche
and apply it locally to determine its worth. — Postmodernism and our understanding of Science, conclusion
I do not think there is text in Nietzsche that settles this matter, and so this is more a matter of giving the most philosophically appealing reconstruction of his actual explanatory practice. — Nietzsche's Naturalism Reconsidered, top of p11
My pleasure, and thanks for the positive feedback. You make an excellent point about the two layers in Derrida's deconstructions. One has to try and keep the distinction clear. In the case of Saussure, it's as if Derrida is siding with Saussure's radical tendency against his obliviously still-phonocentric tendency. He uses a crowbar provided by Saussure in the first place to set his work ajar.
the Therapeutic Nietzsche has (as I argued in Leiter [2002: 159, 176]) a variety of other rhetorical devices at his disposal beyond the Humean Nietzsche‟s understanding of morality: for example, exploiting the genetic fallacy (leading his readers to think that there is something wrong with their morality because of its unseemly origin) or exploiting their will to truth (by showing that the metaphysics of agency on which their morality depends is false). — Leiter, p12
(Moliere: Nancy Murphy's)... view does however demonstrate that no clear and generally accepted demarcation is possible between modern and postmodern thought. — Lötter, p3
... three central philosophical theses have dominated modern thought up to the middle of the twentieth century. The first is epistemological foundationalism, which she (Murphy 1990:292) defines as the view that knowledge can only be justified by "reconstructing it upon indubitable 'foundational' beliefs." Another dominating modern philosophical thesis is the representational or referential theory of language. Murphy (1990:292) defines this view as one which says that language gets its primary meaning "by representing the objects or facts to which it refers." The third philosophical thesis of modern thought is individualism (atomism) (Murphy 1990:292), which takes the individual "to be prior to the community." — Lötter, p2
Joseph Rouse's discussions of modernity and postmodernism with respect to the philosophy of science revolves around the Lyotardian idea of "global narratives of legitimation" (Rouse 1991b:610). In philosophy of science these metanarratives refer to the importance of the ability to tell a certain kind of story about the history of science which would justify the cultural authority of (natural) science in the Western world (Rouse 1991b:611). Such metanarratives touch on two issues. The one is the crucial role of the story of the spectacular growth of modern science and its wide-ranging influence through its technological applications in the narrative legitimation of modernity, as well as in the counter narratives which subvert the story of modern progress into one of unfolding disaster (Rouse 1991b:611). The other issue touched upon by the metanarratives of modern science is the attempt to justifiably view the history of science in terms of modernist ideas of progress or rational development (Rouse 1991b:611). — Lötter, p 5
In a note from the year 1887 Nietzsche poses the question,
"What does nihilism mean?" (Will to Power, Aph. 2). He answers
: "That the highest values are devaluing themselves."
This answer is underlined and is furnished with the explanatory
amplification : "The aim is lacking; 'Why?' finds no answer."
According to this note Nietzsche understands nihilism as an
ongoing historical event. He interprets that event as the devaluing
of the highest values up to now. God, the supra sensory world
as the world that truly is and determines all, ideals and Ideas,
the purposes and grounds that determine and support everything
that is and human life in particular-all this is here represented
as meaning the highest values. In conformity with the opinion
that is even now still current, we understand by this the true,
the good, and the beautiful; the true, i.e., that which really is ;
the good, i.e., that upon which everything everywhere depends ;
the beautiful, i.e., the order and unity of that which is in its
entirety. And yet the highest values are already devaluing themselves
through the emerging of the insight that the ideal world
is not and is never to be realized within the real world. The
obligatory character of the highest values begins to totter. The
question arises : Of what avail are these highest values if they
do not simultaneously render secure the warrant and the ways
and means for a realization of the goals posited in them? — Heidegger, p99 of pdf linked above
The Madman. Have you not heard of that madman who lit a lantern
in the bright morning hours, ran to the market place, and cried incessantly,
"1 seek God ! I seek God !" As many of those who do
not believe in God were standing around just then, he provoked
much laughter. Why, did he get lost? said one. Did he lose his way
like a child? said another. Or is he hiding? Is he afraid of us? Has
he gone on a voyage? or emigrated? Thus they yelled and laughed.
The madman jumped into their midst and pierced them with his
"Whither is God" he cried. "1 shall tell you. We have killed him you
and 1. All of us are his murderers. But how have we done this?
How were we able to drink up the sea? Who gave us the sponge to
wipe away the entire horizon? What did we do when we unchained
this earth from its sun? Whither is it moving now? Whither are we
moving now? Away from all suns? Are we not plunging continually?
Backward, sideward, forward, in all directions? Is there any up or
down left? Are we not straying as through an infinite nothing? Do
we not feel the breath of empty space? Has it not become colder?
Is not night and more night coming on all the while? Must not
lanterns be lit in the morning? Do we not hear anything yet of the
noise of the gravediggers who are burying God? Do we not smell
anything yet of God's decomposition? Gods too decompose. God is
dead. God remains dead. And we have killed him. How shall we,
the murderers of all murderers, comfort ourselves? What was holiest
and most powerful of all that the world has yet owned has bled to
death under our knives. Who will wipe this blood off us? What
water is there for us to clean ourselves ? What festivals of atonement,
what sacred games shall we have to invent? Is not the greatness
of this deed too great for us? Must not we ourselves become
gods simply to seem worthy of it? There has never been a greater
deed; and whoever will be born after us-for the sake of this deed
he will be part of a higher history than all history hitherto./I
Here the madman fell silent and looked again at his listeners ;
and they too were silent and stared at him in astonishment. At last
he threw his lantern on the ground, and it broke and went out.
"I come too early," he said then; "my time has not come yet. This
tremendous event is still on its way, still wandering-it has not yet
reached the ears of man. Lightning and thunder require time, the
light of the stars requires time, deeds require time even after they
are done, before they can be seen and heard. This deed is still more
distant from them than the most distant stars-and yet they have
done it themselves."
It has been related further that on that same day the madman
entered divers churches and there sang his requiem aeternam deo.
Led out and called to account, he is s aid to have replied each time,
"What are these churches now if they are not the tombs and
sepulchers of God ? — Nietzsche, The Gay Science
4. Why not Untruth rather than Truth?
In Beyond Good and Evil, among other places, Nietzsche raises the question of the value of truth:
For all the value that the true, the truthful, the selfless may deserve, it would be possible that a higher and more fundamental value for life might have to be ascribed to deception, selfishness and lust (BGE 2)
The falseness of a judgment is for us not necessarily an objection to a judgment; in this respect our new language may sound strangest. The question is to what extent it is life preserving, species-preserving, perhaps even species cultivating (BGE 4)
What we need to note here is the spearating of the pragmatic question of the usefulness of a judgment from the question of its truth value. Philosophers have tended to assume that the fact that a judgment is in the long run useful in helping us order and predict our experience and/or increasing our survival prospects is strong evidence that the judgment is true. yet Nietzsche rejects this alleged link:
...a belief, however necessary it may be for the preservation of a species, has nothing to do with truth (WTP 487)
In this light Nietzsche's rejection of the importance of truth is not so startling. After all, who but an ascetic fanatic would choose to have true but perhaps life-destroying beliefs over false but life-enhancing beliefs? Nietzsche, like many modern philosophers of science, claims there is no clear connection between truth and various pragmatic virtues. Once we separate the question of pragmatic virtues from the question of truth the property of truth loses its importance. Indeed, if pragmatic virtues are no guide to truth it would seem that truth is unobtainable -- for how could we ever recognize it -- and hence doubly unworthy of our interest
significantly influenced by Plato's 'Early-Middle Dialogues' (e.g. Socrates versus Protagoras / Gorgias / Euthyphro...) Simply put, I read Nietzsche or Peirce or Wittgenstein against the likes of Foucault, Lyotard, Derrida & Rorty whereby the latter, IME, flounder in 'discursive relativisms' (i.e. sophistries) from deliberately mis-reading the various conceptual-pragmatic doubts raised by the former.modern : aporetic :: post-modern : rhetoric
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.