If something exists, so does nothing exist. — Jackson

Leucippus (contra Parmenides et al) millennia before Hegel: "there is only atoms swirling in the void".

And donut holes.

If something exists, so does nothing exist. — Jackson

EX-ist: passage , transition, difference. No-thing and something together form an Existing. There is no nothing or something by itself , as itself. Without the movement between the poles, the poles cannot be. The be-ing is in the ex-isting, which is the differentiation.

How a debate over 'nothing' split Western philosophy apart

"Nothing," it turns out, is really quite something. As in the concept of nothingness. So much so, that in the 1920s, a debate about "nothing" between two philosophers led to a lasting schism in Western philosophy.

The two thinkers were Martin Heidegger and Rudolf Carnap. On the one hand, Heidegger plays with language in an attempt to talk about nothing. On the other, Carnap claims the dictates of logic reduce any talk of nothing to nonsense. And their conflicting views on nothing catalyzed what's now known as the 'continental-analytic split' in philosophy.

The clash between Heidegger's playfulness with Carnap's logic raises some big questions: just what is philosophy? Is it closer to art or science? And can anything be done to bridge the chasm opened by Heidegger and Carnap?

https://www.cbc.ca/radio/ideas/how-a-debate-over-nothing-split-western-philosophy-apart-1.6268281

Keeping it simple, if existence entails a mass & volume (basic/naïve materialism), nothing simply can't exist (there isn't a thing that can possess mass and occupy space).

That said, Being & Time (Heidegger) - nothing seems compatible with the passage of time (there was nothing for 18 trillion years). :snicker:

If something exists, so does nothing exist — Jackson

There is a hole in that argument but it's nothing to worry

the problem is that 'exist' means 'ex-' outside of, apart from (e.g. external, exile) and 'ist', to stand or to be. So there's nothing about nothing which qualifies for that. If it existed, it would be something. So it can't exist, as a matter of definition.

When you score nothing in a game it's still a score and a score is something. When you get a zero it's a big fat zero.

That is true, but the score signifies something you didn’t get, namely, a score. But that is only meaningful as a signifier, not as an existent thing. In getting nothing, you don’t get some thing designated as ‘nothing’, the zero is merely the indicator of something not gotten. In that sense, nothingness is dependent on what exists, because if nothing existed, there could be nothing to negate, and nothing is only meaningful in relation to something.

If something exists, so does nothing exist. — Jackson

A 'something' in Hegel, an 'Etwas', is already a more concrete form. Pure Being and pure nothing are sublated into becoming. I am not saying this to quibble but to indicate that being and nothing does not lead to an 'existent', they lead to 'flux', however a flux requires there is something concrete that is in flux. Nothing as well as being are thought determinations. As pure abstract generalities, they do not exist. Nothing therefore does not exist at least not in its 'pure' form.

The passage you quoted does not entail that 'nothing' exists, at least not as pure nothing, perhaps best translated as 'nothingness'. What exists concretely, when opposed to 'Etwas' is 'determined nothing', bestimmtes Nichts. And bestimmtes Nichts is lack of something, at least I find that the most convincing reading of the first remark: "It is customary to oppose nothing to something. Something is however already a determinate existent that distinguishes itself from another something; consequently, the nothing which is being opposed to something is also the nothing of a certain something, a determinate nothing. Here, however, the nothing is to be taken in its indeterminate simplicity" P. 60. So I think here Hegel already backpedals on his opposition of pure nothing to something on p 59. It is often done but incorrect. Determinate being 'etwas' is opposed to determinate nothing, aka, a not something, lack of something, or void. That idea is much less forceful than pure nothingness. Nothingness is pure abstract generality, emptiness and as such the same as pure being, while also its opposite.

I did not know that debate between Heidegger and Carnap, thanks for that! I do think Heideggers 'Nichts' and Hegel's 'Nichts' are very different. In Hegel it is not really a 'something', in Heidegger it has much more of a function in and of itself. Das 'Nichts nichtet' and also serves as the backdrop I believe against which Dasein realizes itself, there Nichts is a bit akin to the fear of death. That though is memory from a long time ago....

the zero is merely the indicator of something not gotten. — Wayfarer

True. But an indicator, whatever else it might do, indicates. The nothing I get as a score in a game is quite different from the nothing I have in the bank. We're talking about separate indicateds (horrible word, but I'm avoiding '..things indicated' so as not to be too obviously begging the question. I may be surreptitiously begging the question, of course.)

No. Nothing, in the sense of nothingness the state, is a false term that prescribes definition where none is.

"It's nothing! Boooop!" He says as he squints two fingers together.

But it’s only different in respect of something. Couldn’t help but notice the similarity between what I said and this:

Something is however already a determinate existent that distinguishes itself from another something; consequently, the nothing which is being opposed to something is also the nothing of a certain something, a determinate nothing - Hegel. — Tobias

Although now I’ve learned the meaning of ‘determinate nothing’, which is something. :wink:

@wayfarer

nothing which is being opposed to something is also the nothing of a certain something, a determinate nothing — Tobias

So we can have determinate nothings - the zero score is understood as nothing only in relation to the positive score I might have got. At any rate, there are nothings after all - determinate ones.

However, the implied search is for indeterminate nothings - pure nothingness, perhaps.

I'm not sure we'll find pure nothingness - not because it's nothing - rather, because it's presumed indeterminate. If we try to talk about Something that is not Something-in-particular, we will have just the same problem.

The concept of ‘nothing’ ends in paradox as nothing is the absence of something and you need something to refer to the concept of ‘nothing.’

If we try to talk about Something that is not Something-in-particular, we will have just the same problem. — Cuthbert

Yes, but in that case, we're talking about something, which by definition is not nothing!

So I maintain the idea of 'pure nothingness' is a fallacy. 'Nothing exists' sounds like an actual proposition as it is grammatically sound, but it's a meaningless combination of words. Maybe it could be described as an antimony: 'a self-contradictory phrase such as "There is no absolute truth" can be considered an antinomy because this statement is suggesting in itself to be an absolute truth, and therefore denies itself any truth in its statement.' 'Nothing exists' is similar, because if it were true there would be nobody to either utter it or interpret it.

Interesting to contemplate whether the sentence 'nothing is real' falls into the same trap. I think not, actually, because the brain-in-vat scenario is at least logically feasible. In which case, a distinction can be made between 'what exists' and 'what is real', which I think is a far more philosophically fruitful line of enquiry, or at least contemplation, than 'nothing exists' is.

The concept of ‘nothing’ ends in paradox as nothing is the absence of something and you need something to refer to the concept of ‘nothing.’ — universeness

No shit Sherlock :rofl:

Elementary my dear Watson!

It's my Birthday *police sirens and party sounds".

It's seems only righteous that I mention I'll being doing nothing, which is subtracting from all possible things I could be doing on this day.

If I anoint the beginning of time, where there is supposedly 'nothing'- I've just subtracted from something that, in the present exists.

If I was subsiding around that time there's something other than what is apparently nothing... A paradox ensues.

it makes a difference whether something or nothing is being intuited or thought. — Jackson

Does this refer to thinking about nothing or not thinking?

Any word affixed with the suffix “ness” is usually a descriptor of things and is not itself a thing—redness, consciousness, happiness. Nothing, though, is a noun, so it get’s weird when you add the suffix. It still means the state or quality of nothing, I guess.

If something exists, so does nothing exist. — Jackson

Well of course. If a thing exists, it's obvious it doesn't exist.

So it can't exist, as a matter of definition. — Wayfarer

Yes, a wrong definition.

Does this refer to thinking about nothing or not thinking? — Luke

Thinking about nothing as an object.

The concept of ‘nothing’ ends in paradox as nothing is the absence of something and you need something to refer to the concept of ‘nothing.’ — universeness

Which is the problem. I think Hegel makes a good point, that the negation of being is nonbeing, but that is a fallacy.

Nothingness is pure abstract generality, emptiness and as such the same as pure being, while also its opposite. — Tobias

Yes, your exposition is accurate. I think Hegel is correct to point out that, "Nothing comes from nothing," is true only if you privilege being as an irreducible metaphysical reality.

I did not know that debate between Heidegger and Carnap, thanks for that! I do think Heideggers 'Nichts' and Hegel's 'Nichts' are very different. In Hegel it is not really a 'something', in Heidegger it has much more of a function in and of itself. Das 'Nichts nichtet' and also serves as the backdrop I believe against which Dasein realizes itself, there Nichts is a bit akin to the fear of death. That though is memory from a long time ago.... — Tobias

I am not a huge fan of Heidegger but I think he makes a valid point, following Hegel, that we do talk about nothing or nothingness and it is not a meaningless concept.

I think of nothingness as negative space in a visual field. It is the space between things that helps define the objects.

If space is nothing, then it forms the world with substance. When Heidegger says "nothing nothings" he means, I think, the flux within us finds itself with its pure nothing. Buddhist find emptiness in themselves too. It's like yin and yang

Buddhist find emptiness in themselves too. It's like yin and yang — Gregory

Hegel does mention Buddhism in the chapter I quoted from.

What is outside the universe? Nothing. I think that is a meaningful idea.

Which is the problem. I think Hegel makes a good point, that the negation of being is nonbeing, but that is a fallacy. — Jackson

But that which exists can stop existing in its current form. A human can stop existing as a human by dying.
Mass can stop existing as mass by getting converted into energy but all existence cannot become nonexistent it can only return to its most fundamental form which seems to be energy or spatial extent/dimensionality.
Even the Penrose bounce does not suggest a previous Universe becomes nothing before a new ‘Big Bang.’

What is outside the universe? Nothing. I think that is a meaningful idea. — Jackson

I don’t think it is meaningful to try to objectify ‘outside’ of everything that exists.