You keep your idealism by watering it down until it becomes realism. Hence:

So Kant doesn't deny the existence of the material world but I think he rightfully denies what we would call the 'mind-independent reality' of the material world. — Wayfarer

And on the other side we have @Michael apparently arguing that idealists do not hold truth to be mind-dependent.

So over to you to explain what "mind-independent reality" might be. I think there are things that are the case and yet are not believed (held to be true) by any mind. In this way there are truths that are not dependent on any mind. I think this a mere grammar, a way of talking that leaves open various unknowns that are closed off to those who think otherwise. What do you think?

Is there a point of difference between us?

Folks, are there things you don't know?

Does a subject or being have uniform properties?
— Harry Hindu

That is also a question that tends to reify the subject. — Wayfarer

Like I said, YOU already reified THE subject by giving it a name, "subject". I'm merely asking what you mean by YOUR use of the scribble, "subject". What do you intend for me to understand by your use of the scribble?

I think there are things that are the case and yet are not believed (held to be true) by any mind. — Banno

Surely - as a surmise. But by definition, you will never know that, because if you did know it, then it would be beheld by a mind.

So over to you to explain what "mind-independent reality" might be. — Banno

Scientific realism is the view that the physical universe is an objective reality that exists independentl of any cognitive or intellectual act on our part. It exists independently of anything going on in our minds. Realism often includes the idea that it is a pre-existing reality, that is to say, pre-existing our observation of it. Einstein captured this last idea by saying, “I like to think the moon is there even if I’m not looking at it.”

In contrast, idealism is the view that the physical universe exists within the mind - a mind, or the minds of all beings, or some variety of that. Regardless of which conception of mind, the key idea of idealism is that mind is fundamental and does not derive from matter or from physical universe energy.

The 'great debate' between Neils Bohr and Albert Einstein, which continued for decades after the 1920's, revolved around this question. It was Einstein's scientific realism, the assumption of a world existing independently of any mind, that was called into question by quantum physics. (See Quantum: Einstein, Bohr, and the Great Debate about the Nature of Reality.)

But of course it goes without saying that as soon as reference is made to physics, you'll duck the conversation because 'we're not physicists'. Note that if you try and discuss these questions on Physics Forum the thread will be locked immediately 'because they're not philosophers'. It's a very convenient way of avoiding one of the fundamental philosophical questions of the modern age.

We have to raise almost impossibly deep levels of presupposition in our own thinking and imagination to the level of self-consciousness before we are able to achieve a critical awareness of all our realistic assumptions, and thus achieve an understanding of transcendental idealism which is untainted by them. This, of course, is one of the explanations for the almost unfathomably deep counterintuitiveness of transcendental idealism, and also for the general notion of 'depth' with which people associate Kantian and post-Kantian philosophy. Something akin to it is the reason for much of the prolonged, self-disciplined meditation involved in a number of Eastern religious practices. — Bryan Magee, Schoenhauer's Philosophy

I'm merely asking what you mean by YOUR use of the scribble, "subject" — Harry Hindu

By subject, I refer to the subject of experience. Conventionally, the person, the being, to whom experiences occur.

Are you able to briefly summarize what the alternative to a mind-at-large would be by way of explaining regularities and objectivities in the world?

Do you really wish to argue that there are other minds, but not tables and chairs and trees and rocks? How are you to know about other minds, if not via your experience of their bodies?

How do you know that there are other minds? — Banno

Minds, tables , bodies , quarks and chairs are all contestable realities, conceptual abstractions that we make use of in various ways , which differ in ways subtle or profound from occasion to occasion , from culture to culture and from era to era. What is not contestable is that reality appears in terms of relational patterns that allow for some form of relatively stable anticipations of events. These patterns can be articulated in terms of objects like minds, brains, chairs and bodies. Other minds don’t have any more grounding than trees and rocks. But there is something other at every moment of expereince. I am other to
myself every moment in that self -reflection introduces novelty. I am already an other ‘mind’ with respect to myself. ‘Mind’ harbors no intrinsic content or features.

It exists independently of anything going on in our minds. — Wayfarer

I think there are things that are the case and yet are not believed (held to be true) by any mind.
— Banno

Surely - as a surmise. But by definition, you will never know that, because if you did know it, then it would be beheld by a mind. — Wayfarer

So, which is it to be - that there are things outside of our minds, or not?

24. The idealist's question would be something like: "What right have I not to doubt the existence of my hands?" (And to that the answer can't be: I know that they exist.) But someone who asks such a question is overlooking the fact that a doubt about existence only works in a language-game. Hence, that we should first have to ask: what would such a doubt be like?, and don't understand this straight off. — On Certainty

:smile: That quote suits as well. Why should I doubt Minds, tables , bodies , quarks and chairs - after all, they are a more apparent "other" than "relational patterns". You are only aware of relational patterns because of other minds, tables , bodies , quarks and chairs..

When you observe another human being - call it their "brain activity" or behavior - what do you think is going on? Your notion seems to verge on solipsism.

Your act of observing is, of course, your own subjective experience. But where do the things you observe originate from? Your own mind? An uber-mind? Or do you just refuse to think about it?

If your brain/body is an illusion, why that particular illusion? Why is it universally shared?

I think a great deal of your position hinges on whether you think other humans exist, what they are, and how you know. — Real Gone Cat

All excellent questions.

I'm certainly not advocating solipsism. If the external world is an illusion, then how and why this particular illusion and how does a solipstic mind come to even imagine such a thing as an external world?

The objects that visually appear in conscious originate from the causal interaction of light, the object and my sensory system. The relationship between cause and effect is information. The mind is the effect of these prior causes as well as the cause of subsequent effects, like learning. Information exists wherever causes leave effects and its information all the way down.

Neither mind nor matter are fundamental. Information is.

Illusions are misinterpretations of sensory data. Mirages do not disappear once we realize that they are not pools of water but an interaction between light and heat. What we experience when seeing a mirage is what one would expect given the way light behaves. What we experience is real and it is the interpretation of what we see that makes the difference between reality and illusion. The mind as information is fundamental and the solid, physical properties that objects seem to take are the result of the way light and the objects behave and interpreted by the mind.

The rate at which the working memory if our minds process the external information is relative to the rate, or frequency, at which the events in the world change. Slow change relative the processing rate of the mind makes these other processes appear as static, solid, unchanging objects. Faster processes appear as a blur of action in our visual working memory. So the relative rate of change between or mental processing and other processes will skew our view of the world in interpreting the world as full of non-changing objects that perform actions and behaviors. It's all causal relations (information) or process, or relations, all the way down, not physical objects all the way down. That is the illusion.

that there are things outside of our minds, or not? — Banno

Where, precisely, is the boundary?

That's why I made the point, x pages back, about the emergence of consciousness as being marked by the boundary between self and non-self. That awareness is one of the fundamental constituents of consciousness, it is also something that exists within mind.

All philosophy is about sentences to you. It's just language-games.

Minds, tables , bodies , quarks and chairs are all contestable realities, conceptual abstractions that we make use of in various ways , which differ in ways subtle or profound from occasion to occasion, from culture to culture and from era to era. — Joshs

In Charles Pinter's book these are all gestalts. They are the way the mind organises inputs into wholes - all minds, not just human minds, but even insect and reptile minds. In this view, the physical world really does exist outside that but in a manner which is by definition unknowable as it contains no features, structure, or objects. In this sense, creatures being order and meaning to the physical universe, but that order and meaning is wholly the function of the mind,

By subject, I refer to the subject of experience. Conventionally, the person, the being, to whom experiences occur. — Wayfarer

Then the subject is an object, like a person.

What is an experience? Would it be fair to define experience as the information of the subject/object/person relative to the world? For instance, the visual experience of the world for a person appears as if the world is located relative to the person's eyes.

Where, precisely, is the boundary? — Wayfarer

Well, my position is that there isn't one, or at best that it is arbitrary. But you, Wayfarer, need to draw a boundary in order to break the material from the spiritual.

All philosophy is about sentences to you. It's just language-games. — Wayfarer

Pretty much. Unlike life.

Minds, tables , bodies , quarks and chairs are all contestable realities, conceptual abstractions that we make use of in various ways — Joshs

Would that one might pull Pinter's conceptually abstracted chair out from under him, so he lands on his conceptually abstracted arse.

In this view, the physical world really does exist outside that but in a manner which is by definition unknowable. — Wayfarer

Another book telling us all about the stuff about which we can know nothing? Philosophy is indeed all about sentences.

The thing is, you and I know a lot about the physical world. It's just that in the philosophy forum, you forget this.

Yet idealism holds as a minimal position that reality is mind-dependent. Reality is of course what is said by true sentences. Hence idealism must hold that the truth of a sentence true is dependent on mind. — Banno

I think that’s an oversimplification. Does physicalism entail that mathematical truths are physics-dependant? Does dualism entail that mathematical truths are either physics- or mind-dependent? Must one be an eternalist to believe that claims about the future have a truth value? Must one believe in the existence of all possible worlds to believe that counterfactuals have a truth value?

I think it’s more appropriate to say that idealism is the position that only minds and mental phenomena exist. It is quiet on truth. Truth might not depend on the existence of some entity that makes it true (e.g in the case of mathematics, counterfactuals, and statements about the future).

Or perhaps you don't think that this is idealism "proper"? Then how would you name a position that argues that 1) there is no external material world, 2) every entity that exists is a mind or mental phenomena, and 3) logical/mathematical/counterfactual/future truths are mind-independent?

If idealism is true then we know everything. — Banno

Your extreme idealist must conclude that because it is not part of experience, what you will do tomorrow does not (yet) exist. It is not either true nor false. — Banno

This is where you appear to equivocate. In saying that "we know everything" it's implied that we know the future. But Fitch's paradox is only that every truth is known. If claims about the future have no truth value then the future isn't known. If the future isn't known then can we really be said to know everything? There appears to be a meaningful difference between "we know everything" and "we know every truth".

And as an aside, it should also be noted that Fitch's paradox concludes that "every truth is known", not that "I know every truth". These aren't the same thing, so be cautious not to assert the latter. Your wording is ambiguous here so I thought I'd point it out.

what you will do tomorrow does not (yet) exist. It is not either true nor false. — Banno

This is the case for every metaphysics (physicalist, dualist, other) that isn't eternalist, correct?

For A and B to be separate there must be some C that makes them separate? Why? What then separates C from A and B? Some D? And so on ad infinitum. Seems an unreasonable requirement. — Michael

I think you misunderstand. It's obviously not "some C" which separates A from B. What is the case is that A is different from, or other than B. C could not make A other than B, because C is of the same type as both A and B, and this is why the infinite regress appears, you have not grasped the need for something of a different type. What makes A different from B, must be something categorically distinct from both A and B, as well as C, D, E, F, or anything else of that category, because these are all of the same type, and cannot account for the difference within the type. Another thing of the same type cannot account for the differences between things of the same type.

This is why there is a need for dualism, rather than pure idealism, or solipsism. If A and B represent distinct minds, then there must be something which makes A other than, or different from B. This must be something categorically distinct, like "matter" is supposed to be distinct from mind, not another bit of the same substance, C. Or else we would have one continuity of mind, A, B, C, D... with nothing really separating one from the other.

I think you misunderstand. It's obviously not "some C" which separates A from B. What is the case is that A is different from, or other than B. C could not make A other than B, because C is of the same type as both A and B, and this is why the infinite regress appears, you have not grasped the need for something of a different type.. What makes A different from B, must be something categorically distinct from both A and B, as well as C, D, E, F, or anything else of that category, because these are all of the same type, and cannot account for the difference within the type. Another thing of the same type cannot account for the differences between things of the same type.

This is why there is a need for dualism, rather than pure idealism, or solipsism. If A and B represent distinct minds, then there must be something which makes A other than, or different from B. This must be something categorically distinct, like "matter" is supposed to be distinct from mind, not another bit of the same substance, C. Or else we would have one continuity of mind, A, B, C, D... with nothing really separating one from the other. — Metaphysician Undercover

You're right, I don't understand. I think it's entirely possible (in principle) that two apples exist, and are the only things to exist. There doesn't need to be some third thing to "separate" them.

There could not be two distinct things without separation between them, otherwise they'd be only one thing. And, if there is separation between them, that separation must consist of something. If it's not something real, then we're back to there really being only one thing.

There could not be two distinct things without separation between them, otherwise they'd be only one thing. And, if there is separation between them, that separation must consist of something. If it's not something real, then we're back to there really being only one thing. — Metaphysician Undercover

This makes no sense at all. You’re saying that some third thing is required for the two apples to be separated. Then what separates the two apples from this third thing?

I think that’s an oversimplification. — Michael

Of course. One might be a realist with regard to mathematics and yet antirealist in regard to a physical world or to ethics. Nuance, everywhere. Hence analysis.

idealism is the position that only minds and mental phenomena exist. It is quiet on truth. — Michael

I don't see how this can be maintained. If idealism is the position that only minds and mental phenomena exist, then idealism is the position that only statements concerning minds and mental phenomena can be true.

Statements about anything else must just stand in for statements about minds and mental phenomena.

Truth might not depend on the existence of some entity that makes it true (e.g in the case of mathematics, counterfactuals, and statements about the future). — Michael

A rabbit hole. At the least, we must agree that "P" is true iff P. If idealism is true, P must be about minds and mental phenomena.

...how would you name a position that argues that 1) there is no external material world, 2) every entity that exists is a mind or mental phenomena, and 3) logical/mathematical/counterfactual/future truths are mind-independent? — Michael

Physical antirealism combined with mathematical realism.

In saying that "we know everything" it's implied that we know the future. — Michael

Not at all. Isn't the idealist you mooted is committed to the future not existing, since everything that exists is perceived, and the future is not yet perceived?

Fitch's paradox concludes that "every truth is known", not that "I know every truth". — Michael

...yes. As I said, it was a joke.

I don't see how this can be maintained. If idealism is the position that only minds and mental phenomena exist, then idealism is the position that only statements concerning minds and mental phenomena can be true. — Banno

I don’t think that truth depends on the existence of some corresponding entity. Claims about the future can be true even if the future doesn’t exist. Counterfactuals can be true even if other possible worlds don’t exist.

Not at all. Isn't the idealist you mooted is committed to the future not existing, since everything that exists is perceived, and the future is not yet perceived? — Banno

Then assuming that Fitch’s paradox applies to idealism, can you give an example of something that isn’t known?

I don’t think that truth depends on the existence of some corresponding entity. — Michael

Not sure what that means.

Seems we agree it is better to avoid correspondence theories of truth.

Try this: if idealism is the position that only minds and mental phenomena exist, then any truth about things that exist must be a truth about minds and mental phenomena.

Do you agree?

Try this: if idealism is the position that only minds and mental phenomena exist, then any truth about things that exist must be a truth about minds and mental phenomena.

Do you agree? — Banno

That a statement is about a mind isn’t that it’s truth depends on someone knowing it to be true. This is where there appears to be some equivocation. The truth of “tomorrow Michael will dream about going on holiday” is mind-dependent in the sense that it’s about someone’s mind but is mind-independent in the sense that it can be true even if nobody believes it. And that’s the case whether idealist or not.

Forget about tomorrow. It doesn't matter to this:

if idealism is the position that only minds and mental phenomena exist, then any truth about things that exist must be a truth about minds and mental phenomena.

if idealism is the position that only minds and mental phenomena exist, then any truth about things that exist must be a truth about minds and mental phenomena. — Banno

Yes.

Not sure what that means. — Banno

I’m saying that the truth of “if X had happened then Y would have happened” does not depend on the existence of a parallel world where X and then Y happened (or indeed on the existence of anything).

Cheers. And by "Minds and mental phenomena" we mean roughly the things we are conscious of? The point of idealism is that the things that exist are the things we are conscious of, isn't it?

Can one be conscious of something and yet not know that one is conscious of it?

So if some statement about things that exist is true, someone must be conscious that it is true? To suppose otherwise would be to suppose that there are truths about things that exist that are not mental phenomena, wouldn't it?

So, on the idealist account, for some statement about things that exist to be true, it must be apparent to some conscious mind, mustn't it?

So for some statement about things that exist to be true, it must be apparent to some conscious mind, mustn't it? — Banno

Yes

Thanks.

So here is what I take to be the impulse of the objection to idealism from Fitch’s Paradox of Knowability.

We agree that on the idealist account, for some statement about things that exist to be true, it must be apparent to some conscious mind. When some truth is apparent to a conscious mind, we might say that mind knows that truth.

And so we get the premiss, that for an idealist account and for things that exist,

If P is true, then it is possible to know P

And from the proof of the paradox, we can conclude that

If P is true, then P is known

Less formally the impulse is that if idealism is true, and hence only minds and mental phenomena exist, then all that can be true must be apparent to a conscious mind.

Now I understand that you think this conclusion wrong, but I would be reassured to know that you can see how the argument is supposed to work.

(Edit: of all the threads in this thread, this is the one I find most difficult, and perhaps most promising.)